In this paper we propose a formal theory of metaphors called Constrained Semantic Transference [CST]. We start from the assumptions that metaphors are characterized by the description of one domain, called the target domain, in terms of another domain, called the source domain; and that a metaphor works by transferring a set of structural relationships from the source domain to the target domain coherently.Starting from these assumptions, we formally define the concept of T-MAPs which are partial coherent mappings from the (...) source domain to the target domain. We also define two operators, called Augmentation and Positing Structure that extend a given T-MAP by adding new structure to the target domain. (shrink)

Both mainstream and art comics often use various flourishes surrounding characters’ heads. These so-called “pictorial runes” help convey the emotional states of the characters. In this paper, using panels from Western and Indian comic albums as well as neutral emoticons and basic shapes in different colors, we focus on the following two issues: whether runes increase the awareness in comics readers about the emotional state of the character; and whether a correspondence can be found between the types of runes and (...) specific emotions. Our results show that runes help communicate emotion. Although no one-to-one correspondence was found between the tested runes and specific emotions, it was found that droplets and spikes indicate generic emotions, spirals indicate negative emotions, and twirls indicate confusion and dizziness. (shrink)

The present study examines the relationship between pictorial similes and hybrid pictorial metaphors. The results suggest that hybrid pictorial metaphors are perceived more strongly than pictorial similes when they are presented on their own and in corrective convention but not when they are verbalized. We argue that hybrid pictorial metaphors have transformational effects as the fusion of two concepts allow the reader to see one thing in terms of another. Juxtaposition in a pictorial simile merely suggests a search for similarity, (...) which is not explicit. Results also showed that verbalized metaphor (X is Y) or the simile (X is like Y) forms are often used to convey a similar meaning and strength for pictorial simile and pictorial metaphor. However, in corrective scenarios participants are forced to reassess visual features: in this situation, pictorial metaphors are considered more strongly than pictorial similes even when they are verbalized. (shrink)

In this paper we start from the assumption that in a metaphor, or an analogy, some terms belonging to one domain (source domain) are used to refer to objects other than their conventional referents belonging to a possibly different domain (target domain). We describe a formalism, which is based on the First Order Predicate Calculus, for representing the knowledge structure associated with a domain and then develop a theory of Constrained Semantic Transference [CST] which allows the terms and the structural (...) relationships of the source domain to be transferred coherently across to the target domain. We show how metaphors and analogies can be characterized in CST in such a way that many of their cognitive properties con be explained.We then propose a theory of Approximate Semantic Transference [AST] which is a computational version of CST and is derived from it by replacing the coherency requirement with approximate coherency. We show how AST can be used as a basis for designing models of cognitive processes involved in comprehending metaphors and analogies. (shrink)

This paper begins with a rigorous critique of David Stove''s recent bookThe Rationality of Induction. In it, Stove produced four different proofs to refute Hume''s sceptical thesis about induction. I show that Stove''s attempts to vindicate induction are unsuccessful. Three of his proofs refute theses that are not the sceptical thesis about induction at all. Stove''s fourth proof, which uses the sampling principle to justify one particular inductive inference, makes crucial use of an unstated assumption regarding randomness. Once this assumption (...) is made explicit, Hume''s thesis once more survives.The refutation of Stove''s fourth proof leads to some observations which relate Goodman''s grue paradox with randomness of a sample. I formulate a generalized version of Goodman''s grue paradox, and argue that whenever a sample, no matter how large, is drawn from a predetermined smaller interval of a population that is distributed over a larger interval, any conclusion drawn about the characteristics of the population based on the observed characteristics of the sample is fatally vulnerable to the generalized grue paradox. (shrink)

A metaphor can often create novel features in an object or a situation. This phenomenon has been particularly hard to account for using amodal symbol systems: although highlighting and downplaying can explain the shift of focus, it cannot explain how entirely new features can come about. We suggest here that the dynamism of perceptual symbol systems, particularly the notion of simulator, provides an elegant account of the creativity of metaphor. The elegance lies in the idea that the creation of new (...) features by a metaphor proceeds in the same way as the creation of regular features in a perceptual symbol. (shrink)

Focusing on the mirror system and imitation, I examine the role of metaphor and projection in evolutionary neurolinguistics. I suggest that the key to language evolution in hominid might be an ability to project one's thoughts and feelings onto another agent or object, to see and feel things from another perspective, and to be able to empathize with another agent.

Considerations from an interaction-based approach to the evolution of language and the role of word-sentences therein show that the object-attribute ontology is arrived at a much later stage. Therefore, Hurford's arguments, by focusing on the predicate-argument structure, seem to miss out on most of the interesting aspects of the early stages in language evolution.

The role of figurative languages such as metaphor and metonymy in creativity has been studied in cognitive linguistics. These methods can also be applied to analyze non-linguistic data such as pictures and gestures. In this paper we analyze fashion design by focusing on visual metaphor and metonymy. The nature of creativity in fashion design is not fully studied from a cognitive perspective compared to other related fields such as art. We especially focus on the aspect of fashion design as a (...) communication tool between the designer and the audience to convey designer’s image of human. Photos from two fashion shows are analyzed. We carried out an experiment to compare how human images in two shows are interpreted by those who are familiar with fashion and those who are not. We got three results: (1) As far as figurative (metaphorical and metonymic) interpretations of human image are concerned, two groups with different familiarity to fashion have significantly different patterns of responses to two shows. (2) For non-figurative interpretations (such as physical or personal attributes), no significant difference in the pattern of response to the show was observed between two groups. The participants as a whole, however, responded to the two shows differently. (3) In addition for non-figurative interpretation, fashion experts found significantly more attributes in human images than the others. The results show that the analysis of figurative interpreations is effective in seeing how the familiarity to fashion affects the mode of seeing fashion shows. (shrink)