"""This book neither wants to make an accusation, nor impose things that are impossible to carry out. It merely wants to make the Balinese and tourists aware of what is happening in this paradise on earth and about the positive infl uence they can have in preserving the culture of the beautiful island of Bali. Tri Hita Karana, the spirit of Bali originated from the rich Balinese-Hindu philosophy. Tri Hita Karana means three causes of happiness: (...) balanced and harmonious relationships of humans with God; of humans with fellow human beings; and of humans with the surrounding nature. Respect and togetherness are essential values in this philosophy. The Hindu doctrine of tat tvam asi, “I am you and you are me”, teaches us that all things are connected. Humans who do not respect God, fellow humans and nature are not respecting themselves, and this will eventually lead to self-destruction. Respect and togetherness will lead to harmony and happiness. Since the Balinese are already living according to the age-old philosophy of Tri Hita Karana, they can contribute to a sustainable environment for their children. The past and the present cannot be separated from each other; the present is born out of the past. Our actions to create a sustainable environment today matter, or in Gandhi’s words: the future depends on what we do today. The authors, Jan Hendrik Peters, a former professor of service studies and Wisnu Wardana, chief-editor of Bali Travel Newspaper, are deeply concerned about the negative infl uences of mass tourism and want to plead for a sustainable future for Bali, by writing this book. “We really do need this book on Bali to make the Balinese people and the international tourists familiar with the essence of Hinduism. If the Balinese follow the philosophy of Tri Hita Karana as a guide in their personal life and business, it means that Bali will be the Island of the Gods forever.” - Ida Pedanda Subali Tianyar, Hindu high priest, Chairman of the Council of Hindu Priests in Indonesia.""". (shrink)

The present volume, comprising ninteen articles by renowned scholars, is divided into three sections, namely, Buddhist Jaina and Hindu Philsosphical Researches.

Ciudad sobre ciudad compendia y resume a la perfección el proyecto filosófico de Eugenio Trías: la filosofía del límite. En anteriores libros Trías ha desarrollado separadamente lo que en este libro pretende articular de modo global. Lógica del limite desarrollaba una estética, La edad del espíritu, una filosofía de la religión y de la historia en función de lo que el autor denomina "la cita con lo sagrado, La razón fronteriza, se adentraba en el ámbito de la teoría del conocimiento, (...) Etica y condición humana, expone la naturaleza del ser del límite (el hombre) en su vertiente práctica y en su desarrollo cívico político. Ahora se trata de articular estos cuatro barrios que componen la ciudadela limítrofe, para construir la ciudad ideal, recuperando el proyecto platónico en su vertiente más innovadora... Sobre esos cuatro barrios se proyectan y desarrollan los conceptos fundamentales de la obra del autor: el ser del limite, la razón fronteriza y el suplemento simbólico. Trías desarrolla la ordenación de la ciudad y el despliegue de los barrios que la componen. Con ello consigue dar perfecta coherencia al proyecto de desarrollar la filosofía del límite y de ver las relaciones e interrelaciones que se dan entre esos diferentes barrios o ámbitos del pensamiento. Para desarrollar este proyecto Trías señala que la filosofía antes de ser un producto de la inteligencia, constituye una emoción. Por tanto este desarrollo vendrá marcado por tres emociones filosóficas fundamentales: el asombro, el vértigo y el amor-pasión. Tres elementos esenciales para comprender la noción del hombre como ser del límite, como anhelo de lo estético y de lo religioso en su afán de superar mediante lo simbólico las limitaciones impuestas a la razón por su carácter fronterizo. (shrink)

Contributed seminar papers on concept of knowledge in Indian philosophy organised by Poornprajna Samshodhana Mandirm, Bangalore in March 2010.

In recent years, misogyny has become a central concept in philosophy as well as an established concept in public discourse and political policy. But where is misogyny’s supposed counterpart, namely, misandry? In this paper I argue for an ameliorative analysis of "misandry", arguing that it can be reformulated in an effort to reclaim it from its misogynistic weaponisation. The term "misandry" is used almost exclusively as a misogynistic rhetorical device for attributing unjust anger, hatred, or other similar emotions to (...) a speaker, thereby undermining their epistemic authority. Rather than dismissing the term as conceptually flawed and politically problematic, I argue that we ought to ameliorate misandry to instead refer to a felt anger, hostility, or fear toward the patriarchal social order and its valorisation and/or expression in misogynistic and machismo behaviour. To support these claims, I begin with a discussion of Kate Manne's analysis of misogyny before reflecting on how this can inform our understanding of misandry. I then demonstrate the various ways in which misandry is rhetorically deployed as a means of silencing speakers that express dissent against the patriarchy. Following this, I argue that we should ameliorate the term, not only to undermine these misogynistic practices, but also to articulate a legitimate affective and reactive attitude against the patriarchal imposition of a hierarchical gender binary. (shrink)

In this paper, my aim is to develop a phenomenological understanding of discrimination from the perspective of the discriminator. Since early existential phenomenology, the phenomenon of discrimination has received a great deal of attention. While much of this work has focused on the experience of the discriminatee, recent scholarship has begun to reflect on the intentional structures on the side of the discriminator. In a contribution to this trend, I argue that our sense of what is (ab)normal plays a constitutively (...) significant role in the reiteration and reinforcement of harmful discriminatory practices. More specifically, I argue that Husserl's distinction between two forms of normality, namely, concordance-normality [Einstimmigkeit] and optimal-normality [Optimalität], is an important tool for illuminating otherwise overlooked aspects of the discriminator's experience. I achieve this by demonstrating how these two notions of normality play distinct constitutive roles when comparing deliberate acts of discrimination committed with malintent, compared with more primordial, habitual, and prereflective expectations which are already discriminatory in nucleo. I argue that at the heart of discriminatory practices there is a naïve, normalizing attempt to stabilize concordance at the expense of critical self-reflection, normative revisions, and enriched horizons of expectation. In doing so, this paper provides a novel and important contribution to philosophical discussions surrounding discrimination. (shrink)

Phenomenological discussions of sociality have long been concerned with the relations between the I, the You, and the We. Recently, dialogue between phenomenology and analytic philosophical work on collective intentionality has given rise to a corpus of literature oriented around the first-person plural 'we'. In this paper, I demonstrate how these dominant accounts of the 'we' are not exhaustive of first-person plural experiences as such. I achieve these aims by arguing for a phenomenological distinction between an experience of being part (...) of a 'we' compared to an experience of being part of an 'us'. To have a 'we-experience' there must be a plurality of (unified) subjects sharing in an experience together such that the experience has the phenomenal character of being ours. An 'us-experience', on the other hand, requires the experiential salience of an external 'Third' in a way which is constitutively significant. Drawing on Sartrean social ontology, I argue that the 'us' is distinct from the 'we' on three levels, all of which pertain to the constitutive and unifying role of the Third. I then outline two forms of us-experiences: (1) the experience of being grouped and (2) the experience of apprehending one's seriality. (shrink)

Publicado por primera vez en 1982 y merecedor del Premio Nacional de Ensayo en 1983, Lo bello y lo siniestro es un texto imprescindible para comprender la historia de las ideas estéticas y de la teoría del arte. Mediante el análisis de obras diversas -desde las pinturas renacentistas de Sandro Botticelli hasta la célebre película Vertigo de Alfred Hitchcock- el genial filósofo valora la evolución histórica de dos categorías estéticas opuestas, lo bello y lo siniestro, para descubrir lo que ambas (...) tienen de sublime. Eugenio Trías persigue y consigue incansablemente para ofrecer al lector uno de los ensayos más descollantes de nuestro tiempo. (shrink)

Working in academia is challenging, even more so for those with limited resources and opportunities. Researchers around the world do not have equal working conditions. The paper presents the structure, operation method, and conceptual framework of the SM3D Portal's community coaching method, which is built to help Early Career Researchers (ECRs) and researchers in low-resource settings overcome the obstacle of inequality and start their career progress. The community coaching method is envisioned by three science philosophies (cost-effectiveness, transparency spirit, and proactive (...) attitude) and established and operated based on the Serendipity-Mindsponge-3D knowledge (SM3D) management framework (i.e., mindsponge thinking and Bayesian Mindsponge Framework analytics serve as the coaching program's foundational theory and analytical tools). The coaching method also embraces Open Science's values for lowering the cost of doing science and encouraging the trainees to be transparent, which is expected to facilitate the self-correcting mechanism of science through open data, open review, and open dialogue. Throughout the training process, members are central beneficiaries by gaining research knowledge and skills, acquiring publication as the training's product, and shifting their mindsets from “I can't do it” to “I can do it,” and at the same time transforming a mentee to be ready for a future mentor's role. The coaching method is thus one of the members, for the member, by the members. -/- • The paper provides the structure, operation method, and conceptual framework of the SM3D Portal's community coaching method, which is built to help Early Career Researchers (ECRs) and researchers in low-resource settings overcome the obstacle of inequality and start their career progress. • The paper presents three major science philosophies envisioning the establishment and operation of scholarly community coaching. • The paper employs the mindsponge theory and BMF analytics to construct a conceptual framework explaining how an environment is created to help shift members’ mindsets from “I can't do it” to “I can do it.”. (shrink)

Background Achieving meaningful consent can be challenging, particularly in contexts of diminished literacy, yet is a vital part of participant protection in global health research. Method We explored the challenges and potential solutions of achieving meaningful consent through a qualitative study in a predominantly hill tribe ethnic minority population in northern Thailand, a culturally distinctive population with low literacy. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 37 respondents who had participated in scrub typhus clinical research, their family members, researchers and other key (...) informants. A thematic analysis was conducted. Results Our analysis identified four interrelated themes surrounding participants’ ability to give consent: varying degrees of research understanding, limitations of using informal translators, issues impacting decisions to join research, and voluntariness of consent. Suggestions for achieving more meaningful consent included the use of formal translators and community engagement with research populations. Conclusions Participant’s agency in decision making to join research should be supported, but research information needs to be communicated to potential participants in a way that they can understand. We found that improved understanding about the study and its potential benefits and harms goes beyond literacy or translation and requires attention to social and cultural factors. (shrink)

Lives and work of Veṅkaṭanātha (Vedantadesika), 1268-1369, and Maṇavāḷa Māmun̲i, 1370-1444, Vaishnavite leaders and exponents of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school in Hindu philosophy from Tamil Nadu.

Within the context of a critique of volitionism, Trying Without Willing articulates a new philosophy of the mind and its role in intentional action, based on the notion of de re intentionality. This book will be of interest to anyone seriously interested in the philosophy of mind, the nature of intentional action and mental causation, or the influence of Cartesianism in contemporary analytic philosophy.

Within the context of a critique of volitionism, Trying Without Willing articulates a new philosophy of the mind and its role in intentional action, based on the notion of de re intentionality. This book will be of interest to anyone seriously interested in the philosophy of mind, the nature of intentional action and mental causation, or the influence of Cartesianism in contemporary analytic philosophy.

Maybe God doesn’t have to do anything in order to bring it about that there be light. Most of us, however, have to perform some sort of act like flicking a switch to do so. But some of the things we bring about do not require such mediating acts. For example, it appears that I don’t have to do anything in order to bring about or cause the arm movements I perform in flicking the switch. I just move my arm. (...) Of course, a number of things will happen when I move my arm: neurons fire, muscles flex. But these are not acts in and of themselves. The only act we have here is the moving of the arm. So my arm movement in this instance is basic in a sense in which my illumination of the room is not. (shrink)

The 2014 movie God’s Not Dead is a clear argument for the truth of its title; in other words, it is an argument that God exists. It does this, primarily, by having its protagonist, college freshman Josh Wheaton, present a number of arguments for God’s existence in front of his philosophy class. It is the purpose of this chapter to evaluate those arguments. In the end, we will see that the movie fails, pretty dramatically, at accomplishing its task, while (...) also unfairly demonizing those who deny its thesis along the way. (shrink)

This introduction to a collection of papers on normativity provides a framework modelled on the division in ethics to approach normative issues. It suggests that is is useful to divide questions about normativity into five groups: normative ontology, normative semantics, normative epistemology, normative psychology, and substantial normative theory.

Sue knows that, unaided, she cannot lift the 1,000 pound weight, but surely she can try. Can she not? For even if she believes it is impossible to succeed in lifting the weight, trying to lift the weight need not involve success. So surely, it would seem that nothing could be easier than for Sue to give lifting the weight a try. In this paper, I agrue that, appearances aside, it is not possible for someone to try to do what (...) that person believes to be impossible. So, on this view, perhaps surprisingly, not only would it be impossible for Sue to lift the weight, but it would be impossible for her to try (as long as she believed her lifting it to be impossible). I defend this view in the context of a package of related claims and a functional accoung of trying and intentional action. (shrink)

What is the relationship between trying, desire, and desiring to try? Is it necessary to desire to do something in order to try to do it? Must Dave desire to quit smoking in order to try to quit? I shall defend the view that desiring to do A is necessary for trying to do A. First, Dave needs motivation to quit smoking and motivation comes in the form of desire. So it seems straightforward that when one tries to do something (...) A, one’s desire to do that thing A is one’s motivation. Second, when Dave throws out a pack of cigarettes, this may or may not be part of an attempt to quit smoking. It may be a political protest against R.J.R. Nabisco. Dave’s throwing out the cigarettes only counts as part of his attempt to quit smoking, if it is done for the right reason, out of the right motivation. Again, the right motivation seems to be the desire to quit smoking. Thus, the desire to do A appears to play important roles in the attempt to do A. At the very least, it helps to motivate, guide, and constitute the attempt as the attempt to do A. It is because Dave wants to quit smoking that his throwing out his cigarettes counts as part of his attempt to quit smoking, not as a political protest. (shrink)

Does 'Person P tried to A' entail that there is some particular, whether a mental act or a brain state or whatever, that is a trying? Most discussions of trying assume that this entailment holds. There is no good reason for holding that this is a valid inference. In particular, I examine one 'Davidsonian' argument that might be used to justify the validity of such an inference and argue that the argument is not sound. See: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/IxsuPqt7rvdzqMxpFiTv/full.

In the specialized and often peculiar conversation of philosophers, some speak of themselves and of others as willing our actions. Usually, they intend to imply thereby a distinctive kind of psychological event, one that lies at the origin of every instance of intentional action. This thesis, of course, has become highly controversial. Many argue that despite much traditional philosophical theorizing committed to such an essential feature of action, there is no basis for it in ordinary speech, introspection, or sound theory (...) about the mind’s role in behavior. But even in everyday conversation, we do say of ourselves and of others that we or they often are trying to do various things, sometimes successfully and sometimes not. Since we not only say this but are aware of it often enough, sound theory should provide a place for this feature, at least. Now some recent philosophers seek to forge a link between the ordinary notion of ‘trying’ and the philosophical notion of ‘willing’. They fix upon special cases where agents experience themselves as acting while little or no bodily movement occurs. It seems that the activity there experienced must be purely psychological, a striving to achieve an effect that we often term “trying”. If this is right, perhaps it can be argued cogently that such a psychological activity is present in ordinary cases as well. (shrink)

The implications of this example for the philosophy of action are, of course, important: at the very least, it casts serious doubt on the often heard view that the notion of volition is a mere invention of philosophers, having no use outside philosophical contexts. It is, then, worthy of study. But many recent philosophers have paid practically no attention to actual cases of paralysis. Instead, they have preferred to deal a priori with the possibility of a paralytic trying to (...) perform a bodily movement, and to deal with it in such a way that the occurrence of acts of volition, to which they have theoretical objections, need not be admitted in the theory of action. I have undertaken a theoretical defense of volition elsewhere, so we shall deal little with such objections here. Instead, we shall focus on the subject of trying, and especially on attempts like that described above, which seem to me to have been badly misunderstood. It will be my contention that trying is generally present in intentional, overt action, that in cases of paralysis trying has substantially the same features it has in relatively uncontroversial cases, and that the attempts of paralytics constitute sound evidence that acts of volition occur typically when bodily movements are performed. (shrink)

The narrativist insight -- From analytic philosophy of history to narrativism -- Three tenets of narrativist philosophy of historiography -- Representationalism and non-representationalism -- Reasoning in historiography -- Colligation -- Underdetermination and epistemic values -- From truth to warranted assertion -- The tri-partite theory of justification in historiography -- Historiography between objectivism and subjectivism -- Postnarrativist philosophy of historiography.

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Extent of Trying Trying to Move the Body Trying and Intending References Further reading.

Maybe God doesn’t have to do anything in order to bring it about that there be light. Most of us, however, have to perform some sort of act like flicking a switch to do so. But some of the things we bring about do not require such mediating acts. For example, it appears that I don’t have to do anything in order to bring about or cause the arm movements I perform in flicking the switch. I just move my arm. (...) Of course, a number of things will happen when I move my arm: neurons fire, muscles flex. But these are not acts in and of themselves. The only act we have here is the moving of the arm. So my arm movement in this instance is basic in a sense in which my illumination of the room is not. (shrink)

Explores "why we find spontaneity so elusive and shows how early Chinese philosophy points the way to happier, more authentic lives"--Dust jacket flap.

In Philosophy of Care, Boris Groys undertakes a reading of key philosophical texts in terms of the relationship between self-care and care, as a way of trying to reinvigorate the question of health beyond its current instantiation in biopolitical life and algorithmic life. He passes through Socrates, Hegel, Nietzsche, Kojève, Bataille, Heidegger and others, culminating in Bogdanov’s distinction between egressive and degressive organization and his cosmist-immortalist dreams. The philosophy outlined by Groys is questioned here through the prism of (...) the work of Bernard Stiegler, in particular via the distinction between labour and work, a re-reading of Hegel on the master-slave dialectic, an interpretation of the meaning of defunctionalization, and an account of the necessity of reorienting ourselves in thought so as to make possible a new economy of care, which depends on the possibility of fostering new processes of sublimation. (shrink)

Trying, a central human concern, is actualized and beheld in rather pure form in athletic endeavor, where successful trying interests us as a revelation of a waxing kind of human being, full of promise. In the moral life trying is not so openly displayed, yet one’s standing in the moral system of evaluation is determined by it. The honor attaching to athletic success models the moral community’s confirmation of individuals’ commitment to it.

We enjoy first-person authority with respect to a certain class of actions: for these actions, we know what we are doing just because we are doing it. This paper first formulates an epistemological principle that captures this authority in terms of trying to act in a way that one has the capacity to act. It then considers a case of effortful action – running a middle distance race – that threatens this principle. And proposes the solution of changing the metaphysics (...) of action: one can keep hold of the idea that we have first-person authority over what we are doing by adopting a disjunctive account of action. (shrink)

Ovaj tekst nastavlja istraživanje započeto u članku naslovljenom „Semantičke strukture filozofije: postavljanje problema“. Počinje pokušajem suprotstavljanja Kantu i Wittgensteinu u više točaka: Kantov mentalni konstruktivizam, Wittgensteinova teorija slike, pitanje o granicama znanja/izrecivosti, prirodi logike, stavu da ima nečeg pogrešnog u filozofiji i tako dalje . Također, osvrće se i na filozofijske pretpostavke samog ovog teksta.Nakon toga, opis kôda, ili „jezika“, filozofije dan je kao tri kozmopoetička oblika. Upućuje se da je unutar tih triju shema moguće svrstati svaki filozofijski tekst te (...) je načinjena usporedba filozofije sa znanošću i književnošću. Raspravljano je i o ostalim stalnim pitanjima, poput naravi filozofskih problema u danom kontekstu i prijedloga metode analize nasuprot interpretiranju filozofijskih tekstova.U posljednjem dijelu teksta, autor postavlja pitanje o mogućnosti ostvarenja njegova cilja o ovome tekstu kao nefilozofskoj deskripciji filozofije te ga nakon kraće rasprave ostavlja otvorenim.This article continues the inquiry begun in the article entitled »The Semantic Structures of Philoso-phy: Posing the Problem«. It begins with an attempt to oppose Kant and Wittgenstein on many points: Kant’s mental constructivism, Wittgenstein’spicture theory, the question of limits to knowledge/expressibility, the view that there is somethingwrong with philosophy, the nature of logic, etc. .Also, the problem of a philosophical background to this very text is adressed.After this, the description of the code, or »language«, of philosophy is given as the three cosmopoeticforms. It is proposed that every philosophical text can be fitted into these schemata. Philosophyis then brought into comparison with science and literature. Other residual issues are discussed, in-cluding the nature of philosophical problems as seen in this context and the proposal of the methodfor analysing philosophical texts, as opposed to interpreting them.In the last part of the text, the question is briefly discussed and left open, namely whether the aim ofthis text to be a non-philosophical description of philosophy is achievable. (shrink)

Arhitektura se kot veščina in kasneje kot lepa umetnost od antike naprej vpisuje v polje filozofskega raziskovanja. Namen članka je prikazati razumevanje arhitekture v sklopu hermenevtične filozofije s prikazom mišljenja njenih treh velikih mislecev: Heideggra, Gadamerja in Vattima, ki bodo na področje arhitekture stopali z ontološkega in z estetskega vidika. Heidegger tako arhitekturo razume kot temeljno potezo biti, Gadamerju je najodličnejša umetnostna forma, kjer je tudi oblika presežena z vsebino, Vattimo pa poda tri vidike arhitekture v postmoderni dobi, ki jih (...) poveže s simultanostjo, simulakri in vprašanjem ornamentalnosti.Architecture as a skill, and later as a form of fine art, has been included in the field of philosophical research since Antiquity. The purpose of this article is to present the understanding of architecture within the field of hermeneutic philosophy by describing the ideas of three great hermeneutic philosophers: Heidegger, Gadamer and Vattimo, who approach architecture from the ontological and aesthetic point of view. Heidegger interprets architecture as a fundamental trait of existence; Gadamer values it as the artistic form par excellence, with the form surpassed by the contents, too; and Vattimo discusses three possible ways of perceiving architecture in the postmodern society, related to simultaneity, simulacra and the question of ornamentality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 42.1 (2004) 104-105 [Access article in PDF] William R. Newman and Lawrence M. Principe. Alchemy Tried in the Fire: Starkey, Boyle, and the Fate of Helmontian Chymistry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002. Pp. xv + 344. Cloth, $40.00. Newman and Principe have produced a masterful study of intellectual context, primarily by correcting the commonly held belief that there was a radical (...) break in the seventeenth century between late medieval alchemy and early modern chemistry. Although their main focus is on George Starkey (the 'alchemist') and Robert Boyle (the 'chemist'), they also provide copious details on the chemical practices and theories of Van Helmont, Benjamin Worsley, Frederick Clodius, and Kenelm Digby, among others. It is hard to do justice to their complex study in a short review. Following a brief summary, therefore, I will limit my discussion to how the authors' conclusions are significant for a more in-depth and nuanced understanding of philosophy in the seventeenth century.After a helpful introduction, Chapter 1 outlines the differences in the early lives of the English, aristocratic Boyle and the American, Harvard-educated Starkey. Chapter 2's background on late medieval chemistry includes an examination of corpuscular theories within that tradition as well as Van Helmont's arguments concerning the way in which mathematics is useful for explaining "superficial" changes but not the real, internal changes in bodies. Chapters 3 and 4 provide a close study of Starkey's laboratory notebooks. Among the entries, recorded in a style adapted from Scholasticism, there are passages that adopt the secrecy of alchemy, while others show Starkey's effective use of theoretical principles and such experimental quantitative methods as mass balance. Chapter 5 examines Boyle's intellectual context. Newman and Principe argue convincingly for Starkey's role in Boyle's addition of Helmontian elements to the general Baconian program. Chapter 6 looks at the [End Page 104] results of Boyle's eclectic mix of chemistry and mechanism. Although Helmontian chemistry played a significant role in Boyle's natural philosophy, the authors attribute his meager interest in quantitative measures and analyses to his attempts to use chemistry as a support for mechanism and as evidence against Aristotelianism. The concluding chapter draws together elements from previous chapters to provide the full argument against the idea of a radical break between medieval alchemy and modern chemistry.Newman and Principe's reconsideration of traditional categories surrounding the idea of a radical break should provide an impetus for similar reconsideration in the history of philosophy. As they point out, 'the' mechanical philosophy drew from a diverse range of disciplines. Boyle's eclectic and complex attempt to develop a unique version of the mechanical philosophy can be seen in other English philosophers, especially Locke and Newton. This study provides a promising basis for yet more extensive and refined studies of the seventeenth-century milieu. The continuing over-emphasis on the physical principles of Descartes and Gassendi's versions of the mechanical philosophy and the tendency to reduce all mechanism to their view needs revision. Also in need of reconsideration is the currently popular belief that the study of context simply means adding social elements to an uncontroversial intellectual context. As the authors clearly show, much more work on the intellectual context remains to be done.One line of research in the history of philosophy that could be pursued concerns the role of Francis Bacon in this context. Although Newman and Principe mention the general Baconian ethos, a detailed discussion of Bacon was clearly beyond their scope. Yet Bacon's own debts to chemistry, although frequently unrecognized, seem more significant given this study. Also, it would be interesting to see the extent to which Bacon's works influenced Van Helmont or Starkey. Newman and Principe's claims regarding the novelty of Starkey's notebooks, for example, may be a little overstated. Many of the elements from Starkey's notebooks can be found in Bacon's advice in his Natural and Experimental Histories (1622). In that work, Bacon advised writers... (shrink)