Dans ce texte, nous proposons un cadre, qui vise à intégrer les contributions des approches constructionnistes et biologiques dans un domaine précis, celui des maladies mentales. Pour ce faire, nous utiliserons quelques propositions récentes faites par des philosophes de la biologie — plus spécifiquement les idées avancées par les tenants de la « théorie des systèmes développementaux » ainsi que la notion d’« enracinement génératif » .In this paper, we are proposing a framework to integrate the core insights of the (...) constructivist and biological approaches of mental illness. In order to do so, we will use some recent propositions by philosophers of biology, specifically ideas put forth by «developmental system theory» and the notion of «generative entrenchment». (shrink)

RésuméLes concepts de Ian Hacking ont apporté une contribution importante aux débats dans le domaine de la philosophie de la psychiatrie, qui est aussi au coeur de son Cours au Collège de France. Titulaire de la « Chaire de philosophie et d’histoire des concepts scientifiques » après Michel Foucault, il est l’auteur d’une réflexion sur la classification des troubles mentaux à partir de la problématique des natural kinds. Pour expliquer les cas d’études développés dans son enseignement parisien, nous revenons d’abord (...) sur une série de concepts, pour ensuite poser la question du statut des métaphores scientifiques, et enfin discuter les rapports entre les notions de « maladie mentale transitoire » et de culture-bound syndrome – cette dernière étant issue de la psychiatrie transculturelle canadienne. (shrink)

La maladie de l'ame... la belle expression platonicienne n'a de cesse d'etre d'actualite. Non seulement elle est prompte a revenir d'epoque en epoque, mais elle semble particulierement friande de la notre. Que cette maladie designe une vague tristesse, un taedium vitae, ou, plus grave, une depression, elle implique tout a la fois la souffrance morale et la souffrance physique. L'ame et le corps sont divises mais se retrouvent dans la douleur si bien que la maladie de l'ame (...) vient de ce que nous avons un corps. De ce constat paradoxal Jackie Pigeaud tire une histoire, celle du triomphe du dualisme, du fardeau de l'ame et du corps contraints a etre separes et ensemble a perpetuite. Cette histoire trouve son origine dans le monde grec, et plus exactement dans sa philosophie. La division entre maladies de l'ame et autres maladies, c'est-a-dire maladies du corps, appartient a la philosophie. La medecine aurait ete bien soulagee de cette partition. Est-ce a dire qu'elle n'entendait pas etre philosophique? Sans doute: Hippocrate en offre un bon exemple. L'accord, tacite, est le suivant: l'ame appartient au philosophe et le corps au medecin. Ciceron s'occupe des passions et Galien suspend son jugement des qu'il approche la psyche. Chacun y trouve son compte mais les consequences sont importantes: la partition du champ des maladies, la place du malade dans la societe, les traitements a apporter, notamment a la folie, dependent de ce dualisme initial. Si le legs de la medecine greco-romaine est riche, il est aussi fort lourd et trouve des developpements tout au long de l'histoire de la medecine, jusqu'a la constitution au XVIIIe siecle de la psychiatrie. D'une ecriture et d'une pensee personnelles et profondes, ce livre est un essai sur l'histoire de la pensee medicale, depuis l'Antiquite jusqu'a nos jours. La Maladie de l'ame a ete un succes des sa parution, et ce succes n'a pas ete dementi depuis. L'ouvrage n'etait malheureusement plus disponible: les livres ont leur destin commentait l'auteur. Avec cette edition revue et augmentee, accompagnee d'une preface nouvelle, le livre connait enfin le sort qu'il merite.Jackie Pigeaud est professeur emerite de litterature latine a l'Universite de Nantes et membre de l'Institut universitaire de France. On lui doit egalement, aux Belles Lettres, Folie et cures de la folie chez les medecins de l'Antiquite greco-romaine. La manie. (shrink)

Avant de répondre à la question : qu’est-ce qu’une maladie mentale pour Pinel ? il convient de se demander qu’est-ce qu’une maladie pour lui ? Or la réponse à cette question indique premièrement que pour Pinel, il n’y a pas sens à établir une distinction radicale entre maladie mentale et maladie physique. Malgré le fait que la tradition voit en lui un des fondateurs de la psychiatrie en tant que discipline autonome, pour Pinel, l’aliénation (...) ne constitue pas un type d’affection radicalement différent de la maladie physique. Deuxièmement, elle montre que pour Pinel il n’y a pas de continuité entre le temps de la maladie et la temporalité subjective du patient. Ce qui veut dire que pour lui, contrairement à la tradition psychiatrique subséquente, il n’y a pas de lien explicatif entre le trouble mental et l’histoire du sujet.Before answering the question : what is mental illness according to Pinel, it is necessary to ask, what is a disease according to him ? The answer to that question indicates first of all that for Pinel there is no fundamental distinction between mental illness and physical disease. In spite of the fact that tradition sees in him one of the founders of modern psychiatry as an independent discipline, for him madness does not constitute a radically different type of disease. This inquiry also shows that for Pinel there is no continuity between the time in which the disease takes place and the subjective time of the patient’s history. Therefore for him, contrary to what is the case in the subsequent psychiatric tradition there is not relation of explanation between the history of the subject and mental illness. (shrink)

We conducted a systematic analysis of conceptions of Alzheimer’s disease in the French specialized social workers press between 1990 and 2014, and compared these results to recent studies on autism and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) in the same field. Analysis of discourse about Alzheimer’s disease, and more generally on mental and psychosocial disorders in the specialized social workers press shows that social factors highly involved in these pathologies are never presented, as they are widely argued in the international literature, (...) and can be subject to specific socio-educational policies and practices. Most ways of Alzheimer’disease presented to French social workers belong to the therapeutic sphere, and reveal a growing medicalization of social work, allowing us to question the practice, institutional and training issues. (shrink)

The Collective Unconscious in the Age of Neuroscience brings the connection between C.G. Jung's theory of a collective unconscious, neuroscience, and personal experiences of severe mental illness to life. Hallie B. Durchslag uses narrative analysis to examine four autobiographical accounts of mental illness, including her own, and illuminate the interplay between psychic material and human physiology that Jung intuited to exist. Durchslag's unique study considers the links between expressions of the collective unconscious, such as myth, fairy tales, folk tales, and (...) 'big dreams', and the experiences of those diagnosed with severe mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. The author's personal narrative account of a psychotic episode is at its heart, bringing both an intimate foundation and exceptional insight to the book. With reference to neuroscientific and genetic research throughout, The Collective Unconscious in the Age of Neuroscience highlights the gap between depth psychological notions of etiology and treatment, highlights patterns of collective material in the qualitative experience of these genetic and biological disorders, and explores how the efficacy of pharmacological treatment sheds light on Jung's theoretical model. The Collective Unconscious in the Age of Neuroscience will be essential reading for academics and students of Jungian and post-Jungian studies, consciousness, neuroscience and mental health. It will also provide unique insight for analytical psychologists interested in severe mental illness and the collective unconscious. (shrink)

Kant’s conception of mental illness is unlikely to satisfy contemporary readers. His classifications of mental illness are often fluid and ambiguous, and he seems to attribute to human beings at least some responsibility for preventing mental illness. In spite of these apparent disadvantages, I argue that Kant’s account of mental illness can be illuminating to his views about the normative dimensions of human cognition. In contrast to current understandings of mental illness, Kant’s account is what I refer to as “non-pathological.” (...) That is, most mental illnesses are for Kant continuous with normally functioning cognition. Someone with a healthy reason can easily fall into mental illness and someone with mental illness can (perhaps not as easily) re-establish healthy reason. By accepting a non-pathological definition of mental illness, it follows for Kant that humans have more agency and responsibility regarding their mental health than current views allow, which explains why several of his writings aim to prescribe a “diet of the mind” (2:271). Contrary to popular readings of Kant as a champion of reason’s power, Kant’s conception of mental illness shows that he recognizes how fragile human reason can be. (shrink)

Luke Demaitre's Leprosy in Premodern Medicine: A Malady of the Whole Body is a highly interesting study of the medical history of leprosy and the medical and social perceptions on leprosy that have been around for centuries. Remarkably, it is likely that leprosy will disappear from the face of the Earth in our generation, thanks to the development of a curative treatment and its increasing availability (although the battle has not yet been won completely). Demaitre's book is a very good (...) read not only for its information about leprosy but also for all interested in or affected by the social phenomenon of stigma. In illnesses such as leprosy, HIV/AIDS, epilepsy, and mental disorders such as schizophrenia, the stigma attached to the condition may be worse than the condition itself. (shrink)

Dans ce texte, je suggère que les personnes souffrant d’anorexie mentale s’infligent une forme particulière de violence épistémique lorsqu’elles ignorent volontairement les symptômes de leur maladie. Pour ce faire, dans une démarche inspirée par celle de Havi Carel, je présente d’abord le rapport particulier qu’entretiennent les personnes souffrant d’anorexie avec leur corps, et ce, à l’aide de trois axes d’analyse empruntés à Susan Bordo, soit le dualisme Corps/Esprit, les idéaux de contrôle et d’autonomie, et les rapports de genre. (...) Je propose ensuite le concept de violence épistémique auto-infligée en montrant que l’ignorance volontaire de la faim a pour objectif de préserver l’identité des personnes vivant avec cette maladie comme autonomes et en contrôle, autrement dit comme n’étant pas « malades ». (shrink)

This text is an innovative exploration of philosophy and madness in the context of the critical engagement of Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology with Freudian psychoanalysis. Included is a play in which, after a mental breakdown, Martin Heidegger undergoes psychoanalytic treatment from Dr. Medard Boss. Boss is essentially caught between two intellectual giants: his patient, Heidegger, who challenges him to evolve beyond traditional Freudian psychoanalysis, and his mentor, Freud, who acts as a “ghostly” consultant in facilitating Heidegger’s return to health. The dialogue (...) of the play consists of actual quotes taken from the major thinkers themselves, which enhances the authenticity of this fictitious production. In addition, the theoretical perspectives of Freud, Heidegger, Boss, and Ludwig Binswanger are included to enhance the readers’ background knowledge. In the process of disclosing these brilliant theorists, this book uncovers what each orientation has to offer the others. (shrink)

O artigo tem por objetivo interpretar como Foucault concebe a possibilidade da cura nos discursos e práticas psicológicas, durante sua fase protoarqueológica. Para atingir tal fim, discorre sobre os dois textos mais importantes dessa fase ? Maladie!Mentale!et!Personnalité e a introdução à Le Rêve et l'?Existence ? evidenciando como nesses textos se desenha uma concepção psicopatológica que deve subsidiar uma prática psicoterápica. Constata-se, no entanto, que reina uma contradição inerente aos dois textos, em que ora se completam, ora conflitam (...) no modo de conceber a doença mental. Terminamos assim por demarcar toda a intensidade dessa contradição, sublinhando a indecisão teórica de Foucault sobre o estatuto da psicologia. (shrink)

This text is an innovative exploration of philosophy and madness in the context of the critical engagement of Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology with Freudian psychoanalysis. Included is a play in which, after a mental breakdown, Martin Heidegger undergoes psychoanalytic treatment from Dr. Medard Boss. Boss is essentially caught between two intellectual giants: his patient, Heidegger, who challenges him to evolve beyond traditional Freudian psychoanalysis, and his mentor, Freud, who acts as a “ghostly” consultant in facilitating Heidegger’s return to health. The dialogue (...) of the play consists of actual quotes taken from the major thinkers themselves, which enhances the authenticity of this fictitious production. In addition, the theoretical perspectives of Freud, Heidegger, Boss, and Ludwig Binswanger are included to enhance the readers’ background knowledge. In the process of disclosing these brilliant theorists, this book uncovers what each orientation has to offer the others. (shrink)

Cet article tente d’éclairer l’obscurité qui entoure la réalité dans laquelle vivent ou survivent les demandeurs d’asile pendant des mois, voire des années. Si, pour beaucoup d’entre eux, cette réalité reste « humainement supportable », pour d’autres, elle constitue un environnement pathogène propice à la production de la maladie mentale et physique. L’auteur souligne ici l’importance de ne pas réduire un sujet à ses appartenances culturelles ni de faire de lui uniquement un être exilé. Il est primordial de (...) prendre en considération l’ensemble du parcours subjectif et collectif qui se dessine avant, pendant et après le voyage vers la terre promise. Ce parcours s’éclaire autant des représentations du réel du sujet exilé que de la réalité du pays d’origine et du pays d’accueil. (shrink)

Dans ce manuscrit du début des années 1950, Foucault met en relief la perspective freudienne qui substitue à l’approche biologique de la maladie fondée sur l’évolutionnisme une démarche basée sur la compréhension de sa signification psychologique. Cependant, puisque le point de vue évolutif n’est jamais abandonné par Freud, se pose la question de savoir comment, dans la définition psychanalytique de la maladie et de ses rapports à la personnalité, se distribuent les éléments d’une analyse évolutive et ceux d’une (...) compréhension significative : quel équilibre peut être instauré entre eux, et quelle image de l’homme malade en résulte? En outre, si la maladie a un sens, et si elle se définit par un ensemble de réactions significatives et cohérentes, en quoi est-elle maladie? (shrink)

Le but de cet article n'est pas de fournir une quelconque interprétation de la pensée de Deleuze ou de fournir des clés de lectures pour comprendre l'anti Oedipe. Plus modestement je tente de fournir un angle d'approche de cet ouvrage. Mon point de départ est le suivant : bien que Deleuze ait rédigé un ouvrage désormais classique sur Hume, ce dernier n'est que rarement cité parmi les sources de l'anti Oedipe. De là, j'ai esquissé quelques rapprochements afin de permettre d'éclairer (...) l'approche deleuzienne de la maladie mentale. (shrink)

Ce livre s'emploie d'abord a dechiffrer des traces, des lignes, des figures naturelles, ensuite a tirer des regles generales de comprehension afin de fonder une science morphogenetique. Un paysage en devient un probleme. Il ne se cantonne pas dans la seule geologie critique. Il s'attache a montrer les ressources offertes par une science de l'espace, c'est-a-dire l'etudes des etalements, des rencontres et des distributions. La projection sur le sol des donnees peut les eclairer. Plus, la psychologie, la maladie (...) class='Hi'>mentale ont elles-memes beneficie de cette optique topographique, parce que les hommes ne se concoivent qu'a travers les reseaux et les emplacements qui les definissent. L'espace n'est plus un cadre ou un contenant, mais un operateur decisif d'analyse et de constitution. Le savant gagne a se situer en des points-centres ou noeuds qui autorisent une lecture synoptique, de meme que les groupes se doivent d'explorer, voire de modifier les positions de leurs elements, ainsi que les liens qui les joignent. Cette neo-geographie va d'une science du paysage et des indices a l'examen des rapports souterrains, des chemins insoupconnes et des communications sociales. (shrink)

La savoir pyschiatrique et la pensée philosophique entretiennent des relations étroites d'intercritique et d'éclairage réciproque. La dynamique de ces échanges est sans cesse relancée par la croissance des connaissances sur les maladies mentales, l'organisation du cerveau et par les mutations de la société. La sémiologie, les interprétations psychopathologiques, la thérapeutique entraînent le praticien au seuil des cercles de la métaphysique de la connaissance et de l'intersubjectivité. Le savoir de la psychiatrie incite à reformuler certaines interrogations philosophiques essentielles. Il permet d'esquisser (...) les tracés des nouvelles frontières des " topiques " du psychisme humain et des diverses représentations et théories de l'Esprit. (shrink)

Since the time of Hippocrates, madness has typically been viewed through the lens of disease, dysfunction, and defect. In 'Madness', philosopher of science Justin Garson presents a radically different paradigm for conceiving of madness and the forms that it takes. In this paradigm, which he calls madness-as-strategy, madness is neither a disease nor a defect, but a designed feature, like the heart or lungs.

L'oeuvre de Pinel a donné lieu à des évaluations tout à fait contradictoires : certains, comme Pierre Pichot, Kavka, Zilboorg et Gladys Swain ont estimé, en effet, que Pinel n’avait pas été sensible à l'influence de la psychologie « sensualiste » et « associationniste »; Pichot et Zilboorg pour en conclure que ce que souhaitait Pinel, c'était en fait une psychiatrie sans psychologie ; Kavka et Swain pour en déduire l’opposé. Mon intention est de montrer brièvement : l) que dans (...) l’esprit de l'Idéologie il n’y a pas fondamentalement de contradiction entre le physiologisme organiciste et la psychologie associationniste , ce qui explique la coexistence du traitement médical et du traitement moral chez Pinel dans le traitement des maladies mentales, y compris la folie raisonnante ; 2) que l’influence de Condillac sur Pinel est beaucoup plus grande qu’on ne le croit généralement ; et 3) que Pinel a décidément bien peu à voir avec la psychanalyse.Pinel's works have been evaluated in completely contradictory ways : some, like Pierre Pichot, Kavka, Zilboorg and Gladys Swain have indeed considered that Pinel was not sensitive to the influence of "sensualist" and "associationist" psychology. Pichot and Zilboorg conclude from this that what Pinel was hoping for was in fact psychiatry without psychology. Kavka and Swain deduce the opposite. 1) intended to show, briefly : I) that in the minds of the ideologists there is fundamentally no contradiction between organicist physiologism and association nist psychology , which explains the coexistence of medical treatment and moral treatment of mental illness, including mania without delirium, in Pinel's work ; 2) that Condillac's influence on Pinel is much greater than is generally believed ; and 3) that Pinel has really very little to do with psychoanalysis. (shrink)

Henri Maldiney est ancien élève de l’Ecole normale supérieure. Il fut prisonnier en Allemagne pendant la guerre. Il est un des représentants en France du courant philosophique de la phénoménologie. Ses champs de réflexion concernent la maladie mentale, l'art et, bien sûr la philosophie. Il a influencé nombre de psychiatres, de philosophes et d'artistes. La meilleure façon de proposer une introduction à la pensée de Henri Maldiney, c’est peut-être de faire partager une expérience personnelle de rencontre. Bernard Rigaud, (...) en travaillant sur différents sujets, a croisé et recroisé de façon régulière la pensée de ce philosophe. À chaque occasion, il a eu le sentiment d’être éclairé et inspiré. Partant des différentes modalités du mal-être, la pensée d’Henri Maldiney devient une pensée sur l’être. Mais comment penser ce qui est? Le philosophe nous conduit sur les voies de l’art, et sur les voies des dysfonctionnements, de la folie, de la dépression... (shrink)

O presente trabalho pretende comparar o debate ocorrido entre Georges Canguilhem e Robert Pagès em Qu’est-ce que la Psychologie?, de 1956, com os escritos de Michel Foucault publicados nos anos 1950. Para isso, após alguns apontamentos históricos, faz-se uma breve análise dos textos de Foucault publicados em 1954, Maladie Mentale et Personnalité e a Introduction à Le Rêve et l’Existence. Os textos de Foucault são então confrontados com o debate entre Canguilhem e Robert Pagès, que por sua vez (...) são analisados e comparados com outros dois textos de Foucault publicados em 1957, La Psychologie de 1850 à 1950 e La Recherche Scientifique et la Psychologie. Tenta-se mostrar que o início da trajetória de Foucault não apenas dialoga com diversos temas sobre a Psicologia e as Ciências Humanas colocados por Canguilhem e Pagès, mas também ensaia respostas cujo teor será mais visível em Folie et Déraison e na Introduction à l’Anthropologie de Kant. (shrink)

Notre propos s’inscrit dans la perspective d’une anthropologie en vue d’une psychiatrie phénoménologique ou Daseinsanalyse, c’est-à-dire d’une compréhension de l’être de l’homme et de la possibilité de son aliénation sous la forme de ce qu’on appelle traditionnellement les maladies mentales et qu’on pourrait également appeler les troubles de l’existence. Ce projet est né de la conviction que la psychiatrie, qu’elle puise ses principes du côté des neurosciences, de la psychanalyse, du béhavior...

RESUMO: O presente artigo pretende problematizar, preliminarmente, o "problema antropológico" segundo a arqueologia de Michel Foucault. Partindo de teses populares da Psicologia, em particular, e das ciências humanas, em geral, sobre o "Homem", este texto primeiramente correlaciona essas teses com as problemáticas dos textos foucaultianos dos anos 1950, a Introdução a Sonho e Existência e Maladie Mentale et Personnalité, para então mostrar como os textos "arqueológicos" do autor se configuram como respostas iniciais às questões dos textos de 1954, (...) já começando pelos textos publicados em 1957. Os exemplares privilegiados são História da Loucura e As Palavras e as Coisas: após circunscrever aspectos singulares de cada argumentação, o artigo pretende explorar em que sentido os textos se reúnem sob a questão mais geral de uma crítica arqueológica à questão antropológica dos "saberes" modernos. //////////////// ABSTRACT: This article aims to discuss, on a preliminary basis, the "anthropological question" in the context of Michel Foucault's "archeological" texts. The paper starts with some popular assertions and postulates regarding "man" in the human sciences, based on historical examples in the history of psychology. Secondly, the article correlates these postulates with Foucauldian texts published in the 1950s, each one providing a singular project for an anthropological view. Finally, it is shown how the "archaeological" texts can be read as initial responses to the questions formulated in 1954 and 1957. The analysis concentrates on Madness and Civilization and The Order of Things, exploring the differences of each argument and discussing how each book contemplates the general question of an archaeological criticism of the anthropological problem. (shrink)

The paper focuses on Michel Foucault's early monograph, Maladie Mentale et Psychologie (1954/62); specifically the focus is on the issue of anxiety, which Foucault treats as central to pathological signification. Through a close reading of the text of Maladie Mentale and a comparison of the work to interpretive trends in French psychoanalytic theory in the 1950s and 1960s, the paper argues that anxiety as a discursive phenomenon overruns psychological discourse as well as Foucault's own theoretical engagement (...) of such discourse. In conclusion, the paper finds that the voice of unreason Foucault detects in psychological discourse is the anxiety of theory confined within the limits of individual psychology. (shrink)

Philosophes et psychiatres nourrissent des capillarités secrètes et des questionnements communs. Souvent, la méditation du philosophe se met à l'école de ces situations et de ces visages de l'humain malade qui habitent des masques que l'on croit inhabitables, "horla", et que lui rapporte le psychiatre. Sous le souci de biologiser la maladie mentale, le savoir et le savoir-faire de la psychiatrie font le pari de l'humanité et de la nécessité de la relation, demandant: où demeure-t-il celui dont on (...) dit qu'il est un "demeuré"? Où est vraiment l'homme, lorsque nous découvrons combien nous sommes pressés de tracer très vite, trop vite, la frontière entre le délire et la réalité? (shrink)

Antipsychotic medications are sometimes imposed on psychiatric patients deemed dangerous to themselves and others. This is based on the assumption that treatment is safe and effective, and that recovery depends on biological adjustment. Under new laws, patients can be required to remain on these medications after leaving hospitals. However, survivors attest that forced treatment used as a restraint can feel like torture, while the consequences of withdrawal can also be severe.

Mental disorders have been suggested to differ from somatic diseases because they lack an organic correlate. We show that this argument is both empirically wrong and theoretically irrelevant, because diseases are defined by functional impairments and not biological variation. Due to human diversity, a multitude of functions can be defined, and any selection of medically relevant functional impairments is necessarily value-based. We suggest that such values include individual survival and living in a shared world with others, and that their definition (...) requires public debate and a critical reflection by Philosophical Anthropology. However, the presence of functional impairments that are generally relevant for human life and survival only fulfils the so-called disease criterion, which is necessary but not sufficient to diagnose a clinically relevant malady. This would only be justified if such functional impairments cause individual harm, either because they are accompanied by suffering (the illness criterion) or because they interfere with basic activities of daily living such as personal hygiene and food intake (the sickness criterion of a clinically relevant malady). We apply this theory to mental disorders, conclude that only a fraction of such “disorders” currently listed in international classifications of diseases are clinically relevant mental maladies, suggest focusing on the needs of persons with such maladies and recommend avoiding “pathologization” of human diversity. (shrink)

Most mental disorders affect only a small segment of the population. On the reasonable assumption that minds or brains are prone to occasional malfunction, these disorders do not seem to pose distinctive explanatory problems. Depression, however, because it is so prevalent and costly, poses a conundrum that some try to explain by characterizing it as an adaptation—a trait that exists because it performed fitness-enhancing functions in ancestral populations. Heretofore, proposed evolutionary explanations of depression did not focus on thought processes; instead, (...) they emphasized that it facilitates navigation of adverse social circumstances or promotes immune response to infectious agents. According to a new hypothesis, the “analytical rumination hypothesis” (ARH), however, depression’s crucial adaptive trait is rumination—negative, intrusive thought. ARH holds that, (i) social dilemmas trigger depressed mood; (ii) depressed mood induces changes in body systems that facilitate ruminative analysis aimed at solving dilemmas; and, (iii) depressive rumination is a fitness-enhancing trait that was selected for in evolutionary time. Jointly, (i)~(iii) imply that we should not think of rumination as a disorder; instead, it is a trade-off, an eminently rational one. In the same way that fever solves a problem—coordination of the immune system in response to infection—so too does depressive rumination solve a problem, a social dilemma, albeit at the cost of inducing anhedonia and other maladies. But they argue that the cost is worthwhile, something that should be endured “until the problem is solved.” First, we argue that there are two distinct types of rumination, brooding and pondering; the former is associated with a disposition for depression, not the latter. But only the latter has the problem-solving capabilities that ARH requires. Second, recent brain imaging studies of depression reveal resting state hypoactivity in lateral regions and hyperactivity in paralimbic regions; this asymmetric pattern correlates with heightened levels of brooding, self-focused rumination. In other words, on the personal level, patients are trapped within self, isolated from the external world and suffused with negative affect; on the subpersonal level, this pattern is reflected by an asymmetric pattern of lateral vs. paralimbic resting state activity. Third, we proceed to conjecture that rational responses (e.g., pondering) to social dilemmas are those that strike a balance between internal and external considerations in the process of belief formation. Fourth, because the asymmetric resting state activity blocks those who suffer with depression from accessing and processing potentially positive stimuli from the external world, the capacity for rational, analytic response—hence, problem-solving—is constrained. Fifth, it follows that, although there might be conditions for which suffering should be endured rather than pharmacologically alleviated, depression is not one of those. Indeed, in view of the effects of the asymmetric resting state pattern, it is unlikely that depressive rumination would have been useful even for ancestral populations. (shrink)

_In the light of Sri Aurobindo's philosophy, this paper looks into some of the problems of contemporary man as an individual, a member of society, a citizen of his country, a component of this world, and of nature itself. Concepts like Science; Nature,;Matter; Mental Being; Mana-purusa; Prana-purusa; Citta-purusa; Nation-ego and Nation-soul; True and False Subjectivism; World-state and World-union; Religion of Humanism are the focus of this paper. Nature: Beneath the diversity and uniqueness of the different elements in Nature there is (...) an essential unity that not only allows for this diversity but even supports it. Nature is both a benefactor and a force: a benefactor, because it acts to carry out the evolution of mankind; a force, because it also supplies the necessary energy and momentum to achieve it. Natural calamities: If mankind can quieten the tsunamis and cyclones and droughts and earthquakes that rage within, and behave with care and compassion towards Nature, not exploiting, denuding, or denigrating it, there is a strong possibility that Nature too will behave with equal care and compassion towards man and spare him the natural calamities than rend him asunder. Science: The limitation of science become obvious, according to Sri Aurobindo, when we realize that it has mastered knowledge of processes and helped in the creation of machinery but is ignorant of the foundations of being and, therefore, cannot perfect our nature or our life. Science and philosophy: The insights of philosophy could become heuristic and algorithmic models for scientific experimentation. Matter: An interesting aspect of Sri Aurobindo's philosophy is his acceptance of the reality of matter even while highlighting its inadequacies; the ultimate goal, according to him, is the divination of matter itself. Purusa: If the mana-purusa (mental being) were to log on to the genuine citta-purusa (psychic formation), without necessarily logging off from the prana-purusa (frontal formation), it may help quieten the turbulences within, which may be a prelude to the quietening of the disturbances without, whether it be physical maladies, cravings (for food, fame, fortune, etc.), destructive competitiveness; or wars, terrorism, ethnic conflicts, communal riots, and the other such social maladies that afflict mankind today. Nation-ego (false subjectivism) and Nation-soul (true subjectivism): Sri Aurobindo considers Nation-ego an example of false subjectivism, in which national identity and pride are stressed to prove one's superiority and suppress or exploit the rest. The Nation-soul, as an example of true subjectivism, attempts to capture one's traditional heritage and values in its pristine form, not as a reaction to hurts and angers or as compensation for real or imagined injuries or indignities of the past. World-state (false subjectivism) and World-union (true subjectivism): Similarly, a World-state founded upon the principle of centralization and uniformity, a mechanical and formal unity, is an example of false subjectivism, while a World-union founded upon the principle of liberty and variation in a free and intelligent unity is an example of true subjectivism Human actualization: Even if two human beings are similar, in so far as they are human beings, there is so much diversity between them. Part of the movement towards human self-actualization lies in the fact that this diversity should not be forcibly curbed, as also the realization that beneath all that appears disparate there is an essential unity. Also, man is not the end product of evolution but an intermediate stage between the animal and the divine. Moreover, he is endowed with consciousness that enables him to cooperate with the forces of evolution and speed up and telescope the next stage of evolution._. (shrink)

Why do 'maladies of the soul' such as hysteria, anxiety disorders, or depression wax and wane over time? Through a study of the history of psychiatry, Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen provocatively argues that most mental illnesses are not, in fact, diseases but the product of varying expectations shared and negotiated by therapists and patients. With a series of fascinating historical vignettes, stretching from Freud's creation of false memories of sexual abuse in his early hysterical patients to today's promotion and marketing of depression (...) by drug companies, Making Minds and Madness offers a powerful critique of all the theories, such as psychoanalysis and biomedical psychiatry, that claim to discover facts about the human psyche while, in reality, producing them. Borch-Jacobsen proposes such objectivizing approaches should be abandoned in favor of a constructionist and relativist psychology that recognizes the artifactual and interactive character of psychic productions instead of attempting to deny or control it. (shrink)

A multifactorial and growing crisis of health care systems in the developed world has affected medicine. In order to provide rational responses, some central concepts of the past, such as the definitions of health and disease, need to be updated. For this purpose physicians should initiate a new debate. As a point of departure the following definitions are proposed: Health is a dynamic state of wellbeing characterized by a physical, mental and social potential, which satisfies the demands of a life (...) commensurate with age, culture, and personal responsibility. If the potential is insufficient to satisfy these demands the state is disease. This term includes sickness, illness, ill health, and malady. The described potential is divided into a biologically given and a personally acquired partial potential. Their proportions vary throughout the life cycle. The proposed definitions render it empirically possible to diagnose persons as healthy or diseased and to apportion some of the responsibility for their state of health to individuals themselves. Treatment strategies should always consider three therapeutic routes: improvements of the biologically given and of the personally acquired partial potentials and adaptations of the demands of life. These consequences favourably contrast with those resulting from the WHO-definition of health. (shrink)

Patañjali’s Yoga Sutra (second century CE) is the basic text of one of the nine canonical schools of Indian philosophy. In it the legendary author lays down the blueprint for success in yoga, now practiced the world over. Patañjali draws upon many ideas of his time, and the result is a unique work of Indian moral philosophy that has been the foundational text for the practice of yoga since. The Yoga Sutra sets out a sophisticated theory of moral psychology and (...) perhaps the oldest theory of psychoanalysis. For Patañjali, present mental maladies are a function of subconscious tendencies formed in reaction to past experiences. He argues that people are not powerless against such forces and that they can radically alter their lives through yoga—a process of moral transformation and perfection, which brings the body and mind of a person in line with their personhood. Accompanying this translation is an extended introduction that explains the challenges of accurately translating Indian philosophical texts, locates the historical antecedents of Patañjali’s text and situates Patanjali’s philosophy within the history of scholastic Indian philosophy. This is explicitly a philosophical translation of the text. (shrink)

It is argued that alcoholism, and substance addiction generally, is a disease. It is not of its nature chronic or progressive, although it is in serious cases. It is better viewed as a psychological disease than a neurological one. It is argued that each time an alcoholic takes a drink, this is the result of choice; however, in cases of serious affliction, such choices are compulsive and may be called 'involuntary' in that they are made against the subject's will, motivated (...) by an overwhelmingly powerful desire that he wishes he did not have and not to act on. Alternative accounts in terms social learning theory and behavioral economics are critiqued. The conception of alcoholism as a tripartite disease composed of a 'physical allergy,' a mental obsession, and a 'spiritual malady' is defended from a contemporary scientific point of view. (shrink)