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Joshua D. Greene [21]Joshua Greene [6]Joshua David Greene [3]
  1. The secret joke of Kant’s soul.Joshua Greene - 2007 - In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Vol. 3. MIT Press.
    In this essay, I draw on Haidt’s and Baron’s respective insights in the service of a bit of philosophical psychoanalysis. I will argue that deontological judgments tend to be driven by emotional responses, and that deontological philosophy, rather than being grounded in moral reasoning, is to a large extent3 an exercise in moral rationalization. This is in contrast to consequentialism, which, I will argue, arises from rather different psychological processes, ones that are more “cognitive,” and more likely to involve genuine (...)
     
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  2. Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)Science Matters for Ethics.Joshua D. Greene - 2014 - Ethics 124 (4):695-726.
    In this article I explain why cognitive science (including some neuroscience) matters for normative ethics. First, I describe the dual-process theory of moral judgment and briefly summarize the evidence supporting it. Next I describe related experimental research examining influences on intuitive moral judgment. I then describe two ways in which research along these lines can have implications for ethics. I argue that a deeper understanding of moral psychology favors certain forms of consequentialism over other classes of normative moral theory. I (...)
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  3. Pushing moral buttons: The interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment.Joshua D. Greene, Fiery A. Cushman, Lisa E. Stewart, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom & Jonathan D. Cohen - 2009 - Cognition 111 (3):364-371.
    In some cases people judge it morally acceptable to sacrifice one person’s life in order to save several other lives, while in other similar cases they make the opposite judgment. Researchers have identified two general factors that may explain this phenomenon at the stimulus level: (1) the agent’s intention (i.e. whether the harmful event is intended as a means or merely foreseen as a side-effect) and (2) whether the agent harms the victim in a manner that is relatively “direct” or (...)
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  4. Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment.Joshua D. Greene, Sylvia A. Morelli, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom & Jonathan D. Cohen - 2008 - Cognition 107 (3):1144-1154.
    Traditional theories of moral development emphasize the role of controlled cognition in mature moral judgment, while a more recent trend emphasizes intuitive and emotional processes. Here we test a dual-process theory synthesizing these perspectives. More specifically, our theory associates utilitarian moral judgment (approving of harmful actions that maximize good consequences) with controlled cognitive processes and associates non-utilitarian moral judgment with automatic emotional responses. Consistent with this theory, we find that a cognitive load manipulation selectively interferes with utilitarian judgment. This interference (...)
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  5.  4
    The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul (Spanish Translation).Joshua Greene - 2022 - Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso 20:183-229.
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  6. Reflection and Reasoning in Moral Judgment.Joshua D. Greene - 2012 - Cognitive Science 36 (1):163-177.
    While there is much evidence for the influence of automatic emotional responses on moral judgment, the roles of reflection and reasoning remain uncertain. In Experiment 1, we induced subjects to be more reflective by completing the Cognitive Reflection Test prior to responding to moral dilemmas. This manipulation increased utilitarian responding, as individuals who reflected more on the CRT made more utilitarian judgments. A follow-up study suggested that trait reflectiveness is also associated with increased utilitarian judgment. In Experiment 2, subjects considered (...)
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  7.  46
    Divine intuition: Cognitive style influences belief in God.Amitai Shenhav, David G. Rand & Joshua D. Greene - 2012 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 141 (3):423.
  8.  37
    Sacrificial utilitarian judgments do reflect concern for the greater good: Clarification via process dissociation and the judgments of philosophers.Paul Conway, Jacob Goldstein-Greenwood, David Polacek & Joshua D. Greene - 2018 - Cognition 179 (C):241-265.
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  9. Multi-system moral psychology.Fiery Cushman, Liane Young & Joshua D. Greene - 2010 - In John M. Doris (ed.), Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
  10. Comparing the Effect of Rational and Emotional Appeals on Donation Behavior.Matthew Lindauer, Marcus Mayorga, Joshua D. Greene, Paul Slovic, Daniel Västfjäll & Peter Singer - 2020 - Judgment and Decision Making 15 (3):413-420.
    We present evidence from a pre-registered experiment indicating that a philosophical argument––a type of rational appeal––can persuade people to make charitable donations. The rational appeal we used follows Singer’s well-known “shallow pond” argument (1972), while incorporating an evolutionary debunking argument (Paxton, Ungar, & Greene 2012) against favoring nearby victims over distant ones. The effectiveness of this rational appeal did not differ significantly from that of a well-tested emotional appeal involving an image of a single child in need (Small, Loewenstein, and (...)
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  11.  82
    The rat-a-gorical imperative: Moral intuition and the limits of affective learning.Joshua D. Greene - 2017 - Cognition 167 (C):66-77.
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  12.  71
    The rise of moral cognition.Joshua D. Greene - 2015 - Cognition 135 (C):39-42.
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  13. Moral Reasoning: Hints and Allegations.Joseph M. Paxton & Joshua D. Greene - 2010 - Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):511-527.
    Recent research in moral psychology highlights the role of emotion and intuition in moral judgment. In the wake of these findings, the role and significance of moral reasoning remain uncertain. In this article, we distinguish among different kinds of moral reasoning and review evidence suggesting that at least some kinds of moral reasoning play significant roles in moral judgment, including roles in abandoning moral intuitions in the absence of justifying reasons, applying both deontological and utilitarian moral principles, and counteracting automatic (...)
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  14.  20
    Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive Science Matters for Ethics.Joshua D. Greene - 2015 - The Law and Ethics of Human Rights 9 (2):141-172.
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  15. Finding faults: How moral dilemmas illuminate cognitive structure.Joshua D. Greene - unknown
    In philosophy, a debate can live forever. Nowhere is this more evident than in ethics, a field that is fueled by apparently intractable dilemmas. To promote the wellbeing of many, may we sacrifice the rights of a few? If our actions are predetermined, can we be held responsible for them? Should people be judged on their intentions alone, or also by the consequences of their behavior? Is failing to prevent someone’s death as blameworthy as actively causing it? For generations, questions (...)
     
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  16.  40
    Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive Science Matters for Ethics.Joshua D. Greene - 2015 - Law and Ethics of Human Rights 9 (2):141-172.
    Journal Name: The Law & Ethics of Human Rights Issue: Ahead of print.
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  17.  26
    A long time ago in a galaxy far, far away: How temporal are episodic contents?Johannes B. Mahr, Joshua D. Greene & Daniel L. Schacter - 2021 - Consciousness and Cognition 96 (C):103224.
  18.  34
    19 Cognitive Neuroscience and the Structure of the Moral Mind.Joshua Greene - 2005 - In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. New York, US: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 1--338.
    This chapter discusses neurocognitive work relevant to moral psychology and the proposition that innate factors make important contributions to moral judgment. It reviews various sources of evidence for an innate moral faculty, before presenting brain-imaging data in support of the same conclusion. It is argued that our moral thought is the product of an interaction between some ‘gut-reaction’ moral emotions and our capacity for abstract reflection.
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  19. Emotion and Morality: A Tasting Menu.Joshua D. Greene - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (3):227-229.
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  20.  57
    Solving the Trolley Problem.Joshua D. Greene - 2016 - In Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter (eds.), A Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Malden, MA: Wiley. pp. 173–189.
    The Trolley Problem arises from a set of moral dilemmas, most of which involve tradeoffs between causing one death and preventing several more deaths. The normative and descriptive Trolley Problems are closely related. The normative Trolley Problem begins with the assumption that authors' natural responses to these cases are generally, if not uniformly, correct. Thus, any attempt to solve the normative Trolley Problem begins with an attempt to solve the descriptive problem, to identify the features of actions that elicit their (...)
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  21.  41
    Emotion and Morality: A Tasting Menu.Joshua D. Greene - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (3):227-229.
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  22.  31
    Determinants of insensitivity to quantity in valuation of public goods: Contribution, warm glow, budget constraints, availability, and prominence.Jonathan Baron & Joshua Greene - 1996 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 2 (2):107.
  23.  72
    Dual-process moral judgment beyond fast and slow.Joshua D. Greene - 2023 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46:e123.
    De Neys makes a compelling case that the sacrificial moral dilemmas do not elicit competing “fast and slow” processes. But are there even two processes? Or just two intuitions? There remains strong evidence, most notably from lesion studies, that sacrificial dilemmas engage distinct cognitive processes generating conflicting emotional and rational responses. The dual-process theory gets much right, but needs revision.
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  24.  61
    Conflict monitoring in cognition-emotion competition.Samuel M. McClure, Matthew M. Botvinick, Nick Yeung, Joshua D. Greene & Jonathan D. Cohen - 2007 - In James J. Gross (ed.), Handbook of Emotion Regulation. Guilford Press.
  25.  11
    Positive Neuroscience.Joshua David Greene, India Morrison & Martin E. P. Seligman (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford University Press USA.
    How do we thrive in our behaviors and experiences? Positive neuroscience research illuminates the brain mechanisms that enable human flourishing. Supported by the John Templeton Foundation's Positive Neuroscience Project, which Martin E. P. Seligman established in 2008, Positive Neuroscience provides an intersection between neuroscience and positive psychology.In this edited volume, leading researchers describe the neuroscience of social bonding, altruism, and the capacities for resilience and creativity. Part I describes the mechanisms that enable humans to connect with one another. Part II (...)
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  26. Emocje i procesy poznawcze zaangażowane w wydawanie sądów moralnych. Dane z neuroobrazowania.Joshua Greene & Wioletta Dziarnowska - 2012 - Studia Z Kognitywistyki I Filozofii Umysłu 6.
    Tradycyjne teorie psychologii moralności podkreślają rolę rozumowania i „wyższych procesów poznawczych”, podczas gdy ostatnie prace z tego zakresu uwypuklają udział emocji. W niniejszym artykule rozpatruję dane pochodzące z neuroobrazowania wspierające teorię sądzenia moralnego, zgodnie z którą zarówno procesy „poznawcze”, jak i emocjonalne pełnią istotne a czasami wzajemnie konkurencyjne role. Dane te wskazują, że rejony mózgu związane z kontrolą poznawczą (przednia część zakrętu obręczy i grzbietowo boczna kora przedczołowa) są zaangażowane w rozwiązywanie trudnych moralnych dylematów, w których wartości utylitarne wymagają naruszenia (...)
     
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  27. How moral dilemmas illuminate cognitive structure.Joshua D. Greene - unknown
    In philosophy, a debate can live forever. Nowhere is this more evident than in ethics, a field that is fueled by apparently intractable dilemmas. To promote the wellbeing of many, may we sacrifice the rights of a few? If our actions are predetermined, can we be held responsible for them? Should people be judged on their intentions alone, or also by the consequences of their behavior? Is failing to prevent someone’s death as blameworthy as actively causing it? For generations, questions (...)
     
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  28. Trends in Cognitive Sciences–How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?Joshua Greene & Jonathan Haidt - 2010 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences. Web 13:02011-9.