The subject of this paper is the controversy between cognitivist philosophy and phenomenology concerning the nature of emotions. This article has a limited scope restricted to the domain of the aesthetic emotions usually dependent on the works of art and literature. The author raises the criticism against the cognitivist stance, this criticism based chiefly on the principles of Max Scheler's phenomenology of emotions.

Understanding emotions — an apparent contradiction. Comments on Andrzej Dąbrowski’s Origins, nature and functions of emotions: This paper offers some polemical comments on Andrzej Dąbrowski’s recently published book Origins, nature and functions of emotions. The background for reflection is Leon Petrażycki’s theory of emotions. The author aims to evaluate Dąbrowski’s presentation of an influential Polish philosopher Leon Petrażycki, considered an important forerunner of the psychosocial theory of law or legal psychologism, who initiated a long‐lasting debate on the role and meaning (...) of emotions. (shrink)

In this paper, there were presented ethical arguments concerning the application of modern techniques of genetic intervention in human procreation. In particular, the rationalistic arguments in favour of genetic interventions were critically presented, namely the argument on ethical neutrality of technology, liberal argument on procreative freedom and argument on genetic enhancement. There were also analysed the negative emotional reaction to genetic engineering. The main aim of the paper was to express the cognitive element from these emotions enabling a wider understanding (...) of human procreation and the values of parent-child relations. (shrink)

Tradycyjne teorie psychologii moralności podkreślają rolę rozumowania i „wyższych procesów poznawczych”, podczas gdy ostatnie prace z tego zakresu uwypuklają udział emocji. W niniejszym artykule rozpatruję dane pochodzące z neuroobrazowania wspierające teorię sądzenia moralnego, zgodnie z którą zarówno procesy „poznawcze”, jak i emocjonalne pełnią istotne a czasami wzajemnie konkurencyjne role. Dane te wskazują, że rejony mózgu związane z kontrolą poznawczą (przednia część zakrętu obręczy i grzbietowo boczna kora przedczołowa) są zaangażowane w rozwiązywanie trudnych moralnych dylematów, w których wartości utylitarne wymagają naruszenia (...) „osobistej” sfery moralnej, co wiąże się ze wzrostem aktywności rejonów mózgu związanych z emocjami i poznaniem społecznym (przyśrodkowa kora przedczołowa, górna bruzda skroniowa, tylna część zakrętu obręczy, bieguny skroniowe, ciało migdałowate). Odkryliśmy także, że aktywność w~obszarach mózgu obejmujących przednią część grzbietowo bocznej kory przedczołowej prognozuje różnice w sądzeniu moralnym, w odmiennych warunkach — obszary te wykazują większą aktywność podczas wydawania sądów o~charakterze utylitarnym. Przypuszczam też, że coraz lepsze rozumienie fizjologicznych i neuronaukowych podstaw wydawania sądów moralnych może mieć wpływ na rozwiązywanie dylematów moralnych w~świecie realnym. (shrink)

Czy emocje mogą wpływać na myślenie? Jaka jest ich geneza? Oto pytania, które są przedmiotem naukowej refleksji w prezentowanym opracowaniu, które stawia sobie za cel interdyscyplinarną analizę problematyki stanów emocjonalnych w odniesieniu do procesów kognitywnych. Najnowsze badania neuronaukowe przynoszą coraz więcej odkryć, które pomagają nam lepiej zrozumieć pracę mózgu oraz centralnego układu nerwowego oraz ich relacji do tzw. wyższych funkcji umysłowych jak planowanie, czy poznanie. Wskazują one na wzajemną relacje stanów emocjonalnych oraz procesów poznawczych, co jest kolejnym krokiem w (...) dyskusji problemu mind-body. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest wykazanie, że przyjmowane na gruncie multimodularnej teorii umysłu rozwiązanie problemu integracji modułów jest niewystarczające. Emocje nie mogą być jedynymi czynnikami, które synchronizują i integrują pracę modułów, ponieważ nie funkcjonują stale, same wymagają synchronizacji modułów niezbędnych do ich aktywizacji i nie pozwalają na wyjaśnienie mechanizmu koordynacji modułów potrzebnej do uzyskania nowej funkcji. Wskazuje się także na dość uproszczone pojmowanie emocji przez psychologów ewolucyjnych.

Celem artykułu jest scharakteryzowanie współczesnej publicznej debaty bioetycznej w Polsce na przykładzie dyskusji na temat kwestii reprodukcyjnych. Autorki podkreślają polaryzację i radykalizację przeciwstawnych stanowisk i pomijanie zagadnień istotnych dla dyskusji filozoficznych na ten temat. Debata społeczna ma charakter sporu światopoglądowego o charakterze pragmatycznym, a jej celem jest oddziaływanie na zmianę bądź ugruntowanie już przyjmowanych przekonań moralnych umożliwiające przyjęcie i akceptację społeczną proponowanego rozwiązania legislacyjnego. Do radykalizacji sporu przyczynia się silny wpływ instytucji Kościoła, rozwój ruchu społecznego na rzecz obrony praw (...) kobiet i praw reprodukcyjnych oraz brak należytej uwagi dla tej debaty i jej wszystkich uczestników ze strony władz publicznych. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Some epistemologists hold that all rational norms are fundamentally concerned with the agent’s states or attitudes at an individual time [Hedden 2015, 2016; Moss 2015]; others argue that all rational norms are fundamentally concerned with processes [Podgorski 2017]. This distinction is not drawn in discussions of emotional rationality. As a result, a widely held assumption in the literature on emotional rationality has gone unexamined. I employ Abelard Podgorski’s argument from rational delay to argue that many emotional norms are fundamentally (...) concerned with emotional processes. I also claim that the main response available to the synchronist about belief is not available to the synchronist about emotions and, therefore, fundamental process norms are more plausible than epistemologists tend to believe. (shrink)

本书以宽广的哲学视野,分析了法治与德治及其相互关系的历史演变,指出了两者之间存在着“合—分—合”的历史运动,社会主义社会中法治与德治之间是一个不可分割的“法治—人—德治”双向动互动关系链条,坚持“以人 为本”进行法治与德治建设是构建社会主义和谐社会的必然选择。.

On propagation of rationalism in Sri Lanka, pioneered by Abraham T. Kovoor, 1898-1978.

Ghazzālī, 1058-1111; political thoughts.

History of feudalism in Bengal, India between 1717 and 1765.

The paper argues against a widely held synchronic view of emotional rationality. I begin by considering recent philosophical literature on various backward‐looking emotions, such as regret, grief, resentment, and anger. I articulate the general problem these accounts grapple with: a certain diminution in backward‐looking emotions seems fitting while the reasons for these emotions seem to persist. The problem, I argue, rests on the assumption that if the facts that give reason for an emotion remain unchanged, the emotion remains fitting. However, (...) I argue there are rationally self‐consuming attitudes: affective attitudes that become less fitting the longer they endure while the facts that give reason for them persist. A widely held synchronic view of fitting affective attitudes denies that fittingness at a time depends on the agent's attitudes at different times and therefore denies that the fittingness of an affective attitude can depend on its duration. Once we reject the synchronic view, we may see that affective attitudes are often fitting due to the fitting processes of which they are part. These fitting processes explain the fitting diminution of backward‐looking emotions as well as other diachronic aspects of the fittingness of emotions. -/- . (shrink)

Commentary on Kusumāñjali of Udayanācārya, treatise on Nyaya philosophy.

Islamic ethics; Muslims; conduct of life.

A new English translation of the founding text of the Madhyamaka (Middle Way) school of Buddhism, with the Tibetan version of the text included. The Root Stanzas holds an honored place in all branches of Tibetan Buddhism, as well as in the Buddhist traditions found in China, Japan, and Korea, because of the way it develops the seminal view of emptiness (shunyata), which is crucial to understanding Mahayana Buddhism and central to its practice. It is prized for its pithy and (...) pointed arguments that show that things lack intrinsic being and thus are “empty” (shunya). They abide in the Middle Way, free from the extremes of permanence and annihilation. (shrink)

I propose that shock can be morally significant independently of its consequences but only as part of an ongoing commitment to certain norms, in particular norms that constitute recognizing another as a person. When we witness others in agony, or being severely wronged, or when we ourselves severely wrong or mistreat others, our shock can reflect our recognition of them as persons, a recognition constituted by our commitment to certain moral norms. However, if we do not in fact respond to (...) the suffering or wrong in accordance with these norms—if, for example, we do not act to relieve their suffering or to properly address the wrong done, and do not avoid or prevent its recurrence—then our commitment to the relevant norms is undermined. When we consistently violate the norms whose violation initially shocked us, our lingering shock upon repeated violations gradually loses its significance and becomes a mere impulse—a fossil of a past commitment, so to speak—before it disappears completely. The failure to be shocked in such instances marks the failure of our moral commitments, which is the failure to recognize others as persons. (shrink)

How can we explain the rational diminution of backward-looking emotions without resorting to pragmatic or wrong kind of reason explanations? That is to say, how can the diminution of these emotions not only be rational but fitting? In this paper, I offer an answer to this question by considering the case of anger. In Sect. 1, I examine Pamela Hieronymi’s account of forgiveness as the rational resolution of resentment. I argue that Hieronymi’s account rests on an assumption about the rationality (...) of emotions —namely, that a rational change in emotion entails a change in the fact that constitutes the reason for the emotion. Then, in Sect. 2, I consider Agnes Callard’s recent criticism of accounts like Hieronymi’s as well as Callard’s alternative account of the rational resolution of anger. I argue that Callard offers a promising account but fails to explain how it avoids the criticism she levels against Hieronymi and others. Finally, in Sect. 3, I reject Hieronymi’s assumption and argue that an emotion can cease to be fitting without any change in the fact that constitutes the reason for it. I also explain how my proposal can complement Callard’s account of the rational dissipation of anger. My discussion of anger leads to a solution to the general problem about backward-looking emotions: a fitting backward-looking emotion can fittingly diminish when it is part of a process that is itself a fitting response to the past occurrence. (shrink)

Background: The three-dimensional model of nurses’ moral sensitivity has typically been studied using a variable-centered rather than a person-centered approach, preventing a more complete understanding of how these forms of moral sensitivity are expressed as a whole. Latent profile analysis is a person-centered approach that classifies individuals from a heterogeneous population into homogeneous subgroups, helping identify how different subpopulations of nurses use distinct combinations of different moral sensitivities to affect their service behaviors. Objective: Latent profile analysis was used to identify (...) three distinct profiles of nurses’ moral sensitivity. Associations of the profiles with service behaviors were then examined. Methods: Five hundred twenty-five nurses from three tertiary hospitals in China were investigated with Moral Sensitivity Questionnaire and Nurses’ Service Behavior Scale. Latent profile analysis was used to analyze the data. Ethical considerations: Approval was obtained from the Ethics committee for biomedical research of Medical College, the Hebei University of Engineering. Results: A three-profile moral sensitivity model provided the best fit to the data. The resulting profiles were low moral sensitivity, moderate moral sensitivity, and high moral sensitivity. There were significant differences in service behaviors among different profiles of moral sensitivity. Conclusion: The results provide a new and expanded view of nurses’ moral sensitivity, which may be used to monitor nurses’ service behaviors comprehensively and to evaluate nursing ethics management strategies. (shrink)

Background: Nurses’ service behaviors have critical implications for hospitals. However, few studies had adequate ethical considerations of service behaviors and accounted for how organizational or individual antecedents can induce nurses to engage in service behaviors. In addition, they mainly focused on the one side of role-prescribed or extra-role service behavior. Objective: This study aims to explore the chained mediation effect of ethical climate and moral sensitivity on the relationship between organizational ethical leadership and nurses’ service behaviors and to examine the (...) relationship, from a comparative view, of the role-prescribed service behavior and extra-role service behavior. Methods: In all, 476 nurses from three tertiary hospitals were investigated with the Ethical Leadership Scale, Ethical Climate Scale, Moral Sensitivity Questionnaire and Service Behavior Questionnaire. Structural equation modeling was adopted to analyze the data. SPSS and Mplus statistical software was used in the data analysis. Ethical considerations: Approval was obtained from the Ethics Committee at School of Nursing, Hebei Medical University. Data privacy and confidentiality were maintained and assured by obtaining subjects’ informed consent to participate in the research before data collection. Results: The effects of ethical leadership on nurses’ service behaviors are mediated by two variables in turn: ethical climate and nurses’ moral sensitivity. Ethical climate and moral sensitivity partially mediated the relationship between ethical leadership and nurses’ role-prescribed service behavior and fully mediated the relationship between ethical leadership and nurses’ extra-role service behavior. Conclusion: Organizational ethical leadership positively affected ethical climate, which positively affected nurses’ moral sensitivity and affected both their role-prescribed service behavior and extra-role service behavior. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This study seeks exploration of how employees’ moral identity is related to voice behavior in the current organizational dynamics. By integrating the self-consistency theory with a situational strength perspective, a moderated mediation model was constructed to examine connections among moral identity, leader secure-base support, work engagement, and voice behavior. Surveys were collected at 2 time points, 1 month apart, from 206 full-time employees in various organizations and industries in Taiwan. Supporting results indicated that employees’ moral identity was positively related (...) to voice behavior. The mediating impact of work engagement as a motivational mechanism between moral identity and voice behavior was observed. Relative to when LSBS was low, the effect of moral identity on work engagement and the indirect effect of moral identity on voice behavior through work engagement were more substantial when LSBS was high. Academic and managerial implications were discussed. (shrink)

Research on unethical pro-organizational behavior has predominantly focused on its antecedents, while overlooking how engaging in such behavior might affect employees’ psychological experience and their downstream work behaviors. Integrating cognitive dissonance theory with the moral identity literature, we argue that engaging in UPB restricts moral identity internalization as a result of attempts to alleviate the cognitive dissonance about moral self-regard, which in turn translates into decreased organizational citizenship behavior and increased counterproductive workplace behavior. Moreover, employees’ construal level weakens these indirect (...) effects by alleviating the negative effect of engaging in UPB on moral identity internalization. The results from one experimental study and one multi-wave, multisource field study provide support for these predictions. Our research extends knowledge on the negative consequences of UPB for actors and organizations. (shrink)

El presente artículo versa sobre Abū Zakariyyāʾ Yaḥyà al-Balansī, un discípulo fervoroso y distinguido del conocido maestro sufí Ibn Sabʿīn de Ricote. Hay poca información sobre Yaḥyà, y quizás por ello ha pasado desapercibido. En el trabajo se recogen estos datos para darlo a conocer. Yaḥyà al-Balansī (o algún antepasado suyo cercano) habría nacido en Valencia. Estuvo en Alejandría en compañía del šayḫ Abū l-Ḥasan al-Šāḏilī, quizás a partir del año 642/1244. Regresó a al-Andalus y, después, habría viajado nuevamente hacia (...) el Magreb. En Bugía, se encontró con Ibn Sabʿīn, en fecha desconocida, aunque debió de haber sido hacia el año 648/1250. Desde entonces se hizo discípulo incondicional suyo. Habría acompañado a Ibn Sabʿīn, hasta establecerse en La Meca, después de pasar por Túnez y Egipto. También estuvo en Medina y en el Líbano. Se deduce que Yaḥyà era un sufí viajero, al igual que Abū l-Ḥasan al-Šuštarī. Yaḥyà falleció en el año 665/1267 y fue enterrado en al-Balyana, en el Alto Egipto. En este trabajo se presentan los fragmentos de las pocas obras que nos han llegado, y se busca confirmar su autoría de Kitāb al-Sulūk fī ṭarīq al-qawm, la única epístola suya que se conserva completa. Al final, se traducen los fragmentos tanto de al-Wirāṯa al-muḥammadiyya, y un fragmento recogido por Ibn al-Ṭawwāḥ, como de otro fragmento que aparece al final de una Risāla de Ibn Sabʿīn. Del estudio de este acopio de datos se llega a dos conclusiones de relevancia: 1. Aunque en el encabezado de Kitāb al-Sulūk, Yaḥyà se presenta como hijo de Ibn Sabʿīn, en este trabajo se va a demostrar que no lo era. 2. Se confirma su autoría de Kitāb al-Sulūk. (shrink)