A story of rabbinic poverty relief serves as the fulcrum of this presentation of a rabbinic perspective on wealth and taxes. The rabbinic move, from biblical to Mishnaic law, places the obligation of poverty relief on the city and suggests that the institutions of the polis are the only way to achieve justice on this scale. However, the city must be aware of the individual Other in making policy. In essence the story suggests that when policies ignore the (...) face of an individual stranger, they do not fulfill the demands of justice. This is the rabbinic attempt at threading the needle by walking in the tension between the obsessive asymmetry of the obligation towards the other person and the need for a larger more equitable system of justice which must include others. (shrink)

This article suggests enacting an accession tax instead of the estate duty – which was repealed in Israel in 1981. This suggestion evolves from historical and normative explorations of the tension between perceptions of familial intergenerational property rights and justifications for the “death tax,” as termed by its opponents, i.e., estate and inheritance tax. First, the Article explores this tension as expressed in the history of the Israeli Estate Duty Law. This chronological survey reveals a move from the State’s taken-for-granted (...) interest in revenue justifying the Law’s enactment in 1949; moving on to the “needy widow” and “poor orphan” in whose name the tax was attacked during the years 1959–1964, continuing to the abolition of the tax in 1981 in the name of efficiency and the right of the testator to transfer his wealth to his family, and finally cumulating with the targeting of tycoon dynasties that characterizes the recent calls for reintroducing the tax. Next, based on the rich literature on the subject, the Article maps the arguments for and against intergenerational wealth transfer taxation, placing the Israeli case in larger philosophical, political, and pragmatic contexts. Lastly, it associates the ideas of accession tax and “social inheritance” with inspirational sources for rethinking a realistic wealth transfer taxation to bridge the gap between notions of intergenerational familial rights and intergenerational social justice. (shrink)

President Lincoln's platform included a recommendation of "a vigorous and just system of taxation," because he believed that if you had been blessed by living in America and had benefited from what this country has to offer, then you should do more for your country. One hundred forty years later, we still need a "vigorous and just system of taxation," not because we like taxes, but because, as Oliver Wendell Holmes said, taxes are the price we pay for (...) a civilized society. We have been having a tax debate for more than a century, but what is new about today's debate is that tour leaders want to shift the tax burden from unearned income straight on to the backs of working people. This radical notion turns on its head the very values that built America — rewarding hard work. My radical notion is that it is time to abolish the work penalty by abolishing the tax code of special privileges for wealth. In this talk I set forth a set of ideas to do just that, and further I show how we can use our tax code to encourage asset building and reduce poverty. (shrink)

President Lincoln's platform included a recommendation of "a vigorous and just system of taxation," because he believed that if you had been blessed by living in America and had benefited from what this country has to offer, then you should do more for your country. One hundred forty years later, we still need a "vigorous and just system of taxation," not because we like taxes, but because, as Oliver Wendell Holmes said, taxes are the price we pay for (...) a civilized society. We have been having a tax debate for more than a century, but what is new about today's debate is that tour leaders want to shift the tax burden from unearned income straight on to the backs of working people. This radical notion turns on its head the very values that built America — rewarding hard work. My radical notion is that it is time to abolish the work penalty by abolishing the tax code of special privileges for wealth. In this talk I set forth a set of ideas to do just that, and further I show how we can use our tax code to encourage asset building and reduce poverty. (shrink)

In this essay we argue against preventing people from amassing extreme wealth via increased taxation. The first argument in favor of such a proposal, recently advanced by Ingrid Robeyns (2018), states that billionaires’ resources would be better spent addressing morally important goals such as meeting disadvantaged people’s needs and solving collective action problems. In response to this claim, we argue that billionaires are typically in a better position to benefit the poor and to solve collective action problems than public (...) officials. The second argument in favor of preventing extreme wealth accumulation, advanced by Robeyns and Robert Reich (2018), states that billionaires have an inappropriate amount of influence in public life, which undermines political equality. We argue that corporate leaders tend to be more accountable to their fellow citizens than public officials. We then consider and criticize the objection that billionaires’ success is typically a result of public investment, which entitles public officials to enforce taxes that demand a return on the public investment. (shrink)

The real significance of this book lies in the fact that it tells us more about the everyday life of black South Africans. It delves into the essence of black family life and the secret anguish of family members who often battle to cope. A secret torment for some, a proud responsibility for others, 'black tax' is a daily reality for thousands of black South Africans. In this thought-provoking and moving anthology, a provocative range of voices share their deeply personal (...) stories.With the majority of black South Africans still living in poverty today, many black middle-class households are connected to working-class or jobless homes. Some believe supporting family members is an undeniable part of African culture and question whether it should even be labelled as a kind of tax.Others point to the financial pressure it places on black students and professionals, who, as a consequence, struggle to build their own wealth. Many feel they are taking over what is essentially a government responsibility.The contributions also investigate the historical roots of black tax, the concept of the black family and the black middle class.In giving voice to so many different perspectives, Black Tax hopes to start a dialogue on this widespread social phenomenon. (shrink)

In this article I maintain that a progressive and leftist carbon tax should be revenue-neutral through a dual policy package: first, it should use some revenues to offset price increases for the poor and middle classes; second, it should use the remaining part of revenues to lower taxes on labour income (both employed and self-employed income) for those below a middle-income threshold. I will briefly examine three reasons why such a revenue-neutral and dual-package carbon tax (RN-DP-CT) could (and should) (...) become central in the political agenda of the European Left – even though much of what I will suggest can reasonably hold also with respect to other countries. First, the tax wage on labour in the euro area is one of the highest in the world. Second, the revenue-neutral and dual policy package carbon tax will tax more capital that yields income without a proportional increase in labour demand, rather than capital that creates new job opportunities. Third, we live in societies that are highly unequal, hence I see no moral reason why a carbon tax reform should not aim, among other things, to take wealth away from the richest. (shrink)

This article examines John Stuart Mill’s influential proposal of how to tax wealth transfers. According to Mill, every person should be free to bequeath but not to receive bequest. Mill proposed an upper limit on how much each person could receive from wealth transfers. We discuss three objections against this proposal. The nonseparability objection holds that it is not possible to separate the freedom to give from the freedom to receive. The objection from private property holds that private (...) property includes an unlimited right to dispose of one’s assets and that this right is violated under Mill’s scheme. The objection from incentives holds that Mill’s scheme would have negative effects on people’s willingness to work and save. We argue that these objections can be met and that taxing bequeathed wealth according to Mill’s scheme is more just and more efficient compared to systems that rely less on wealth transfer taxation. (shrink)

Historically, it is safe to say that very few laws did as much to stoke inequality as laws touching descents and hereditary transmissions. This paper attempts to see if the classical liberal tradition can endorse inheritance taxation so as to further fair equality of opportunity, as well as to lessen inequality of undeserved wealth. It argues that fair equality of opportunity is a necessary feature of market societies to make sure that they remain competitive. Hence, inheritance taxation is most (...) likely necessary from a classical liberal point of view as an instrument of social mobility to counter notable problems of social immobility, say hereditary vocational stratification, which a system of private property rights creates. (shrink)

Rich people stash away trillions of dollars in tax havens like Switzerland, the Cayman Islands, or Singapore. Multinational corporations shift their profits to low-tax jurisdictions like Ireland or Panama to avoid paying tax. Recent stories in the media about Apple, Google, Starbucks, and Fiat are just the tip of the iceberg. There is hardly any multinational today that respects not just the letter but also the spirit of tax laws. All this becomes possible due to tax competition, with countries strategically (...) designing fiscal policy to attract capital from abroad. The loopholes in national tax regimes that tax competition generates and exploits draw into question political economic life as we presently know it. They undermine the fiscal autonomy of political communities and contribute to rising inequalities in income and wealth.Building on a careful analysis of the ethical challenges raised by a world of tax competition, this book puts forward a normative and institutional framework to regulate the practice. In short, individuals and corporations should pay tax in the jurisdictions of which they are members, where this membership can come in degrees. Moreover, the strategic tax setting of states should be limited in important ways. An International Tax Organisation should be created to enforce the principles of tax justice.The author defends this call for reform against two important objections. First, Dietsch refutes the suggestion that regulating tax competition is inefficient. Second, he argues that regulation of this sort, rather than representing a constraint on national sovereignty, in fact turns out to be a requirement of sovereignty in a global economy. The book closes with a series of reflections on the obligations that the beneficiaries of tax competition have towards the losers both prior to any institutional reform as well as in its aftermath. (shrink)

Equity and efficiency -- A society within a society -- Thomas Aquinas : the interplay of natural and positive law -- William of Ockham : repudiation of power and wealth -- Martin Luther's redistributive theology of the Lord's supper -- John Calvin and the challenge of inequality -- Triumph of the economy.

Historically, it is safe to say that very few laws did as much to stoke inequality as laws touching descents and hereditary transmissions. This paper attempts to see if the classical liberal tradition can endorse inheritance taxation so as to further fair equality of opportunity, as well as to lessen inequality of undeserved wealth. It argues that fair equality of opportunity is a necessary feature of market societies to make sure that they remain competitive. Hence, inheritance taxation is most (...) likely necessary from a classical liberal point of view as an instrument of social mobility to counter notable problems of social immobility, say hereditary vocational stratification, which a system of private property rights creates. (shrink)

Daniel Halliday examines the morality of the right to bequeath or transfer wealth, and argues that inheritance is unjust to the extent that it enhances the intergenerational replication of inequality, concentrating opportunities in certain groups. He presents an egalitarian case for imposition of a significant inheritance tax.

This paper examines whether, and if so when, luxury tax is justifiable. After a characterization of luxury tax, I critically examine several arguments that have been or can be made in defence of luxury tax, including Ng’s diamond good argument and a variation of Frank’s positional good argument. I put forward an alternative, expressive argument, according to which luxury tax can help to create and sustain social norms that discourage conspicuous luxury consumption and display of wealth. I explain several (...) ways in which luxury tax fails to achieve the expressive goal and brings about unintended consequences. (shrink)

‘Marx on tax’ as an effective antidote to inequality is an overlooked theme within his own output, but also for our own time. Marx theorising on tax is seen even by pre-eminent Marxists as an empty box, but Marx and Engels in fact had plenty to say about tax. Their coverage embraces progressive taxes, both on capital and income, a strong preference for direct over indirect taxation, inheritance tax, land-value tax, taxes on financial transactions, and state finances around (...) the world. Tax also provides the battleground for a rare sight of Marx as campaigning activist, in 1848, matched in the same period by close ally Wilhelm Wolff. The tax policies of Marx and Engels have been neglected because they are primarily to be found in their journalism and letters. They are no anachronistic curiosity but perfectly applicable to the income and wealth inequalities of our own era. (shrink)

Imagine two friends. Anna inherits nothing and works for every penny she has, while Mary inherits millions. How should a world that respects individual autonomy and private property rights treat Anna’s earnings and Mary’s inheritance? Should it tax them the same, or tax one more heavily than the other? If the latter, which one? The conventional wisdom holds that although some “right” libertarian theories justify taxing income, none justify taxing inheritances. Such taxes are “expropriations” and “an especially cruel injury” (...) that “run[] roughshod over [a] deceased’s interest in the ends his property will serve.” This essay explores the standard libertarian objections to taxing gifts and bequests and argues that libertarians overstate their case when distinguishing the taxation of gratuitous transfers from other types of taxation. At minimum, the benefit theory of taxation embraced by many minimal statists and classical liberals mandates that the receipt of gifts and bequests should be taxed to the recipient. Moreover, the goals of curbing inherited political power and preventing wealthy families from insulating their members from market competition provide two additional explanations for why taxing inheritances to recipients is compatible with classical liberal values. (shrink)

ABSTRACTGiven the centrality of corporations in distribution of income and wealth studies, discursive constructions of corporate taxation are essential to understanding the production of inequality. The focus of this study is an interview with Apple’s Chief Executive Tim Cook on the Irish state broadcaster, Raidió Teilifís Éireann’s flagship news programme, Morning Ireland, following the ruling by the European Commission on the corporation tax arrangements between Apple Inc. and Ireland. Drawing on a Critical Discourse Analysis approach, a frame analysis is (...) provided. The significance and extent of the EC’s ruling has potential implications for corporation taxation policy, within and beyond the European Union, which provides a timely reflection in the Brexit era and in the context of rising economic nationalism generally. Thus, the discursive construction of this ruling in the media is of importance in understanding how inequality is produced and reproduced, and journalism’s role therein. (shrink)

This article joins a somewhat nascent, but growing, body of scholarship addressing the ethical obligation to pay tax. The analysis is grounded to the ethical duty to obey law generally and highlights two competing orientations to statutory interpretation. The norms of self-interested advocacy suggest that tax planners should assert that interpretation that will generate the most wealth for the client. The norms of professional advising, by contrast, direct the tax planner to interpret tax law with reference to plain meaning, (...) interpretive maxims, court precedents, and legislative purpose. When the two orientations differ, the ethical duty to obey law requires the tax planner to recommend, and for the taxpayer to follow, the latter view. Case studies drawn from a Louisiana sales tax avoidance scheme and from Google’s profit-shifting activities illustrate the ethical issues incumbent in tax interpretation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Ethics of Wealth in a World of Economic Inequality: A Christian Perspective in a Buddhist-Christian DialogueJoerg RiegerThere is common agreement that we find ourselves in a world of economic inequality. More precisely, we are living in a world where economic inequality continues to grow by leaps and bounds. Income inequality in the United States is greater than it has ever been, greater than that of most other (...) wealthy countries,1 and it is even greater than the income inequality known in the Roman Empire. In Ancient Rome, the top 1 percent controlled 16 percent of society’s wealth, compared to 40 percent in the contemporary United States.2 Nevertheless, although there is broad agreement on the existence of economic inequality, there are different perspectives on what it all means.While many lament the existence of economic inequality, others welcome it. Christians who follow the teachings of the so-called gospel of prosperity, for instance, are rarely bothered by economic inequality because they see economic success as a result of faithfulness to God, while stagnation or even poverty is the result of lack of faith. Among economists, one of the dominant perspectives on economic inequality is that it is necessary and beneficial. More specifically, one current economic theory that is widely agreed upon holds that cutting taxes for the wealthy and providing subsidies for large corporations is the only way to maintain economic growth as well as job growth. This theory is maintained despite mounting empirical evidence to the contrary. As a recent study by the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service notes, “there is little evidence over the past 65 years that tax cuts for the highest earners are associated with savings, investment or productivity growth.”3Other prominent perspectives on economic inequality take more critical approaches, although some of the most common stereotypes also fail the reality test. One common assumption, for instance, is that the wealth gap is a matter of the so-called First World versus the so-called Third World. In the Americas, for instance, many believe that wealth resides north of the US-Mexico border, and that poverty resides to the south of it. Nevertheless, the world’s wealthiest individual is currently a Mexican citizen, business magnate Carlos Slim Helú. The case of Slim is, of course, [End Page 153] only the tip of the iceberg, as a tremendous amount of wealth resides in many places “south of the border.” Whenever I take seminary students on immersion trips into countries of the so-called Third World, I make it a point to take them not only into the poor neighborhoods but also into the wealthy ones.Observing wealth in Third World contexts never fails to create substantial cognitive dissonance, as most US residents do not expect to see so many expensive cars and expansive villas in São Paulo, Brazil; Lima, Peru; or Harare, Zimbabwe. By the same token, even most US residents do not expect to see so much dire poverty in the United States, although it often resides only a few miles from where they live. According to the National Center for Children in Poverty, 21 percent of all children in the United States live in families with incomes below the poverty level.4 Without ignoring the economic differences between North and South, substantial economic inequality exists in both so-called Third World and First World settings.Whose Wealth?One crucial insight emerges from our reflections so far: when we talk about an ethics of wealth in a world of economic inequality, we need to ask whose wealth we are discussing. When we are talking about wealth in many Christian communities, we tend to talk about ourselves and about the perceived wealth of the so-called middle class. What we are rarely discussing, however, is the tremendous wealth that is amassed at the upper levels of society, with the proverbial 1 percent or the 0.1 percent. I have observed similar discourses for many years, all around the world. There are several problems with this discourse.One problem is that by talking about members of the middle class as representatives of wealth, we fail to investigate the full scale of economic... (shrink)

Libertarians famously contend that the minimal state is the most just social arrangement because it secures individual freedoms and basic political rights. They also oppose wealth transfer taxation, i.e. taxation of inheritances, bequests, and inter vivos gifts, arguing that it violates people's right to use their wealth freely. However, as I argue, libertarian opposition to wealth transfer taxation causes practical problems for their commitment to a minimal state, as there is strong empirical evidence demonstrating that wealth (...) transfer taxation is required to secure the political rights necessary for a free and stable society. In other words, I contend that without an effective wealth transfer tax, it will be difficult to ensure political rights and basic freedoms, thus leaving the libertarian minimal state in peril of collapse. (shrink)

We address the most fundamental yet routinely ignored issue in economics today: that of distributive impact of the monetary system on the real economy. By re-examining the logical implications of token re-presentation of value and Irving Fisher’s theory of exchange, we argue that producers of value incur incidental expropriation of wealth associated with the deflationary effect that new value supply has on the purchasing power of money. In order to remedy the alleged inequity we propose a value-added negative tax (...) (VANT) based on net individual contribution to the economic output, which is structured as a negative tax function geared to profits derived from eligible productive activities in consideration of their estimated deflationary impact. We show that an adequately optimised VANT can be non-inflationary and have zero net cost to the public. Furthermore, economic output stands to improve due to direct incentivisation of value creation, making the proposed scheme not only politically feasible but economically desirable. The proposal advances the principle of ‘fair money’, where all forms of economic value are attributed to their rightful owners prior to any positive taxation. (shrink)

Singapore's strategic play to secure international wealth management market share has been very successful. Serious questions, however, were raised in relation to this ascendency as the Global Financial Crisis drove the European Union and the United States of America to become proactive in clamping down on tax evasion and other areas deemed by them to be undesirable within the international financial system. This paper will examine the Singapore government's decade-long growth policy of its wealth management sector, and how (...) it has been impacted upon by international regulatory responses. Further, it examines how in stark contrast to the EU and the US, Indonesia has been far less successful in its diplomatic efforts to have Singapore address financial diplomacy issues in relation to Indonesian citizens residing in Singapore. This article will argue, however, that Singapore's less than robust response to Indonesia's constant requests for action maybe to the long-term detriment of Singapore itself. (shrink)

The unprecedented economic changes taking place in China over the past three decades have led to significant new fiscal pressures for the central and provincial governments. The relative decline of public ownership and rise of the private sector has forced governments to substitute revenues from new taxes for the funds formerly provided by public enterprises. The shift from profit distribution to tax revenues has led to a realignment of power between local governments and the central government while the growing (...) disparity in wealth between have and have-not provinces has increased the pressure on the central government to further consolidate control over tax revenues and to apply the enhanced revenues to fund fiscal redistribution transfers. At the same time, modernization of the economy and the influx of foreign investment have created pressure to revamp tax laws and tax administration so both resemble more closely western market economy norms. These processes may lead to an irreversible shift of fiscal power from provincial governments to the central government and a consequent consolidation of political power, changing forever the political economy of modern China. (shrink)

Any decision by a company regarding the use of profits to pay tax, remuneration or shareholder returns has ethical implications. Sharing Profits reviews high-profile ethical issues facing companies in how profits are used, and proposes a framework for understanding the ethical implications of decisions.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:110 DAVID HUME'S INVISIBLE HAND IN THE WEALTH OF NATIONS THE PUBLIC CHOICE OF MORAL INFORMATION Introduction The thesis I shall defend is that there are systematic aspects of Adam Smith's economics which make little sense when read in isolation from a literature in which David Hume provides the signal contributions. Consequently, parts of Hume's own work are stripped of meaning, isolated as they are from later developments. (...) The puzzles about Smith's analysis which I find illuminated by Hume's are the following: 1. Why does Smith both defend the importance of economic growth for the material of well-being of the working class and claim that property originates as spoil, impoverishing the working class? After all, in the classical system the existence of property is one requisite for economic growth. 2. Why does Smith exalt the assumption of self-interested behavior in private activity but claim that irrationality dominates the political process? 3. Why does Smith deny the importance of benevolence in Wealth of Nations and insist on the importance of morality Sentiment morality in Theory of Moral its?3 The three questions have a common feature: they are related to the question of how public goods are provided. The particular public good in question is the institution of private property. As with all true I am obligated to the Center for Study of Public Choice for generous support of my research. Suzanne Levy gets the credit for the extent to which this approaches English. I have benefited from acute comments from Charles Rowley and Charles Griswold. The errors and obscurities which remain are solely my responsibility. Ill public goods, society considered as a whole benefits from having such an institution, but each individual considered separately can gain by anti-social behavior.4 Public goods provide a considerable difficulty for any social institution; neither competition in the market nor government requests that individuals reveal how much they wish to be taxed are certain to be efficient. There are aspects of the classical economic analysis which stress the importance of moral information as a partial solution to the public goods problem. By "moral information" I only require that the theory is employed as a guide and that if an individual acts contrary to the theory, this choice is not cited as "falsifying" the theory. Rather, something is said to be "wrong" or "wicked" about the choice.6 Much of modern economic analysis assumes that individuals have perfect information; this postulate rules out any significant role for moral information in the provision of the public goods. To avoid assuming away such a role for morality, we will drop the perfect information assumption and then examine if we can make sense of the classics' attack on the public goods problem. Of course, the specification that individuals see their own interests very poorly is consistent with Smith's general approach. The technique employed below is to look at the issue which Hume and Smith addressed as a problem in modern economics. The key difficulty is to determine under what conditions moral information could guide individuals with very imperfect perceptions to maximize their utility. In particular, suppose we find that moral guidance tells an individual how efficiently to produce. Is this morality self-enforcing or are resources required to persuade people to act in accord with these teachings? If resources are required, we will not pay much attention to just how this persuasion 112 is provided, e.g., whether we tell people that theft is "evil" or whether we hang a few thieves. General production theory tells us we probably will do both, but this is a separate issue. The argument to be advanced is that moral information has self-enforcement properties in private activities but these properties are missing in public activities. In this account, then, real resources will be required for implementing the morality. This consideration in turn raises an interesting issue. If the government expends these resources, what reason is there to believe that they will be provided to serve the public interest and not the interest of the government? Is it possible that the government can prosper by keeping people ignorant or by giving them advice... (shrink)

The inequalities of wealth and fortune form a central part of the human condition, and these over time have been a constant source of social unease. Whether they should be praised and preserved or endured or corrected is an issue that produces uniform discord. One source of this difficulty in analysis stems from the possible ways in which these persistent inequalities arise. It is easy to condemn any differences in wealth created by the victor's expropriation of the vanquished's (...) honest toil. It is far more difficult to condemn those identical differences when they are attributable to the thrift and foresight of the successful relative to the laziness or self-destructiveness of the impoverished. Furthermore, most find it morally ambiguous how best to respond to differences between persons that are the result of luck or chance, such that they do not reflect positively or negatively on either the character of those who have done well or those who have done poorly. (shrink)

Recent decades have seen a resurgence of contractarian thinking about the nature and origins of the state. Scholars in this tradition ask what constraints rational, self-interested actors might deliberately impose upon themselves. In response, Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke, and other early contractarians answered that laws of property were an attractive alternative to “the war of all against all.” More recently, James Buchanan, Russell Hardin, Mancur Olson, Gordon Tullock, and others have used contractarian principles to justify laws that solve a variety of (...) Prisoner's Dilemmas and other collective-action problems. And in the distributional realm, John Rawls and others have applied contractarian analysis to investigate how material wealth ought to be allocated among people. (shrink)

In this comparative analysis of the UK and Sweden, we consider, if inherited wealth is most deserving of redistributive taxation, then what lessons, if any, may be learned from the difficult paths faced by this tax in these countries. We conclude that the political momentum behind the Swedish family business was distinct, and, possibly, capable of travel to the UK. The research for this article is part of the FairTax EU project, which is funded by the European Union’s Horizon (...) 2020 research and innovation programme 2014-2018, grant agreement No. FairTax 649439. (shrink)

Over its entire life, the Internal Revenue Code (like other tax systems) has never tried to tax economic income as such, because of the administrative and liquidity problems that arise from taxing any combination of values consumed and from appreciation (or depreciation) of capital stocks. Instead, the common practice limits tax occasions to a realization of income from sale or other disposition of property. Even then, if the proceeds of the transaction are not cash or marketable securities, as with many (...) corporation reorganizations, taxation is deferred until these assets are converted in cash or marketable securities.Any effort to eliminate these twin filters by taxing income—and income regardless of realization—will overburden government agencies and private taxpayers, while reducing economic activity. A wealth tax scores even worse by these welfare measures, creating massive problems of evasion and enforcement that will reduce capital formation across the board in the effort to transfer wealth from the ultra-rich to everyone else. A simple tax structure with affordable rates is the only path to economic prosperity. (shrink)

Die ATB ist die traditionsreichste Editionsreihe der germanistischen Mediävistik. Begründet 1881 von Hermann Paul, wurde sie von führenden Fachvertretern, Georg Baesecke, Hugo Kuhn, Burghart Wachinger, betreut. Seit 2001 liegt die Verantwortung in den Händen von Christian Kiening. Die mittlerweile etwa 120 Bände verknüpfen exemplarisch Handschriftennähe und Lesbarkeit, wissenschaftliche Arbeit am Text und Blick auf die akademische Lehre. Sie umfassen anerkannte, zum Teil kommentierte Ausgaben 'klassischer' Autoren der Zeit um 1200, aber auch veritable Werkausgaben (Notker der Deutsche) und anspruchsvolle Neueditionen (Eckenlied, (...) Heinrich von dem Türlin). (shrink)

The Altdeutsche Textbibliothek [Old German Text Library] is the series of editions of German medieval texts with the richest history. Foundedin 1881 by Hermann Paul, it has been edited by leading Germanists- Georg Beasecke, Hugo Kuhn, Burghart Wachinger. Since 2001, responsibility for the series has rested with Christian Kiening. In the meantime, the series comprises some 120 volumes, with an exemplary combination of closeness to the original manuscript(s) with ease of reading, philological accuracy with concern for university teaching. It includes (...) recognised editions of "classical" authors from around 1200- some with commentary- but also presents veritable editions of authors' works (Notker the German) and high-quality new editions (Eckenlied, Heinrich von dem Türlin). (shrink)

Liberal egalitarians argue that the state is justified in taxing members of a political community to achieve distributive justice and ensure political equality and regime stability. This involves an uneasy compromise between equality and efficiency, a compromise that many argue has recently been undermined by the growth of unchecked wealth and income inequality. This essay argues that there is also a trade-off between selecting fair processes for taxation and aiming for particular distributive outcomes. The way people accumulate wealth, (...) and the way states tax often matters more than distributive outcomes. Policymakers must allow for the fair assessment of tax liabilities, avoid excessive enforcement costs and prevent political actors from using tax systems to achieve their partial ends. Recognizing these considerations justifies a systematic scheme of taxation while constraining the mechanisms for collecting revenue. I justify this position using comparative analysis, which I contrast with the conceptual intuitionistic approach associated with egalitarianism. (shrink)

Substantially increased wealth inequality across the developed world has prompted many philosophers, economists and legal theorists to support comprehensive taxes on all forms of wealth. Proposals include levying taxes on the basis of total wealth, or alternatively the change in the value of capital holdings measured from year-to-year. This contrasts with most existing policies that tax capital assets at the point they are transferred from one beneficiary to another through sale or gifts. Are these tax (...) reforms likely to meet their aims of greater economic and political equality? We argue that these policies are likely to fail because, following neoclassical economic theory, they are based on a conception of capital as possessing given values in what amounts to a static equilibrium. This mischaracterizes the dynamic and subjective character of market economies and the contested value of real instantiations of capital goods. This makes them very difficult, often impossible, to value apart from at the point of voluntary transfer or profit realization. This means most taxes levied on a mark-to-market basis will be arbitrary and unfair. We propose alternative policies based on an income realization approach to taxation that are more likely to curb excessive wealth holdings. This includes introducing international treaties that prohibit preferential tax treatment for individual companies and specific sectors, and broadening the income tax base to include the imputed rent of personal housing wealth. (shrink)

The rapid development of complex income taxation and welfare systems in the 20th century may give the impression that progressive wealth redistribution systems are uniquely modern. However, religious systems provided similar mechanisms for addressing economic injustice and poverty alleviation centuries earlier. Zakat is the obligation of almsgiving and is the third pillar of Islam--a requirement for all believers. In the early development of the Islamic community, zakat was collected as a tax by the state and the funds were distributed (...) to a defined set of needy groups. As a theoretical matter, there are three insights that make zakat an especially relevant subject for modern legal scholars. First, zakat is an example of a modest wealth tax combined with an income tax that may be illustrative in the discourse regarding wealth taxes. Second, the jurisprudence of zakat supports the ethical conclusions of scholars who contend that property rights are attached to post rather than pre-tax income. Third, to the extent that zakat is considered a principal source of revenue for public programs, it might imply a limited role for government, focusing on equitable distribution of goods. This paper begins with a thorough evaluation and synthesis of the traditional Islamic jurisprudence related to zakat. The next section identifies three broad approaches to zakat adopted by modern Muslim states, with particular emphasis on ways that zakat is institutionalized legally. This is followed by an empirical analysis of the correlation of the approaches to zakat with individual income and wealth stratification. The article concludes with observations and policy recommendations related to zakat and broader legal theory based on the earlier qualitative analysis and empirical findings. (shrink)

Substantially increased wealth inequality across the developed world has prompted many philosophers, economists and legal theorists to support comprehensive taxes on all forms of wealth. Proposals include levying taxes on the basis of total wealth, or alternatively the change in the value of capital holdings measured from year-to-year. This contrasts with most existing policies that tax capital assets at the point they are transferred from one beneficiary to another through sale or gifts. Are these tax (...) reforms likely to meet their aims of greater economic and political equality? We argue that these policies are likely to fail because, following neoclassical economic theory, they are based on a conception of capital as possessing given values in what amounts to a static equilibrium. This mischaracterizes the dynamic and subjective character of market economies and the contested value of real instantiations of capital goods. This makes them very difficult, often impossible, to value apart from at the point of voluntary transfer or profit realization. This means most taxes levied on a mark-to-market basis will be arbitrary and unfair. We propose alternative policies based on an income realization approach to taxation that are more likely to curb excessive wealth holdings. This includes introducing international treaties that prohibit preferential tax treatment for individual companies and specific sectors, and broadening the income tax base to include the imputed rent of personal housing wealth. (shrink)

Professors Ackerman and Alstott contrast their proposal for stakeholding with Philippe Van Parijs’s proposal for a universal basic income. InThe Stakeholder Society, Ackerman and Alstott proposed that the federal government give all U.S. citizens an $80,000 grant as they reach adulthood. The program’s revenue cost is to be funded by an annual wealth tax of 2 percent and a “payback” requirement at death. Although stakeholding and basic income share common foundations in liberal political theory, Ackerman and Alstott discuss the (...) principled and practical advantages of stakeholding and introduce Tony Blair’sU.K. proposal forChildren’s Savings Accounts, which shares important features with stakeholding. (shrink)

"Providing a thorough examination of distributive justice, Distributive Justice and Taxation presents and discusses different theories of what constitutes a just society, and how goods should be distributed in such a society. The distribution of goods in society has direct and serious consequences on the lives of the people. There are therefore important questions to be asked regarding the justice of that distribution: Is it just that some people inherit large fortunes while others inherit nothing? Do rich people have additional (...) access to political power because of their wealth? If so, is that just? And should the ambition for economic policies be to combat poverty, or to reduce inequality? This book explores these questions and a number of others through the analysis of related theories, spanning from strong egalitarian theories on the left to right-wing libertarianism. The chapters also explicitly examine the case of taxation - one of the most important and controversial measures of distribution of goods in society. Placing emphasis on the case of Norway and using data from both the UK and USA as a point of comparison, the work details and explores the key features of the tax system. It concludes by presenting and evaluating arguments for and against taxes such as income tax, wealth tax, and inheritance tax. This book is essential reading for those interested in distributive justice, as well as students and scholars of philosophy, law, political science and economics. J2rgen Pedersen is Professor of Practical Philosophy at the Department of Business Administration, Western Norway University of Applied Sciences, Norway"--. (shrink)

Lockdowns were a morally and medically appropriate anti-contagion policy to stop the spread of Covid. However, lockdowns came with considerable costs. Specifically, lockdowns imposed harms and losses upon the young in order to benefit the elderly, who were at the highest risk of severe illness and death from Covid. This represented a shifting of the (epidemiological) burden of Covid for the elderly to a systemic burden of lockdown upon the young. This article argues that even if lockdowns were a morally (...) permissible response to Covid, the harms and losses they imposed on the young ground a claim of compensation. I defend an intergenerational compensation argument that defends a claim for an egalitarian intergenerational transfer to compensate the young for the harms of lockdown. (shrink)

This volume presents philosophical contributions examining questions of the grounding and justification of taxation and different types of taxes such as inheritance, wealth, consumption or income tax in relation to justice and the concept of a just society. The chapters cover the different levels at which the discussion on taxation and justice takes place: On the principal level, chapters investigate the justification and grounding of taxation as such and the role taxation plays and should play in the design (...) of justice, be it for a just society or a just world order. On a more concrete level, chapters present discussions of these general reflections in more depth and examine different types of taxation, tax systems and their design and implementation. On an applied level, chapters discuss certain specific taxes, such as wealth and inheritance taxes, and examine whether or not a certain tax should be favored and for what reasons as well as why it is just to target certain kinds of assets or income. Finally, this volume contains chapters that discuss the central issue of international and global taxation and their relation to global justice. (shrink)

Inherited wealth will be of increasing importance in years to come. Yet inheritance taxation is unpopular, and part of this unpopularity is due to family concerns. Such taxation is seen by many as morally problematic because it is taken to violate important family values. In this article, we explore five family arguments against inheritance taxation: firstly, whether we have a right to benefit our children; secondly, whether it is a virtue to benefit one's children; thirdly, whether children have a (...) right to their parent's belongings, due to common ownership; fourthly, whether inheritance taxation may impair a vital sense of continuity and belonging; and lastly, an argument from incentives that appeals specifically to the relation between parents and children. We conclude that none of the arguments provide strong objections against a moderate or even a high inheritance tax rate, at least not when special provisions are made for things like family houses or farms. However, since the arguments all introduce concerns that should be assigned some weight, it would be unjust to abolish inheritance entirely. (shrink)