This article outlines the foundations of a nomos-observing theory of social justice, termed ‘rule egalitarianism’, that explains how the seemingly contradictory merger of classical liberalism and s...

The distinction between redistribution and predistribution is now embraced by many political philosophers, like Jacob Hacker or Martin O’Neill. This distinction, we could think, is particularly important for the question of how we react to crises, like the current coronavirus pandemic. If the policies take the form of taxes and transfers, like cash-flow assistance, it is redistribution, one could argue. If the policies are meant to alter pretax incomes, as policies changing the conditions for bankruptcy are, it is predistribution. This (...) paper shows why that is not so. Re- and predistribution are only techniques of presentation. They are meant to put the emphasis on different ways we can depict the consequences of policies. Both the “pre-” of predistribution and the “re-” of redistribution are misnomers. This paper argues that we cannot establish a strong distinction between policies that are re- and those that are predistributive, as the case of the basic income will show. Given that classical liberals endorsed egalitarian policies, moreover, the idea of predistribution cannot be used by progressives who want to differentiate their social justice platforms from the classical liberal program. (shrink)

Historically, it is safe to say that very few laws did as much to stoke inequality as laws touching descents and hereditary transmissions. This paper attempts to see if the classical liberal tradition can endorse inheritance taxation so as to further fair equality of opportunity, as well as to lessen inequality of undeserved wealth. It argues that fair equality of opportunity is a necessary feature of market societies to make sure that they remain competitive. Hence, inheritance taxation is most likely (...) necessary from a classical liberal point of view as an instrument of social mobility to counter notable problems of social immobility, say hereditary vocational stratification, which a system of private property rights creates. (shrink)

This article outlines the foundations of a nomos-observing theory of social justice, termed ‘rule egalitarianism’, that explains how the seemingly contradictory merger of classical liberalism and social justice is conceivable. The first step towards such a theory consists in ensuring that a concern for the rule of law is etched in the very core of our understanding of social justice, in which case some egalitarian rules will be acceptable from a classical liberal viewpoint. The legal framework of capitalism can indeed (...) be designed to reduce inequality in the name of justice inasmuch as any egalitarian goal is specified in terms of institutional rules. More precisely, rules in a liberal polity should be general and abstract, which will lead us to establish a distinction between four concepts of rules, namely between laws, regulations, statutes and decrees. Moreover, against the neoclassical liberal understanding of social justice, rule egalitarianism argues that having general and abstract rules of market capitalism imposes some constraints on any institutional framework so that social justice becomes necessary to correct the errors of imperfect generalisations, leaving some people behind. (shrink)

The main question dividing classical and high liberals is about how economic rights rank compared to other rights and public goals. That is, the question is about what can or cannot outweigh such rights. High liberals argue that economic rights can be outweighed by any legitimate state interest, such that they are prima facie rights. Neoclassical liberals, conversely, have recently sought to elevate economic rights to basic rights, which could then only be outweighed by other basic rights. This paper shows (...) where the real debate should be for classical liberals, challenging Samuel Freeman’s widely held distinction between classical and high liberalism. Economic rights are prima facie for all liberals in that they can be outweighed by, say, considerations of utility or social justice. Although neoclassical liberals are correct to say that such rights are much more important than high liberals normally recognize, it does not follow that economic rights are basic. (shrink)

Cet article plaide pour une révolution marginale en éthique appliquée, suivant la révolution marginale qui a marqué le début de l’économie néoclassique. L’éthique est situationnelle en ce sens qu’elle concerne les incréments de valeurs. Nous ne choisissons pas entre toute la liberté ou toute l’égalité du monde. Nous choisissons plutôt entre des incréments, par exemple, de liberté ou d’égalité. Cet article introduit donc les bases d’une théorie de l’éthique marginale : (1) nous devrions préférer les échelles cardinales aux échelles ordinales, (...) (2) les valeurs devraient être évaluées à travers leur taux marginal de substitution, (3) nous devrions rejeter l’idée de valeur absolue ou intrinsèque, (4) quelque chose est juste dans la mesure où le dernier desideratum réalisable qui lui est attaché à la marge est satisfait. L’objectif de cette approche est de nous permettre de mieux classer les desiderata, conceptualisées à la marge, et d’introduire dans le domaine de l’éthique certaines notions issues de la théorie économique moderne. JEL Codes : B13, A12, A13. (shrink)

This article examines the question of private coercion in market societies, arguing for an unconditional basic income guarantee from a classical liberal viewpoint. It proposes three main arguments. First, classical liberals view the purpose of government to be the reduction of coercion, both public and private. Second, a proper understanding of the nature of coercion indicates that parties subject to certain types of hardship are being coerced. Third, where the total amount of coercion is reduced by eliminating the hardship, the (...) classical liberal state must do so to fulfill its purpose. Hence, this article argues that if the total amount of coercion in society can be reduced by the state employing the amount of coercion necessary to maintain an unconditional basic income guarantee, then the classical liberal state is obligated to maintain such a guarantee by its underlying justification. (shrink)

Historically, it is safe to say that very few laws did as much to stoke inequality as laws touching descents and hereditary transmissions. This paper attempts to see if the classical liberal tradition can endorse inheritance taxation so as to further fair equality of opportunity, as well as to lessen inequality of undeserved wealth. It argues that fair equality of opportunity is a necessary feature of market societies to make sure that they remain competitive. Hence, inheritance taxation is most likely (...) necessary from a classical liberal point of view as an instrument of social mobility to counter notable problems of social immobility, say hereditary vocational stratification, which a system of private property rights creates. (shrink)

This article indicates a new direction for business ethics, which Lon Fuller pioneered with his work on social architecture. “Eunomics”, as Fuller called it, is “the theory or study of good order and workable arrangements”. How should we appraise the effects of the various ways of organizing and running a corporation, for example, with regard to the different structures and basic plans it can espouse? We should reject the “doctrine of the infinite pliability of social arrangements”, as some forms of (...) organization are unsound. They cannot be implemented in a proper fashion given the boundaries and the rules of the market established. A theory of business eunomics explains why each kind of legal process, including managerial direction, is better suited for the pursuit of a limited number of ends, and thus why we should not force a single institution to solve all ethical problems. (shrink)