This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction A Critical Review of Two Earlier Approaches to Critical Thinking, Modern and Postmodern Critical Thinking as Ethical Reflection Notes References.

Despite the fact that business people and business students often cast doubt on the relevance of universal moral principles in business, the rejection of relativism is a precondition for business ethics to get off the ground. This paper proposes an educational strategy to overcome the philosophical confusions about relativism in which business people and students are often trapped. First, the paper provides some conceptual distinctions and clarifications related to moral relativism, particularism, and virtue (...) ethics. More particularly, it revisits arguments demonstrating that virtues in business are not in contradiction with the relevance of universal principles, despite the fact that virtue ethics is often identified with particular relationships and contexts. It goes on to show how students and managers, but also researchers, often mix up radically different conceptions of moral relativism. It is also argued that this confusion is in part created by the cross-cultural management literature in which the methodological stance of the value-freedom of the social sciences is, in a perplexingly mistaken way, transformed into a rejection of all normative discussion and a plea for relativism. The remainder of the paper presents some tools that may be helpful in steering people toward less simplistic views about moral relativism and virtue ethics. It further argues that it is equally important to spell out that moral universalism can be understood in a humble way, without implying either arrogant ethnocentrism or omniscience, as part of an ongoing debate that progresses gradually. (shrink)

Following from the critiques of moral relativism advanced by philosophers such as Gilbert Harman and J.L. Mackie, the author explores philosophical challenges that educators face in philosophy courses. Specifically, the author accounts for the new wave of moral relativism and its effects on classroom discussions in philosophy courses. The purpose of this paper is to outline various pedagogical approaches that help with identifying student relativism. Unlike philosophical relativism, student relativism can be identified as (...) an unreflective response to or attitude towards moral philosophical issues. The author contends that the proper identification of student relativism will allow educators to effectively respond to and be able to decipher its philosophical validity in order to improve students’ ability to comprehend philosophical discourse. In addition to the identification of various aspects student relativism the author seeks to qualify the ways in which it functions in student college life. (shrink)

In this essay I discuss a novel engineering ethics class that has the potential to significantly decrease the likelihood that students will inadvertently or unintentionally act unethically in the future. This class is different from standard engineering ethics classes in that it focuses on the issue of why people act unethically and how students can avoid a variety of hurdles to ethical behavior. I do not deny that it is important for students to develop cogent (...) class='Hi'>moral reasoning and ethical decision-making as taught in traditional college-level ethics classes, but as an educator, I aim to help students apply moral reasoning in specific, real-life situations so they are able to make ethical decisions and act ethically in their academic careers and after they graduate. Research in moral psychology provides evidence that many seemingly irrelevant situational factors affect the moral judgment of most moral agents and frequently lead agents to unintentionally or inadvertently act wrongly. I argue that, in addition to teaching college students moral reasoning and ethical decision-making, it is important to: 1. Teach students about psychological and situational factors that affect people’s ethical judgments/behaviors in the sometimes stressful, emotion-laden environment of the workplace; 2. Guide students to engage in critical reflection about the sorts of situations they personally might find ethically challenging before they encounter those situations; and 3. Provide students with strategies to help them avoid future unethical behavior when they encounter these situations in school and in the workplace. (shrink)

This essay examines why some introductory ethics students are averse to any sort of moral requirement. It provides a series of descriptions and techniques to help teachers recognize, diagnose, and engage such students. After discussing the nature of student aversions to moral obligations, I discuss three causes and several ways to engage each: 1) Student Relativism; 2) student fears and misunderstandings of obligations; and 3) the phenomenon of what I call fetishized liberty, which leads to (...) the “liberty paradox”—where students actively fight for liberties, yet actively give up or fail to use the ones they currently have. (shrink)

Judge and Be Judged offers insights into moral life and moral judgment that aim to help in understanding our society's tendency towards either fundamentalism or relativism. By examining the social function of shame, the possibility of cross-cultural understanding, and obstacles to moral judgment in the classroom, this book charts a path that helps to avoid both fundamentalism and relativism.

One of the major concerns of advocates of common morality is that respect for cultural diversity may result in moral relativism. On their part, proponents of culturally responsive bioethics are concerned that common morality may result in moral imperialism because of the asymmetry of power in the world. It is in this context that critics argue that global bioethics is impossible because of the difficulties to address these two theoretical concerns. In this paper, I argue that global (...) bioethics is possible if we adopt a culturally responsive and self-critical attitude towards our moral values and those of others. I use the example of women’s reproductive autonomy in indigenous African culture to show that the difference between the leading Euro-American and indigenous African construal of autonomy is that the former ascribes greater weight on individual self-determination while the latter emphasizes responsibilities towards the community. One develops dignity in virtue of their capacity for communing with others. Hence, women have rights, but as members of the community, they also have obligations including the duty to procreate. The involvement of the family in reproductive decisions does not contravene women’s dignity and human rights. In applying the principle of autonomy in this communitarian context, one has to be sensitive to these ontological and moral specificities. The aim of global bioethics should not be to reach common grounds at all costs; any common norms should be the result of a negotiated democratic dialogue between cultures and not the result of imposition by the preponderant culture. (shrink)

The paper describes a two week course that has been offered as a special study module to intermediate level undergraduate medical students at Dundee University Medical School for the past five years. The course requires students to research the various aspects of ethical dilemmas that they have identified themselves, and to “teach” these issues to their colleagues in a short PowerPoint presentation as well as to prepare an extended 3000 word essay discussion. The course specifically asks students (...) not to disclose their own ethical positions, as these are probably still in formation and the objective is to promote critical thinking capacity in ethical and moral issues as a prelude to the development of practical skills in dealing with clinical problems. The course is easy to resource for the school and has received universally high evaluations from the students since its inception. (shrink)

This study used design-based research approaches to investigate student plagiarism in an online course, with the objective of determining the instructional interventionist strategies that can help students avoid the practice in online courses. Twenty eight undergraduate students who were engaged in a semester-long online course in Educational Technology at a private university in Ghana participated in the study. Drawing on relevant learning and related theories, the study implemented different learning activities pertaining to plagiarism at regular intervals during (...) the semester, and then subsequently analyzed students’ individual and group course writings for evidence of plagiarism. Findings reveal that regular and varied instructional interventions helps students reduce and eventually avoid plagiarism in the online learning environment. Students were also found to plagiarize to a much lesser extent when they worked in groups than when they worked individually. Implications of these findings for the design and management of online learning courses in higher education are briefly discussed. (shrink)

I argue that evolutionary strategies of kin selection and game-theoretic reciprocity are apt to generate agent-centered and agent- neutral moral intuitions, respectively. Such intuitions are the building blocks of moral theories, resulting in a fundamental schism between agent-centered theories on the one hand and agent-neutral theories on the other. An agent-neutral moral theory is one according to which everyone has the same duties and moral aims, no matter what their personal interests or interpersonal relationships. Agent-centered (...) class='Hi'>moral theories deny this and include at least some prescriptions that include ineliminable indexicals. I argue that there are no rational means of bridging the gap between the two types of theories; nevertheless this does not necessitate skepticism about the moral—we might instead opt for an ethical relativism in which the truth of moral statements is relativized to the perspective of moral theories on either side of the schism. Such a relativism does not mean that any ethical theory is as good as any other; some cannot be held in reflective equilibrium, and even among those that can, there may well be pragmatic reasons that motivate the selection of one theory over another. But if no sort of relativism is deemed acceptable, then it is hard to avoid moral skepticism. (shrink)

We present an instrument developed to explain to students the concept of the personal ethical threshold. The PET represents an individual's susceptibility to situational pressure in his or her organization that makes moral behavior more personally difficult. Further, the PET varies according to the moral intensity of the issue at hand, such that individuals are less vulnerable to situational pressure for issues of high moral intensity, i.e., those with greater consequences for others. A higher PET reflects (...) an individual's greater likelihood of adhering to the morally correct path, even in the face of high situational pressures and low moral intensity. PET questionnaires were completed by 506 students representing eight business schools throughout the United States. Relationships between respondents' PET and their gender, age, and major field of study, as well as the geographical location of their school, are explored. Results indicate that older students have higher PETs and that students attending schools in the northeastern part of the United States have lower PETs. These findings are discussed. It is argued that the PET instrument can be used to help students identify organizational pressures and intrapersonal processes that can impede their moral behavior in organizations. (shrink)

Metaethical relativism is the view that whether a moral claim is true depends on the standards endorsed by an individual or society. This view is attractive because it allows one to hold that moral claims can be true or false in an ordinary correspondence sense, without being committed to the view that moral claims state objective facts. But what could it mean to say that a whether a moral claim is true depends on an individual (...) or society’s standards? How could a single claim be true or false in an ordinary sense, and yet be true for some people while false for others? This thesis defends a certain answer to this question: metaethical truth relativism. Metaethical relativists have historically endorsed a different view: content relativism, which is the view that the semantic contents of moral claims vary across contexts of use. However, semanticists working outside metaethics have recently shown that an alternative exists, namely truth relativism: the view that the truth values of moral contents vary across contexts. Metaethicists have been slow to investigate the significance of this discovery. This is surprising, because truth relativism appears to avoid some of the most influential objections to content relativist views. Thus, this development in semantics appears to offer an exciting new direction for research on relativism in metaethics. The scope of this thesis is not narrowly semantic, however. Questions in moral semantics often interconnect with questions in substantive metaethics, and the question of whether ethical thought and talk is semantically relativistic is no exception. Therefore, while the core of the this thesis focuses on moral semantics, it also contains a fair amount of substantive metaethical material, located primarily in the first and final chapters. The plan of the thesis is as follows. Chapters 1 & 2 begin with a discussion of the most historically influential argument for metaethical relativism: the argument from disagreement. Chapter 1 discusses an epistemic version of this argument, but concludes that this version provides only limited evidence for relativism. However, chapter 2 introduces a different version of the argument, with a more semantic focus, and begins to make the case that this argument provides evidence not only for metaethical relativism broadly construed, but for truth relativism in particular. The broad strokes of this argument are that there can be moral disagreements which are faultless and furthermore that only truth relativism can vindicate the sense that these are genuine disagreements, rather than mere differences of opinion. Chapter 2 presents empirical evidence for the claim that putative moral disagreements can be faultless. Chapters 3 and 4 then take a deep dive into the topic of disagreement. Chapter 3 develops a positive account of disagreement which is available only to truth relativists. And chapter 4 advances detailed arguments against contextualist accounts of disagreement. Chapters 3 and 4 together thus defend in detail the claim that truth relativism can, while content relativism cannot, account for the sense that there is genuine disagreement in the relevant cases. Chapters 2 through 4, therefore, form a single long argument for truth relativism. They show that there is a compelling argument for relativism broadly construed, and that deep analysis of the issues surrounding this argument favour truth relativism over content relativism. Chapter 5 zooms back out to the broader metaethical landscape, discussing two remaining objections to relativism. The first objection is that relativism has objectionably subjectivistic implications, and the second is that moral standards cannot helpfully be understood as determined by societies. In the course of responding to these objections, natural opportunities to flesh out the substantive metaethical commitments of the theory will arise. And this will set us up to conclude with a brief comparison of truth relativism with some of the other main options in the space of substantive metaethical theory. (shrink)

What constitutes a just war? How does race matter in America? Are the interests of corporations the same as those of the public when it comes to the environment or public health? Middle and high school history, literature, and science classes abound with important moral, social, and political questions. But under pressure to cover required materials and out of fear of raising controversy, teachers often avoid classroom discussions of questions of profound importance to students and to society. (...) This book investigates how schools can responsibly take an active role in moral education while honoring their academic mission. Using extensive observations in public, Catholic, and Jewish high schools, Katherine Simon analyzes the ways in which teachers avoid or address moral questions raised by students and implicit in course materials. She examines how morally charged issues may be taught responsibly in a diverse democracy. And in an afterword that teachers and teacher educators will find particularly useful, Simon provides practical tools and strategies for structuring discussion and designing units to help teachers explore moral issues more deeply with their middle and high school students. (shrink)

Moral relativism familiar in the Western philosophical tradition, according to David Lyons, is either agent relativism or appraiser relativism or appraiser group). As Lyons has convincingly argued, they are both problematic. However, in the ancient Chinese Daoist classic, the Zhuangzi, we can find a different type of moral relativism, which I call patient relativism. In the essay, I aim to argue in what sense Zhuangzi is a patient relativist and how patient relativism (...) can avoid the problem of agent relativism and appraiser relativism. (shrink)

This paper argues that the contemporary practice of moral philosophy (particularly in the examples it relies on) and the contemporary practice of legal education both tend to ignore, dismiss or exclude that which is here called 'moral experience.' Moral experience is here defined (non-exhaustively) to be: 1) that which helps us face up to, instead of hide away from, our mortality and fallibility; 2) that which helps us experience radical uncertainty about who we are, where we have (...) been, and where we will be, and about what has happened, is happening and will happen; 3) that which helps us experience the insight that we are not in control of all that which influences us; 4) that which helps us experience the infinite (for us) complexity of others and the world; 5) that which helps us to notice hitherto-invisible (to us) forms of suffering and vulnerability; and 6) that which helps us to widen the scope of, or sometimes change, that which we find valuable and care about. Moral experience is not designed to replace traditions of moral inquiry (such as virtue ethics or utilitarianism), and it is not designed to help us meet the demands of moral life. Rather, it is designed to help us avoid underestimating the demands of moral life. Following a discussion of moral experience in the first part of the paper, the second part turns to offer some activities and resources thanks to which law schools can enable moral experience for both their students and their staff. In doing so, the second part of the paper draws on research undertaken as part of the AHRC Beyond Text in Legal Education project at the School of Law, University of Edinburgh. It also draws on the author's own research as part of a pedagogical project entitled Unnatural Exercises. (shrink)

This book provides a sophisticated analysis of various types of moral relativism, showing how arguments both for and against them fail to account for the basic intuitions such theories were inteded to address. Streiffer then constructs a compelling alternative model of reasons for acting which avoids the pitfalls of theories earlier discussed.

Moral absolutes have little or no moral standing in our morally diverse modern society. Moral relativism is far more palatable for most ethicists and to the public at large. Yet, when pressed, every moral relativist will finally admit that there are some things which ought never be done. It is the rarest of moral relativists that will take rape, murder, theft, child sacrifice as morally neutral choices. In general ethics, the list of those things (...) that must never be done will vary from person to person. In clinical ethics, however, the nature of the physician–patient relationship is such that certain moral absolutes are essential to the attainment of the good of the patient – the end of the relationship itself. These are all derivatives of the first moral absolute of all morality: Do good and avoid evil. In the clinical encounter, this absolute entails several subsidiary absolutes – act for the good of the patient, do not kill, keep promises, protect the dignity of the patient, do not lie, avoid complicity with evil. Each absolute is intrinsic to the healing and helping ends of the clinical encounter. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to answer the question of the importance of legal education in ensuring legal ethics and the moral compass of a person by understanding the most important aspects of it. Methods applied include theoretical-scientific analysis, systematic and critical review of scientific literature and other relevant sources, normative and critical analysis of ethical principles in the context of legal education, empirical-quantitative and qualitative analysis of scholarly articles. According to the main thesis of this article, the (...) integration of ethics into legal education can enhance moral development of future lawyers and improve their ability to serve justice. This paper traces the historical neglect of ethics in legal education and argues for its central place in modern studies. For lawyers to serve justice, a well-defined moral compass is essential. Several conclusions are drawn in this article, and first of all it is believed that universities will have to realise that a good lawyer is not only a professionally competent lawyer, because that is not enough in today’s world. Even if it is a personal journey, universities cannot stand aside, the future lawyer must be helped to grow. What is much more important is not so much the codes of ethics but how our moral compass works and what path it can point us down. To avoid getting lost, law schools could teach future lawyers how to empower their moral compass and find their way around. Each law teacher should have to find ways to teach the key virtues of a lawyer’s moral compass (e.g., wisdom, fortitude, temperance, and justice), how to help law students grow and not burn out in difficult situations. As our empirical research shows, the best scholarly articles on legal education discuss the elements of legal ethics. It is recognised that the ethics of lawyers is increasingly becoming an issue that goes beyond the professional aspects, and it is the university that must contribute to the development of the moral compass. (shrink)

What constitutes a just war? How does race matter in America? Are the interests of corporations the same as those of the public when it comes to the environment or public health? Middle and high school history, literature, and science classes abound with important moral, social, and political questions. But under pressure to cover required materials and out of fear of raising controversy, teachers often avoid classroom discussions of questions of profound importance to students and to society. (...) This book investigates how schools can responsibly take an active role in moral education while honoring their academic mission. Using extensive observations in public, Catholic, and Jewish high schools, Katherine Simon analyzes the ways in which teachers avoid or address moral questions raised by students and implicit in course materials. She examines how morally charged issues may be taught responsibly in a diverse democracy. And in an afterword that teachers and teacher educators will find particularly useful, Simon provides practical tools and strategies for structuring discussion and designing units to help teachers explore moral issues more deeply with their middle and high school students. (shrink)

One of the most important roles of schools is to enable students to become good citizens, capable of participating in the public affairs of society. However, the term ‘good citizens’ evokes different interpretations and definitions in different value systems. Using the methods of quantitative content analysis and narrative analysis, this paper aims to identify the dominant moral values of a good citizen that are conveyed by Malaysian moral education textbooks. The findings demonstrate that ‘responsibility’ is the dominant (...) value for shaping a good citizen in Malaysia. The value of responsibility in the textbooks embraces not only the meanings of self-obligation and accountability, but responsibility is also defined as an individual's sense of self-discipline in their behaviour that enables them to avoid conflict and strive for harmonious social order. The other important values are “Respect”, “Helpful”, “Hard-working” and “Caring”. This study provides an example of how a multi-ethnic nation state like Malaysia promotes these moral values through its educational curriculum, for political legitimacy and forging national unity. (shrink)

Offering students an accessible, in-depth, and highly practical introduction to ethics, this text covers argumentation and moral reasoning, various types of moral arguments, and theoretical issues that commonly arise in introductory ethics courses, including skepticism, subjectivism,relativism, religion, and normative theories. The book combines primary sources in moral theory and applied ethics with explanatory material, case studies, and pedagogical features to help students think critically about moral issues.

We present an instrument developed to explain to students the concept of the personal ethical threshold (PET). The PET represents an individual’s susceptibility to situational pressure in his or her organization that makes moral behavior more personally difficult. Further, the PET varies according to the moral intensity of the issue at hand, such that individuals are less vulnerable to situational pressure for issues of high moral intensity, i.e., those with greater consequences for others. A higher PET (...) reflects an individual’s greater likelihood of adhering to the morally correct path, even in the face of high situational pressures (personal costs) and low moral intensity (collective importance). PET questionnaires were completed by 506 students representing eight business schools throughout the United States. Relationships between respondents’ PET and their gender, age, and major field of study, as well as the geographical location of their school, are explored. Results indicate that older students have higher PETs and that students attending schools in the northeastern part of the United States have lower PETs. These findings are discussed. It is argued that the PET instrument can be used to help students identify organizational pressures and intrapersonal processes that can impede their moral behavior in organizations. (shrink)

Do moral questions have objective answers? In this great debate, Gilbert Harman explains and argues for relativism, emotivism, and moral scepticism. In his view, moral disagreements are like disagreements about what to pay for a house; there are no correct answers ahead of time, except in relation to one or another moral framework. Independently, Judith Jarvis Thomson examines what she takes to be the case against moral objectivity, and rejects it; she argues that it (...) is possible to find out the correct answers to some moral questions. In her view, some moral disagreements are like disagreements about whether the house has a ghost. Harman and Thomson then reply to each other. This important, lively accessible exchange will be invaluable to all students of moral theory and meta-ethics. (shrink)

Many scholars and activists favor banning illicit businesses, especially given that such businesses constitute a large part of the global economy. But these businesses are commonly operated as if they are subject only to the ethical norms their management chooses to recognize, and as a result they sometimes harm innocent people. This can happen in part because there are no effective legal constraints on illicit businesses, and in part because it seems theoretically impossible to dispose definitively of arguments that support (...) moral relativism. Progress is being made, however, towards a “second best” arrangement consisting of widespread institutional agreements regarding ethical norms. This development might eventually enable us to transcend moral relativism in some respects. Indeed, although some business ethicists who examine illicit business practices accept moral relativism, others attempt to surmount it. The latters’ endeavor, I show, is cross-cultural in nature in that it involves businesses that are deemed illicit in at least one but not every culture. I then recall some traditional solutions and their limits: ideological teachings are culture-specific, hence both temporally and spatially limited; legal constraints, though potentially helpful, are too diverse hence often narrow in reach. Especially problematic are defense industry businesses, which are inherently transcultural and, though uniquely harmful, are not effectively banned in any culture. Harm to quality of life (QoL) can, however, be measured. So I recommend institutional support for international human rights tied to QoL data as a workable way to counter moral relativism regarding illicit businesses. (shrink)

Plagiarism detection service like Turnitin can be powerful tools to help faculty evaluate whether a student’s paper is plagiarized. But there’s another side to Turnitin: The service promotes itself as a way to help teach students how to avoid plagiarism. I argue that the use of plagiarism detection services as learning tools actually contributes to the problem of plagiarism, by encouraging the idea that original papers are the goal of a class, instead of instruments to assess a student’s (...) ability to understand the class material. In addition, giving students access to the very tool that professors use to evaluate the authenticity of a paper allows students to use the tool to intentionally plagiarize in a way that passes the test. While plagiarism-detection services can help professors investigate suspected acts of plagiarism, they should not be used as a tool to teach students how to write papers. (shrink)

Do moral questions have objective answers? In this great debate, Gilbert Harman explains and argues for relativism, emotivism, and moral scepticism. In his view, moral disagreements are like disagreements about what to pay for a house; there are no correct answers ahead of time, except in relation to one or another moral framework. Independently, Judith Jarvis Thomson examines what she takes to be the case against moral objectivity, and rejects it; she argues that it (...) is possible to find out the correct answers to some moral questions. In her view, some moral disagreements are like disagreements about whether the house has a ghost. Harman and Thomson then reply to each other. This important, lively accessible exchange will be invaluable to all students of moral theory and meta-ethics. (shrink)

In an attempt to be rational and objective, and, possibly, to avoid the charge of moral relativism, ethicists seek to categorise and characterise ethical dilemmas. This approach is intended to minimise the effect of the confusing individuality of the context within which ethically challenging problems exist. Despite and I argue partly as a result of this attempt to be rational and objective, even when the logic of the argument is accepted—for example, by healthcare professionals—those same professionals might (...) well respond by stating that the conclusions are unacceptable to them. In this paper, I argue that an interpretative approach to ethical analysis, involving an examination of the ways in which ethical arguments are constructed and shared, can help ethicists to understand the origins of this gap between logic and intuition. I suggest that an argument will be persuasive either if the values underpinning the proposed argument accord with the reader’s values and worldview, or if the argument succeeds in persuading the reader to alter these. A failure either to appreciate or to acknowledge those things that give meaning to the lives of all the interested parties will make this objective far harder, if not impossible, to achieve. If, as a consequence, the narratives ethicists use to make their arguments seem to be about people living in different circumstances, and faced with different choices and challenges, from those the readers or listeners consider important or have to face in their own lives, then the argument is unlikely to seem either relevant or applicable to those people. The conclusion offered by the ethicist will be, for that individual, counterintuitive. Abortion, euthanasia and cadaveric organ donation are used as examples to support my argument. (shrink)

Research in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics fields has become much more complex in the twenty-first century. As a result, the students of our Graduate School, who are all Ph.D. candidates, need to be trained in essential skills and processes that are crucial for success in academia and beyond. Some research problems are inherently complex in that they raise deep moral dilemmas, such as antimicrobial resistance, sustainability, dual-use research of concern, and human cloning. Dealing with moral dilemmas (...) is one of several core competencies that twenty-first-century Ph.D. students must acquire. However, this might prove difficult for STEM Ph.D. students who have had limited exposure to moral philosophy. Since the task of dealing with moral dilemmas in STEM research requires input from both scientific and philosophical disciplines, it is argued with the help of the 4 examples above that this task be explicitly modelled as an interdisciplinary process. Furthermore, it is argued that a particular model from the interdisciplinary education literature could serve as a learning tool to support ethical decision-making in research ethics and integrity courses for doctoral students. (shrink)

Background: Moral philosophical positions and professional values have been shown to influence nurses’ practice behaviours. Understanding nursing students’ professional values and ethical ideologies, therefore, is important as they may help inform evidence-informed curriculum decisions and education strategies to develop students’ professional reflective competencies. However, there is a dearth in current empirical data on Canadian nursing students’ perceptions of professional values and ethical positions. Objectives: This study’s purpose was to examine undergraduate nursing student’s perceptions of professional values (...) and ethical ideology and explore relationships in data and selected participant demographic variables. Research design, participants and context: A descriptive cross-sectional research design was conducted with a convenience sample of undergraduate nursing students recruited from a university in Canada. An online encrypted survey consisting of two validated instruments was administered to participants who met study eligibility criteria. Descriptive and inferential statistics were employed to analyse the data and classify nursing students’ ethical ideologies into four categories based on mean scores for idealism and relativism. Ethical considerations: This study received ethical approval from the institutional Behavioural Research Ethics Board and was executed in-line with ethical principles for research involving humans. Findings: Nursing students scored high on professional values and ethical idealism and differed significantly on a measure of ethical relativism in terms of age and year of study. Professional values were significantly associated with ethical idealism. Based on mean scores for idealism and relativism, most nursing students in the study were classified as situationists. Discussion and conclusion: Findings suggest that faculty pay attention to influences of moral philosophical positions in facilitating nursing students’ professional values development. Implications for future research and curriculum are highlighted to strengthen nursing students’ professional values. (shrink)

Students sometimes profess moral relativism or skepticism with retorts like ‘how can we know?’ or ‘it’s all relative!’ Here I defend a pedagogical method to defuse moral relativism and moral skepticism using phenomenal conservatism: if it seems to S that p, S has defeasible justification to believe that p; e.g., moral seemings, like perceptual ones, are defeasibly justified. The purpose of defusing moral skepticism and relativism is to prevent these metaethical views (...) from acting as stumbling blocks to insightful ethical inquiry in the classroom. This approach puts the burden of proof on the relativist or skeptic (to justify their view, contrary to appearances), and makes their views costlier: if we reject moral seemings as a kind, we must reject other less objectionable seemings too (e.g. intellectual seemings). Finally, this approach improves learning outcomes by ‘hooking onto’ student familiarity with seemings, e.g. seeing is (defeasibly justified) believing. (shrink)

This essay explores the unique perspective of medical students regarding the ethical challenges of providing full disclosure to patients and their families when medical mistakes are made, especially when such mistakes lead to tragic outcomes. This narrative underscores core precepts of the healing profession, challenging the health care team to be open and truthful, even when doing so is uncomfortable. This account also reminds us that nonabandonment is an obligation that assumes accountability for one’s actions in the healing relationship (...) and that apologizing for mistakes can serve to heal. It argues that even medical students have an obligation to speak up when actions violate their moral beliefs, even if this means confronting a superior. Ethical principles cannot be abandoned in fear of adverse evaluation or failure to conform. Healthcare workers have an obligation to address mistakes made around the time of a patient’s death with the patient’s family. This responsibility trumps any selfish desire to avoid unpleasant feelings of guilt or regret. Such events often bring closure to already anguished relatives and spouses, and may help to facilitate the grieving process. This includes pressing forward the need to apologize to patients and/or their families when mistakes are made and when decisions are made that lead to poor outcomes for the patient, even when benevolently intended. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:An Ethical Life: A Practical Guide to Ethical Reasoning by Richard KyteChristine FletcherAn Ethical Life: A Practical Guide to Ethical Reasoning Richard Kyte WINONA, NM: ANSELM ACADEMIC, 2012. 254 PP. $25.95Richard Kyte's introductory guide to ethics is designed to meet three concerns about current ethics textbooks: they tend to decrease students' confidence in their ability to think, they inculcate a distrust of deliberative processes, and they create (...) an appearance of moral relativism. Kyte succeeds in creating a text that overcomes these deficiencies. He uses common language and examples while remaining rigorous and fully explaining the common ethical theories.He opens with a chapter debunking thirteen misconceptions about ethics, such as "Ethics Is 'Nothing but Words,'" "Ethics Is Just a Matter of Opinion," and "Ethics Is Separate from Religion." This chapter should set the tone for a class that doesn't allow sloppy thinking or the reduction of ethics to feelings. The chapter concludes by defining ethics as common sense, meaning "the ability to find shared meaning in the words we use together to make sense of our lives" (51).The second chapter examines four ways of ethical thinking: truth, thinking in terms of the facts of the situation; consequences, thinking in terms of the results of an action; fairness, thinking in terms of equality and consistency; and character, thinking in terms of people's motivations, character traits, or both. He then uses practical problems to illustrate how, by using these four ways of ethical thinking, a conversation working toward an agreed-on action can take place. Ethics is no longer a shouting match but a way of appreciating different points of view and coming to a reasoned conclusion.The following chapters explore these four ways of ethical thinking. Chapter 3, "Truth," on its own would be an excellent text for any course that has "critical thinking" as a learning outcome. He covers moral responsibility, bias, self-deception, and power with succinct but powerful illustrations from life. He then moves on to discernment, which includes a discussion of good reading, evaluating sources of information, and evaluating arguments, including examples of the most common fallacies. His examples are from diverse sources such as Mark Twain's Life on the Mississippi, E. M. Forster's A Passage to India, the Bible, Francis Bacon, and situations in ordinary life. This gives richness to the text and presents these concepts in an accessible and interesting way.The next three chapters, "Consequences," "Fairness," and "Character," cover the main features of utilitarianism, deontological ethics, and virtue ethics [End Page 191] in good detail, with summaries about major figures associated with these theories: Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Epictetus, Immanuel Kant, Aristotle, and St. Thomas Aquinas. These give the students biographical information as well as the significance of each thinker's work, explaining the key features, strengths, and weaknesses of their theories. The chapter on character has a very helpful discussion of the cardinal and theological virtues. Each chapter has suggestions for further reading.The appendix covers how to use this four-way method in group decision-making and in writing case studies or issues analyses, helpfully including an example of each. This book is written by a gifted teacher who draws students into his subject, shows them its relevance, and helps them develop the confidence and skills they need to take their part in the ethical conversations that will occur throughout their lives. It is an excellent text on its own or as a supplement to a standard textbook in professional ethics.Christine FletcherBenedictine UniversityCopyright © 2017 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 133 of its time and nothing beyond that, while in classical historicism every philosophy was a step in the progressive manifestation of truth not only a historical phenomenon. As a result it iustified not only a historicist treatment but also a speculative discussion of its truth-content. These genuine philosophies may be nonetheless rooted in their own time as we all are, but in philosophy as in life (...) everybody is confronted with a decision whether he wants to be merely a part of history or whether he wants to have history, i.e. also to have the link with true being. Pareyson's theory of interpretation is specially tailored to the reconciliation of the multiplicity of philosophies and of the unity of philosophical thought, aiming at ontological truth. All philosophies are personal interpretations of the world, yet they have an indestructible content of ontological truth that surpasses their own time. We shall not err if we compare Pareyson's interpretation with what Joseph Scbelling called "intelektuelle Anschauung," i.e. the intuitive penetration of what he called the Absolute. Pareyson protests also against the claims of the humanistic sciences, such as sociology, anthropology and cultural history, to replace philosophy. All these sciences canhot replace the function of philosophy as described above. Pareyson uses a very illuminating metaphor: interpreting truth is like interpreting a musical score. While any such interpretation may be legitimate, all may be different and all are personal. But the musical score is always the same. The musical score is compared here with the ontological truth of philosophical thought, while the various readings of the score are the various historical philosophies. By so doing Pareyson avoids the error of Heidegger who rejected all historical philosophies from Parmenides to Nietzsche. MAx RINSER New York Ctty Moser, Shia. Absolutism and Relativism in Ethics. (Springfield, Ill., Thomas, 1968) In the last twenty years our ethics textbooks have been modeled upon the topics of normative and critical ethics. Eventually one finds appended to these main subjects discussions on moral determinism and relativism. While the former problem continues to foster much rigorous scholarship, both substantive and analytic, the germane issue of relativism has been seldom set forth today in a clear and convincing fashion. The fleeting recognition the problem receives in our textbooks renders homage to the curiosity of the student rather than encourages research in the origin, variability and validity of moral ideas,x The several articles 2 of any philosophical impact written after A. Edel essayed refutation of Westermarck's relativity thesis by appealing to invariant factors in the social sciences, fare no better. Although it is true that this recent literature has opened An exception is Maria Ossowska's, Social Determinants of Moral Ideas (Philadelphia, 1970); this book belongs to the tradition of A. Edel and is an excellent example of fruitful research in the sociology of morals. 2 C. Wellman, "The Ethical Implications of Cultural Relativity," Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963): 169-184; J. Ladd, "The Issue of Relativism," The Monist 47 (1963): 585-609; T. L. McClintoek, "The Argument for Ethical Relativism from the Diversity of Morals," The Monist 47 (1963): 528-544; G. B. Wall, "Primitive Cultures and Ethical Universals," International Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1967): 471-482; V. A. Howard, "Do Anthropologists Become Moral Relativists by Mistake?" Inquiry 11 (1968): 175-189. 134 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY new avenues of conceptual investigation, the diversity of definitions offered and propounded theses make it difficult to ascertain precisely where these new avenues are planned to lead. It seems to me that if one construes relativism in terms of one component of J. Ladd's thesis,3 i.e., moral ideas are causally dependent on socio-cultural determinants of some kind, there is substantially no difference between the alleged moral implications of relativism and those of determinism. Indeed relativism so interpreted becomes entangled in one of the problems peculiar to determinism, which is the difficulty of ascribing responsibility to societies and individuals. Thus the determinist's avowed impotence to blame and praise coincides with the relafivist's virtue of tolerance.4 By the same token one could exploit the determinist's model and speak of hard relativism, soft relativism and... (shrink)

This essay draws on comparative ethnographic material from Albania and Italy. It addresses different forms of corruption, arguing that in order to understand the way in which phenomena such as corruption occur and are experienced in any given society, we should contextualize them in the historical and cultural traditions of that specific society. In doing so, however, we should be alert in avoiding falling into the trap of either moral relativism or cultural determinism. The essay suggests that an (...) anthropological analysis of corruption should distinguish between legal rules and social norms. In particular, the empirical study of such norms helps to understand the meanings—both individual and inter-subjective—that actors give to the social and political situation in which they operate. (shrink)

How medical education and practice can move beyond a narrow focus on biological intervention to recognize the lived experiences of illness, suffering, and death. In Afflicted, Nicole Piemonte examines the preoccupation in medicine with cure over care, arguing that the traditional focus on biological intervention keeps medicine from addressing the complex realities of patient suffering. Although many have pointed to the lack of compassion and empathy in medical practice, few have considered the deeper philosophical, psychological, and ontological reasons for it. (...) Piemonte fills that gap, examining why it is that clinicians and medical trainees largely evade issues of vulnerability and mortality and, doing so, offer patients compromised care. She argues that contemporary medical pedagogy and epistemology are not only shaped by the human tendency to flee from the reality of death and suffering but also perpetuate it. The root of the problem, she writes, is the educational and institutional culture that promotes reductionist understandings of care, illness, and suffering but avoids any authentic confrontation with human suffering and the fear and self-doubt that can come with that confrontation. Through a philosophical analysis of the patient-practitioner encounter, Piemonte argues that the doctor, in escaping from authentic engagement with a patient who is suffering, in fact “escapes from herself.” Piemonte explores the epistemology and pedagogy of medicine, examines its focus on calculative or technical thinking, and considers how “clinical detachment” diminishes physicians. She suggests ways that educators might cultivate the capacity for authentic patient care and proposes specific curricular changes to help students expand their moral imaginations. (shrink)

I aim to undermine an account of the difference between conceptual and moral relativism according to which conceptual relativism focuses on the description of nature and moral relativism on values. I do so with some help from Joseph Raz.

BackgroundReferencing is an integral part of scientific writing and professional research conduct that requires appropriate acknowledgement of others’ work and avoidance of plagiarism. University students should understand and apply this as part of their academic development, but for this, it is essential that supervisors also display proper research integrity and support.MethodsThis study used an online educative questionnaire to understand the knowledge and attitudes of students and supervisors at two institutes in Europe and Africa. The results were then used (...) to create discussion around education of students and faculty in workshops and lectures.ResultsOverall, 138 students and 14 supervisors participated: most were Swedish (89) and Kenyan (11). Overall, 98% had heard about plagiarism, and 35% believed it was common. Only 45% had heard about self-plagiarism, and when explained what it was, 44.5% considered it morally wrong. Europeans and North Americans had more knowledge than other nationalities. Most (85%) had received some training on referencing, but there was little consensus about principles, with more than 30% considering it acceptable to cite a reference in a paper they had not read. Discussing these results and the questions in workshops was helpful; it was also clear that there was no consensus among supervisors on what constituted correct behavior.ConclusionsThis survey shows a need for greater consensus on appropriate referencing, and that there is need for more discussions and training on the topic for both students and faculty. (shrink)

This chapter examines some of the most important perspectives that Mazu 馬祖 and his followers hold, based on author’s reading of reliable Hongzhou 洪州 texts and utilizing contemporary philosophical insights. The first is trans-metaphysical perspective, which is embodied in the Hongzhou deconstruction of the tendency to substantialize Buddha-nature as something independent of the everyday world of human beings. Hongzhou overturns Shenhui 神會’s quasi-metaphysical understanding of the realization of Buddha-nature as intuitive awareness isolated from ordinary cognitive activities, and as the favorable (...) ti, which relies on no conditions, over the yong. The second is liminological perspective, which is manifested in the Hongzhou understanding of the limits of descriptive language, the relativizing of the absolute boundary between speaking and non-speaking or silence, and the use of language to play at the limits of language. The third is ethical perspective, but it demonstrates itself through a twist of the ethical and non-ethical. While the Hongzhou masters often subvert conventional moral distinctions, they advise students to practice morality merely according to shifting conditions. This relational perspective enhances Hongzhou Chan’s profound ethicality. The fourth is counter-institutional perspective, which describes the Hongzhou masters’ middle way towards institutionalization, an attitude of “being with and against” institution by walking two roads at the same time, and avoiding the extreme iconoclasm and conformism. It helps Hongzhou Chan de-stabilize the hierarchical effect of formalization and generalization, emphasize the expedient nature of institutionalized teaching and practice, and make the institution remain open to changing circumstances. These perspectives provide implications for contemporary discourse on metaphysics/ontology, philosophy of language, ethics, and critical theory about institution; however, they originally only serve Hongzhou Chan’s soteriological purpose. (shrink)

In A Theory of Moral Education, Michael Hand homes in on a central problem of moral education and offers us a solution. Briefly put, the problem is this: There is often widespread disagreement about moral matters, even among those who have thought long and hard about them. So how is moral education possible without resorting to indoctrination? We are all aware of familiar strategies to avoid this problem, such as introducing various moral systems and (...) conflicting beliefs without taking a stand on them, encouraging students to reach their own conclusions about moral matters, or even keeping well clear of the whole subject in the first place. Unfortunately, these options are not available to anyone who sees the need for moral education and takes it that bringing about rational assent to moral standards is among its aims. Given this starting point, the fact of reasonable disagreement makes it difficult to see how to avoid the problem of indoctrination. Hand’s solution is to argue that, while disagreement about moral matters is a salient feature of social life, there is a significant core of moral values about which there is actually little contention, and for which an adequate justification is within reach. Among them are “prohibitions on killing and causing harm, stealing and extorting, lying and cheating, and requirements to treat others fairly, keep one’s promises and help those in need”. With well-known caveats, there is at least general assent to these prescriptions, but their rational justification is more problematic. The history of ethical theory is littered with arguments as to why such things are wrong, but the arguments are contentious—and that looks to compound the problem. Nevertheless, Hand believes that there is at least one sound argument that can be used to justify our core moral standards. (shrink)

I present a novel approach to teaching ethics to students who are moral relativists. I argue that we should not try to convince students to abandon moral relativism; while we can and should present arguments against the view, we should not try to use these arguments to change students’ minds. Attempts to convince student relativists to change their minds can be disrespectful, and often overlook the reasons why students are relativists. I explain how (...) instead to show moral relativists that their commitment to relativism is also a commitment to studying ethics rigorously and engaging with the views of others. This approach is easier and more respectful than alternatives, and openness to relativism encourages good pedagogy. (shrink)

Many students struggle to enter moral debates in a productive way because they automatically think of moral claims as ‘just opinions’ and not something one could productively argue about. Underlying this response are various versions of a muddled distinction between ‘facts’ and ‘opinions.’ This paper outlines a way to help students overcome their use of this distinction, thereby clearing an obstacle to true moral debate. It explains why the fact-opinion distinction should simply be scrapped, rather (...) than merely sharpened. It then proposes a different distinction well suited to replace it. Finally, it outlines an activity which can be used to teach the new distinction, as well as a number of benefits to attempting the whole replacement process. (shrink)

Helping people to die may involve killing and/or alleviation of pain in a dying person. A dual commitment to the avoidance of killing and the alleviation of pain raises the question of whether these two ways of helping people are always compatible. This paper addresses the question through use of sources in classical American pragmatism and contemporary bioethics. First, I apply Charles Peirce’s notion of pragmatism to the concept of killing through consideration of the empirical consequences of alternative (...) interpretations. James Rachels’ account of the distinction between active and passive euthanasia is critiqued in this analysis. Second, I examine what it means to relieve pain by relating Jane Addams’ concept of maternal nurturance to an ethic of care and opposition to killing. Utilizing these concepts, I apply William James’ notion of pragmatism as a method of mediating or straddling different theoretical approaches to resolve the apparent incompatibility between pain relief and the avoidance of killing. To address social concerns raised by the practice of helping people to die, I propose a corrective insight of Addams, along with John Dewey, about the role of the philosopher as social critic. Thus understood, pragmatism is a means of avoiding abuses that may occur in the process. I conclude that so long as permissive practices are restrained sufficiently to avoid injustices, it is morally both possible and desirable to resist killing while relieving pain. (shrink)

Our aim here is to explore the prospects of a relativist response to moral debunking arguments. We begin by clarifying the relativist thesis under consideration, and we explain why relativists seem well-positioned to resist the arguments in a way that avoids the drawbacks of existing responses. We then show that appearances are deceiving. At bottom, the relativist response is no less question-begging than standard realist responses, and – when we turn our attention to the strongest formulation of the debunking (...) argument – the virtues of relativism turn out to be vices. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this paper I will defend a version of pluralistic relativism. In the first section of this paper I will present my view of a functional morality by appealing to the moral diverse traditions in China. If each is indeed conceptually consistent and practically sufficient, then it seems to me that each is a functional morality. In the second section I explain the connection between moral plurality and the perception of moral ambivalence that our own (...) class='Hi'>moral beliefs might not be true. In the third section I argue that radical moral relativism and weak universalism cannot accommodate moral plurality and moral ambivalence. In the fourth section I explain why pluralistic relativism can best accommodate moral plurality and moral ambivalence. In the last section I present how pluralistic relativism helps us to deal with disagreement and motivates us to respect those who are different from us. (shrink)

"We hold these truths to be self-evident..." So begins the U.S. Declaration of Independence. What follows those words is a ringing endorsement of universal rights, but it is far from self-evident. Why did the authors claim that it was? William Talbott suggests that they were trapped by a presupposition of Enlightenment philosophy: That there was only one way to rationally justify universal truths, by proving them from self-evident premises. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the authors of (...) the U.S. Declaration had no infallible source of moral truth. For example, many of the authors of the Declaration of Independence endorsed slavery. The wrongness of slavery was not self-evident; it was a moral discovery. In this book, William Talbott builds on the work of John Rawls, Jurgen Habermas, J.S. Mill, Amartya Sen, and Henry Shue to explain how, over the course of history, human beings have learned how to adopt a distinctively moral point of view from which it is possible to make universal, though not infallible, judgments of right and wrong. He explains how this distinctively moral point of view has led to the discovery of the moral importance of nine basic rights. Undoubtedly, the most controversial issue raised by the claim of universal rights is the issue of moral relativism. How can the advocate of universal rights avoid being a moral imperialist? In this book, Talbott shows how to defend basic individual rights from a universal moral point of view that is neither imperialistic nor relativistic. Talbott avoids moral imperialism by insisting that all of us, himself included, have moral blindspots and that we usually depend on others to help us to identify those blindspots. Talbott's book speaks to not only debates on human rights but to broader issues of moral and cultural relativism, and will interest a broad range of readers. (shrink)

Democracies are calling on schools to respond to a rise in extremist ideologies and actions. In this article Sigal Ben-Porath situates the rise in extremism within the broader context of political polarization. She suggests that the latter is a more appropriate target for school intervention than the former. She further suggests that addressing polarization can result in a reduction in extremism, and that polarization can be addressed by refocusing the use of existing teaching and learning tools, rather than by instituting (...) new forms of intervention such as the Prevent strategy used in the UK. Tackling polarization through media literacy and the development of democratic habits can help rectify false beliefs, which contribute both to broad political polarization and to individuals' slide toward extremism. Focusing on strengthening knowledge as well as social ties can fortify individuals' and communities' resilience against extremism, as well as build bridges and connect people to a sense of shared fate across political divides. These practices are more effective and more justified than targeting individual students who are suspected of holding radical beliefs. (shrink)

There are many introductions to the animal ethics literature. There aren't many introductions to the practice of doing animal ethics. Bob Fischer's Animal Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction fills that gap, offering an accessible model of how animal ethics can be done today. The book takes up classic issues, such as the ethics of eating meat and experimenting on animals, but tackles them in an empirically informed and nuanced way. It also covers a range of relatively neglected issues in animal ethics, (...) such as the possibility of insect sentience and the ethics of dealing with pests. Finally, the book doesn't assess every current practice using standard ethical theories, but tries to evaluate some of them using the moral frameworks endorsed by those involved. So, for instance, there is a chapter on the way that animal care and use committees try to justify some of the educational uses of animals, and the chapter on zoos considers the way that international zoological societies justify compromising animal welfare. The book wraps up with a discussion of the future of animal ethics. Each chapter opens with a helpful initial overview of the chapter and ends with a list of suggested readings to help students go further on their own. Key Features Covers animal ethics from an empirically informed perspective, bringing philosophy into conversation with key issues in animal science, conservation biology, economics, ethology, and legal studies, among other fields Provides ample coverage of the most salient current topics, including, for example: Debates about which animals are sentient The suffering of wild animals Research ethics The boundaries of activism Avoids suggesting that animal ethics is simply the practice of applying the right general theory to a problem, instead allowing readers to first work out the specific costs and benefits of making ethical decisions Impresses upon the reader the need for her to work out for herself the best way forward with difficult ethical issues, suggesting that progress can indeed be made Includes summaries and recommended readings at the end of each chapter. (shrink)

Human Dignity in Contemporary Ethics develops a holistic and relevant understanding of human dignity for ethics today. Whilst critics of the concept of human dignity call for its dismissal, and many of its defenders rehearse the same old arguments, this book offers an alternative set of methodological assumptions on which to base a revitalized and practical understanding of human dignity, which at the same time overcomes the challenges that the concept currently faces. The Component Dimensions of Human Dignity model enables (...) human dignity to serve both as a descriptive category that explains moral choices, and as a normative criterion that helps to evaluate moral behaviour. A consideration of two cases--violent crime and physician-assisted suicide--demonstrates how the model offers a way to avoid the pitfalls of both moralism and moral relativism, while still leaving space for relativity in ethics. By using an approach that should be acceptable to both religious and secular perspectives alike, this book offers a unique way out of the 'dignity talk' that currently plagues ethics. (shrink)

In this article I argue that, despite my previous strongly held beliefs to the contrary, a focused-theory approach to teaching Introductory Ethics (meaning that one theory or family of theories is the main focus of the course) is a legitimate and effective way to introduce undergraduate students to philosophical ethics. There are at least three advantages to the focused-theory approach to teaching ethics: increased depth of learning, avoidance of relativism (or “theory-relativism”) as a default position, and opportunity (...) for moral education. There are some obvious objections to a focused-theory course—that skipping inter-theoretical controversy lessens opportunity for argument analysis and contemporary application, that lack of exposure to all of the major ethical theories is a disadvantage for grad school–bound students, and that a focused-theory approach amounts to indoctrinating students by teaching one’s favorite theory as though it were the only theory; but each objection can be addressed effectively. (shrink)

Occupational fraud frequently involves the direct or indirect participation of professional accountants. To reduce fraud, companies often focus on the incentive/pressure and opportunity legs of the fraud triangle, perhaps believing that rationalization is beyond their control. We argue that rationalization reduction is necessary to minimize occupational fraud. We propose that educators and PA consider incorporating fences as controls to reduce rationalization. Because they focus on compliance and risk avoidance and are non-negotiable, fences appeal to accountant’s Myers Briggs personalities and conventional (...) level of moral development. Educators can teach students about the fences used in practice, and explain how they help new professionals resist pressures and temptations. By adding fences to existing professional guidance, accountants can reduce the likelihood that they will be a party to fraud. (shrink)