Synthese 166 (2):431 - 447 (2009)

Authors
Steven Hales
Bloomsburg University
Abstract
I argue that evolutionary strategies of kin selection and game-theoretic reciprocity are apt to generate agent-centered and agent- neutral moral intuitions, respectively. Such intuitions are the building blocks of moral theories, resulting in a fundamental schism between agent-centered theories on the one hand and agent-neutral theories on the other. An agent-neutral moral theory is one according to which everyone has the same duties and moral aims, no matter what their personal interests or interpersonal relationships. Agent-centered moral theories deny this and include at least some prescriptions that include ineliminable indexicals. I argue that there are no rational means of bridging the gap between the two types of theories; nevertheless this does not necessitate skepticism about the moral—we might instead opt for an ethical relativism in which the truth of moral statements is relativized to the perspective of moral theories on either side of the schism. Such a relativism does not mean that any ethical theory is as good as any other; some cannot be held in reflective equilibrium, and even among those that can, there may well be pragmatic reasons that motivate the selection of one theory over another. But if no sort of relativism is deemed acceptable, then it is hard to avoid moral skepticism.
Keywords moral relativism  evolutionary psychology  agent neutral  agent relative  kin selection  reciprocity
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Reprint years 2009
DOI 10.1007/s11229-007-9287-1
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Moral Relativism.Christopher Gowans - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Faculty of Intuition.Steven D. Hales - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):180-207.
Thinking About the Liar, Fast and Slow.Robert Barnard, Joseph Ulatowski & Jonathan Weinberg - 2017 - In Bradley Armour-Garb (ed.), Reflections on the Liar. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 39-70.

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