Both mainstream and art comics often use various flourishes surrounding characters’ heads. These so-called “pictorial runes” help convey the emotional states of the characters. In this paper, using panels from Western and Indian comic albums as well as neutral emoticons and basic shapes in different colors, we focus on the following two issues: whether runes increase the awareness in comics readers about the emotional state of the character; and whether a correspondence can be found between the types (...) of runes and specific emotions. Our results show that runes help communicate emotion. Although no one-to-one correspondence was found between the tested runes and specific emotions, it was found that droplets and spikes indicate generic emotions, spirals indicate negative emotions, and twirls indicate confusion and dizziness. (shrink)

A parade of personalities, broken occasionally by general statements indicating that the personalities in question were to some extent concerned with philosophical problems. It is hard to know to what audience this book is directed, although Runes in his preface expresses the hope that the readers will be stimulated to delve into the writings of these thinkers. He asserts that "Philosophy is ethics, or it is nothing at all." He singles out three men who have fulfilled his ideal of (...) philosophers: Solomon, Socrates and Spinoza. But this distinction wins for the latter two only a half page of text and three pages of pictures, and for the wise King Solomon, even less attention. Some of the reproductions are quite good.--J. E. M. (shrink)

Provides layman with clear, concise and correct definitions and descriptions of philosophical terms throughout the range of philosophic thought.

"Methods of the Way: Early Chinese Ethical Thought" gives a detailed account of the textual history as well as the early development of 112 ethical terms defined in the chapter "Methods ot the Way (Daoshu)" ascribed to Jia Yi (200-168 B.C.). An important contribution to our understanding of the roles of ethics in early China.

Transparency has been proposed as a way of handling value-ladenness in machine learning (ML). This article highlights limits to this strategy. I distinguish three kinds of transparency: epistemic transparency, retrospective value transparency, and prospective value transparency. This corresponds to different approaches to transparency in ML, including so-called explainable artificial intelligence and governance based on disclosing information about the design process. I discuss three sources of value-ladenness in ML—problem formulation, inductive risk, and specification gaming—and argue that retrospective value transparency is only (...) well-suited for dealing with the first, while the third raises serious challenges even for prospective value transparency. (shrink)

This article highlights a use of analogies in science that so far has received relatively little systematic discussion: providing reasons for pursuing a model or theory. Using the development of the liquid drop model as a test case, I critically assess two extant pursuit worthiness accounts: that analogies justify pursuit by supporting plausibility arguments and that analogies can serve as a guide to potential theoretical unification. Neither of these fit the liquid drop model case. Instead, I develop an alternative account, (...) based on the idea that analogies facilitate the transfer of a well-understood modelling strategy to a new domain. 1Introduction2Case Study: The Development of the Liquid Drop Model3Plausibility Accounts 3.1Bartha on plausibility and analogical inference3.2Plausibility and the drop analogy4Analogies as a Guide to Unification5Generative Accounts 5.1Analogy-based modelling strategies5.2Did analogies play a merely generative role?6A New Pursuit Worthiness Account of Analogies 6.1Transferring understanding-with through analogies6.2Understanding-with and the liquid drop model7Conclusion. (shrink)

This paper defends an account of explanatory reasoning generally, and inference to the best explanation in particular, according to which it first and foremost justifies pursuing hypotheses rather than accepting them as true. This side-steps the problem of why better explanations should be more likely to be true. I argue that this account faces no analogous problems. I propose an account of justification for pursuit and show how this provides a simple and straightforward connection between explanatoriness and justification for pursuit.

pt. I. Ethics, by J. H. Tufts. Aesthetics, by D. H. Parker. Axiology, by W. M. Urban. Philosophy of law, by Roscoe Pound. Philosophy of history, by J. E. Boodin. Philosophy of science, by V. F. Lenzen. Philosophy of life, by A. N. Whitehead. Metaphysics, by E. W. Hall. Theology and metaphysics, by D. C. Mackintosh.--pt. II. Philosophy of the twentieth century, by Bertrand Russell. Kantianism, by A. C. Ewing. Philosophy of Hegelianism, by Richard Hoenigswald. The humanism of St. Thomas (...) Aquinas, by Jacques Maritain. Transcendental absolutism, by George Santayana. (shrink)

Simion and Kelp defend a non-anthropocentric account of trustworthy AI, based on the idea that the obligations of AI systems should be sourced in purely functional norms. In this commentary, I highlight some pressing counterexamples to their account, involving AI systems that reliably fulfil their functions but are untrustworthy because those functions are antagonistic to the interests of the trustor. Instead, I outline an alternative account, based on the idea that AI systems should not be considered primarily as tools but (...) as technological participants in social practices. Specifically, I propose to source the obligations of an AI system in the norms that should govern the role it plays within the social practices it participates in, taking into account any changes to the social practices that its participation may bring about. This proposal is anthropocentric insofar as it ascribes obligations to AI systems that are similar to those of human participants in social practices, but only modestly so, as it does not require trustworthy AI to have contentious anthropomorphic capacities (e.g. for consciousness or moral responsibility). (shrink)

Climate change is an existential risk reinforced by ordinary actions in afuent societies—often silently present in comfortable and enjoyable habits. This silence is sometimes broken, presenting itself as a nagging reminder of how our habits fuel a catastrophe. As a case in point, global warming has created a state of urgency among wine makers in Spain, as the alcohol level has risen to a point where it jeopardises wine quality and thereby Spanish viticulture. Eforts are currently being made to solve (...) this problem technologically by developing (non-GMO) strains of yeast that produce less alcohol. If successful, this could help save Spanish viticulture. This kind of technological solution is routinely criticised for ofering simplistic “techno-fx” solutions to solve complex societal problems. However, it is not clear what features are criticised by the notion of techno-fx and hence how to avoid this criticism. In our interpretation, the techno-fx notion is not exclusively used as a dismissive term. The notion points to a general virtue of engineering: to create technological solutions that work silently in the background. This asset of technological solutions might sometimes be problematic and sometimes not. Hence, it needs to be analysed case-by-case by paying attention to the moral relevance of the hidden implications of the technology and of the unrefective actions and habits that they facilitate. Such moral analysis will in turn inform strategies for foregrounding this technology to counteract silencing. We discuss what this means in the case of modifying yeast as a viticultural climate resilience strategy. (shrink)

This article offers reinterpretation of the current economic and political crisis through the lens of Gramsci’s concept of “interregnum,” departing from the model of “punctured equilibrium” to analyze the specific political dynamics of nonhegemonic periods between the breakdown of one ideological order and the emergence of a new one. Although political science has a range theories about periods of hegemony and paradigmatic stability, the periods between stable hegemonies remain distinctly undertheorized. A theoretical concept describing periods of interregnum is offered and (...) applied to the changes in economic ideology and political alignments that followed the breakdown of the liberal order in the interwar period and the postwar Keynesian consensus of the 1970s. The concept is then applied to the current juncture, in which the hegemony of neoliberalism has been shaken by the 2008 financial crisis but no clear successor has emerged. (shrink)

Constellations, Volume 29, Issue 3, Page 310-328, September 2022.

This paper investigates the relationships between organizational change and trust in management. It is argued that organizational change represents a critical episode for the production and destruction of trust in management. Although trust in management is seen as a semi stable psychological state, changes in organizations make trust issues salient and organizational members attend to and process trust relevant information resulting in a reassessment of their trust in management. The direction and magnitude of change in trust is dependent on a (...) set of change dimensions that reflect trust relevant experiences and information. We distinguish between dimensions related to trust relevant consequences of the change and trust relevant aspects of how the change process is performed. Empirical results indicate that increases in post change emotional stress and the use of referential accounts for justifying change are both negatively related to post change trust in management. The use of ideological accounts and participation were found to be positively related to post change trust in management, so was perceived decision quality. Findings also indicate that the effects of change on trust are negatively moderated by tenure. (shrink)

I highlight a lacuna in recent debates concerning analogies in science. Most philosophers focus on analogical inferences as a way to justify accepting hypotheses. I argue that analogies play another important role, namely to justify pursuing hypotheses. In particular, I argue that both Paul Bartha's formal account and John Norton's material view of analogical inference, as they stand, fail to address this issue. I present my own account of justification for pursuit and show how analogies on this account can justify (...) pursuit independently of whether they can also justify acceptance. (shrink)

This article examines the drivers and barriers for corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the Norwegian graduate uniform industry, which is a market devoid of large corporations, consisting entirely of two small businesses. It finds that these small businesses' CSR activities are not particularly well explained by the existing literature on CSR in small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises, which assumes the presence of large competitors. This raises the question of whether small businesses that do not compete against large corporations may actually behave (...) more like ‘little big firms’ when it comes to CSR. The article finds that the two businesses studied are mostly driven by external pressure to improve their social responsibility. Such pressure stems partly from news reports on their activities and partly from increasing competition leading to a situation where the small businesses operating in the market scrutinise each others' activities. (shrink)

This article examines the drivers and barriers for corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the Norwegian graduate uniform industry, which is a market devoid of large corporations, consisting entirely of two small businesses. It finds that these small businesses' CSR activities are not particularly well explained by the existing literature on CSR in small- and medium-sized enterprises, which assumes the presence of large competitors. This raises the question of whether small businesses that do not compete against large corporations may actually behave (...) more like ‘little big firms’ when it comes to CSR. The article finds that the two businesses studied are mostly driven by external pressure to improve their social responsibility. Such pressure stems partly from news reports on their activities and partly from increasing competition leading to a situation where the small businesses operating in the market scrutinise each others' activities. (shrink)

The right inferior frontal gyrus has most strongly, although not exclusively, been associated with response inhibition, not least based on covariations of behavioral performance measures and local gray matter characteristics. However, the white matter microstructure of the rIFG as well as its connectivity has been less in focus, especially when it comes to the consideration of potential subdivisions within this area. The present study reconstructed the structural connections of the three main subregions of the rIFG using diffusion tensor imaging, and (...) further assessed their associations with behavioral measures of inhibitory control. The results revealed a marked heterogeneity of the three subregions with respect to the pattern and extent of their connections, with the pars orbitalis showing the most widespread inter-regional connectivity, while the pars opercularis showed the lowest number of interconnected regions. When relating behavioral performance measures of a stop signal task to brain structure, the data indicated an association between the dorsal opercular connectivity and the go reaction time and the stopping accuracy. (shrink)

This thesis draws a distinction between reasoning about which scientific hypothesis to accept, reasoning concerned with generating new hypotheses and reasoning about which hypothesis to pursue. I argue that and should be evaluated according to the same normative standard, namely whether the hypotheses generated/selected are pursuit worthy. A consequentialist account of pursuit worthiness is defended, based on C. S. Peirce’s notion of ‘abduction’ and the ‘economy of research’, and developed as a family of formal, decision-theoretic models. This account is then (...) deployed to discuss four more specific topics concerning scientific reasoning. First, I defend an account according to which explanatory reasoning mainly provides reasons for pursuing hypotheses, and criticise empirical arguments for the view that it also provides reasons for acceptance. Second, I discuss a number of pursuit worthiness accounts of analogical reasoning in science, arguing that, in some cases, analogies allow scientists to transfer an already well-understood modelling framework to a new domain. Third, I discuss the use of analogies within archaeological theorising, arguing that the distinction between using analogies for acceptance, generation and pursuit is implicit in methodological discussions in archaeology. A philosophical analysis of these uses is presented. Fourth, diagnostic reasoning in medicine is analysed from the perspective of Peircean abduction, where the conception of abduction as strategic reasoning is shown to be particularly important. (shrink)

We live in a world in which every aspect of our existence is influenced by inordinate amounts of complexity. Technical Complexity, for example, is not necessarily the same as Economic Complexity although the two are related. Similarly, Public Health and Social Complexity are different as well. Nonetheless, one thing above all is a prominent feature of today's world; all the various types and forms of complexity are not only related, but deeply intertwined. Today, an idea can travel the globe in (...) mere seconds thanks to the internet and social media! These factors make our world today so complex and extremely different from previous ages in history. (shrink)

Explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) is an emerging, multidisciplinary field of research that seeks to develop methods and tools for making AI systems more explainable or interpretable. XAI researchers increasingly recognise explainability as a context-, audience- and purpose-sensitive phenomenon, rather than a single well-defined property that can be directly measured and optimised. However, since there is currently no overarching definition of explainability, this poses a risk of miscommunication between the many different researchers within this multidisciplinary space. This is the problem we (...) seek to address in this paper. We outline a framework, called Explanatory Pragmatism, which we argue has two attractive features. First, it allows us to conceptualise explainability in explicitly context-, audience- and purpose-relative terms, while retaining a unified underlying definition of explainability. Second, it makes visible any normative disagreements that may underpin conflicting claims about explainability regarding the purposes for which explanations are sought. Third, it allows us to distinguish several dimensions of AI explainability. We illustrate this framework by applying it to a case study involving a machine learning model for predicting whether patients suffering disorders of consciousness were likely to recover consciousness. (shrink)

Healthcare applications of AI have the potential to produce great benefit, but also come with significant ethical risks. This has brought ethics to the forefront of academic, policy and public debates about AI in healthcare. To help navigate these debates, we distinguish three general modes of ethical theorizing in contemporary secular AI ethics: (1) idealism, which seeks to articulate moral ideals that can be applied to concrete problems; (2) realism, which focuses on understanding complex social realities that underpin ethical problems; (...) and (3) pragmatism, which promotes deliberate methods that allow joint action in the present but also enable to future moral growth and progress. We discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each of these modes and illustrate their relevance to salient ethical problems arising from AI in healthcare. Finally, we argue that, while all three have merits, pragmatist approaches deserve more attention they have received thus far. (shrink)

Analogies often provide reasons for pursuing hypotheses or models. This is illustrated with a case study on the liquid drop model of the atomic nucleus. I criticise accounts in which analogies provide reasons for pursuit through epistemic support, proposing instead that analogies increase the value of learning the truth. I consider two accounts of this type: first, that analogies indicate potentials for theoretical unification; second, that analogies facilitate the transfer of already well-understood modelling frameworks to new domains. While the first (...) is plausible for some cases, only the second can account for the liquid drop case study. (shrink)

Trust has a great potential for furthering our understanding of organizational change and learning. This potential however remains largely untapped. It is argued that two reasons as for why this potential remains unrealized are: (i) A narrow conceptualization of change as implementation and (ii) an emphasis on direct and aggregated effects of individual trust to the exclusion of other effects. It is further suggested that our understanding of the effects of trust on organizational change, should benefit from including effects of (...) trust on the formulation stage. It should also benefit from exploring the structuring effects of trust in organizations. Throughout this chapter, ways to extend current research on trust in organizations are suggested. The chapter also provides examples of relevant contributions where available. In order to capture organizational effects of trust, it is suggested that trust should be studied over longer time intervals, and include several referents of trust, spanning both horizontal and vertical relationships in the organization. (shrink)

Denne artikkelen tar utgangspunkt i observasjonen at slutten av vekstfasene i kapitalismen har vært preget av en forvokst finanskapital på jakt etter store og raske profitter. Dette kan forklares med at jakten på profitt er selve drivkraften i den kapitalistiske produksjonsmåten. Pengekapital som søker avkastning innenfor finanssektoren, tar så å si en snarvei i profittjakten. Denne typen profittjakt forutsetter såkalte finansinnovasjoner, historisk for eksempel aksjer og obligasjoner, og i seinere tid ulike typer kredittderivater, hedgefond og pri- vate aksjefond som kan (...) sirkulere så å si uten innblanding fra realøkonomien. Artikkelen diskuterer særlig kredittderivatenes, hedgefondenes og de private aksjefondenes rolle når det gjaldt å skape finansiell ustabilitet som til slutt førte til den generelle økonomiske krisa. (shrink)