Self-realization through Confucian learning: a contemporary reconstruction of Xunzi's ethics

Albany: State University of New York Press (2016)
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Abstract

Confucian philosopher Xunzi’s moral thought is considered in light of the modern focus on self-realization. Self-Realization through Confucian Learning reconstructs Confucian thinker Xunzi’s moral philosophy in response to the modern focus on self-realization. Xunzi (born around 310 BCE) claims that human xing (“nature” or “native conditions”) is without an ethical framework and has a tendency to dominate, leading to bad judgments and bad behavior. Confucian ritual propriety (li) is needed to transform these human native conditions. Through li, people become self-directing: in control of feelings and desires and in command of their own lives. Siufu Tang explicates Xunzi’s understanding of the hierarchical structure of human agency to articulate why and how li is essential to self-realization. Ritual propriety also structures relationships to make a harmonious communal life possible. Tang’s focus on self-realization highlights how Confucianism can address the individual as well as the communal and serve as a philosophy for contemporary times.

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Citations of this work

Xunzi.Dan Robins - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Core Message of Xunzi’s Claim that Xing is Bad.Doil Kim - 2020 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 19 (1):121-131.
Comments on Siufu T ang ’s Self-Realization through Confucian Learning.Hui-Chieh Loy - 2020 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 19 (1):133-137.

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The problem of action.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1997 - In Alfred R. Mele (ed.), The philosophy of action. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 157-62.
Free Agency.Gary Watson - 1982 - In Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.

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