Moral relativism and reasons for action

New York: Routledge (2003)
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Abstract

This book provides a sophisticated analysis of various types of moral relativism, showing how arguments both for and against them fail to account for the basic intuitions such theories were inteded to address. Streiffer then constructs a compelling alternative model of reasons for acting which avoids the pitfalls of theories earlier discussed.

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Robert Streiffer
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Citations of this work

No Deep Disagreement for New Relativists.Ragnar Francén - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (1):19--37.
Moral relativism.Christopher Gowans - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Relativity and Degrees of Relationality.Jack Spencer - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):432-459.

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