This study represents a comparison between two radical gestures of literary self-reflexivity: romantic irony and postmodernist metafiction. It examines the impact of early German romantic theory and its central concept of irony on German and English romantic narrative fiction and relates the same to postmodernist self-reflexive novels, including its British and American variants. A primary objective of this comparison is to account for the radical skepticism that postmodernist metafiction voices with respect to the paramount philosophical (...) question of truth and reality. The immanent tension between an absolute idealistic and a radically skeptic position which romantic irony articulates and enacts is conceived of as an important and instructive link to the understanding of postmodernism. (shrink)

The Romantic Irony of Semiotics: Friedrich Schlegel and the Crisis of Representation (Approaches to Semiotics [As]).

Although several writers have noted significant complementary features in the respective projects of Russian philosopher and cultural theorist Mikhail Bakhtin (1895–1975) and the French social thinker Henri Lefebvre (1901–91), to date there has not been a systematic comparison of them. This article seeks to redress this oversight, by exploring some of the more intriguing of these conceptual dovetailings: first, their relationship to the intellectual and cultural legacy of Romanticism; and second, their respective assessments of irony (including Romantic (...) class='Hi'>irony), and, more specifically, of the ironic register as a potential vehicle for socio-cultural criticism. Although the positions Bakhtin and Lefebvre stake out vis-à-vis these issues reveal many similarities – such as extensive use of Socrates in the writings of each – there are also significant differences, not least because Lefebvre’s understanding of Romanticism is more fully developed than Bakhtin’s. Accordingly, the central argument advanced here is that Bakhtin’s fairly disparaging account of Romanticism, together with his scattered and often contradictory remarks on irony, can be subjected to re-envisioning and potential enrichment by reference to Lefebvre’s more considered thoughts, especially the latter’s notions of ‘Revolutionary romanticism’ and ‘Marxist irony’. (shrink)

Students of Kierkegaard are familiar with his dogged polemic against Hegelianism, his critique of Friedrich von Schlegel's Romantic irony, and his visit to Schelling's lectures in Berlin. However, these are only a few well-known examples of a deep relationship that Kierkegaard had with German culture. In Faust, Romantic Irony, and System, Jon Stewart maps out the many ways in which German thinkers and writers inspired and influenced the Danish philosopher. Kierkegaard's famous criticisms of the Hegelians, Schlegel, (...) and Schelling has led many to view him as anti-German. As Stewart shows, however, he offered high praise for other German thinkers, including Johann Georg Hamann, Gotthold Lessing, and Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg. Stewart traces the many points of contact between Kierkegaard and a range of German thinkers, and ultimately he argues convincingly that were it not for the influence of German culture, Kierkegaard would have been a very different, and less lasting, philosopher. (shrink)

This paper revisits the rhetorics of system and irony in Fichte and Friedrich Schlegel in order to theorize the utopic operation and standpoint that, I argue, system and irony share. Both system and irony transport the speculative speaker to the impossible zero point preceding and suspending the construction of any binary terms or the world itself—an immanent nonplace (of the in-itself, nothingness, or chaos) that cannot be inscribed into the world's regime of comprehensibility and possibility. It is (...) because the philosopher and the ironist articulate their speech immanently from this standpoint that system and irony are positioned as incomprehensible to those framed rhetorically as incapable of occupying it. This standpoint is philosophically important, I maintain, because it allows one to think how the (comprehensibility of the) world is constructed without being bound to the necessity of this construction or having to absolutize the way things are or can be. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is twofold. In the first instance it is an attempt to offer a new perspective from which to reflect on the meaning and philosophical presuppositions of Friedrich Schlegel’s defence and use of (romantic) irony, as well other related notions: humour, wit, and other comic devices. I propose to situate this perspective within a revaluation of pleasure and joy. To do this in a new way (although not in opposition to authors such as Manfred (...) Frank, Elizabeth Millan-Zaibert, or Gary Handwerk), I refer to one of Schlegel’s earliest texts devoted to The Aesthetic Value of Greek Comedy from 1794. In addition, this paper questions the extent to which Schlegel’s position is tenable in the aftermath of the ‘death of God’. For this, I reflect briefly on the ways in which Nietzsche’s writings and notion of life-affirmation respond to Schlegel’s vindication of romantic irony. (shrink)

Schlegel’s irony, which is the main author along with Solger, of irony in German romanticism, becomes a reinterpretation of the figure of the ironic Plato’s Socrates . Nevertheless, his proposal of a pragmatic irony was rejected in a violent way by Hegel and Kierkegaard, that reread Socrates and his irony in a different sense of Schlegel. For these the proposal of the romantic author was a challenge to the society that would end up destroying it, (...) but, from our perspective such semantic reading of the schlegelian irony is very weak and, rather, the proposal of the German writer can be understood like a way of a constructive critic of the political community and we can learn much of Schlegel today.La ironía de Schlegel, máximo representante, junto con Solger, de la ironía en el romanticismo alemán supuso una reinterpretación de la figura del Sócrates irónico de Platón. Sin embargo, su propuesta de una ironía pragmática fue rechazada de manera violenta por Hegel y Kierkegaard, que releyeron a Sócrates y su ironía enfrentándola a la de Schlegel. Para estos la propuesta del autor romántico era un reto a la sociedad que acabaría destruyéndola, pero, desde nuestra perspectiva tal lectura semántica de la ironía schlegeliana no se sostiene y, más bien, la propuesta del escritor alemán puede entenderse como un modo de crítica constructiva de la comunidad política de la que todavía hoy podemos aprender mucho. (shrink)

Behler discusses the current state of thought on modernity and postmodernity, detailing the intellectual problems to be faced and examining the positions of such central figures in the debate as Lyotard, Habermas, Rorty, and Derrida. He finds that beyond the "limits of communication," further discussion must be carried out through irony. The historical rise of the concept of modernity is examined through discussions of the querelle des anciens et des modernes as a break with classical tradition, and on the (...) theoretical writings of de Stael, the English romantics, and the great German romantics Schlegel, Hegel, and Nietzsche. The growth of the concept of irony from a formal rhetorical term to a mode of indirectness that comes to characterize thought and discourse generally is then examined from Plato and Socrates to Nietzsche, who avoided the term "irony" but used it in his cetnral concept of the mask. (shrink)

Nature of irony -- Sarcasm -- Impersonal irony -- Self-disparaging irony -- Ingenu irony -- Irony of self-betrayal -- Irony of simple incongruity -- Dramatic irony -- General irony -- Romantic irony.

A critical examination of the different kinds of irony relevant to architecture, especially romantic and postmodern irony, and a suggestion for a less self-sure haughty kind of irony.

Though Fichte had many romantics among his colleagues and his influence on them is undeniable, the concept of irony, one of the most characteristic terms for the romantics of his time, occupies no relevant place in his thought. Friedrich Schlegel, the most well-known representative of the romantic movement in Germany, however, not only recognized Fichte’s relevant impact on his era in general but also developed a clear idea of Fichte’s philosophical standpoint. He crystallized his understanding in the concept (...) of philosophical irony, especially in the fragments published in Athenäum and Lyceum. I want to show the parallel structure between the philosophical aims of the poet and of the philosopher, especially in the use of the ideas of “irony” on Schlegel’s side and of “belief” on Fichte’s side. The shared problem is how to reconcile and integrate the contradictory epistemological instances; and the analogously shared solution to this problem is to set up a balancing medium in the mid of the mutually opposing epistemological instances.Obwohl sich unter Fichtes Kollegen viele Romantiker befinden und sein Einfluss auf sie unleugbar ist, spielt der Begriff der Ironie in Fichtes Philosophie keine bedeutende Rolle. Doch hat Friedrich Schlegel in Fichtes Philosophie nicht nur den Einfluss auf seine Zeit, sondern auch die philosophische Relevanz seines Beitrags gewürdigt, und diese Anerkennung im Ironiebegriff kristallisiert, besonders in den Athenäums- und Lyceumsfragmenten. In diesem Artikel möchte ich im Hinblick auf die Aufgabe der philosophischen Reflexion auf eine parallele Zielsetzung bei Fichte und Schlegel hinweisen und die analoge Rolle von Schlegels Ironie-Begriff und Fichtes Glaubensbegriff in ihren Systemen feststellen. Ihre gemeinsame philosophische Aufgabe war die einheitliche Einsicht in sich widersprechende epistemologische Instanzen, und der analog gemeinsame Weg der Auflösung dieser Antinomie war die Einführung der Methode der Relativierung dieser Instanzen. (shrink)

Turing made strong statements about the future of machines in society. This article asks how they can be interpreted to advance our understanding of Turing’s philosophy. His irony has been largely caricatured or minimized by historians, philosophers, scientists, and others. Turing is often portrayed as an irresponsible scientist, or associated with childlike manners and polite humor. While these representations of Turing have been widely disseminated, another image suggested by one of his contemporaries, that of a nonconformist, utopian, and radically (...) progressive thinker reminiscent of the English Romantic poet Percy B. Shelley, has remained largely underexplored. Following this image, I will reconstruct the argument underlying what Turing called (but denied being guilty of) his “Promethean irreverence” (1947–1951) as a utopian satire directed against chauvinists of all kinds, especially intellectuals who might sacrifice independent thought to maintain their power. These, Turing hoped, would eventually be rivaled and surpassed by intelligent machines and transformed into ordinary people, as work once considered “intellectual” would be transformed into non-intellectual, “mechanical” work. I study Turing’s irony in its historical context and follow the internal logic of his arguments to their limit. I suggest that Turing genuinely believed that the possibilities of the machines he envisioned were not utopian dreams, and yet he conceived them from a utopian frame of mind, aspiring to a different society. His ever-learning child machines, whose intelligence would grow out of their own individual experiences, would help distribute power. (shrink)

While many studies of 'On the Concept of Irony' treat Kierkegaard's "irony" primarily from a literary perspective, "The Isolated Self" also examines irony with an eye to the fundamental problem in Kierkegaard's authorship, namely, the challenge of becoming a "self". Kierkegaard's "irony" is a cavalier way of life that seeks isolation from the other -- an isolation he considers necessary to becoming a self. At the same time, irony is said to be a hindrance to (...) selfhood because the self fails to become a part of the social world in which it resides. The book puts the existential tension of 'On the Concept of Irony' into relief and suggests how it sets the stage for the rest of Kierkegaard's authorship. The book reconstructs the horizon of understanding during Kierkegaard's time, including Hegel's interpretation of both Socratic irony and Friedrich Schlegel's romantic irony. In addition, the work explores material from the little-known Danish discussion of irony in the works of Poul Martin Møller, Johan ,Ludwig Helberg and Hans Lassen Martensen. (shrink)

This essay reconsiders the role of irony in the Hegelian project of developing a theory of modern ethical life. It recognizes in Socratic irony the traces of an alternative concept of morality that leads both to an acknowledgement of Hegel’s convincing critique of the Kantian moral principle and to a rejection of Hegel’s misconception of Socratic and Romantic irony. Arguing against Hegel that irony cannot be reduced to a form of alienation from the normative dimension (...) of ethical life as a whole, but should instead be understood as a necessary component of a dynamic mediation between subjective freedom and ethical universality, the author further claims that irony, thus conceived, takes on the productive function that it should actually have had within the Hegelian system. That is, ironyis a phenomenon that, from the standpoint of morality, refers us to a form of ethical life in which subjective freedom and difference are respected. (shrink)

The founder of early German Romantic philosophy, Friedrich Schlegel, is a pivotal figure in the history of philosophy because of the way that he establishes many of the themes by which nineteenth-century continental thought separates itself from Kant. Yet our view of his depth and originality as a thinker has often been distorted by his proximity to Hegel, who propounded a highly polemical and reductive reading of Schlegel. One of the ways in which our view of Schlegel is distorted (...) by Hegel's reading is our association of Schlegel with the stance of irony. While Schlegel considered irony as merely one of several fruitful ways to rethink the relation of the subject to the absolute, Hegel used a reductive reading of... (shrink)

This essay reconsiders the role of irony in the Hegelian project of developing a theory of modern ethical life. It recognizes in Socratic irony the traces of an alternative concept of morality that leads both to an acknowledgement of Hegel’s convincing critique of the Kantian moral principle and to a rejection of Hegel’s misconception of Socratic and Romantic irony. Arguing against Hegel that irony cannot be reduced to a form of alienation from the normative dimension (...) of ethical life as a whole, but should instead be understood as a necessary component of a dynamic mediation between subjective freedom and ethical universality, the author further claims that irony, thus conceived, takes on the productive function that it should actually have had within the Hegelian system. That is, ironyis a phenomenon that, from the standpoint of morality, refers us to a form of ethical life in which subjective freedom and difference are respected. (shrink)

Perhaps no other critical label has been made to cover more ground than "irony," and in our time irony has come to have so many meanings that by itself it means almost nothing. In this work, Wayne C. Booth cuts through the resulting confusions by analyzing how we manage to share quite specific ironies—and why we often fail when we try to do so. How does a reader or listener recognize the kind of statement which requires him to (...) reject its "clear" and "obvious" meaning? And how does any reader know where to stop, once he has embarked on the hazardous and exhilarating path of rejecting "what the words say" and reconstructing "what the author means"? In the first and longer part of his work, Booth deals with the workings of what he calls "stable irony," irony with a clear rhetorical intent. He then turns to intended instabilities—ironies that resist interpretation and finally lead to the "infinite absolute negativities" that have obsessed criticism since the Romantic period. Professor Booth is always ironically aware that no one can fathom the unfathomable. But by looking closely at unstable ironists like Samuel Becket, he shows that at least some of our commonplaces about meaninglessness require revision. Finally, he explores—with the help of Plato—the wry paradoxes that threaten any uncompromising assertion that all assertion can be undermined by the spirit of irony. (shrink)

The term “irony” has always found itself caught up in philosophical discourse, yet this term has only been elevated to the status of a philosophical concept relatively recently along the trajectory of the movement of philosophy. In fact, the philosophical centrality of irony can be traced to the Romantics at the turn of the 19th century and, in particular, to the writings of Friedrich Schlegel, even though the topic of “Socratic irony” has been discussed from Plato’s time (...) on. This is to say that, although it has long been a pondered over that philosophical points can be made ironically, i.e., socratically, the notion that philosophical discourse, philosophy itself, might be essentially informed by irony is a relatively recent proposal. (shrink)

The term “irony” has always found itself caught up in philosophical discourse, yet this term has only been elevated to the status of a philosophical concept relatively recently along the trajectory of the movement of philosophy. In fact, the philosophical centrality of irony can be traced to the Romantics at the turn of the 19th century and, in particular, to the writings of Friedrich Schlegel, even though the topic of “Socratic irony” has been discussed from Plato’s time (...) on. This is to say that, although it has long been a pondered over that philosophical points can be made ironically, i.e., socratically, the notion that philosophical discourse, philosophy itself, might be essentially informed by irony is a relatively recent proposal. (shrink)

Though irony is a category familiar to rhetoric and literature, its philosophical forms are far less explored, and this is especially true with regards to its articulation in the work of Friedrich Schlegel. Schlegel’s engagement with irony is essential to the Romantic philosophical project, one that is fundamentally concerned with contradiction and posits itself as a challenge to and continuation of idealism. Through exploring his relation to the philosophies of Kant and Fichte, this essay demonstrates that Schlegel (...) can deploy irony as a method of taking up the philosophical paradigm of idealism without limiting himself to their systems. He can use Kant and Fichte against themselves, making sincere philosophical arguments through a brazen playfulness. Further, Schlegel’s concept of irony is shown to be a philosophical faculty that is concerned with the limits of philosophy in language. Irony is much more than a rhetorical device – it is a form that allows Schlegel to approach the limits of discursivity from within and so continually stage instances of philosophical contradiction, undermining systematicity. This centering of contradiction is one of Schlegel’s major contributions to the development of German philosophy, critical of those who precede him and spurning their presuppositions of univocal logic. The outworking of Schlegel’s philosophical concern with irony is unmistakably humorous, full of puns, jokes and witticisms, which nevertheless need to be taken seriously. This paper contends that irony is at the crux of Schlegel’s philosophical project, simultaneously the content and mode of his criticism, the source and justification of his humour, and one of Romanticism’s most significant conceptual developments. (shrink)

A work that "not only treats of irony but is irony," wrote a contemporary reviewer of The Concept of Irony, with Continual Reference to Socrates. Presented here with Kierkegaard's notes of the celebrated Berlin lectures on "positive philosophy" by F.W.J. Schelling, the book is a seedbed of Kierkegaard's subsequent work, both stylistically and thematically. Part One concentrates on Socrates, the master ironist, as interpreted by Xenophon, Plato, and Aristophanes, with a word on Hegel and Hegelian categories. Part (...) Two is a more synoptic discussion of the concept of irony in Kierkegaard's categories, with examples from other philosophers and with particular attention given to A. W. Schlegel's novel Lucinde as an epitome of romantic irony.The Concept of Irony and the Notes of Schelling's Berlin Lectures belong to the momentous year 1841, which included not only the completion of Kierkegaard's university work and his sojourn in Berlin, but also the end of his engagement to Regine Olsen and the initial writing of Either/Or. (shrink)

The conceptions of wit and irony of the early Friedrich Schlegel together constitute a philosophically ambitious form of early-romantic dialectic. This dialectic was directed especially against the closed philosophical system of Fichte, and tries to show a third way between the abandonment of a system and a closed system. The result is an open system, which can accommodate historical change and an infinite approach to the absolute. The article discusses the origin of this third way in romantic (...) irony, and Schlegel’s critique of Fichte, as well as the role poetry and the fragment as a form of philosophical discourse plays for Schlegel’s dialectic. (shrink)

This essay is concerned with an initial mapping out of a model of intersubjectivity that, viewed within the context of education, breaks with the hegemonic dialogics of current pedagogies. Intent on rethinking the (so-called)problem of solipsism for phenomenology in terms of a pedagogy that situates itself within solitude and the alterity of self and other, Maurice Blanchot and Emmanuel Levinas will here speak as the voices of this other mode of teaching. Beginning with the problematization of intersubjectivity in romantic (...) aesthetics and hermeneutics, I introduce the concept of irony as a crucial element in the conceptualization of this other pedagogical model, one that requires, initially, a discussion of Husserl''s response to the charge of solipsism in the 5th Cartesian Meditation. As a starting point I introduce his symmetrical notion of bodily pairing into a consideration of rhetoric, understood here as an integral part of teaching, thus forging links with phenomenology via the work of Merleau-Ponty. The above provides a context for an extended discussion of pedagogy as it appears in the work of Blanchot and Levinas. Although similar in many respects, on closer inspection it will emerge that important differences are evident in the dissymmetrical and asymmetrical models suggested by the two thinkers respectively. These differences, I will argue, begin to open up a critical perspective on Levinas'' height model of teaching in the name of the more radical configuration of phenomenology and rhetoric to be found in Blanchot. (shrink)

For the Jena Romantics the idea of a self is always in a process, never fully completed. It develops itself as an acting I that interacts with the world, an ongoing interchange between what I am and what I am not. In order to grasp how the self develops and is educated, this paper compares this idea of the self to Schlegel’s account of irony. Both irony and the I exist as an ongoing process. In this comparison the (...) self is found to be a work of art, which is never what it is since its identity always still has to become completed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Willing and DecidingHegel on Irony, Evil, and the Sovereign ExceptionAndrew NorrisIf political decisionism is the claim that the most important political decisions cannot be regulated by rational norms and instead require a confrontation with the exception, Carl Schmitt remains its most notorious advocate. While Schmitt distanced himself from decisionism when he joined the Nazi party in the 1930s, his critics insist that his role in the events leading (...) to Hitler’s assumption of power and his own membership in the party were only attempts “to put... into practice” his earlier theoretical attack on legal positivism and what he vaguely termed “liberalism.”1 Even for those who reject such sweeping claims, the teaching laid out in his 1922 Political Theology remains deeply disturbing. On Schmitt’s account, “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception” [Political Theology 5]. This decision is not a matter of recognizing an exception that already exists; rather it has a performative quality whereby the sovereign decision that names a given event to be an exception is the necessary precondition for the existence of the exception as such—as well as, by extension, the legal system from which it is excepted or removed. The exception is, as it were, called into being by the sovereign, whose decision on it is unregulated by the standards of law or, indeed, of normal life itself.The exception is that which cannot be subsumed; it defies general codification, but it simultaneously reveals a specifically juristic element—the decision in its absolute purity. The exception appears in its absolute form when a situation in which legal prescriptions can be valid must first be brought about. Every general norm demands a normal, everyday frame of life to which it can be factually applied and which is subjected to its regulations. The norm requires a homogenous medium.... For a legal order to make sense, a normal situation must exist, and he is sovereign who definitively decides whether this normal situation actually exists.[Political Theology 13]2 [End Page 135]As the ability to decide on the exception (and hence the norm and the normal) in this sense is what defines the sovereign, sovereignty only appears in its “absolute purity” in the act of naming the exception. Schmitt’s sovereign is a creature of the border: “although he stands outside the normally valid legal system, he nevertheless belongs to it, for it is he who decides when the constitution needs to be suspended in its entirety” [Political Theology 7].3 But while the sovereign’s decision on the exception seems to range back and forth over the borders of the legal order, this movement is in fact the oscillation of the borders themselves—an oscillation that bears the two names sovereignty and exception. Though it makes sense in one way to speak of the sovereign overstepping the limits he lays down, in a deeper sense he, as the moment of decision, is himself the limit. On this account, George W. Bush was more accurate than he could have known in his recent halting suggestion that he is not just the nation’s “decider,” but also himself “a decision.” Or, as he more regularly if quietly maintains, an exception.4While Schmitt’s celebratory analysis of the exception is the best-known today, he is hardly the inventor of this problematic: as he himself emphasizes in Political Romanticism (1919), the question of the decision lies at the heart of nineteenth-century Continental Romanticism, which celebrated an “occasionalism” derived from Malebranche in which the self and its whims take precedence over any substantive commitments that self might take up.5 Karl Löwith has demonstrated that Schmitt’s 1920s decisionism is, rather ironically, open in many aspects to his earlier attack upon this Romantic occasionalism [see Löwith]. Löwith was perhaps as attuned to this as he was on account of being a keen student of Hegel, as well as of Heidegger. Indeed, many features of Schmitt’s own attack upon the Romantics are anticipated in Hegel’s fierce critique of this movement and, in particular, his attack upon Friedrich Schlegel’s role in it. But if Hegel’s critique of Schlegel casts... (shrink)

Goethe and Friedrich Schiller stand together immortalised in Ernst Rietschel's statue at the centre of Weimar. In their lifetime, Goethe and Schiller shaped the culture of German-speaking lands, not only through their poetry, plays, and novels, but also in their role as editors of journals that helped to set the intellectual tone of the period. Schiller's journalDie Horen and Goethe'sPropyläen, although short-lived, were important literary vehicles of the period and provided a forum that brought scientists, historians, philosophers, and poets into (...) conversation with one another. The late 1700s and early 1800s were years of intense intellectual development in Germanspeaking lands; the arts flourished and aesthetics developed as a serious branch of philosophy.During the ‘Age of Goethe and Schiller’, philosophy was dominated by Kant's philosophy and its post-Kantian variations. A problem with traditional philosophical histories of this period is the overwhelmingly Hegelian reading of it, a reading that subsumes all of the so-called minor figures under the shadows of the great system builder, Hegel. Richard Kroner's influentialVon Kant bis Hegelof 1921 set the tone for this reading. Silenced by such narratives are the voices of the early German Romantics, a group of thinkers whose impudence created problems for them, and whose work posed hermeneutical challenges that continue to plague a proper understanding of the movement and the worth of its contributions. As we shall see, Hegel himself began to prepare the ground for a history of philosophy that would dismiss the contributions of the early German Romantics, a dismissal that is unfair and unfortunate: unfair because it is based on false characterisations of the movement, and unfortunate because such misreadings lead us to overlook the wealth of insights offered by the early German Romantics. (shrink)

Stimulating, thought-provoking text by one of the 20th centurys most creative philosophers clearly and discerningly makes accessible such topics as probability, measurement and quantitative language, structure of space, causality and determinism, theoretical laws and concepts and much more. "...the best book available for the intelligent reader who wants to gain some insight into the nature of contemporary philosophy of science."Choice.

The Full Bayesian Significance Test (FBST) for precise hypotheses is presented, with some applications relevant to reliability theory. The FBST is an alternative to significance tests or, equivalently, to p-ualue.s. In the FBST we compute the evidence of the precise hypothesis. This evidence is the probability of the complement of a credible set "tangent" to the sub-manifold (of the para,rreter space) that defines the null hypothesis. We use the FBST in an application requiring a quality control of used components, based (...) on remaining life statistics. (shrink)

German literature played an important role in Kierkegaard's reading, and he often relates to German authors in his writings, especially to those of the period between 1770 and 1830. Against the background of German Romanticism, he deals with Romantic irony in the second part of The Concept of Irony. His harsh verdict on famous German writers like Friedrich Schlegel and Ludwig Tieck in his master's thesis is in some cases relativized by a more balanced appreciation in other (...) writings. Some German authors like Georg Christoph Lichtenberg and Jean Paul served as stylistic models, while others like Gotthold Ephraim Lessing offered valuable inspirations for his thinking. One of the most frequently cited poets is Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, who appears in Kierkegaard's writings throughout all his working periods and is dealt with in a very comprehensive manner. (shrink)

Hegel's critique of Schleiermacher as the embodiment of two currents of romantic irony: empiricist skepticism (Schlegel) and feeling (Novalis), are explicitly presented as "absolute presupposition of our time". The article associates these "presuppositions" with features of postmodernity, as presented by Lyotard. Thus, the Hegelian critique of Schleiermacher might be read as a critique of postmodernity.

The article draws a conceptual distinction the (French) structuralism of the 50’s–60’s and the post-structuralism of the 70’s, which are discussed as overlapping in their intellectual paths; their mutual dynamics is defined as a reaction of the intelligence to the pressure of depersonalized unified schemes within the logic of structuralism against free improvisation and loose interpretation instead of total explanations in the post-structuralism interpretation. The article establishes a conceptual identity of the paradoxical nature between post-structuralism (and deconstructionism, which is homogeneous (...) and identical thereto in a number of aspects), on the one hand, and constructionism with its specific process of language dismantling – social/ideological languages, social group dialects, on the other hand, which naturally leads the authors to the analysis of the paradoxicality principles, defined by post-structuralism (five principles of paradoxicality of Gilles Deleuze – paradox of regress, paradox of sterile reiteration, paradox of neutrality, paradox of absurd, paradox of Levi-Strauss); poststructuralists’ paralogisms are examined through paradoxical denotation; the late Roland Barthes’ phenomenon of paradoxicality, becoming a plot-forming principle of narration, is analyzed. Poststructuralism is conceptualized in the article as the first decisive step of post-modernism; the affinity of post-structuralist and postmodernist commitment to parody, game and irony is stated; the theory of language games in post-modern interpretation is explored; one of those games – a game of carnival – is explored within the diachronic retrospective; the affinity of parody and carnival tradition of post-structuralism and post-modernism to the romantic irony of the XIXth century and its inconsistency with the popular culture of laugh is established. The genesis of poststructuralism and post-modernism is connected with the ideological restart of the Western society before the “very end” of the Resistance ideas and the disappointment of the left European intellectuals in the “great legends” and illusions of Marxism. The blurred concepts of relativism are connected with the mutual disproportion of different layers of historical experience. (shrink)

This paper illustrates Hegel’s criticism of the reduction of reality to thought in the idealism which he believed to be peculiar to the Indian spirit. The paper starts by analyzing the metaphors of dream and mesmerism. Hegel deducted these metaphors from anthropology and he largely used them to describe the ways in which Indian idealism is structured. We outline Hegel’s interpretation of some central concepts of Indian philosophy and religion, especially those of Brahman and Yoga. Then we reach the rebound (...) which is proper of every idealism of this kind: the resolution of material reality into an absolutized, and therefore absolutely empty, thought turns ipso facto into a subjection of thought to reality in its harshest and most natural shape, represented in India by castes. Finally, we trace Hegel’s criticism of Romantic irony, and in particular of Friedrich Schlegel. We show that irony ends up subjecting the spiritual dimension to superstition and to bare reality, like Indian idealism. However, irony starts from an absolutization of a form of thought which is very far from the Indian one. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to explain why, in Hegel's view, art's history brings it to the point at which it can no longer afford the highest satisfaction of our spiritual needs and so fulfill its own highest calling, and why, nevertheless, we moderns still need art and still need it to create beauty. I argue that Hegel advocates a modern art of beauty because he believes that what has to be given aesthetic expression in the modern world is (...) concrete human freedom and life (ratherthan the abstract, subjective freedom of Romantic irony) and that the aesthetic expression of such concrete human freedom entails beauty. (shrink)

Definida como beleza lógica e forma do paradoxo, a ironia romântica de Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829) assimila a antiga ironia socrática e a reinterpreta, inserindo-a como elemento central de sua teorização crítico-literária. O presente artigo analisa a ironia romântica, buscando situar sua alteração e abrangência no final do século XVIII, quando o conceito passa a significar metacrítica, reflexão filosófica, ruptura ficcional, distância estética e forma de exposição da arte literária. Defined as logical beauty and form of paradox, Friedrich Schlegel's (1772-1829) (...) class='Hi'>romantic irony incorporates ancient Socratic irony and reinterprets it, inserting it as a nuclear element of his theorization on literary criticism. The current paper analyses the concept of romantic irony seeking to situate its alterations at the end of 18th century, when it changed its meaning for metacritics, philosophical reflexion, fictional rupture, aesthetical distance and form of art exposition. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Textual Status of Hegel's “Historical Deduction” The Place of the “Historical Deduction” within the Argumentative Task of the Lectures ' Introduction The Three “Common Ideas of Art” and the Emergence of the Standpoint of the “Historical Deduction” From Kant to Schiller to Schlegel: The Third Critique, the Culture of Reflectivity, and the Rise of the Concept of the Beautiful The Problem of History and the Narrative Structure of Hegel's Philosophy of Art.

The philosophy of irony has had, since its romantic origins, no good reputation because of its methodological and logical inconclusiveness and its contamination with literature. Whether we talk about Friedrich Schlegel or Paul de Man, about Søren Kierkegaard or Friedrich Nietzsche, Richard Rorty or Peter Sloterdijk, the “ironists” are hated because of their ability to say, even on the verge of death: “however”. The charge that philosophy makes against ironists is based on three “suspicions”: 1) that they are (...) not philosophically consistent and, therefore, that they, ultimately, do not know how to ironize themselves; 2) that their irony is only a disguised “egology”, as Hegel would claim and assumes literary forms; 3) finally that they are vitiated by a sort of anthropological “lack of commitment”, or – as Rorty would say – a “lack of solidarity”, and, therefore, they are quite often ineffective and even harmful from a social and political point of view. In the following pages I will try to dissolve these “suspicions” through a close and “ironic” reading of two texts that belong to this tradition of cultural (not only literary) analysis, telling the story of an elective affinity between two emblematic thinkers: Friedrich Schlegel and Paul de Man. (shrink)

The old spiritual masters told us to be in the world but not of it. We moderns have given this a secular twist. We are in our world — we have values, ways of life, world pictures — but not of it — we are to be aware of our freedom, aware of the contingency of our world and its dependence on factors many of which are or will be under our control. We both inhabit our world and enjoy the (...) status of distanced controllers. Or, if our lack of control and our dependence on historical and social factors is being emphasized, we are to inhabit our world with a certain knowing irony, since we understand the process by which it came about, even if we cannot change it. We hnave found ways to institutionalize this split-level identity. -/- Such institutions posit a separation of form and content. In the free market, in procedural justice, in free speech we live out that separation. This parallels cognitive and volitional theories of Kantian and Utilitarian descent, which make the same separation. All these give us freedom by having us seek our identity in a formal process above all content, but at the cost of introducing distance and irony. -/- Martin Heidegger's response to modernity often sounds like a romantic flight from modern distances. He clearly wants to overcome our split-level existence, the uneasy balance of facticity and freedom, which for him is but another manifestation of the will to power which he fines lurking behind our tradition. But to what degree is his own overcoming of modernity also susceptible to split-level living and ironic distance? (shrink)

Thе aim of the paper is to present the problem of boredom in Bogomil Raynov’s fourth book Travelling in Everyday Life. The interpretation of boredom in the novel is seen as based on the idea of a mismatch between expectation and experience. The expectation of the individual turns out to be modeled by the mass commercialization of the 20th century. The "cultural industry" replaces the sublime ideas of the romantic poetics with superfluous clichés, which deny the world its unpredictability, (...) its unexpectedness. It is these kinds of clichés that are subject of irony in Bogomil Raynov's novel – false expectations create a false feeling of boredom. Boredom as a problem has been rarely discussed either by Bulgarian authors, or by Bulgarian literary historians, therefore this paper tries not only to focus scholars’ attention on it, but also to interprete it. (shrink)