The concept of “self-realization” plays a central role in philosophy, since it summarizes the idea that a good life is a flourishing life, that is, an existence in which a person makes the best of what she is. A long tradition has understood this in terms of actualizing one’s potential or fulfilling one’s highest and most worthy aspirations. The aim of this paper is to analyze Hegel’s Logic and Philosophy of Right, in order to show that they outline (...) an alternative and valuable account of self-realization that conceives of human flourishing as tied to the flourishing of the world. (shrink)

This article addresses the question raised by the Anthropocene of rethinking the concept of autonomy which, in the conditions of the new geological epoch, is subject to a crisis of legitimation. It explores the ‘strong hypothesis’ according to which nature is a necessary condition of our qualitative experience of the world and a constitutive relation of autonomy defined as the self-realisation of individual identity. With this aim in mind, the article attempts to rethink the concept of recognition in order (...) to conceive a recognising attitude of nature in the form of love of nature as a form of adequate recognition. Rethinking recognition can serve as foundation of an ‘objective’ theory of autonomy, that is, a theory that explains how nature can be defined as a condition and constitutive relation of autonomy. The article, therefore, proposes to reformulate the concept of autonomy as the self-realisation of an ecological or environmental identity in the form of the self-realisation of an ecological ethos, that is, an attitude of respect and care for nature. This enquiry, ultimately, is a contribution to the task of rethinking the basis of our conceptions of autonomy and freedom in the Anthropocene, so that the idea of autonomy can legitimately constitute the central value of the social transformation that is needed to face the ecological crisis. (shrink)

In the Critique of Gotha Programme, Karl Marx famously argues that a communist society will be characterised by the principle, ‘From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs!’ In this essay, I take up a question about this principle that was originally posed by G.A. Cohen, namely: what makes communism (so conceived) possible for Marx? In reply to this question, Cohen interprets Marx as saying that communism is possible because of limitless abundance, a view that Cohen (...) takes to be implausible for ecological reasons. In this paper, I develop a new interpretation of Marx’s position. On this interpretation, people in communist society achieve self-realisation through providing others with the goods and services required for their self-realisation. Coupled with a reasonably high (but not immense) development of productive power, self-realisation generates conditions in which people can produce according to their abilities and receive according to their needs. I defend this view as an interpretation of Marx and I argue that it represents a more plausible account of what makes communism possible than Cohen’s interpretation in which technological advance and limitless abundance play the predominant role. (shrink)

In this paper, I take issue with Axel Honneth's proposal for renewing critical theory in terms of the normative ideal of 'self-realisation'. Honneth's proposal involves a break with critical theory's traditional preoccupation with the meaning and potential of modern reason, and the way he makes that break depletes the critical resources of his alternative to Habermasian critical theory, leaving open the question of what form the renewal of critical theory should take.

In the Critique of Gotha Programme, Karl Marx famously argues that a communist society will be characterised by the principle, ‘From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs!’ I take up a question about this principle that was originally posed by G.A. Cohen, namely: what makes communism (so conceived) possible for Marx? In reply to this question, Cohen interprets Marx as saying that communism is possible because of limitless abundance, a view that Cohen takes to be (...) implausible for ecological reasons. I develop a new interpretation of Marx's position. On this interpretation, people in communist society achieve self-realisation through providing others with the goods and services required for their self-realisation. Coupled with a reasonably high (but not immense) development of productive power, self-realisation generates conditions in which people can produce according to their abilities and receive according to their needs. I defend this view as an interpretation of Marx and I argue that it represents a more plausible account of what makes communism possible than Cohen's interpretation in which technological advance and limitless abundance play the predominant role. (shrink)

The following discussion highlights the sociological relevance of Maria Márkus’s work for the Budapest School’s concept of ‘radical democracy’. A brief historical sketch exhibits how the concept has emerged. It is in particular the ‘messy’ social conditions for equal and free forms of self-realisation in civil society that underpin radical democracy which are central in Maria Márkus’s critique of the neoliberal state, identity formation and a gendered achievement principle. Her approach, I argue, can be advanced as a prism for (...) the critical analysis of contemporary issues. To do so, I contend that late-modern societies are increasingly defined by a paradox with a pluralisation of identity claims in civil society on the one hand, and tendencies to homogenise identities on the other by concurring economic and political forces. A democratisation of everyday life, and with it diverse and plural forms of self-realisation, appears to be under homogenising pressures from governments and markets alike. This will be briefly demonstrated using Maria Márkus’s work, which also points toward possible departure points to advance a critical sociology of radical democracy. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

The Trika school, which is popularly known as Pratyabhijñā-darśana or Kashmir Śaivism is an absolutist and theistic school of Śaivism in the 9th Century. For the Trika school, the self is synonymous with pure consciousness, equated with Śiva. The path elaborated by the school is from self-ignorance to the realisation of pure consciousness. The Trika philosophy strives to answer two fundamental and interrelated questions. Firstly, understanding oneself as a reduced form of Śiva? Secondly, how does an individual attain (...) “Śivatva”? In this study, we explicate answers to these queries by resorting to the metaphysics of the Trika school along with interpretative textual analysis and present a model proposed by Bhoja Raja based on the three guṇas. This model attributed to Sāṅkhya philosophy and puruṣārtha could help to place the metaphysics of upāya in Trika philosophy in the context of the question of attaining “Śivatva”. (shrink)

Introduction -- Self-definition -- Self-realisation -- Self-unification -- Self-constitution -- Application -- The autonomy of agents -- Paternalism, consent, and moral responsibility -- Autonomy under oppression -- Aids to autonomy.

This study explores young people’s perceptions of their existential well-being during the transition after leaving care. We use the theoretical framework of ‘existential well-being,’ which is a relational approach. The study deploys participatory action research methodology and involves peer research with 74 young people leaving care aged 17–32 in Finland (2011–2012) and England (2016–2018). The data was gathered through semi-structured interviews and thematically analysed.We identified three inter-linking categories of existential well-being related to the basic issues of being a person: who (...) one is and where one belongs. Self-feeling involves the importance of how one feels about oneself and one’s physical and mental health and security. Self-realisation relates to one’s hopes and the means for making one’s own decisions in everyday life. Belonging concerns the confidence one expresses in one’s supportive social networks.The findings highlight that, alongside the practical issues of out-of-home care, attention should increasingly focus on young people's reflections on their own lives, and an ethics of care should be developed to better meet their needs. These findings argue for the need to further support young people’s psychosocial and mental health in child welfare policy and practice. (shrink)

Life is ever-changing and unpredictable. Because of drastic changes in our society, numerous people are under pressure from various sources at school, in the workplace, or in their families. People...

The relationship between self‐realization, and so what I really wholeheartedly endorse and owe to myself, and morality or what we owe to others is normally thought of as antagonism, or as a pleasant coincidence: only if I am indebted to such relations as my fundamental projects that I care wholeheartedly about does morality have a direct connection to self‐realization. The aim of this article is to argue against this picture. It will be argued that the structure (...) of self‐realization and the caring activity involved commits the person to values that are beyond the object of his wholehearted caring, in a way that might just pave the way to morality. (shrink)

This study analysed the effects a values education programme can have on the feelings of self‐realisation, self‐concept and self‐esteem of Romany adolescents in southern Spain. To do this, an experimental group received a values education intervention but a control group did not. The intervention programme was adapted to the Romany culture. The self‐realisation, self‐concept and self‐esteem of both groups were evaluated using the Self‐Concept and Realisation Questionnaire. Statistical analyses showed the existence of significant (...) differences between the experimental and control groups on the variables studied. Based on the results, we suggest that a values education programme like this, that has been culturally adapted, can make a positive impact on the self‐realisation of young people from a marginalised community. (shrink)

(1998). Species‐being, teleology and individuality part III: Alienation and self‐realisation the physiognomy of the human. Angelaki: Vol. 3, Impurity, authenticity and humanity, pp. 89-101.

The concept of evolution as envisaged and developed by modern scientists will be reviewed. The concept of consciousness and its evolution in humans as enlightenment and self-realization as experienced and expressed in the Upanishads, Vedanta, Yoga Sutras, Bhakti Sutras and in the experiences and expressions of modern spiritual seers will be critically analyzed. And self-realization in individual leading one to and getting established in jeevanmukta state will be discussed. The possible irreversible physicochemical nature and implications of (...) such consciousness evolution in humans will be discussed. (shrink)

Despite the fact that the sociological notion ‘individualization’ contains the most heterogeneous phenomena, the article develops an interpretation of the fate of individualization in Western capitalism today. After having differentiated three different meanings of that notion with the help of Georg Simmel, the position is defended that the claims to individual self-realization, which have rapidly multiplied in the Western societies of thirty or forty years ago, have become so much a feature of the institutionalized expectations inherent in social (...) reproduction that the particular goals of such claims are lost and they are transmuted into a support of the system’s legitimacy. The result of this paradoxical reversal, where the processes which once promised an increase of qualitative freedom are henceforth altered into an ideology of de-institutionalization, is the emergence in individuals of a number of symptoms of inner emptiness, of feeling oneself to be superfluous, and of absence of purpose. (shrink)

This contribution focuses on Andreas Reckwitz’s considerations on phenomena of ‘exhausted self-realization’ and ‘disappointment’ in The Society of Singularities, as well as in his follow-up volume, The End of Illusions. Under discussion is the range of analytical distinctions that tend to come into play in this area between what one might call a generally primordial concept of self-realization and more derivative articulations of the concept that exhibit various aspects of instrumentalization—variously termed ‘self-maximization’ or ‘self-optimization’. (...) The paper argues that while Reckwitz’s work offers great resources for an understanding of how and why ‘self-realization’ so frequently appears to take on an instrumentalizing character in late-modern social behaviour, the extent to which his work attributes this tendency to a wholly immanent cultural-cognitive logic of lifestyle singularization is open to criticism. The reasons must also be sought from within the more directly economic contexts of diminished material security and solidarity typical of contemporary societies shaped by neoliberal economic governance orders at the level of policy. (shrink)

Confucian philosopher Xunzi’s moral thought is considered in light of the modern focus on self-realization. Self-Realization through Confucian Learning reconstructs Confucian thinker Xunzi’s moral philosophy in response to the modern focus on self-realization. Xunzi (born around 310 BCE) claims that human xing (“nature” or “native conditions”) is without an ethical framework and has a tendency to dominate, leading to bad judgments and bad behavior. Confucian ritual propriety (li) is needed to transform these human native (...) conditions. Through li, people become self-directing: in control of feelings and desires and in command of their own lives. Siufu Tang explicates Xunzi’s understanding of the hierarchical structure of human agency to articulate why and how li is essential to self-realization. Ritual propriety also structures relationships to make a harmonious communal life possible. Tang’s focus on self-realization highlights how Confucianism can address the individual as well as the communal and serve as a philosophy for contemporary times. (shrink)

In arguments in support of capitalism, the following propositions are sometimes advanced or presupposed: the best life for the individual is one of consumption, understood in a broad sense that includes aesthetic pleasures and entertainment as well as consumption of goods in the ordinary sense; consumption is to be valued because it promotes happiness or welfare, which is the ultimate good; since there are not enough opportunities for consumption to provide satiation for everybody, some principles of distributive justice must be (...) chosen to decide who gets what; the total to be distributed has first to be produced. What is produced depends, among other things, on the motivation and information of the producers. The theory of justice must take account of the fact that different principles of distribution have different effects on motivation and information; economic theory tells us that the motivational and informational consequences of private ownership of the means of production are superior to those of the various forms of collective ownerships. In the traditional controversy over the relative merits of capitalism and economic systems, the focus has been on proposition. In this paper, I consider instead propositions and. Before one can even begin to discuss how values are to be allocated, one must consider what they are – what it is that ought to be valued. I shall argue that at the center of Marxism is a specific conception of the good life as one of active self-realization, rather than passive consumption. (shrink)

This paper considers the foundation of self-realization and the sense of morality that could justify Arne Naess’s claim ‘Self-realization is morally neutral,’ by focusing on the recent debate among deep ecologists. Self-realization, the ultimate norm of Naess’s ecosophy T, is the realization of the maxim ‘everything is interrelated.’ This norm seems to be based on two basic principles: the diminishing of narrow ego, and the integrity between the human and non-human worlds. The paper (...) argues that the former is an extension of Plato’s idea of self-development or self-mastery while the latter is implicit in Aristotle’s holism. It defends that Self-realization is morally neutral only if the term ‘moral’ is considered in the Kantian sense. However, Naess reluctantly distinguishes between ethics and morality, which makes his approach less credible. The paper concludes that Aristotle’s notion of eudaimonia supports Self-realization to qualify as a virtue. (shrink)

It would be an exaggeration to say that the Victorian age in England was philosophically barren; but it would not be a great exaggeration. By this somewhat uncomplimentary opening, I do not mean to imply that Victorian England contained no competent philosophers at all. Indeed, if one considers thinkers of the second and lower ranks only, their literary productivity was probably greater than those of any previous period in English, or even British, history, even if in sheer numbers they can (...) hardly compete with the prolific hordes of our own century. It is at the very highest level of philosophical greatness and originality that one finds the Victorian age wanting. The great period of British philosophy, which runs roughly from the 1630s to the 1770s, contains at least three thinkers who cannot be matched in the succeeding 140 years, Hobbes, Locke and Hume. (shrink)

In this book, Mike W. Martin interprets Schweitzer's 'reverence for life' as an umbrella virtue, drawing together the specific virtues--authenticity, love, compassion, gratitude, justice and peace loving--in individual chapters. Martin's treatment of his subject is sympathetic yet critical, and for the first time clearly places Schweitzer's environmental ethics within the wider framework of his ethical theory.

In arguments in support of capitalism, the following propositions are sometimes advanced or presupposed: the best life for the individual is one of consumption, understood in a broad sense that includes aesthetic pleasures and entertainment as well as consumption of goods in the ordinary sense; consumption is to be valued because it promotes happiness or welfare, which is the ultimate good; since there are not enough opportunities for consumption to provide satiation for everybody, some principles of distributive justice must be (...) chosen to decide who gets what; the total to be distributed has first to be produced. What is produced depends, among other things, on the motivation and information of the producers. The theory of justice must take account of the fact that different principles of distribution have different effects on motivation and information; economic theory tells us that the motivational and informational consequences of private ownership of the means of production are superior to those of the various forms of collective ownerships. In the traditional controversy over the relative merits of capitalism and economic systems, the focus has been on proposition. In this paper, I consider instead propositions and. Before one can even begin to discuss how values are to be allocated, one must consider what they are – what it is that ought to be valued. I shall argue that at the center of Marxism is a specific conception of the good life as one of active self-realization, rather than passive consumption. (shrink)

The lexical priority of fair equality of opportunity in John Rawls’s justice as fairness, which has been sharply criticized by Larry Alexander and Richard Arneson among others, is left almost entirely undefended in Rawls’s works. I argue here that this priority rule can be successfully defended against its critics despite Rawls’s own doubts about it. Using the few textual clues he provides, I speculatively reconstruct his defense of this rule, showing that it can be grounded on our interest in (...) class='Hi'>self-realization through work. This reconstructed defense makes liberal use of concepts already present in A Theory of Justice , including the Aristotelian Principle (which motivates the achievement of increasing virtuosity) and the Humboldtian concept of social union (which provides the context for the development of such virtuosity). I also show that this commitment to self-realization, far from violating the priority of right in Rawls’s theory, stems directly from his underlying commitment to autonomy, which is the very foundation of the moral law in his doctrine of right. The reconstituted defense of this priority rule not only strengthens the case for justice as fairness but also has important and controversial implications for public policy. (shrink)

It would be an exaggeration to say that the Victorian age in England was philosophically barren; but it would not be a great exaggeration. By this somewhat uncomplimentary opening, I do not mean to imply that Victorian England contained no competent philosophers at all. Indeed, if one considers thinkers of the second and lower ranks only, their literary productivity was probably greater than those of any previous period in English, or even British, history, even if in sheer numbers they can (...) hardly compete with the prolific hordes of our own century. It is at the very highest level of philosophical greatness and originality that one finds the Victorian age wanting. The great period of British philosophy, which runs roughly from the 1630s to the 1770s, contains at least three thinkers who cannot be matched in the succeeding 140 years, Hobbes, Locke and Hume. (shrink)

John Dewey’s conception of democracy as the political form devoted to the maximum individual self-realization of the citizenry, in the broadest sense of that term, promises to lift democracy above angry populism while avoiding untenable and contentious metaphysical commitments. The idea of self-realization is traditionally tied to a hierarchical and therefore unacceptable model of society. Dewey breaks this tie by stripping the idea of its metaphysical commitments. But Dewey requires supplementation. I argue that Dewey’s own insights (...) can be best kept alive by being read in light of Stanley Cavell’s understanding of Emersonian Perfectionism, in particular the latter’s focus on the failure of the self to realize itself and its ordinary resistance to doing so. Bringing this Romanticism to bear upon Dewey’s ideas would temper them in important ways, preserving and developing what is best in the rich conception of democratic citizenship he has left us. (shrink)

Velleman, MacIntyre, and others have argued for the compositional view that lives can be other than equally good for the person who lives them even though they contain all and only the same moments, and that this is explained by their narrative structure. I argue instead for explanation by self-realization, partly by interpreting Siegfried Sassoon’s exemplary life-narrative. I decide between the two explanations by distinguishing the various features of the radial concept of narrative, and showing, for each, either (...) that self-realization is just as good an account, or that we should prefer the self-realization account, of the composition it is supposed to explain. I conclude that, if the shape of a life matters, it matters because some shapes are self-realizations, not because they are narratives. (shrink)

Ethical Studies is one of the most enlightening works of moral philosophy in English. This article surveys the principal structural theme running throughout it, but will concentrate on its more explicit development at the beginning and end of the book, Essays II and VI, and the “Concluding Remarks.” Essay II formulates the formal requirements of morality in terms of self-realization, and the remaining Essays survey possible contents, the valuable elements of which are brought together, with further materials, in (...) Essays VI and VII. But Bradley finds that morality involves a contradiction, and so, in order to resolve that contradiction, it issues into something more than morality, namely, religion. However, this article will show that Bradley’s resolution of this contradiction is not satisfactory and that, once morality is conceived as an ἐνέργεια and not a γένεσις, an activity and not a process, this contradiction vanishes. Yet morality does, nevertheless, on Bradley’s own principles, find its completion in religion when so conceived; and such an argument was developed in detail in the great work of one of Bradley’s pupils, A. E. Taylor’s Faith of a Moralist, Vol. I. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to inquire into today's social pathologies, i.e. the negative consequences of the developmental processes of society. In a dialogue with Axel Honneth, the article asserts that a shift has occurred in individualization, a shift that implies a fundamental change in social pathologies: Social pathologies no longer derive from social barriers inhibiting self‐realization but from self‐realization itself. As a consequence, philosophy of education, rather than sociology, appears to be the relevant field (...) of study. The article develops a social‐analytical perspective on ‘sickness in self‐Bildung’, which is conceived as a ‘refusal to transcend oneself into sociality’, and offers interpretations of present pathologies such as depression, anorexia, populist freedom of speech, and demonic rage. (shrink)

In this contribution, I will use Tanabe Hajime’s Philosophy as Metanoetics as a guide to explore the possibility that, in certain cases, self-realization can only be achieved via self-abandonment. Specifically, I shall rely on Tanabe’s notion of the self-awareness of absolute nothingness to show that, specifically in cases in which the subject has met with their own relativity and powerlessness, a switch from active attempts at self-realization to a passive acceptance of a power greater (...) than oneself can be the key to finding a new form of self-realization and forming new relationships with other human beings. While analyzing Tanabe’s texts, I shall also reference group therapy organizations for substance abuse treatment in order to give my statements a more concrete basis. (shrink)

Those attempting to expound a comprehensive normative ethical theory are presumably motivated by the belief that there should be an ultimate reason people can give for their actions and a final response to the question of why we should act morally. Historically, one candidate for this ultimate end or reason is self-realization. To convince us of his theory the self-realizationist must successfully explicate the notion of the self—i.e., he must tell us what man’s distinctive nature or (...) function is—and he must have something to say about the perfecting of this self. (shrink)

In this book, Maskivker argues that there ought to be a right not to participate in the paid economy in a new way; not by appealing to notions of fairness to competing conceptions of the good, but rather to a contentious (but defensible) normative ideal, namely, self-realization. In so doing, she joins a venerable tradition in ethical thought, initiated by Aristotle and developed in the work of important eighteenth and nineteenth century thinkers including Smith, Hume, and Marx.The book (...) engages on-going debates (in both philosophical and real world political and social policy circles) about the provision of basic income grants, necessary to make the possibility of self-realization real for all. Traditional defenses of unconditional welfare benefits emphasize ideals of state neutrality when they claim that society should not discriminate against preferences for leisure in favor of preferences for work. According to these views, the state ought not to interfere with people’s choices about what constitutes the "good life." In contradistinction, Maskivker offers an innovative argument in defense of a particular ideal of the "good life," namely, life-goals directed at the pursuit of self-realization. However, her understanding of self-realization appeals to modern and contemporary values of freedom and pluralism. In a refreshingly new light, the book strikes a balance between fascinating debates on the conditions of human flourishing on the one hand, and heated discussions about the Welfare State on the other. (shrink)

In What Religion Is the British Idealist philosopher Bernard Bosanquet inquires into the essence of religion apprehended as a central human experience which is associated with the dialectical process of the human being’s self-realising endeavour. Bosanquet’s views on religion belong to the second phase of the philosophy of religion of the British Idealists which is characterised by a stronger sense of immanentism. The purpose of this article is, first, to show how Bosanquet’s analysis is based on a conceptual framework (...) which contains notional patterns drawn from a set of normative principles that is derived from his metaphysics. Secondly, the article reconstructs and assesses his views on the meaning and importance of religion and religious consciousness for the human being’s spiritual battle to achieve a state of self-realisation and affirm the spirit that characterises the true content of human nature. Thirdly, the article focuses on the elaboration and crystallisation of the fundamental structural components of Bosanquet’s theory of religion that constitute the conceptual framework of his philosophical project. Throughout, I emphasise that Bosanquet’s analysis of religion is an integral part of his moral and social ontology, the inmost essence of which is the concept of good as the only real and final end of the human being’s struggle for the realisation of the true or real self. It is my contention that Bosanquet defends from the idealistic standpoint a theory of religion that reveals in an original way the essence of religious consciousness in its relation to the meaning of the finite individual’s life. The comprehensive understanding of Bosanquet’s position in What Religion Is presupposes, however, prior knowledge of the basic concepts of his metaphysics. The strength of Bosanquet’s theory of religion derives from: its metaphysical foundation; and its implications for the individual’s ethical and social life. Its contribution to the philosophy of religion lies in the fact that it offers a viable alternative theory to the foundationalist-evidentialist view of religious faith. (shrink)

In this text I would like to argue that individualistic culture of today is imbued with a specific notion of the self. Phenomena like life-style blogs, „cult” of celebrities and especially self-realization gurus and literature co-create a discourse on man where self is no longer regarded as an inner essence, substance or existential potency of a man but rather as a tengible and to some extent concrete object. Thus „being oneself” ceases to function as a verb (...) and starts to be a noun – name of a form of psycho-somatic wholeness that we can and should incorporate. As a consequence the self is ultimately brought to a number of styles of living with its rules, worldviews and modes of behavior and ultimately is reified. Becomes a magico-religious object which in anthropological terms can be described as a fetish. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss Næss’s concept of ecological self in light of the process of identification and the idea of self-realization, in order to understand the asymmetrical relationship among human beings and nature. In this regard, our hypothesis is that Næss does not use the concept of the ecological self to justify ontology of processes, or definitively overcome the idea of individual entities in view of a transpersonal ecology, as Fox argues. Quite the opposite: Næss’s (...) ecological self is nothing but an echo of the theme of the home and of belonging to a place, and, therefore, it deals with a positive relationship of the individual with its environment. This allows us to reshape environmental ethics starting from environmental ontology, and recalling the primacy of the latter on the former: the very theoretic background of an ethical view might only be a suitable interpretation of human nature and properties, starting from a relational viewpoint that may help understanding us our asymmetrical relationships with the world. (shrink)

The paper assumes as a general abstract norm that the specific potentialities of living beings be fulfilled. No being has a priority in principle in the realizing of its possibilities, but norms of increasing diversity or richness of potentialities put limits on the development of destructive life-styles. Application is made to the mixed Norwegian communities of certain mammals and humans. A kind of modus vivendi is established which is firmly based on cultural tradition. It is fairly unimportant whether the term (...) 'rights (of animals)' is or is not used in the fight for human peaceful coexistence with a rich fauna. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A comparative analysis of Zora Neale Hurston's Their Eyes Were Watching God and Flora Nwapa's Efuru suggests the importance of romantic love to the self- actualization of the heroines of these novels, whose authors share similar biographies, concerns, and literary positions in the spheres of African American and African literatures respectively. For Hurston, eros paradoxically represents the ultimately unfulfilled possibility for self-realization that finally may be achieved only in and through the self. By contrast, for (...) Nwapa, the focus shifts from the centrality of romantic love to the complex and contradictory place of childbearing in female self-realization. However, finally, self-actualization is achieved with other women in identification with Mammywater, the powerful Igbo lake goddess. (shrink)

Two rival conceptions of well-being are reconstructed and contrasted, which have contended for philosophical pre-eminence throughout the Western conversation of philosophy. One view understands well-being as a life course in which as many as possible of a subject’s preferences are satisfied. The other view understands well-being as a life course in which some unique project of the subject comes to be realized. In the second part of the paper the aggregative view of well-being, championed by Hobbes and Locke is shown (...) to correlate with a radically or moderately understanding of freedom, and the holistic view of well-being with a positive notion of freedom, championed by Rousseau, Kierkegaard and Kohut. After showing how some of the conceptual difficulties of the radically negative view of freedom reverberate on the aggregative notion of well-being, in the final section some constitutive dimensions of the holistic view are discussed. (shrink)