Towards the end of his life, the French theorist and philosopher René Girard (1923–2015) published a series of conversations titled Battling to the End in which.

In this article, it is argued that a significant internal tension exists in John Rawls' political liberalism. He holds the following positions that might plausibly be considered incongruous: (1) a commitment to tolerating a broad right of freedom of political speech, including a right of subversive advocacy; (2) a commitment to restricting this broad right if it is intended to incite and likely to bring about imminent violence; and (3) a commitment to curbing this broad right only if there (...) is a constitutional crisis. By supporting a broad right of freedom of political speech in Political Liberalism, he allows militant intolerant people such as Jihadists, White Supremacists and Neo-Nazis to advocate publicly their dangerously intolerant beliefs. Public advocacy of dangerously intolerant beliefs can be construed as subversive advocacy. As demonstrated by the historical examples of the Weimar Republic and the Second Spanish Republic, militant intolerant groups could use a right of subversive advocacy to threaten the stability of liberal democracies. Hence, by allowing them to exercise a broad right of freedom of political speech, Rawls could jeopardize that which he intends to defend, namely the actual political stability of a liberal democratic order. Lastly, Rawls' conception of ideal constitutional interpretation, which privileges a broad right of freedom of political speech, might be insufficient to deal effectively with the threat posed by militant intolerant groups. Yet a tradition of American constitutional interpretation that balances freedom of speech with other important constitutional and/or political values has overcome a civil war, two world wars, the Cold War and the 9/11 terrorist attacks without abandoning democracy or permanently renouncing those values. Still, Rawls' ideal approach to constitutional interpretation might, in hindsight, help us to understand some of the excesses and deficiencies of American jurisprudence in times of emergency.<br><br><br><br>. (shrink)

In the 1970s the Federal Republic of Germany found itself locked in a battle with leftwing extremism, when groups of self-styled urban guerrillas attempted to press through a radical agenda using methods that included bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations. This essay examines the counterterrorist initiatives of West Germany’s ruling social-liberal coalition as anti-state violence forced officials to reconsider the principles of democracy and state power. With the collapse of the Weimar Republic casting an ominous shadow, political leaders gradually forged a (...) consensus around the concept of “militant democracy.” In practice, this meant a more centralized state, prepared to forcefully defend the lives and property of its citizens against terrorist attacks. Although the country embraced a new image of German militarism in the form of counterterrorist commandos, citizens expressed a growing concern over computerized crime fighting as an intrusive surveillance of their private lives. (shrink)

For the last three decades or so, Pakistan has been a severe victim of sectarian violence. Although the roots of sectarian violence in the Pakistani society could be traced to various political developments in the country and the region, such as, Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamization process, Iranian Revolution and the anti-Soviet Afghan war, during the late 1970s, the dangerous phase of sectarian menace began after the 9/11 incident when the domestic sectarian militant organizations established their links with international terrorist (...) groups, e.g., Al-Qaeda and then the self-styled Islamic State, and started playing the role of a facilitator as well as becoming the part of global Jihadism. Against this background, the paper analyzes the origins of sectarianism in Pakistan and threats which it poses to the integrity of the country. In the concluding analysis, the paper argues that the violent extremist ideology that creates ideologically-motivated committed terrorists may be countered if Pakistan reorients its strategic policies vis-à-vis its eastern and western neighbors – India and Afghanistan – by discouraging the use of proxies for pursuing its strategic interests in the region. (shrink)

ABSTRACTCentral to the mainstream Sikh identity is the concept of ethically-justified force, used as a last resort. There is no place for absolute pacifism in this conception of ethical living. Fighters and martyrs occupy an important place in the Khalsa narrative, and Sikhs are constantly reminded of the sacrifices and heroism of their co-religionists of the past. This article explores how the Sikh warrior identity is manifested in the contemporary world. It examines the Sikhs who, in the 1980s and 1990s, (...) were involved on both sides of the Punjab crisis: those militants who fought for a Sikh homeland and those Sikhs in the Indian army who suppressed the insurgency. The article also looks beyond the militants and soldiers to Sikhs employed in modern security-related professions, the broader issue of Sikh symbols relating to the use of force, and violence within the Sikh diaspora. An examination of the Sikhs in various parts of the world reveals additional uses and consequences of ideology, w... (shrink)

The contrast, often painted in simplistic colours, between Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm X as civil rights campaigners bolsters an erroneous reading of the freedom struggle of African-Americans, leaving the impression that the resort to violence and self-defence propounded by Malcolm X was a purely circumstantial departure from the general strategy of the civil rights movement. In fact, both of them reflected long on the capacity of violence and a contrario of non-violence to bring about political (...) and social transformation in the context of the extreme brutality and oppression being suffered by African-Americans. Their dilemma stemmed from an old intellectual tradition of the America of the slave period. Well before the ideas of Gandhi won over the African-American elite, and even before Henry David Thoreau laid the theoretical basis for civil disobedience, African slaves gave thought to the legitimacy and effectiveness of violence to amend their situation. The importance of the non-violent movement in the United States and the historical significance of Martin Luther King cannot be understood unless a true measure is taken of the anti-slavery struggle. While within the religious domain, the Black Church played a major role in dissuading violence, secular thought in favour of legitimate forceful rebellion also found itself confronted by a counter-argument which advanced the power of social change and resistance to injustice that non-violence could effect. This article particularly addresses the challenges to their consciences that confronted the militants of non-violence in their campaign for the abolition of slavery and notably those facing the central figure of that struggle, the former slave become the apostle of liberation, Frederick Douglass. (shrink)

This book argues that nationalist violence in developed countries is the product of unresponsive political elites and nationalists blocked from attracting supporters through legal channels. Political elites are prone to ignoring a regional polity when their clout in that region is negligible and they do not rely on the region's support to maintain their positions of power. Conversely, when nationalists cannot make inroads through legal channels, incentives for violence are ripe. Thus, when nationalists in postwar Europe found elites (...) unresponsive, it was state repression that helped radicals build a new group of support around militant action. The larger this new constituency legitimizing violence grew, the longer the conflict lasted. The book elucidates this complex dynamic through a deft combination of theoretical modeling, statistical methods and comparative case studies from the Basque Country, Catalonia, Corsica, Northern Ireland, Sardinia and Wales. (shrink)

psychiatric diagnoses such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder is a rapidly growing and globally increasing phenomenon, not least in different educational contexts such as in family and in school. Children and youths labelled as ADHD are challenging normative claims in terms of nurturing and education, whereas those labelled as ADHD are considered a risk for society to handle. The dominant paradigm regarding ADHD is biomedical, where different levels of attention and activity-impulsivity are perceived as neurobiological dys/functions within the brain best (...) managed by means of an individual diagnosis and instrumental pedagogy. The majority of those labelled as having ADHD encounter a dominant educational model in the form of what is referred to in this article as neurobehaviorism, which is based on onto-epistemological violence. As opposed to this act of violence against being—and against the psychiatrized subject—a less violent educational model is proposed, based on French philosopher Alain Badiou’s ontological examination of being and his concept of love as a truth procedure. In terms of the latter, the focus is on the potential of the encounter as a ‘Two scene of love’. Here, the encounter is a place where it is possible to create new truths and subjects, instead of taking the individual diagnosis as an axiom which only leads to individuals having fixed identities codified in a hierarchical order. This argument is drawn from the ‘mathematical’ formula 1 + 1 = ♥, which originates from an online forum for people who have come into contact with ADHD in one way or another. (shrink)

Masterminded by women, the Red Army Faction terrorized West Germany from the 1970s to the 1990s. Afterimages of its leaders persist in the works of pivotal artists and writers, including Gerhard Richter, Elfriede Jelinek, and Slavoj Žižek. Why were women so prominent in the RAF? What does the continuing cultural response to the German armed struggle tell us about the representation of violence, power, and gender today? Engaging critical theory, Charity Scribner addresses these questions and analyzes signal works that (...) point beyond militancy and terrorism. This literature and art discloses the failures of the Far Left and registers the radical potential that RAF women actually forfeited. _After the Red Army Faction_ maps out a cultural history of militancy and introduces "postmilitancy" as a new critical term. As Scribner demonstrates, the most compelling examples of postmilitant culture don't just repudiate militancy: these works investigate its horizons of possibility, particularly on the front of sexual politics. Objects of analysis include as-yet untranslated essays by Theodor Adorno and Jürgen Habermas, as well as novels by Friedrich Dürrenmatt and Judith Kuckart, Johann Kresnik's _Tanztheaterstück Ulrike Meinhof_, and the blockbuster exhibition _Regarding Terror_ at the Berlin Kunst-Werke. Scribner focuses on German cinema, offering incisive interpretations of films by Margarethe von Trotta, Volker Schlöndorff, and Fatih Akin, as well as the international box-office success _The Baader-Meinhof Complex_. These readings disclose dynamic junctures among several fields of inquiry: national and sexual identity, the disciplining of the militant body, and the relationship between mass media and the arts. (shrink)

In an actual conflict situation many different factors can contribute to the view that a recourse to violence is inescapable and even desirable. Among them are natural responses to repression, encouragement from interested parties outside, and the oversimplification of the situation as it is described in the militant ideologies of the organizers of the conflict and in the moral evaluations of those who take sides in it. The reality is far more complex and the situation far less determined (...) than it seems. Taking the South African situation, the question of whether violence can be avoided can still be seen to depend on the kind of action that is taken. There is a relationship between ends and means. If the end is racial domination (by Africans in place of Afrikaners), then violence is the appropriate means. If the end is racial integration then violence must be avoided. Whether non-violence can serve this end of racial integration depends on its being consistently practiced and on the provision of the necessary outside encouragement. (shrink)

During the already long history of the Israel-Palestine conflict, women from both sides of the Green Line have been highly visible participants in the often perilous enterprise of establishing dialogue, of maintaining links with the other side, and of thinking seriously about the conditions that will need to be brought together for the construction of a just and lasting peace. By their words, their often symbolic actions, and their activist strategies, they have durably contributed to the building of a ‘clandestine’ (...) peace often far removed from the calendars and issues of the major international negotiations. In these collective actions, choosing the path of non-violence has often been at the heart of their repertoire of militant activities and their discourses. This article proposes to examine certain examples of such activities and involvement since the first Intifada of 1987 up until the very recent past, showing that the choice of non-violent strategies has been a significantly marked tendency of the activism of women, and that this is always associated with the formulation of renewed forms of discourse around peace and reconciliation. (shrink)

In this chapter, I explore the role of violence in colonial rule and its role in decolonization struggle by posing the question, “what is alive in Fanon’s thought?” What can Fanon tell us about white settler state power and Fourth World decolonization struggles? I explore the relevance of Fanon’s account to the ongoing colonial situation on the northern part of Anówara Kawennote (Turtle Island), occupied by Canada. In this analysis, I am informed by Kanien’kehaka (Mohawk) political philosopher Taiaiake Alfred. (...) I juxtapose Alfred’s theory of “nonviolent militancy” with Fanon’s concept of “violence in action.” I perform a reading of Fanon and Alfred to glean an understanding of the phenomenality of colonial state power. (shrink)

David Rapoport’s Wave theory of terrorism is one of the most oftencited theories in the literature on terrorist violence. Rapoport is praised for having provided researchers with a universal instrument which allows them to explain the origin and transformation of various historical types of terrorism by applying to them the concept of global waves of terrorist violence driven by universal political impulses. This article, testing the Wave theory against the recent phenomenon of homegrown jihadism in Europe, uncovers this (...) theory’s fundamental weaknesses and questions its real academic and practical value. (shrink)

"Est-il possible pour une nation de se réconcilier? C’est à cette question simple mais nécessaire que cet essai est dédié. La mort de Nelson Mandela en décembre 2013 a conduit à un recueillement mondial au début du XXIe siècle. Les ennemis d’hier se sont réunis autour du mythe du prisonnier réconciliateur. Cette réunion n’indique sans doute pas l’adhésion aux actions du militant sud-africain : célébrer Mandela, c’est chercher à bénéficier de son aura. Une ère de réconciliations a commencé à (...) la fin du XXe siècle. Les processus sont canalisés et enclos dans la tradition libérale : le libéralisme se présente comme le chantre de la paix et du bonheur. Pourtant le monde n’aurait jamais été si violent... Cette contradiction devrait suffire à disqualifier le libéralisme comme projet politique viable, et pourtant, le monde continue à lui confier les rênes. L’auteure piste donc à la fois les réussites et les échecs des réconciliations contemporaines. Elle s’interroge sur ces réconciliations politiques mais aussi philosophiques et scientifiques qui n’auraient jamais pu avoir lieu du temps des deux blocs. Elle propose un chemin à rebrousse-poil, en montrant que la paix et la conciliation ne sont possibles qu’au prix du conflit et de la confrontation. Passant par l’Afrique du Sud, mais aussi le Kurdistan, l’Algérie ou le Canada, l’auteure propose non pas de ne pas réconcilier, mais de réconcilier en déconciliant. Elle ne le propose pas comme une simple idée, mais esquisse les traits d’une pratique" (4ème de couv.). (shrink)

Examples of scriptural and historic militancy in Christianity and Islam are frequently compared today without sufficient attention to the complexity of the subject within each tradition. Through an examination of relevant biblical and Qur’anic materials, and of episodes in later history, this article attempts a fresh examination of violence in the two traditions. It argues that the tensions in each tradition related to violence, while similar in some ways, are quite distinct in others. In light of this, thoughts (...) are suggested on how each community may engage its respective tensions in order to work toward peace today. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:LIBERATION THEOLOGY AND THE INTERPRE.TATION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE FREDERICK SONTAG Pomona OoUego Olaremont, Oalifornia " It is impossible to remain loyal to Marxism, to the Revolution, without treating insurrection as an art." Lenin, paraphrasing Karl Marx WHENEVER Liberation Theology ·and its contributions to theologicail discussion al'e ·concerned, no aspect has been more controversirul than its association with violence. There is no question that Marxism/Leninism depends on the (...) use of violence. But all liberation theories must take violence into consideration. On the one hand, the ties that hold humans in bondage may be so strong that only violent means ca.n be effective to release us. On the other hand, it is well known that violenre often breeds its own do·wnfall and results in ten·or more often than peace. Since the beginning of time, probably every prrogram seeking to release human beings to their furhl. potential has had to consider the use of violence to achieve its ends, even while awal'e of its potential dangers. Yet this issue takes on a new urgency in our time because of two s[gnificant changes in our situation: (I) Most communist proposals which have resulted in world~wide change have militantly asserted the necessity to use force if we are to be set free; (2) In recent times Liberati.on Theofogy has been espoused by some Christian theologians even while the adoption of pacifism or the abhorrence of violence by most Christian groups is well known. The question of religion's intrusion into the politicaiJ. reailm is problem 271 FREDERICK SONTAG enough, but add to this the question of the use of violence and the discussion becomes very heated indeed. Although many traditions have well-developed positions regarding violence and non-violence, Christianity will be our frame of reference in discussing these issues, since Liberation Theology has, in fact, developed in a Christian context. First of all we havie to ask whether the use of violence to ruchieve politicaJ ends is a;lways ruled out or whether some circumstances might justify it as an ruooeptable tool for Christian use. Where Christianity is concerned, it is always instructive to begin by looking at the life and work of Jesus. Trruditionally, Jesus is seen as rejecting the use of violence and as having suffered vioilence himself. Can anything so change this image as to make violence acceptable on Christian grounds? In ·considering this, we first have to note that Jesus himself lived under po1itiool oppression. We must oons~der the Jewish expectations for the ' Messiah ' and how this role came to be projecbed onto Jesus; their hope for release from Roman oppressors was what plruced mroh high political expectations on Jesus. Christians recognized Jesus as a' Messiah', even though he obvious1ly did not fulfill the role of a political liberato·r. Afiter his death and for centuries fater, Jewish political fortunes went from bad to worse. The people's expectations of gaining release by the hand of Jesus did not result in a change in their political fortunes. Christians diid enter into politics and governments in!Later years, and some welcome changes can be attributed to Christian influence. But still, none of these improvements can be directly attributed to Jesus' efforts in his own fileis a prime :requfoement for success. We 'are aware of the Marxist/Leninist insistency on toeing the line on dogma, for conformity to doctrine. But can the Christian,aiccept the uniformity of interpretation which effective acbion seems to require? If the Christian liberation theofogian argues that aU Christians cannot be required to aiocept some one program of wction, he or she is limited by the division that plurality brings. On the other LIBERATION THEOLOGY AND POLITICAL VIOL]j]NCE '277 hand, the Christian revotutionary activist should not be told that his program is " unchristian " as judged by some singular, authoritative standard. Of course, the chief complication in saying this lies with a hieI"archical church which includes authorities to formulate doctrine. The Christian who wants to act differently from what the srbructure of such a chureh allows will either: (1) have to find a way to act independently and still stay within that community; or (2) convince... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RANSOM'S GOD WITHOUT THUNDER: REMYTHOLOGIZING VIOLENCE AND POETICIZING THE SACRED Gary M. Ciuba Kent State University From tree-lined Vanderbilt University of 1930 Nashville, the modernist poet and critic John Crowe Ransom longed to hear in his imagination the God who thundered fiercely in ancient Greece, Rome, and Israel. The God of sacrifice who in Homer's Iliad, "his thunder striking terror," received libations from the warring armies (230). The (...) God of jealousy who in Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound "drove the sleepless thunderbolt, / plunged the fire spurting shaft/ down" on Typhon for defying heaven with his violence (46). The God of vengeance who in Ovid's Metamorphoses sent "blinding / Thunder [to shake] Olympus, and Pelim / Thrust down by heaven's bolt crashed over Ossa" when the giants piled mountain upon mountain to reach Jove's throne (35). The God ofviolence who in Psalm 78:48 delivered the cattle ofthe obstinate Egyptians "to the hail, and their flocks to hot thunderbolts" or who in 1 Samuel 7:10 "thundered with great thunder" to smite the Philistines. In God Without Thunder: An Unorthodox Defense of Orthodoxy Ransom attacked the modern heresy that deprived the deity ofsuch awful might and summoned Americans to live under a new myth of sacred violence. IfRansom listened with the ears ofthe Methodist faith in which he had been raised, he might have heard how the god of old was muted at the university where he studied and later taught. Ten years before Ransom was born, Methodist-sponsored Vanderbilt had eliminated the lectureship of naturalist Alexander Winched because hisPre-Adamites had challenged the Creation story in Genesis. But in 1914, when Ransom returned to his alma Gary M. Ciuba41 mater to begin more than two decades of teaching there, the Methodists ended their affiliation with Vanderbilt because of a dispute about church governance of the university (Bailey 9-10, 31-4). When the Scopes Trial caused a furor in 1925, Ransom was invited by Vanderbilt to condemn the Fundamentalists to the southeast in Dayton. He refused-not because he sided with the anti-Darwinists but because he believed that the tyranny of science was threateningthe poetic foundation ofreligion (Quinlan 40, n. 3). Ransom's thunderless plight was virtually imagined by H.L. Mencken, one of the most stinging critics of the creationists, when in 1922 he penned a tongue-in-cheek lament forthe passing ofthe ancient deities. "Where is the graveyard of dead gods? What lingering mourner waters their mounds? There was a time when Jupiter was the king ofthe gods, and any man who doubted his puissance was ipso facto a barbarian and an ignoramus," Mencken mock-elegized in "Memorial Service." "But where in all the world is there a man who worships Jupiter today?" (95). God Without Thunder provides the answer to Mencken's archly lugubrious question: it is John Crowe Ransom. Grieving the demise ofthe deity ofyore, Ransom's treatise on the religious imagination heralds a one-man revival of Jupiter Tonans. Ransom believes that the god ofantiquity has been muffled bythe spirit of scientific abstraction that reigns notjust in Tennessee but across all of America.7 Hetraces this modern cult ofthe mind beyond the current efforts ofreligion to seek a rapprochement with biology and physics; beyond the science-driven Prometheus of Shelley, the rationalism of the Protestant Reformation, and the inquiry of Copernicus; beyond the errors of early Christianity, to a kind of primal sin. Humans have used their intelligence first to set themselves above nature, then to order the world according to their ways, and finally to exploit all ofcreation for their use. Demystified by science, thunder has become not the mighty weapon ofthe ancient God who tolerated no rivals but only the noise of heated and expanding air. Ransom views science as having such ultimacy that it exercises a mimetic function: it provides Girardian models for desire. "Science directs us to amuse ourselves, between desires," Ransom writes, "by simulating 7 Louis Rubin reads Ransom's "Armageddon" as a poetic companion piece to God Without Thunder, for it tells how divine wrath has been compromised amid the suavities of the modern world At the apocalyptic battle of the poem's title, a militant... (shrink)

Juergensmeyer's interviews of ex-fighters—Muslims in Iraq and Mindanao, Sikhs in Punjab—illustrate how stubbornly they refuse to conform to Western narratives about “religious violence.” Among the Sikhs, “almost none of the militants surveyed... were said to be noticeably religious”; in ISIS, “many in the movement were attracted not by the ideology or the ideals, but by the excitement of being involved in an alternative culture, one of largely male militancy.” For the Moros in Mindanao, likewise, Islamic theology is one factor (...) among many, and one of relatively minor importance for the majority. These are all, nevertheless, treated as exemplars of religious violence, as Juergensmeyer puzzles through how to end it. His final chapter is called “How Imagined Wars End,” though we have been informed in the first chapter that “every war is an imagined war.” War is an “alternative reality,” “an inversion of ordinary reality where differences are negotiated through civil discourse.” Religion—whatever that is; no definition is offered—is also an alternative reality, one based on fear of one's own death. When these two alternative realities are joined, and “religion is thought to be war, and war religion,” the result is “cosmic war,” which is the worst. The book seeks to understand how cosmic war fades into more mundane conflict (and eventually peace).The internal factors that bring cosmic war to an end—fighters lose faith in their movement when it loses battles, when there is infighting, when new alternatives offer hope—and the external factors—a strong military or police response, concessions by the government, gestures of respect from opponents—do not seem different from the factors that bring all wars to an end. Juergensmeyer never convincingly distinguishes cosmic from other kinds of war. But the book exudes a bias toward the status quo, such that the violence of armed anticolonial movements is of a fundamentally different order than the everyday violence of established governments. It is hard to resist the conclusion that cosmic wars are simply wars that we “secular” Westerners find distasteful. We puzzle over cosmic religious violence to assure ourselves that our “ordinary” violence does not really count as violence. (shrink)

Jesus Christ may be regarded as the chief spirit of agitation and innovation. He himself declared, “I come not to bring peace, but a sword.” One cannot delve seriously into the centuries of activism and scholarship against racism, Jim Crowism, and the terrorism of lynching without encountering the legacies of Timothy Thomas Fortune and Ida B. Wells-Barnett. Black scholars from the 19th century to the present have been inspired by the sociological and economic works of Fortune and Wells. Scholars of (...) American philosophy, however, continue to ignore their writings, their theoretical contributions and their ethical aspirations, preferring instead the insipid declarations of white turn of the century.. (shrink)

Marx and Engels's thought—combined with the way in which it has been interpreted—has tended to militate against discussion of an ethics of violence in revolt. Along with Sorel and Fanon, their attitude towards violence is often seen simply as one where the ends justify the means and where violence in pursuit of a just society is necessarily defensible. However, we can (and should) look to certain sources within Marx and Engels for inspiration for an ethics of (...) class='Hi'>violence in revolt, which places emphasis on the humanizing aspects of their work, on the core ideas of freedom, moving beyond dehumanization and moving beyond violence. I argue that this approach suggests an abhorrence of any violence and can thus be combined with a pacifist-influenced approach to the ethics of violence in revolt. This is compatible with Ernst Bloch's interpretation of Marxism, which he describes as “concrete utopianism.” Classical Marxism can, then, offer fruitful pointers to an ethics of violence in political change, although Marx and Engels's texts must be used with considerable care and must be combined with the work of other thinkers, in particular those who display more explicit moral objection to violence of any kind. (shrink)

This article identifies the major forces militating against the promotion of women's rights in the Sudan. These factors are intimately linked to the country's multiple political disputes including Darfur and southern Sudan. The effects of political violence is elaborated through a detailed examination of women’s political, economic and cultural rights. The article concludes by identifying the promotion of good governance and democratization as fundamental pre-requisites for advancing human rights and sustainable peace in the war-torn nation.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Beyond Rivalry?Rethinking Community in View of Apocalyptical ViolenceAndreas Oberprantacher (bio)But the republic of crime must also be the republic of the suicide of criminals, and down to the last among them—the sacrifice of the sacrificers unleashed in passion.—Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative CommunityThe Crisis and Apocalyptic Intensification of RivalryAt first it seemed as if the "rivalry between two rates of speed"1 set at the center of Derrida's essay "No Apocalypse, (...) Not Now," published more than twenty years ago in Diacritics, had finally come to an end, at least in the form of a general and unmistakable division of the world into two competing geopolitical units. Following the breakdown of the USSR, the former super-enemy of the industrialized Northwest, that part of the world that claimed and still claims to be the sole referent of the adjective free, the dynamics of ideological rivalry had, at first, lost considerable momentum. After half a century of mostly symmetrical even if undeclared wars, the period from 1989 to 1991 was truly significant, [End Page 175] for it marked a moment of epistemological crisis, a moment when political fractions that derived their identity from a binary tension were all of a sudden stunned: no visible enemy anymore to deter, no willing scapegoat to blame, just eschatological abandonment.The aftershocks of this historical event can be traced in today's commentaries on and analyses of the political situation: It is certainly no coincidence that two of the most influential US-American political analysts, Samuel Huntington and Bruce Hoffman, both at the same time direct their attention toward questions about the conditions of social identity and cohesion, though from inverted perspectives. In his recent book, Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity (2004), Huntington bemoans the "deconstruction of the American identity,"2 as it challenges—along with certain political developments—"the substance, and the desirability of this concept of America."3 Huntington's fervent interest in US-American identity and his call for its renewal become readily comprehensible when read against the background of his concern that an existential threat might again be imminent, possibly in the form of jihadist terrorism. In Huntington's argument, however, the United States's potential confrontation with militant Islamist movements—the explicit subtext of his book—is not assessed only in terms of political risks and military expenditures; for Huntington, this confrontation also holds out a unique chance of rediscovering one's own (lost, forgotten) identity. Revealing himself as an attentive reader of Carl Schmitt's The Concept of the Political, Huntington argues that "the absence of an ideological threat produced an absence of purpose.... The ideal enemy for America would be ideologically hostile, racially and culturally different, and militarily strong enough to pose a credible threat to American security."4While Huntington is concerned with reaffirming and securing a phantasmagoric vision of the United States's past glory, Hoffman, on the other hand, may be mentioned as a political analyst deeply worried about the inverse aspect of the epistemological crisis, i.e., worried by the fact that "the United States has utterly failed to fulfill the timeless admonition to 'know your enemy'"5 by declaring an all too abstract global war on terrorism. In his commentary, published in March 2007 under the title "Fighting Blind: We Can't Win if We Don't Know the Enemy" in the Washington Post, he argues that a long-term strategy is desperately needed to identify "our adversaries, who are much too elusive and complicated to be vanquished by mere decapitation."6Taking Huntington's and Hoffman's positions seriously as paradigmatic examples of a wider and well-established discursive strategy that calls for a renewed need for binary-opposed collective identities—us/them; the coalition [End Page 176] of the willing/the axis of evil—in order to affirm a state of potentially ubiquitous and highly moralized rivalry, one may well argue with Schmitt that "a new nomos of the earth" is immanent.7 In Schmitt's understanding, such a new paradigm of warfare will no longer be characterized by relative understandings of enmity, but by enemies declared "totally criminal... (shrink)

De nos jours, les partis politiques et les syndicats communiquent avant tout de jour, afin de se faire entendre du plus grand nombre. Il n’en a pas toujours été ainsi. En pleine Guerre froide, les militants devaient bien souvent agir la nuit pour promouvoir et défendre leurs idées – quitte à s’exposer physiquement à des représailles de leurs adversaires. La communication politique après-guerre privilégiait bien souvent les meetings nocturnes (non-)contradictoires, parfois émaillés d’incidents. Ce n’est que progressivement avec la technicisation de (...) la communication et la mise à distance des corps que la violence physique va reculer pour perdurer dans les marges politiques. Profondément liés à des organisations politiques, les syndicats répondaient en partie au même schéma, bien que le déclin de la violence physique nocturne se soit enclenché plus rapidement au profit d’une violence diurne maîtrisée. Cet article contribue à l’étude de l’évolution de la violence militante politique et... (shrink)

In order to address whether states can ever have the proper authority to militarily punish other international agents, I examine three attempts to justify punitive warfare from Augustine, Grotius and Locke for their relevance to both our contemporary international legal and political order and our contemporary security threats from sporadic terrorist or militant violence. Once a plausible model for a state’s valid authority to punish international agents is found, I will consider what punitive aims it can support and (...) what challenges such punitive warfare would have in satisfying the remaining jus ad bellum conditions. (shrink)

In order to address whether states can ever have the proper authority to militarily punish other international agents, I examine three attempts to justify punitive warfare from Augustine, Grotius and Locke for their relevance to both our contemporary international legal and political order and our contemporary security threats from sporadic terrorist or militant violence. Once a plausible model for a state’s valid authority to punish international agents is found, I will consider what punitive aims it can support and (...) what challenges such punitive warfare would have in satisfying the remaining jus ad bellum conditions. (shrink)

The surge of religious fundamentalism is a present reality. This way of reasoning breeds ideologies that are both religious and political in nature and mount themselves against a perceived threat or enemy in order to protect their identities. These ideologies elevate certain fundamentals of a particular religion or life- and worldview to absolutes and interlace their ideas and methods around these absolutes. With a strong reactionary attitude, fundamentalist ideologies and religions easily resort to extremism, militancy, abuses of human rights and (...) even violence. Religious fundamentalist movements share certain characteristics, although they also express features that are particular to the religious tradition from which they emerged. They have many characteristics in common, and this fact points to the possibility that fundamentalist movements emerge under the impact of rather similar processes of social transformation. The purpose of this article is to identify, by way of a comparative literary study, the most outstanding characteristics of religious fundamentalism as it appear in its most prominent manifestations in today’s world. (shrink)

Quelles sont nos responsabilités face à l’injustice ? Les philosophes considèrent généralement que les citoyens d’un État globalement juste doivent obéir à la loi, même lorsqu’elle est injuste, quitte à employer exceptionnellement la désobéissance civile pour protester. Les militants quant à eux, qu’ils luttent pour les droits civiques, contre les violences faites aux femmes ou pour le climat, jugent souvent que l’obligation première est résister à l’injustice.

The tripartite model of militant extremist mind-set proposed by Stankov et al. (2010b) includes three components: War (justification of violent acts); God (extremist acts are moral because they are done in the name of God/Allah); and West (violence against Western countries is justified because they are perceived as evil). There is a lack of conceptual framework regarding psychological mechanism that underlie radicalization and extremism, and there is little evidence regarding risk factors for radicalization in the scientific literature. In (...) the present study, it is hypothesized that irrational beliefs and a constellation of personality factors are two possible psychological mechanisms that put adolescents in a vulnerable position and could influence them to develop an extremist mind-set. The sample consists in 295 Romanian adolescents, ages 15-18 years, and the mean age being 16.41. The present study was conducted in several schools from Bihor County located in the north-western part of Romania. Adolescents took part on a voluntary basis in the study after the written, informed consent was obtained from their parents. A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on the structure of Militant Extremist Mind-Set Scale confirmed the three-factor model of the extremist mind-set. Two confirmatory factor analyses were also conducted for the other two administered scales: CASI and Mini-IPIP. The results support the previous models for both subscales, including items loading on factors. SEM analysis was performed with AMOS 23 statistical package on a final sample size of 242 participants and there were no missing data. Fifth structural models were specified. The fifth model had adequate fit based on all three indices including the RMSEA (0.054), CFI (0.958), and SRMS (0.047). Global evaluation of self seems to be the only irrational belief that was somewhat related with the extremis mind-set, being part of it. Neuroticism was not identified as being a variable that could have a direct influence on mind-set extremism, or an indirect influence through personality. Religious adherence is a good predictor of extremist ideology. A global personality factor consisting in low Intellect/Imagination, low Extraversion and high Agreeableness seems to be a vulnerability factor that influences people to believe in extremist ideology. (shrink)

This essay seeks to examine D’Arcy’s notion of sound militancy to discern whether this term can be fruitfully applied to establishing rioting (riots) as a democratic form of resistance to injustice or negligence. The first part of the essay provides an account of Frazer and Hutchings’ critique of political violence, a critique that perceives violence (used in politics or for political aims) as never being justifiable. In opposition to this position, the second part of the essay posits, through (...) both theoretical (Marcuse, Celikates) and practical (Soei, Sutterlüty) references, the case for an understanding of political violence (riots) as justifiable or defensible in certain circumstances – those that adhere to D’Arcy’s concept of sound militancy and seek to address a particular and present grievance. In conclusion, the essay suggests that (Hegelian) recognition provides an account of why marginalizing seems so pervasive in contemporary Western societies. (shrink)

Voltaire's militancy in favor of religious toleration is well-known. But he seems to be concerned by its practical results, the rehabilitation of those religiously persecuted, rather than by the theorectical reasonings to convince his opponents. That can be seen in the few importance given to argumentation in the Traité sur la tolerance , mostly composed by historical examples of violence caused by religious fanaticism. However, in Voltaire we find real philosophical reflection on tolerance, but the author finds it inneficient (...) to convince his contemporaries, who are more inclined to accept the presentation of matters of fact rather than the discussion of matters of right. But Voltaire does not limit his comments to facts, he knows that philosophy and law have something to say about tolerance, and that theory influences on and is influenced by practices. So that Voltaire's reflections on tolerance are not limited only to practical positions adopted to defend some individuals from religious persecution, his positions have to be understood also at its theorectical level, for at this level he is also original and gives no concessions, which separates him from his English masters such as John Locke. (shrink)

The latest form of violence in the Niger Delta, i.e., hostage taking by militant male youth, reproduces the “logic of capital” that characterizes state and corporate violence. This logic of capital can be explicated in contrast to a relational account of community that can ground alternative logics of care. Nigeria’s oil policy led to drilling impacts including pollution, social costs, and corruption. The failure of organized resistance to these developments produced widespread disillusionment in the 1990s, to which (...) male youth responded with militancy and profiteering. In contrast, women’s organized resistance practices are “logics of care” consistent with distributive, recognition, intergenerational, and restorative justice as well as effectiveness. (shrink)

The recent worldwide resurgence of militant nationalism, fundamentalist intolerance and right-wing authoritarianism has again put the issues of violence and xenophobia at the center of social science research and theory. German psychoanalyst and sociologist Erich Fromm's work provides a useful theoretical microfoundation for contemporary work on nationalism, the politics of identity, and the roots of war and violence. Fromm's analysis of Nasism in Escape from Freedom (1941), in particular, outlines a compelling theory of irrationality, and his later (...) writings on nationalism provide an existential psychoanalysis that can be useful for contemporary social theory and sociology of emotions. Escape from Freedom synthesizes Marxist, Freudian, Weberian, and existentialist insights to offer an Original theoretical explanation of Nazism that combines both Macrostructural and micropsychological levels of analysis. After forty-five Years of research into the social origins of fascism and with recent Theorizing in the sociology of nationalism and emotions, Escape from Freedom, its analysis of Nazism, and Fromm's larger theoretical perspective are worth reconsidering. (shrink)

Jean-Pierre Dupuy, prophet of what he calls "enlightened doomsaying," has long warned that modern society is on a path to self-destruction. In this book, he pleads for a subversion of this crisis from within, arguing that it is our lopsided view of religion and reason that has set us on this course. In denial of our sacred origins and hubristically convinced of the powers of human reason, we cease to know our own limits: our disenchanted world leaves us defenseless against (...) a headlong rush into the abyss of global warming, nuclear holocaust, and the other catastrophes that loom on our horizon. Reviving the religious anthropology of Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, and Marcel Mauss and in dialogue with the work of René Girard, Dupuy shows that we must remember the world's sacredness in order to keep human violence in check. A metaphysical and theological detective, he tracks the sacred in the very fields where human reason considers itself most free from everything it judges irrational: science, technology, economics, political and strategic thought. In making such claims, The Mark of the Sacred takes on religion bashers, secularists, and fundamentalists at once. Written by one of the deepest and most versatile thinkers of our time, it militates for a world where reason is no longer an enemy of faith. (shrink)

This article exploits the synergy of critical discourse studies and Corpus Linguistics to study the pervasive representation of Islam and Muslims in an approximate 670,000-word corpus of US news media stories published between 2001 and 2015. Following collocation and concordance analysis of the most frequent topics or categories which revolve around the representation of Islam and Muslims in US news stories, the Discourse-Historical Approach to critical discourse analysis was adopted to investigate how the discursive strategies of nomination and predication are (...) used in US news media stories. The findings indicated that, in general, Islam and Muslims are associated with violence, religious radicalism, and Islamic extremist militants. Finally, the article discusses the discursive themes resulting from the analysis of personal pronouns as well as the educational implications of the findings for social studies and multicultural education. (shrink)

The concept of evolution is widely considered to be a foundational building block in atheist thought. Leaders of the New Atheist movement have taken Darwin's work and used it to diminish the authority of religious institutions and belief systems. But they have also embraced it as a metaphor for the gradual replacement of religious faith with secular reason. They have posed as harbingers of human progress, claiming the moral high ground, and rejecting with intolerance any message that challenges the hegemony (...) of science and reason. Religion, according to the New Atheists, should be relegated to the Dark Ages of superstition and senseless violence. Yet Darwin did not see evolution as a linear progression to an improved state of being. The more antagonistic members of the New Atheist movement who embrace this idea are not only employing bad history, but also the kind of rigid, black-and-white thinking they excoriate in their religious opponents. Indeed, Stephen LeDrew argues, militant atheists have more in common with religious fundamentalists than they would care to admit, advancing what LeDrew calls secular fundamentalism. In reaction to fundamentalist Christianity and Islamism, this strain of atheism has become an offshoot of the religion it tries so hard to malign. The Evolution of Atheism outlines the essential political tension at the heart of the atheist movement. The New Atheism, LeDrew shows, is part of a tradition of atheist thought and activism that promotes individualism and scientific authority, which puts it at odds with atheist groups that are motivated by humanistic ethics and social justice. LeDrew draws on public relations campaigns, publications, podcasts, and in-depth interviews to explore the belief systems, internal logics, and self-contradictions of the people who consider themselves to be atheists. He argues that evolving understandings of what atheism means, and how it should be put into action, are threatening to irrevocably fragment the movement. (shrink)

A new theory of ethnic cleansing based on the most terrible cases and cases of lesser violence. Murderous cleansing is modern, 'the dark side of democracy'. It results where the demos is confused with the ethnos. Danger arises where two rival ethno-national movements each claims 'its own' state over the same territory. Conflict escalates where either the weaker side fights because of aid from outside, or the stronger side believes it can deploy sudden, overwhelming force. Escalation is not simply (...) the work of 'evil elites' or 'primitive peoples'. It results from complex interactions between leaders, militants, and 'core constituencies' of ethno-nationalism. Understanding this complex process helps us devise policies to avoid ethnic cleansing in the future. (shrink)

Fundamentalism has been widely reckoned as one among many other watchful social phenomena currently. There are two general approaches to it. The first is from those who perceive fundamentalism as a movement of militant piety found almost in any religion, and therefore fundamentalism cannot necessarily be identified with a violent movement. The second is from those who categorize fundamentalism as a political movement with an objective of worldly power, and therefore it is susceptible to turning into a violent movement. (...) In investigating the two views closely, I attempt to put forward a couple of hypothetical inquiries. Is fundamentalism a common phenomenon and common feature found in almost any religion? The answer is yes. Is fundamentalism identical to violent movement? The answer is no. Is fundamentalism then impossibly and utterly unrelated to violent movements? The answer is no. If fundamentalism is unidentical with violent movements but not a few fundamentalists can also turn to be perpetrators of what is called religious violence or violence in the name of religion, then what arguments can be set forth to ensure that fundamentalism cannot be overlooked anymore as one among many other major social problems of our age? This article aims to examine fundamentalism through epistemological and axiological criticism, and to investigate that to a certain range fundamentalism is a form of religious cognitive and behavioral bias, and both as a militant piety and as a political movement fundamentalism should at best be approached from their interplayed relation. (shrink)

The unprecedented cultural consciousness after decades of black cultural suppression in the South African public life since the 1990s summons us to the need to harness African ecclesiopolitical symbols in public life. This task is executed at a time when the notions of inter alia, spirituality and Imvuselelo are at the heart of the combustion chambers of our public and political life. Imvuselelo is a thermometer of decolonialist rebellion – the militant spirituality linked with Tiyo Soga – and is (...) a self-combustion escape route in instances of black African epistemicide and violence. The heuristic device of iziko is employed to illuminate and locate the reestablishment and anamnestic praxis of protological life-giving foundations of spirituality in the African universe in our interpretation of Imvuselelo. The notion of imvuselelo is illuminated through iziko to debunk the incompatibilities, disharmonies, incongruences and conflagrations of virtual spirituality in its capture and domestication of the resources of the downtrodden. (shrink)

Islam means "peace" and "submission to God." With its ethical system of instruction for a balanced life based on faith and reason, how did this "religion of peace" come to be feared? After the 9/11 tragedy, Islam was judged by many in the West to be a hub of terrorism and a threat to world peace. People everywhere voiced concern over its concepts of war and Jihad. Ashraf traces these and related concepts from their inception in Qur'anic injunctions and the (...) Prophet's precepts to their current interpretation, evaluating them in their spiritual, moral, juridical, and cultural contexts. Misunderstandings about Islam lie at the core of much bitterness and violence. With no central authority to definitively interpret its teachings, misconceptions regarding Islam's ideology of war and peace abound. To label Islam as militant is to misinterpret jihad as simply a call to war and to ignore its laws governing warfare, which emphasize restraint as far as possible. Islamic Philosophy of War and Peace explains the spirit of Islam, its mandate for peace, and what the pluralistic notion of jihad stands for in the hope that clearing up ambiguities will foster peaceful relations between Muslims and the rest of the world. (shrink)

Dans cette réflexion surgie des premières expériences de la pandémie du Covid-19, l’autrice met en écho nos peurs et nos réactions face aux dangers de la maladie et face aux actes de violence. Les condamnations sommaires et instantanées auxquelles les militant·es se livrent sur les réseaux sociaux reproduisent partiellement des dynamiques de lynchage dont il faut apprendre à davantage se méfier. Avec la distance de l’abstentiel, il est parfois plus facile de dénoncer ( call-out ) les mauvais comportements, (...) que d’interpeler et d’inclure ( call-in ) celleux qui ont fait du mal. Comment croire les survivant·es tout en restant abolitionnistes? Comment croire les survivant·es tout en pratiquant une justice transformatrice? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Common Sense and Theological 9 9 Exper_,ence on the Bas s o,f Franz Rosenzweig's Philosophy NATHAN ROTENSTREICH The position of Franz Rosenzweig's thinking within the framework of presentday philosophy is difficult to ascertain. Though he was deeply rooted in the philosophical tradition, his chief work, The Star o] Redemption (Der Stern der Erlgsung, 1921), was conceived outside the main discussions of the philosophical controversy in the twenties. He formulated (...) his ideas side by side with the trends of German philosophy, but not by way of keeping pace with these trends. Yet his polemic against traditional philosophy in general, and against idealism in particular brings Rosenzweig close to the character of the rebellion represented by Existenz-Philosophie. 1 I The question of grounding a philosophical system or a set of philosophical ideas with an objective toward faith clearly poses the difficulty, in terms of the ultimate authority, of maintaining the validity of such a system of ideas. Could that authority be reason, which as a source of ideas and confirmation is outside faith while having consequences or expressions within the scope of faith? Or is faith, asserting the existence of God and his relations to world and man, an independent source? In case faith is an independent source, does it have the guarantee of its validity in its own boundaries, or does it still point to a source of validity which is outside faith and yet is not reason? It seems that Franz Rosenzweig was willy-nilly in his concern with this question. As said before the first approach would have been to construct a system along rational lines. This, however, would have done violence to a basic anti-rationalistic trait in Rosenzweig's thinking that can be clearly discerned in his The Star o] Redemption, in his Kleinere Schri]ten and in his small book, Understanding the Sick and Healthy, published until now in English only. Rosenzweig's criticism of rationalism may be summed up as follows: a) Reason strives for a unified conception of the world; and in support of this monistic fiction its assimilative energy is ready to seize upon all arguments that militate against the doctrines and practices of faith. b) Reason tends to ignore the existence of the individual which it regards as 1On the relation between Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Heidegger, see Karl LSwith, "M. Heideggerand F. Rosenzweigor Temporality and Eternity," Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch,III (Sept., 1942),53-77. [353] 354 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY merely one of the variations of an all-inclusive unity. The question of the relation of the particular to the general or of the individual to the whole, which has engrossed philosophers since time immemorial, has no place in rationalistic systems. c) Since reason places the understanding above the things to be understood (and hence also above the data of religious experience, including the existence of God), we find that from a speculative and historical point of view rationalism has a strong bias against religion or theology. The other way open to Rosenzweig was to rely on the principle of Revelation, but he could not adopt this principle as the basis of his system for the following reasons" a) The first reason can be understood from Schelling's paradox: He who adheres to Revelation does not philosophize, and he who philosophizes finds Revelation inadequate for his purposes. Since Rosenzweig was basically a philosopher --despite his protestations to the contrary--he was precluded by that very fact from appealing to the evidence furnished by Revelation. On the contrary, he sought to find a non-rational basis for Revelation itself. b) The second reason that precluded Rosenzweig from taking the traditional course of relying on Revelation is implicit in that principle itself as Rosenzweig understood it. Revelation in his system has no enlightening or cognitive significance, or what is called in Christian theology Kerygma, instructive knowledge. In Revelation, he says, God reveals only revelation; He reveals himself to man and to man alone.2 In his view, then, Revelation does not transmit informative content and hence has no dogmatic significance. It is a dialogue that posits the existence of the participants, the existence of God, and (highly important for... (shrink)

Gandhi’s conception of non-violence was unique in having martial and maternal elements. He drew upon the mythological figure of the noble warrior but he also stressed maternal capacity for love and endurance. The virtuous self-suffering woman and the Kshatriya warrior were the ideals that Gandhi shared with his militant Hindu nationalist opponents. By bringing together these two ideals in the combative non-violent soldier, Gandhi tried to invert his opponents’ hierarchy of values. He proposed that dying without enmity towards (...) the adversary is more courageous than killing. The truth-force required to subdue the enmity of the adversary is generated from within oneself by overcoming fear, desires and attachments. Because of the male-centric nature of this overcoming, Gandhi’s break with the militant nationalists remained incomplete. The diverse elements drawn from various traditions did not blend in the figure of the non-violent soldier because Gandhi’s interpretations of these past ideas remained influenced by the masculinist anxieties of contemporary nationalism. (shrink)

The development of ideologies in re-construction and transformation of the Indian subcontinent during and after its division into new nation states in 1947emerged as the fault lines in its structural and organizational imbalances, which is an interesting phenomenon and at times led to the violent and radical political discourses. This ideological transformation became imbalanced, due to the exploitation by opportunists in state and political elements, through consciously planned attitude especially in dogma, religious traditions, ethnicity and political/state governance thereby fulfilling ulterior (...) motives. Resultantly, violence and conflicts emerged in both the fragile states of the Indian subcontinent besides undergoing a series of dictatorship, one party rule, manipulation of elites, and ethnic or national polarization ultimately leading to the weak governmental structure. This research was aimed at ascertaining both at theoretical and practical levels, the causes of intricacies involved in transformation of religious ideology into a fault line besides suppressing ethnic and identity markers of traditional society like Pakistan, exploiting the structural organization of political governments through state/bureaucratic regimes. It was discovered that this transformation became such due to the indulgence of state elements and their practices besides illiberal democratic governments, which were also leading to the violence and militancy where ideology/religion has been used for parochial political interests embodied in desires to hang on to power. Henceforth, the power made the dismemberment of joint Pakistan in post-1971era, whereas continuously challenged the fragile integrity after 1971. (shrink)

What is ‘evil’? What are the ways of overcoming this destructive and morally recalcitrant phenomenon? To what extent is the use of punitive violence tenable? _Evil and the Philosophy of Retribution _compares the responses of three modern Indian commentators on the Bhagavad-Gita — Aurobindo Ghose, Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Mahatma Gandhi. The book reveals that some of the central themes in the Bhagavad-Gita were transformed by these intellectuals into categories of modern socio-political thought by reclaiming them from pre-modern debates (...) on ritual and renunciation. Based on canonical texts, this work presents a fascinating account of how the relationship between ‘good’, ‘evil’ and retribution is construed against the backdrop of militant nationalism and the development of modern Hinduism. Amid competing constructions of Indian tradition as well as contemporary concerns, it traces the emerging representations of modern Hindu self-consciousness under colonialism, and its very understanding of evil surrounding a textual ethos. Replete with Sanskrit, English, Marathi, and Gujarati sources, this will especially interest scholars of modern Indian history, philosophy, political science, history of religion, and those interested in the Bhagavad-Gita. (shrink)

Jean-Pierre Dupuy, prophet of what he calls "enlightened doomsaying," has long warned that modern society is on a path to self-destruction. In this book, he pleads for a subversion of this crisis from within, arguing that it is our lopsided view of religion and reason that has set us on this course. In denial of our sacred origins and hubristically convinced of the powers of human reason, we cease to know our own limits: our disenchanted world leaves us defenseless against (...) a headlong rush into the abyss of global warming, nuclear holocaust, and the other catastrophes that loom on our horizon. Reviving the religious anthropology of Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, and Marcel Mauss and in dialogue with the work of René Girard, Dupuy shows that we must remember the world's sacredness in order to keep human violence in check. A metaphysical and theological detective, he tracks the sacred in the very fields where human reason considers itself most free from everything it judges irrational: science, technology, economics, political and strategic thought. In making such claims, _The Mark of the Sacred _ takes on religion bashers, secularists, and fundamentalists at once. Written by one of the deepest and most versatile thinkers of our time, it militates for a world where reason is no longer an enemy of faith. (shrink)

This paper examines the impact of a shift in focus from political praxis to trauma work in the context of a failed democratisation movement. It investigates the various phenomena which emerge when intellectuals, under the traumatic impact of violence and atrocities, place trauma narration at the core of their interventions. Drawing on document analysis, participant observation and semi-structured interviews with twenty nine exiled Syrian intellectuals in Paris and Berlin who had participated in the revolutionary movement of 2011, the paper (...) suggests that an inversion of the normative power structures pertaining to how intellectuals relate to their publics occurs when they adopt, under conditions of extreme violence and trauma, what we call a radically embedded positionality vis-à-vis ‘the people’. This results in the dismantling of previous figurations of the ‘militant intellectual’ along with praxis-focused notions of the ‘responsibility of intellectuals’, ultimately undermining their ideational influence upon domestic publics and weakening their political impact and critical role within a revolutionary movement. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The possibility and need for justification Civil, militant, and revolutionary disobedience Worries about violence and letting the individual decide Justifications for militant environmental activism The critique of humans‐only democracy Implications for militant disobedience Conclusion.