Chapter 3 of an e-book 'Handbook for Logotherapists' 2024 (Niiles-Mäki Anne). Institute for Purpose-centered Philosophy Finland.

There are at least two passages in the jamesian corpus where he seems to establish a topology of "regional ontologies", or to set up multiple "language games". the first of these is "the principles of psychology" when he talks about "the many worlds", or "...sub-universes commonly discriminated from each other...", the second is in "pragmatism", where he notes that there "are...at least three well-characterized levels, stages, or types of thought about the world we live in..." two questions immediately come (...) to mind about these levels. first, is each of these areas of equal importance, epistemologically and ontologically speaking? second, how, if at all, are these regional areas related to each other? each of these questions has a seemingly obvious answer. to wit, the world of perception is more important than any of the other areas; and second, the regional areas are related in terms of the disjunctive and conjunctive transitions which james so strenuously upholds, resulting in an overall "concatenated" picture. i argue that both of these responses are insufficient, and that the issue is more complicated than it first appears. (edited). (shrink)

In his book, 'History as a Science and the System of the Sciences', Thomas Seebohm articulates the view that history can serve to mediate between the sciences of explanation and the sciences of interpretation, that is, between the natural sciences and the human sciences. Among other things, Seebohm analyzes history from a phenomenological perspective to reveal the material foundations of the historical human sciences in the lifeworld. As a preliminary to his analyses, Seebohm examines the formal and material presuppositions of (...) phenomenological epistemology, as well as the emergence of the human sciences and the traditional distinctions and divisions that are made between the natural and the human sciences. -/- As part of this examination, Seebohm devotes a section to discussing Husserl’s formal mereology because he understands that a reflective analysis of the foundations of the historical sciences requires a reflective analysis of the objects of the historical sciences, that is, of concrete organic wholes (i.e., social groups) and of their parts. Seebohm concludes that Husserl’s mereological ontology needs to be altered with regard to the historical sciences because the relations between organic wholes and their parts are not summative relations. Seebohm’s conclusion is relevant for the issue of the reducibility of organic wholes such as social groups to their parts and for the issue of the reducibility of the historical sciences to the lower-order sciences, that is, to the sciences concerned with lower-order ontologies. -/- In this paper, I propose to extend Seebohm’s conclusion to the ontology of chemical wholes as object of quantum chemistry and to argue that Husserl’s formal mereology is descriptively inadequate for this regional ontology as well. This may seem surprising at first, since the objects studied by quantum chemists are not organic wholes. However, my discussion of atoms and molecules as they are understood in quantum chemistry will show that Husserl’s classical summative and extensional mereology does not accurately capture the relations between chemical wholes and their parts. This conclusion is relevant for the question of the reducibility of chemical wholes to their parts and of the reducibility of chemistry to physics, issues that have been of central importance within the philosophy of chemistry for the past several decades. (shrink)

The interpretation of functional imaging experiments is complicated by the pluripotency of brain regions. As there is a many-to-one mapping between cognitive functions and their neural substrates, region-based analyses of imaging data provide only weak support for cognitive theories. Price and Friston argue that we need a ‘cognitive ontology’ that abstractly categorizes the function of regions. I argue that abstract characterizations are unlikely to be cognitively interesting. I argue instead that we should attribute functions to regions in a context-sensitive (...) manner. I review recent meta-analyses that approach fMRI data in this light and argue that they have revisionary potential. (shrink)

My enquiry will be within the scope of two suppositions. The first is that Space is continuous, not discrete. The second is that we are to adopt realism about either points or regions or both. That does not, however, preclude a choice of categories—substance or property—for these entities. Thus we could think of either regions or points as properties of the things in those regions or at those points. Alternatively, we could think of regions or points as substances which themselves (...) have properties. (shrink)

I argue that the most promising approach to understanding J.J. Gibson's "affordances" takes affordances themselves as ontological primitives, instead of treating them as dispositional properties of more primitive things, events, surfaces, or substances. These latter are best treated as coalescences of affordances present in the environment (or "coalescences of use-potential," as in Sanders (1994) and Hilditch (1995)). On this view, even the ecological approach's stress on the complementary organism/environment pair is seen as expressing a particular affordance relation between the world (...) and the analyst. That the world is parsed in any way among events and objects, perceivers and worlds, etc., reflects equally features of certain real or possible perspectives on the world and features of the world itself. In section 1, I begin by contending that, contrary to the apparent expectations of some in the field, the bare existence of affordances is surely quite uncontroversial. In section 2, I argue that the most reasonable approach to foundational ontology is a relativistic one. In section 3, I address the claim that affordances must be ontologically complemented by effectivities for the sake of completeness, and I shall argue against that claim on grounds that I take to reflect some of Gibson's most important insights. This work will help to clarify the way affordances are to be used in the fourth and final section, where I argue that ontological work, even within special sciences, should not be merely "regional," and that the most attractive general approach to ontological questions is one that is based on affordances, rather than upon things, events, surfaces, and the like. (shrink)

Our best sciences are frequently held to be one way, perhaps the optimal way, to learn about the world’s higher-level ontology and structure. I first argue that which scientific theory is “best” depends in part on our goals or purposes. As a result, it is theoretically possible to have two scientific theories of the same domain, where each theory is best for some goal, but where the two theories posit incompatible ontologies. That is, it is possible for us to (...) have goal-dependent pluralism in our scientific ontologies. This ontological pluralism arises simply from our inability to directly know the world’s objects, rather than any particular claims about our cognitive limits, values, or social structures. I then present two case studies in which this possibility actually occurs—one based on simulations and theoretical analyses of constructed causal systems, and one from actual scientific investigations into the proper ontology for ocean regions. (shrink)

The article explores specificities of thematization of science and scientific rationality in Martin Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. This analysis focuses on the concept of scienticity, character- istic for Heidegger’s “early” line of thought, as well as continuation and divergence of exposition of “science” and the nature of “theoretical attitude” as the subject of interpretation of transcen- dental phenomenology of E. Husserl. This research places an emphasis on particularity of Hei- degger’s explication of existential concept of science as opposed to prevailing (...) logico-epistemolog- ical philosophy of science, and foundation of thematization of scientific “subject matters” and theoretical attitude upon the universe of ontological understanding of being of entities (regional ontologies). It also focuses on Heidegger’s assertion of fundamental ontological projection in a status of a peculiar “science of knowledge”, which gives ground for a priori pre-conditions of specific sciences. Separate attention is paid to a specifically Heideggerian approach to explication of the rooting of initial scientific orientation in the sphere of pre-scientific experience, which ar- ticulates itself in so called “fundamental concepts”, as well as positioning of contemplative ‘present-at-hand’ paradigm of theoretical knowledge as a derivative modus of a primary use of ‘ready-to-handness’ as a phenomenological founding basis of everydayness’ experience. The author came to the attention that scientific knowledge is a project Dasein. It is within the framework of self-design that Dasein thematizes what happens to another region of being that is the subject of scientific knowledge. In other words, making things available in researching, applying themes, provided that the design allowed late as the systematic development of the most modern buildings, such as is done in the world, and possibly everyday greeting improvised performance. (shrink)

Consider the most recent Yale-Harvard football game, an event which occurred on 11/20/21 in New Haven, lasting about three hours. This event, like many college football games before, was composed of four quarters, each of which was composed of possessions, each of which was composed of downs, each of which was composed of particular movements, tackles and decisions of the individual players. Each of these parts of the game was itself an event, occurring in a smaller region of space and (...) time than the game itself. Each of these events involved material objects like players, helmets, jerseys, etc. Each had causes and effects, and each instantiated qualitative properties, such as being a kickoff or being a tackle. These are paradigmatic examples of events. Events are many and varied; some other examples include the melting of an ice cube, the birth of a horse, the supernova of a star, the presidential election campaign and a winter snowstorm. Each of these took place in a certain region of spacetime, had other events as parts, involved certain objects, had causes and effects, and instantiated properties. Objects and their properties are not the only furniture in the world. Events are a crucial part of our manifest and scientific pictures of the world. We go to football games, think about and participate in elections, eagerly anticipate the birth of a child, and quantify over and explain such things in our scientific theories. Yet, events have received insufficient attention from metaphysicians. Some philosophers have been skeptical of events, holding that talk of events can be paraphrased away, or that events can be reduced to objects and properties.1 When philosophers have accepted events, their motivations have usually been extrinsic—events are introduced in order to play a role in a larger philosophical system. This tendency has led philosophers to miss a number of interesting features of events. In this paper, I wish to reverse that trend by developing an ontology of events which is not an afterthought with respect to another philosophical project. In so doing, I will provide answers to substantive metaphysical questions about the relations in which events stand and their identity conditions. In the next section, I identify four basic relations in which events stand: parthood, involvement, causation and instantiation, focusing in particular on involvement. Then, I argue that events are individuated by their involvements, and criticize the identity conditions which have been offered by other philosophers, notably Quine, Davidson and Kim. I then conclude. (shrink)

After a brief survey of the different meanings of consistency, the study is restricted to consistency understood as non-contradiction of sets of sentences. The philosophical reasons for this requirement are discussed, both in relation to the problem of sense and the problem of truth. The issue of mathematical truth is then addressed, and the different conceptions of it are put in relation with consistency. The formal treatment of consistency and truth in mathematical logic is then considered, with particular attention paid (...) to the relation between syntactic and semantic properties of sets and calculi. After the crisis of mathematical intuition and the dominance of the formalistic view, it seemed that consistency could totally replace the requirement of truth in mathematics, also in the sense that the existence of "objects" of axiomatic systems could be granted by their consistency. A rejection of this claim is presented, whose central point is a detailed analysis of the theorem that any consistent set S of sentences of first order logic has a model. A critical scrutiny shows that this model is very peculiar, being offered by the elements of the same language that is being interpreted, and the satisfiability conditions for any sentence being constituted by the mere fact of belonging to S. Though not being insignificant from a metatheoretical point of view, this theorem fails to endow consistency with an "ontological creativity", that is, with the capability of providing a model ontologically distinct from the language itself. A final discussion regarding the different "ontological regions" and the referential nature of truth clarifies the different aspects of the whole issue discussed. (shrink)

Several authors have suggested that a more parsimonious and conceptually elegant treatment of everyday mereological and topological reasoning can be obtained by adopting a spatial ontology in which regions, not points, are the primitive entities. This paper challenges this suggestion for mereotopological reasoning in two-dimensional space. Our strategy is to define a mereotopological language together with a familiar, point-based interpretation. It is proposed that, to be practically useful, any alternative region-based spatial ontology must support the same sentences in (...) our language as this familiar interpretation. This proposal has the merit of transforming a vague, open-ended question about ontologies for practical mereotopological reasoning into a precise question in model theory. We show that (a version of) the familiar interpretation is countable and atomic, and therefore prime. We conclude that useful alternative ontologies of the plane are, if anything, less parsimonious than the one which they are supposed to replace. (shrink)

In her Investigation Concerning the State, Edith Stein takes up some of the main ideas of the social ontology presented by Adolf Reinach, and develops a social ontology of the state, of the law and of social acts. I argue that Stein’s social ontology is an eidetics of the state, the law and social acts. Stein identifies the essential relations that constitute the state, the law and social acts, i.e. pinpoints the parts upon which the state, the (...) law and social acts existentially depend as wholes. In doing so, Stein applies Husserl’s account of wholes and parts to the social domain. I also suggest that Stein outlines a regional ontology of sociality that embodies Husserl’s idea of regional ontology. I focus on the intertwining of the wholes-parts relations, which characterize Stein’s regional ontology of sociality, and argue that there are not only necessary but also possible parts within the wholes. This makes Stein’s regional ontology of the sociality a dynamic ontology. (shrink)

The purpose of the essay is to contextualize and explain the philosophical project that is under way in Jacques Derrida's Khōraof 1993. Upon a cursory reading, the book will appear to be merely the unpacking of yet another undecidable term that Derrida has located within the history of metaphysics. But, in fact, the stakes of this text are much higher in that Derrida's aim is to continue developing a project that was announced in the late 1960s, namely, to deregionalize (...) class='Hi'>ontology. Precisely what Derrida meant by that phrase and the various texts one would have to revisit in order to properly understand how Khōra instrumentalizes deregionalization is what this essay attempts to survey. Lastly, as Husserlian phenomenology is quite central to the concerns of this essay, researchers may consider it as a contribution to the study of Derrida's relation to Husserl's philosophy. Major texts by Derrida that are discussed include The Problem of Genesis in Husserlian Phenomenology, ‘La difference’, Voice and Phenomena, Of Grammatology, ‘Plato's Pharmacy’, ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’, and Khora. Major topics include: the transcendental ego, regional phenomenology, voice and writing, differance, origin, genesis, woman, negative theology, khora, and Plato. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Extractivist OntologiesLithium Mining and Anthropocene Imaginaries in Chile's Atacama DesertMauricio F. Collao Quevedo (bio)The term energy transition generally refers to efforts to switch from one energy system to another. In light of the current climate crisis, energy transition projects have sought to move societies away from their reliance on fossil fuels and toward a renewables-based energy system. Yet such projects have not been easy to undertake. As Marie Forget (...) and Vincent Bos point out, an energy system based on renewables requires a transformation of energy "regulatory frameworks, technical and organizational structures, geographic forms and network practices" (1). More specifically, current energy transition models rely on the expansion of lithium production, accompanying systems of private property rights, and complex logistical and technical strategies. This article examines the interplay between lithium extraction, national development, and Anthropocene imaginaries in Chile's Atacama Desert, arguing that the green brand of extractivism that characterizes the industry relies on elaborate institutional arrangements aimed at expanding and protecting extractivist ontological and epistemological regimes in the politically contested region. As such, struggles over lithium in Chile's Atacama region demonstrate the extent to which efforts to decolonize the Anthropocene and make possible non-extractive futures of collective survival must unfold on ontological grounds, against the consolidation of the Age of Man.Mining, Water Rights, and Indigenous Communities in the Atacama DesertAmong today's most promising energy sources and materials are sodium, copper, sulfur, nickel, cobalt, rare earth metals, and lithium. These [End Page 78] have become central to energy transition strategies and states seeking to attract investors for development (Lunde Seefeldt). As a report by the World Bank points out, demand for transition minerals like lithium, cobalt, and graphite could increase by 500% by 2050 ("Climate-Smart Mining"), highlighting the extent to which global energy transition efforts are counting on greater extraction of transition minerals and the expansion of extractive frontiers to previously unexplored or unexploited regions (Moore, Capitalism; World Bank Group). Lithium is at the center of this economic and technological shift toward green economies.Global lithium demand is growing rapidly, with investment and production rates growing significantly in recent years (Narins) and catching the attention of states (e.g., China) and corporate tech giants (e.g., Tesla) that are already trying to secure greater shares of the global market. The light metal's popularity is largely due to its internal chemistry, which meets many of the technical and practical requirements associated with green energy transition. Lithium is light, conducive, and energy-dense, which in the context of batteries means faster recharge, lower costs, and charge-holding abilities that make lithium-ion batteries more efficient than a nickel-metal hybrid equivalent (Perotti and Coviello). Because of this, lithium is increasingly being considered as promising for human development and survival as its energy predecessors, inspiring labels such as "white gold," "white petroleum," "the new copper," "the 21st century's petroleum," or the "new gasoline" of sustainability (Acuña and Tironi; Lunde Seefeldt; Voskoboynik and Andreucci).But the industry is not without its downsides. The negative impacts of lithium extraction in Chile's Atacama Desert have been challenged by local communities for whom the metal does not exist as a discrete entity that can be easily extracted from its socioecological context. For many of these communities, lithium is more than a transition metal found in an appropriable and materially heterogenous underground brine: it is an ontologically contested, socioecological entity that sustains and participates in complex webs of life-supporting, place-based, and more-than-human relations. Such accounts of the brine are radically incompatible with "official" state accounts of it, which are maintained through an institutional architecture that allows the ontological basis of the brine to be manipulated for extractive purposes by both corporate and state actors.In the following pages, I examine the ways in which Chile's legal and institutional arrangements, informed by imaginaries of green modernization, [End Page 79] create conditions under which extralocal actors can manipulate along extractivist lines the ontological ambiguity and material heterogeneity of lithium-containing brines in the salt flats of the Atacama Desert. Through an analysis of the ways in which lithium industries in the... (shrink)

This paper examines cancer through the lens of abjection. While cancer can be understood as an abject lifeform, we explore what we name the abject ontologies created through both cancer detection technologies/practices and cancer treatment, specifically the drug combination Adriamycin and Cytoxan. We ask: what are the abject ontologies produced through living with and living on from cancer diagnosis and treatment? Our concern is to map how cancer undoes our supposedly stable categories inherited from modernist logic, challenges our very ideas (...) of what it means to be human, and demands an ethical reorientation of public cancer discourse. (shrink)

A medical intervention is a medical procedure or application intended to relieve or prevent illness or injury. Examples of medical interventions include vaccination and drug administration. After a medical intervention, adverse events (AEs) may occur which lie outside the intended consequences of the intervention. The representation and analysis of AEs are critical to the improvement of public health. Description: The Ontology of Adverse Events (OAE), previously named Adverse Event Ontology (AEO), is a community-driven ontology developed to standardize (...) and integrate data relating to AEs arising subsequent to medical interventions, as well as to support computer-assisted reasoning. OAE has over 3,000 terms with unique identifiers, including terms imported from existing ontologies and more than 1,800 OAE-specific terms. In OAE, the term ‘adverse event’ denotes a pathological bodily process in a patient that occurs after a medical intervention. Causal adverse events are defined by OAE as those events that are causal consequences of a medical intervention. OAE represents various adverse events based on patient anatomic regions and clinical outcomes, including symptoms, signs, and abnormal processes. OAE has been used in the analysis of several different sorts of vaccine and drug adverse event data. (shrink)

Since the turn of the century, however, a double upheaval has occurred, the formulation of the quantum theory and the theory of relativity, providing the ground for the development of modern physics. These theories issued from the problems of light that, in their strict forms, could not be assimilated by Newtonian physics. Before the turn of the century the wave theory had been victorious over the emission theory, and an hypothetical ether was assumed which was intended ultimately to represent absolute (...) space and to play a role similar to that of Anaximander's apeiron or Aristotle's prima materia. This last role seemed required since many philosophers of nature believed that they should see in matter and its elementary components the singularities, the exceptional peculiarities of the ether. However, since the ether held itself strictly incognito, Albert Einstein renounced it and declared that all systems in uniform, rectilinear motion are equivalent. The first portentous ontological consequence of this renunciation was that statements concerning spatial and temporal separation become relative. True relativity means, however, that objectivity and subjectivity enter equally into all statements, for to everything relative, as Max Planck once said, an absolute belongs. In this case the absolute was the combination of space and time into a four-dimensional spatio-temporal unity, which observers in different systems split into different space and time determinations. Our statements concerning space and time are thus neither merely subjective nor merely objective; rather a subject-object relation enters into them and makes them all relative. There is, to be sure, within the four-dimensional spatio-temporal unity a region of a spatial type within which the space-axes of the different observers lie, and the same is true for the temporal region. But even if there is no one universal time or simultaneity, temporality nevertheless plays its own role in contradistinction to spatiality, though both are expressible mathematically. We can say in the sense of critical realism that our spatial and temporal measurements are commensurate with the ordering relations of things and events. (shrink)

This is a new attempt at an analysis of classical Chinese (Confucian) ethics which is still inappropriately explained by Western philosophy as a traditional normative ethical system. Special conditions of ancient Chinese anthropogeny and social and economic development gave rise in this cultural region to an original theory of being, which in modern terminology can be referred to as an ontological model of a fundamental Yin‐Yang dialectic of a bipolar and non‐homogeneous synergy of being. This theory of being became a (...) cornerstone for the whole complex of ancient Chinese philosophy, socio‐anthropology and ethics. Its most leading representatives—several ancient Taoist philosophers as well as the whole ancient Confucian ethical philosophy—proposed an original approach to issues which could be, for the modem world of philosophical research, a very suggestive source of inspiration. (shrink)

This is the second in a sequence of three essays which axiomatize and apply Edmund Husserl's dependence ontology of parts and wholes as a non-Diodorean, non-Kantian temporal semantics for first-order predicate modal languages. The Ontology of Intentionality I introduced enough of Husserl's dependence-ontology of parts and wholes to formulate his account of order as effected by relating moments of unity, and The Ontology of Intentionality II extends that axiomatic dependence-ontology far enough to enable its semantic (...) application. Formalizing the compatibility [Vereinbarkeit] relation implicated in Husserl's notorious doctrine of impossible meanings, the essay introduces a compatibility restriction on relations to formulate Husserl's distinction between singular [einheitliche] and plural [mehrheitliche] objects, using plural relating moments to define first-order versions of Husserl's notions of relation complexes (i.e. Sachverhalte), abstracta of n-ary relation complexes, categorial relations, abstract eide as unifications of categorial relations, semantic domains as completions of abstract eide, and material regions as semantic domains which are compatibility upper bounds of categorial relations. These concepts will enable the formal dependence-ontological noetic semantics for two-valued, first-order modal languages introduced in the sequel Two-Valued Logics of Intentionality, the third essay in the sequence. (shrink)

Meta-ontology (in van Inwagen's sense) concerns the methodology of ontology, and a controversial meta-ontological issue is to what extent ontology can rely on linguistic analysis while establishing the furniture of the world. This paper discusses an argument advanced by some ontologists (I call them unifiers) against supporters of or coincident entities (I call them multipliers) and its meta-ontological import. Multipliers resort to Leibniz's Law to establish that spatiotemporally coincident entities a and b are distinct, by pointing at (...) a predicate F () made true by a and false by b . Unifiers try to put multipliers in front of a dilemma: in attempting to introduce metaphysical differences on the basis of semantic distinctions, multipliers either (a) rest on a fallacy of verbalism, entailed by a trade-off between a de dicto and a de re reading of modal claims, or (b) beg the question against unifiers by having to assume the distinction between a and b beforehand. I shall rise a tu quoque, showing that unifiers couldn't even distinguish material objects (or events) from the spatiotemporal regions they occupy unless they also resorted to linguistic distinctions. Their methodological aim to emancipate themselves from linguistic analysis in ontological businesses is therefore problematic. (shrink)

The General Formal Ontology is a top-level ontology that is being developed at the University of Leipzig since 1999. Besides introducing some of the basic principles of the ontology, we expound axiomatic fragments of its formalization and present ontological models of several use cases. GFO is a top-level ontology that integrates objects and processes into a unified framework, in a way that differs significantly from other ontologies. Another unique selling feature of GFO is its meta-ontological architecture, (...) which includes set theory into ontology and which accounts for its specific role in common representation approaches. The second level of that architecture starts from the distinction of categories and individuals, which forms the backbone of the world’s structure. Furthermore, GFO comprises several kinds of categories, among them universals and concepts, and it considers several ontological regions and levels. In the context of this special issue paper, we study five pre-determined use cases from the perspective of GFO. The results of these analyses yield insights into how the ontology treats several important notions. Very abridged, this covers material objects and their composition; roles and social entities; properties with their relations to objects and processes, and their changing; changes of processes, including a functional perspective; and, eventually, the nature and changing of concepts as well as terminology. A final part summarizes application projects that use GFO in various contexts. (shrink)

This book provides a comprehensive view of the aesthetic realm, placing the various major artforms within the setting of nature and the built environment as they arise within the field of experience. Each chapter displays the regional ontology of the form considered: the comprehensive set of eidetic features that limn the space of the art. It draws upon artists' statements, writings of key figures in the history of philosophy--including Plato, Hegel, Dewey, and Heidegger-and writings from various commentators on (...) art. This volume is unique in its systematic and phenomenological approach, and in how it addresses aesthetics writ large. (shrink)

A model of reality is called separable if the state of a composite system is equal to the union of the states of its parts, located in different regions of space. Spekkens has argued that it is trivial to reproduce the predictions of quantum mechanics using a separable ontological model, provided one allows for arbitrary violations of ‘dynamical locality’. However, since dynamical locality is strictly weaker than local causality, this leaves open the question of whether an ontological model for quantum (...) mechanics can be both separable and dynamically local. We answer this question in the affirmative, using an ontological model based on previous work by Deutsch and Hayden. Although the original formulation of the model avoids Bell’s theorem by denying that measurements result in single, definite outcomes, we show that the model can alternatively be cast in the framework of ontological models, where Bell’s theorem does apply. We find that the resulting model violates local causality, but satisfies both separability and dynamical locality, making it a candidate for the ‘most local’ ontological model of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Recently, Clifton and Halvorson have tried to salvage a particle phenomenology in the absence of particle ontology within algebraic relativistic quantum field theory. Their idea is that the detection of a particle is the measurement of a local observable which simulates the measurement of an almost local observable that annihilates the vacuum. In this note, we argue that the measurements local particle detections are supposed to simulate probe radically holistic aspects of relativistic quantum fields. We prove that in an (...) axiomatic (Haag-Araki) quantum field theory on Minkowski spacetime, formulated in a Hilbert space $\mathcal{H}$ , there is no positive observable C, with norm less than or equal to 1, satisfying the conditions: (1) the expectation value of C in the vacuum state Ω is zero, (2) there is at least one vector state Ψ in $\mathcal{H}$ in which the expectation value of C is different from zero, and (3) there exists at least one spacetime region $\mathcal{O}$ such that the non-selective measurement of C leaves the expectation values of all observables in the local algebra of that region unaltered regardless of the state the system is in. The result reveals a tension between intuitions regarding localization and intuitions regarding causality: to save “particle phenomena” in the absence of particle ontology, one has to feign “particle” detectors with “good” properties as to locality but “bad” behavior as to causality. (shrink)

Thomas Hofweber has written a very rich book. In line with the conviction that ontology should be informed by linguistic considerations, he develops a systematic approach to central ontological questions as they arise in different regions of discourse. More generally, the book seeks to cast light upon the nature of ontology and its proper place in enquiry. His preferred methodology is not without consequence: it promises, for example, to solve what otherwise look like intractable philosophical puzzles raised by (...) arithmetical practice and numerical discourse, and, likewise, his treatment of propositional discourse has ramifications for larger questions to do with the prospects of metaphysical enquiry generally. (shrink)

In this dialogue, Mileva and Albert start to talk about physics and its subject matter, the physical. They end up in a situation that permits causal dependence between separate ontological domains. In this possible world, they continue talking. First, they Socratically agree that the physical is physical and only physical. Then, they call the physical an ontologically homogeneous domain. They then generalise the principle that the physical is causally unaffected by anything non-physical, into the principle that ontologically homogeneous domains do (...) not cause ontologically homogeneous domains. From a modern point of view talking about black hole singularities, they continue discussing the Chandrasekhar limit and the collapse of the physical laws as we know them. Mileva carries a burden and Albert stands up and carries it with her. The burden is an implication of the generalised principle. Relying on parsimony, only ontologically homogeneous domains are forbidden to cause ontologically homogeneous domains. This leaves the door open for ontologically heterogeneous domains to cause ontologically homogeneous domains. Also relying on parsimony, only ontologically homogeneous domains are forbidden to be caused by ontologically homogeneous domains and this allows ontologically heterogeneous domains to be caused by ontologically homogeneous domains. Ontologically heterogeneous domains, thus, are allowed to causally link ontologically homogeneous domains. Albert realises that the mathematical could qualify as an ontologically homogeneous domain and that the theoretical difficulties that are foreseen beyond the Chandrasekhar limit could be addressed by expanding physics into a context that contains also an ontologically heterogeneous domain. The theoretical difficulties beyond the Chandrasekhar limit would be due to an emergent mathematical-physical domain. Mileva concludes that Albert’s theory is not faulty but regional. A global theory would have to include the explanation of the mathematical-physical. (shrink)

This text is devoted to arguing for the thesis that our standard ontology of physical objects is not correct, and to offering a replacement for that ontology. None of the things that we normally take to exist really do exist. There are no animals, vegetables, or minerals. Nothing that I say against the specific physical objects of our standard ontology counts against the general claim that there are physical objects. In fact, I propose an ontology of (...) physical objects that does not suffer from the defects of our standard ontology or from any other defect. What exist, according to the ontology that I propose, are four dimensional hunks of matter, and every filled region of spacetime is exactly filled by one such object. ;In chapter 1, I explain this proposed ontology of four dimensional hunks of matter, give some reason for preferring four dimensional objects over three dimensional ones, and answer some objections to such an ontology. In chapter 2 the ontology is developed in more depth, paying special attention to those features of an object that seem to be most tied to its identity--its persistence conditions and essential properties. It turns out that four dimensional hunks have their spatiotemporal boundaries essentially. I also begin my attack on the standard ontology, offering some reason to believe that they do not really exist, or at least that they do not have the persistence conditions and essential properties that we typically attribute to them. In chapter 3 I present my strongest argument against our standard ontology--a version of the Sorites paradox. I discuss all the possible ways of handling vagueness and show that the only acceptable one is the denial of our standard ontology. In chapter 4 I show that rejecting the standard ontology is not as extreme as it might first seem since another ontology can be offered in its place and a paraphrase can be set up, thereby showing that even our most important and effective utterances need not be committed to the standard ontology. This other ontology is that of four dimensional hunks of matter. (shrink)

I shall describe the beautiful fit of the ideas of Alfred North Whitehead and William James with the concepts of relativistic quantum field theory developed by Tomonaga and Schwinger.The central concept is a set of happenings each of which is assigned a space-time region.This growing set of non-overlapping regions fill out a growing space-time region that advances into the still uncreated and yet-to-be-axed future.Each happening has both experiential aspects and physical aspects,which are jointly needed to generate the advance into the (...) future.This conception is useful in passing from the pragmatic interpretation of science to a putative understanding of the reality beyond phenomena,and of our role within it. James' ideas about attention and volition are naturally implementable within this framework,and make us into agents that can act eficaciously upon the physical world on the basis of felt values, rational reasons,and conscious understandings. (shrink)

Seventeen essays make up the body of this anthology. Most of the authors are Latin Americans (although some of them work in other regions), and thus we might say that this volume is, in a very approximate sense, a showcase of recent Latin-American ontology and metaphysics. The remaining authors—Pierre Aubenque, Barry Smith, Lorenzo Peña and James Hamilton—are distinguished teachers who have had important contacts with the Latin-American philosophical community. The articles in this anthology address some of the central questions (...) in ontology and metaphysics: the possibility of a science of being (Aubenque), the different possible approaches to ontology (Hurtado), the recent application of ontology to informatics (Smith), guise theory and its Leibnizian antecedents (Herrera), the reduction of space and time to phenomenological properties (Rodríguez Larreta), the Newtonian ontology of space and time (Benítez and Robles), the relation between truth and the so-called “truth-makers” (Rodríguez Pereyra), the ontological position of the Pyrrhonic skeptic (Junqueira Smith), the limits and difficulties of metaphysical realism (Cabanchik, Pereda), the defense of physicalist or emergentist positions regarding the mental (Pérez), the metaphysical nature of persons (Naishtat), the ontology of cultural entities (Peña), political ontology (Nudler), the relation between ontology and literature (Hamilton), the ontology of art (Tomasini). Some of the works (e.g., those Aubenque and Robles) approach the question from a historical perspective: others examine the most recent philosophical literature on the problems focalized (e.g., those by Pérez and Rodríguez Pereyra), and others offer new approaches (e.g., those of Rodríguez Larreta, Peña or Nudler) to a specific problematic area. (shrink)

Bohmian mechanics is a realistic interpretation of quantum theory. It shares the same ontology of classical mechanics: particles following continuous trajectories in space through time. For this ontological continuity, it seems to be a good candidate for recovering the classical limit of quantum theory. Indeed, in a Bohmian framework, the issue of the classical limit reduces to showing how classical trajectories can emerge from Bohmian ones, under specific classicality assumptions. In this paper, we shall focus on a technical problem (...) that arises from the dynamics of a Bohmian system in bounded regions; and we suggest that a possible solution is supplied by the action of environmental decoherence. However, we shall show that, in order to implement decoherence in a Bohmian framework, a stronger condition is required rather than the usual one. (shrink)

GRW theory offers precise laws for the collapse of the wave function. These collapses are characterized by two new constants, \ and \ . Recent work has put experimental upper bounds on the collapse rate, \ . Lower bounds on \ have been more controversial since GRW begins to take on a many-worlds character for small values of \ . Here I examine GRW in this odd region of parameter space where collapse events act as natural disasters that destroy branches (...) of the wave function along with their occupants. Our continued survival provides evidence that we don’t live in a universe like that. I offer a quantitative analysis of how such evidence can be used to assess versions of GRW with small collapse rates in an effort to move towards more principled and experimentally-informed lower bounds for \. (shrink)

By its nature, comparative education values diversity. Respectfully studying how different groups pursue education provides opportunities to learn about the variety of human experience, expand the boundaries of the field, and ultimately re-understand ourselves. At its core, the field leverages the dynamic space between life as culturally located and being human. This chapter contributes value to comparative education from an Oceanic viewpoint. Oceania is the world region with more water and languages than any other. Because of its diversity and colonial (...) histories, Oceania is a site of creative tension between regionalism and self-determination. Unsurprisingly, conflict exists in the region. However, a key need in our ‘sea of islands’ for sustainability is to live well together. Faced with the uncertainties of the future such as climate change, mutual understanding and support is at a premium. The collaboration of writers; Solomon Islander, Tongan, and Anglo-Welsh, embodies this, as does the chapter’s woven mat-based structure. The thrust of this chapter is that through walking backwards into the future and embracing solidarity through diversity, we can promote a sustainable educational journey that offers the hope of continuity in the face of the challenges ahead. (shrink)

Background Many indigenous people have died or been harmed because of inadequately monitored research. Strong regulations in Human Research Ethics (HRE) are required to address these injustices and to ensure that peoples’ participation in health research is safe. Indigenous peoples advocate that research that respects indigenous principles can contribute to addressing their health inequities. This scoping literature review aims to analyze existing peer reviewed and grey literature to explore how indigenous values and principles from countries of Oceania are incorporated into (...) HRE and the governance of research involving human participants. Methods A scoping literature review framework was used for this study. A search for peer reviewed and grey literature from Google, bibliographies, and electronic databases such as SCOPUS, SPRINGER, Medline (Ovid) and JBI Database of Systematic Reviews was conducted, limited to the years 2002–2020. Sixty (60) documents that focused on indigenous knowledge from Oceania region and HRE were included, from which key findings and themes were synthesized. Results Charting the data showed that more than half the eligible documents were peer-reviewed journal articles (54%). Other sources included: International Declarations on Human Research (8%); book chapters (8%); government documents (8%); HRE Guidelines or protocols (13%); news articles (7%) and PhD thesis (2%). The literature was from Australia, Cook Islands, Guam, New Zealand, Fiji, Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu, some of which focused specifically on HREs in the Pacific Region. Issues emerging from the literature were grouped into five themes (i) indigenous and cultural principles of HRE; (ii) informed consent in indigenous settings in Oceania; (iii) vulnerability and minority status of indigenous populations exploited for research; (iv) research ethics governance for Oceania indigenous peoples; and (v) research ethics committees in Oceania. Respect, relationship building, and trust were priority indigenous HRE principles that encompass the principles of partnership, capacity building, reciprocity, and equality. Relationship building and trust imply the equal distribution of benefits for indigenous population and researchers. Conclusion Indigenous principles of HRE identified were interconnected and interdependent. Recommendations were to incorporate indigenous principles of research in HRE regulations and processes of all countries with indigenous populations. This is especially pertinent for emerging national research committees in LMIC countries, including Fiji and Tonga. Relationship building among researchers and indigenous populations is key to successful research with indigenous populations. HRE principles important for relationship building include respect that is reciprocal among researchers and indigenous people. Elements of the principle of respect highlighted are empathy, collaboration, sharing of benefits, reciprocity, appreciation, empowerment, protection, safety and awareness of culture and languages. Indigenous ontology from the Oceania region involves spirituality, connectedness to land, religious beliefs and a participatory approach to HRE and should be respected in research. An ethical governance mechanism of HRE is one that incorporates indigenous principles and applications for the purpose of maximizing the protection of the dignity and rights of indigenous peoples of Oceania. (shrink)

Could space consist entirely of extended regions, without any regions shaped like points, lines, or surfaces? Peter Forrest and Frank Arntzenius have independently raised a paradox of size for space like this, drawing on a construction of Cantor’s. I present a new version of this argument and explore possible lines of response.

There are significant problems involved in determining the ontology of quantum field theory. An ontology involving particles seems to be ruled out due to the problem of defining localized position operators, issues involving interactions in QFT, and, perhaps, the appearance of unitarily inequivalent representations. While this might imply that fields are the most natural ontology for QFT, the wavefunctional interpretation of QFT has significant drawbacks. A modified field ontology is examined where determinables are assigned to open (...) bounded regions of spacetime instead of spacetime points. (shrink)

A chemical substance is instantiated in the material world by a number of quantities of such substance, placed in different locations. A change of location implies a change in the net of relationships entertained by the QCS with the region wherein it is found. This fact entails changes of the ontological status of the CS, as this is not fully determined by the inherent features of the CS and includes a relevant relational contribution. In order to demonstrate this thesis, we (...) have chosen to analyse the status of quantities of a same CS that are synchronically located in different spacetime regions: a synthetic lab, a lab where the QCS is turned into a material, an industrial plant, the market where the QCS gets a price and a dump waste where the QCS is discarded, respectively: Chemical substance Open image in new window material Open image in new window product Open image in new window goods Open image in new window wasteThe use of first-order predicate logic, mereology and locative logic allows carrying out a regimentation process that highlights the ontological commitments implied by the formal expressions through which each element of the aforementioned series can be described. The presence of relational properties discloses the systemic nature of the CS instantiated within a spacetime region. The implications of such an aspect are discussed. (shrink)

Through contact algebras we study theories of mereotopology in a uniform way that clearly separates mereological from topological concepts. We identify and axiomatize an important subclass of closure mereotopologies called unique closure mereotopologies whose models always have orthocomplemented contact algebras , an algebraic counterpart. The notion of MT-representability, a weak form of spatial representability but stronger than topological representability, suffices to prove that spatially representable complete OCAs are pseudocomplemented and satisfy the Stone identity. Within the resulting class of contact algebras (...) the strength of the algebraic complementation delineates two classes of mereotopology according to the key ontological choice between mereological and topological closure operations. All closure operations are defined mereologically if and only if the corresponding contact algebras are uniquely complemented while topological closure operations highly restrict the contact relation but allow not uniquely complemented and nondistributive contact algebras. Each class contains a single ontologically coherent theory that admits discrete models. (shrink)

Nancy's writing on the image may be understood as a critical engagement with the traditions of modern aesthetics and classical theories of art. However, the starting point for his approach to the image indicates that his writing on this topic has much wider ambitions than the treatment of a regional aesthetic topic. Nancy defines the image as a mode of access to sense. Nancy attempts an ontological rehabilitation of the image, which reiterates the precepts of his conception of being (...) as ‘co-presence’. I will argue here that a careful study of the implications of this rehabilitation of the image can be used to clarify the significance of the tacit references that Nancy's ontology makes regarding politics. (shrink)

‘Eruv’ is a Hebrew word meaning literally ‘mixture’ or ‘mingling’. An eruv is an urban region demarcated within a larger urban region by means of a boundary made up of telephone wires or similar markers. Through the creation of the eruv, the smaller region is turned symbolically (halachically = according to Jewish law) into a private domain. So long as they remain within the boundaries of the eruv, Orthodox Jews may engage in activities that would otherwise be prohibited on the (...) Sabbath, such as pushing prams or wheelchairs, or carrying walking sticks. There are eruvim in many towns and university campuses throughout the world. There are five eruvim in Chicago, five in Brooklyn, twenty three in Queens and Long Island, and at least three in Manhattan. The US Supreme Court is (like most other major US Federal Government buildings) located within the eruv of Washington DC. In many cases, not all of those living within or near the area of an actual or proposed eruv will themselves be Orthodox Jews, and this has sometimes led to protests against eruv creation. It is such protests which triggered the writing of this essay. (shrink)

In this volume, the author is concerned with working out one of the most fundamental themes in Heidegger’s thought, the "difference" between Being and that-which-is. The expression "ontological difference" is found neither in Being and Time nor Heidegger’s later works, where the term "ontological" is abandoned; nonetheless, what the term signified when it was used—the distinction itself—is central to all of Heidegger’s writings. Vail has written a careful analysis of the role this distinction plays in Heidegger’s later writings, examining it (...) from a multiplicity of perspectives. After discussing the way in which this distinction is opened up by Being itself, viz., by Being’s withdrawal in the very process of revealing itself in beings, Vail then analyzes the relation of this distinction to human thinking, to the "destiny" which lies behind the history of metaphysics, to the Region and, finally, to language. (shrink)

The labor market is an area with diverse data structures and multiple applications, such as matching job seekers with the right training or job. For this reason, the multilingual classification of European Skills, Competences, Qualifications and Occupations (ESCO) is a good example of the central role of ontologies in this area. However, ESCO cannot provide all the details of local labor market needs and does not provide links to other hierarchies of competences. For example, other taxonomies of occupations and skills (...) are widely used in German-speaking countries, but they are not in a state where they are easily accessible for interoperability and reasoning. In this paper, we present a first version of a German Labor Market Ontology (GLMO) that uses ESCO as a top-level ontology for the target domain. This makes it highly interoperable and comparable to existing ontologies by providing details for the regional structures in German-speaking countries. In addition, we present a detailed evaluation of the provided data and applications, as well as an extensive discussion of future work. (shrink)

The concepts of Fundierung (“foundation” or “founding”) and Stiftung (“institution” or “instituting”) play a prominent role in the work of Edmund Husserl, who employs Fundierung to describe relations of essential necessity in “static” analyses of intentional consciousness, and Stiftung to describe movements of sedimentation and reactivation in “genetic” analyses of the co-advent of consciousness and the world. Martin Heidegger, meanwhile, employs the notion of Stiften (“establishing”) in his ontological questioning of the disclosure of the truth of beings. It is, therefore, (...) surprising that scholars tend to assume, if not explicitly assert, that Merleau-Ponty treats Fundierung and Stiftung as synonyms. I argue, on the contrary, that Fundierung and Stiftung take on increasingly divergent functions over the course of Merleau-Ponty’s writings, with Stiftung ultimately giving voice to the “ontological operations” of individuation through intertwining whereby sensible and sentient beings, qua flesh, give birth to sense. In particular, I take seriously Merleau-Ponty’s account of Stiftung – from Institution and Passivity onward – as a “double relation of Fundierung”; given that Fundierung is already a “double relation” between the founding and the founded term, Stiftung must be conceived as a “fourfold” relation, wherein each term is simultaneously founding and founded, relative to the other. This fourfold structure articulates the relation of “simultaneity” or “existential eternity” between beings and sense in their advent. By tracing the development of the concept of Stiftung in Merleau-Ponty’s work, I attempt to show that interpreting his thinking of la chair as an “ontology of institution” – in the sense of an articulation of the movement of existence as relations of Stiftung – highlights the originality of his ontologization of Husserlian phenomenology, and thereby his status as a “foundational” thinker in his own right, rather than a merely regional thinker of embodiment.Les concepts de Fundierung (fondation) et de Stiftung (institution) jouent un rôle central dans l’oeuvre d’Edmund Husserl, qui emploie Fundierung pour décrire des relations de nécessité essentielle dans les analyses « statiques » de la conscience intentionnelle, et Stiftung pour décrire les mouvements de sédimentation et de réactivation dans les analyses « génétiques » de l’avènement concomitant de la conscience et du monde. Martin Heidegger, de son côté, emploie la notion de Stiften (instituer, établir) dans son questionnement ontologique du dévoilement de la vérité de l’être. C’est pourquoi il est surprenant que les commentateurs tendent à supposer, sinon à affirmer, que Merleau-Ponty traite Fundierung et Stiftung comme des synonymes. Je soutiens au contraire que ces deux notions exercent des fonctions de plus en plus divergentes dans ses écrits, où la Stiftung exprime au fond les « opérations ontologiques » de l’individuation à travers l’entrelacement par lequel les êtres sensibles et sentants (en tant que chair) donnent naissance au sens. En particulier, je prends au sérieux la conception merleau-pontienne de la Stiftung – à partir des cours sur L’Institution et la passivité – comme « une double relation de Fundierung » ; étant donné que la Fundierung est déjà une « double relation » entre le terme fondant et le terme fondé, la Stiftung doit être conçue comme une relation « quadripartite » dans laquelle chaque terme est simultanément fondant et fondé, relatif à l’autre. Cette structure quadripartite articule la relation de « simultanéité » ou d’« éternité existentielle » entre les étants et le sens dans leur avènement. En retraçant le développement du concept de Stiftung dans les travaux de Merleau-Ponty, je tente de montrer que l’interprétation de sa pensée de la chair comme une « ontologie de l’institution » – au sens d’une articulation du mouvement de l’existence comme relations de Stiftung – souligne l’originalité de son ontologisation de la phénoménologie husserlienne, et par là son statut comme penseur « fondationnel » de plein droit, plutôt qu’un penseur simplement régional de l’incarnation.I concetti di Fundierung (fondazione) e di Stiftung (istituzione) ricoprono un ruolo centrale nell’opera di Edmund Husserl, che si serve del termine Fundierung per descrivere le relazioni di necessità nelle analisi “statiche” della coscienza intenzionale, e di Stiftung per descrivere i movimenti di sedimentazione e di riattivazione nelle analisi “genetiche” del co-avvento di coscienza e mondo. Inoltre, Martin Heidegger usa il termine Stiften (istituire, stabilire) nella sua interrogazione ontologica dello svelamento della verità dell’essere. Per questo, risulta sorprendente che i commentatori di Merleau-Ponty tendano a supporre, se non ad affermare, che il filosofo tratti Fundierung e Stiftung come dei sinonimi. Ritengo al contrario che queste due nozioni rivestano funzioni progressivamente divergenti nei suoi scritti, dal momento che la Stiftung viene ad esprimere le “operazioni ontologiche” dell’individuazione attraverso l’intreccio per cui gli esseri sensibili e senzienti (in quanto carne) permettono la nascita del senso. In particolare, prendo in considerazione la concezione merleau-pontiana della Stiftung – a partire dai corsi sull’istituzione e la passività – come una “doppia relazione di Fundierung”. Nella misura in cui la Fundierung è già una “doppia relazione” tra termine fondante e termine fondato, la Stiftung deve essere pensata come una relazione “quadripartita” in cui ogni termine è simultaneamente fondante e fondato, relativamente all’altro. Questa struttura quadripartita articola la relazione di “simultaneità” o d’“eternità esistenziale” tra gli enti e il senso nel loro avvenimento. Ritracciando lo sviluppo del concetto di Stiftung nei testi di Merleau-Ponty, tento dunque di mostrare come un’interpretazione della sua filosofia della carne come “ontologia dell’istituzione” – nel senso di un’articolazione del movimento dell’esistenza come relazione di Stiftung – metta in luce l’originalità della sua ontologizzazione della fenomenologia husserliana. Ne emerge dunque a pieno titolo un pensatore “fondazionale”, piuttosto che un pensatore semplicemente regionale dell’incarnazione. (shrink)