The Science Wars have pitted defenders of science against those accused of attacking it with the weapons of constructivism and relativism. I argue that this defensive stance is in large part a consequence of two other -isms, organized skepticism and naïve methodism, that play a significant, if mostly unconscious, role in how scientists tend to think about science, and suggest that increased awareness of these -isms may help dissipate the perceptions of hostility.

I distinguish between two theses, DPJ and DGP. DPJ asserts that one’s justification for accepting particular epistemic propositions positively depends on one’s being justified in believing general epistemic principles. DGP claims that one’s justification in believing general epistemic propositions positively depends on one’s being justified in believing particular epistemic propositions. I claim that methodism accepts DPJ and rejects DGP and particularism accepts DGP and rejects DPJ. I argue that we should reject DGP and methodism roughly because these views (...) imply that many of us do not know epistemic propositions that we do know. This point is made by Roderick Chisholm in The Problem of the Criterion and challenged by Robert Amico. I consider Chisholm’s arguments and Amico’s objections. Finally, I argue that even if we reject DPJ and methodism, we need not embrace particularism, since we could reject both DPJ and DGP. (shrink)

Keith Haartman argues that childrearing practices distinctive of the English middle class in the 18th century produced a type of personality structure characterized by excessive splitting. Methodism proved popular because the Methodist experience providing a way of confronting and working through the conflicts generated by this sort of personality structure. Unfortunately, although Haartman's argument is plausible, there is little or no evidence to support his central contention: that the individuals who found Methodism most appealing were associated with the (...) childhood experiences he posits. A somewhat different psychoanalytic interpretation of the same data that Haartman presents emerges when we pay attention to things, like the orality that pervaded the Methodist experience and the intended goal of the Methodist conversion experience, that Haartman ignores. This article concludes by suggesting that when psychoanalytic investigators study large-scale historical patterns, they would do well to recognize the limits of psychoanalytic explanation in this area. (shrink)

in his second letter to spinoza, William van Blyenbergh expresses his dissatisfaction with Spinoza’s approach to philosophical inquiry. He writes,Before I proceed to ask you to resolve certain other difficulties, you should know that I have two general rules according to which I always try to philosophize: the clear and distinct conception of my intellect and the revealed word, or will, of God.1Spinoza does not share Blyenbergh’s concern that the intellect may lead us astray from the divine truth. He responds,But (...) as for myself, I confess clearly and without circumlocution, that I do not understand Sacred Scripture, though I have spent several years on it. And I am well aware that, when I have found a solid... (shrink)

Edward P Thompson’s disapproval of Methodism (which was his own background) is well known, especially in The Making of the English Working Class. There he describes it as religious terrorism with a destructive moral machinery and all too reactionary. However, through a close reading of the sections on Methodism, this article reveals an ambivalence within Thompson’s own text. Again and again, he notes in passing that radicals emerged from the Methodist ranks, so much so that the Methodist Conference (...) worked hard to deal with the problem. It would seem that Thompson has stumbled across a political tension within theology, one that he was to explore in much greater detail in his study of Blake. (shrink)

This paper examines the contemplative techniques that comprised wesley's method of spiritual transformation. By employing a psychoanalytic perspective that explains the pastoral effectiveness of the method, I claim that Wesley's view of spiritual growth was therapeutic and transformative as measured by contemporary clinical standards. Wesley's developmental model involved a series of spiritual phases each characterized by techniques and meditations that culminated in sanctification, a cognitive-emotional transformation marked by the eradication of sinful temptations and the perfection of altruism. Couched in a (...) theological idiom, the method helped individuals to work through conflicts created by the three main traumata of British middle class childhood: authoritarian parenting and unresolved bereavement grief. This paper argues that religious-cultural symbolism may promote transformations of archaic affect and neurotic conflict that progressively reshape these pre-reflective materials into complex existential insights and convictions. (shrink)

This article seeks to re-examine the arguments among early nineteenth-century Welsh Calvinistic Methodists about Calvinist beliefs. In particular, it uses the example of John Elias to explore the appropriation and re-appropriation of aspects of the theological heritage of the sixteenth-century Reformation in Wales. Examining the tensions between Calvinism‘s tendency to ever stricter interpretation and pressure in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to liberalize Calvinistic Methodisms position under the influence of evangelicalism, it argues that Elias emerged as a defender (...) of the moderate Calvinism that had been forged by Howel Harris and Daniel Rowland in the previous century. (shrink)

This book systematically reviews a variety of methods for addressing ethical problems in medicine, accounting for both their weaknesses and strengths. Illustrated throughout with specific cases or controversies, the book aims to develop an informed eclecticism that knows how to pick the right tool for the right job.

Husserl endeavoured to establish phenomenology as a ‘rigorous science’ and therefore linked its development to methodological considerations from the very beginning. Such considerations are often lacking in current debates on political phenomenology. This article aims to remedy this deficit. It argues that political phenomenology reinterprets Husserl’s methodological principles of epoché and reduction and transforms them into what can be termed interrogation and exposition. In addition, a further, often overlooked, principle of Husserl’s method is uncovered, which is referred to here as (...) demonstration. It is through this triad of interrogation, exposition and demonstration that contemporary political phenomenology adapts and transforms the method of classical phenomenology. The topics of whiteness and race are employed to show how these principles can facilitate the analysis of political struggles. (shrink)

The paper aims to contribute to the ongoing conversation on critical phenomenology with reflections on its method. The key argument is that critical phenomenology should be understood as a form of historico-transcendental inquiry and therefore it cannot forgo the phenomenological reduction. Rather, this methodological step should be centered in critical phenomenology, and appropriated in problematized and rethought forms. The methodological assessment of critical phenomenology has implications also for how we read its canon. The paper shows that while Simone de Beauvoir (...) did not adopt the phenomenological reduction in its full Husserlian meaning, her analyses of experience did not remain on the level of personal or experiential description either. The contention is that if we want to read her as a critical phenomenologist, we should focus on her seminal modification of the historico-transcendental method of phenomenology. (shrink)

Use of argumentation methods applied to legal reasoning is a relatively new field of study. The book provides a survey of the leading problems, and outlines how future research using argumentation-based methods show great promise of leading to useful solutions. The problems studied include not only these of argument evaluation and argument invention, but also analysis of specific kinds of evidence commonly used in law, like witness testimony, circumstantial evidence, forensic evidence and character evidence. New tools for analyzing these kinds (...) of evidence are introduced. (shrink)

The ArgumentFocusing on the celebrations of Newton and his work, this article investigates the use of the concept of genius and its connection with debates on the methodology of science and the morality of great discoverers. During the period studied, two areas of tension developed. Firstly, eighteenth-century ideas about the relationship between genius and method were challenged by the notion of scientific genius as transcending specifiable rules of method. Secondly, assumptions about the nexus between intellectual and moral virtue were threatened (...) by the emerging conception of genius as marked by an extraordinary personality – on the one hand capable of breaking with established methods to achieve great discoveries, on the other, likely to transgress moral and social conventions. The assesments of Newton by nineteenth-century scientists such as Brewster, Whewell, and De Morgan were informed by these tensions. (shrink)

This Hackett edition, first published in 1981, is an unabridged and unaltered republication of the seventh edition as published by Macmillan and Company, Limited. From the forward by John Rawls: In the utilitarian tradition Henry Sidgwick has an important place. His fundamental work, The Methods of Ethics, is the clearest and most accessible formulation of what we may call 'the classical utilitarian doctorine.' This classical doctrine holds that the ultimate moral end of social and individual action is the greatest net (...) sum of the happiness of all sentient beings. Happinesss is specified by the net balance of pleasure over pain, or, as Sidgwick preferred to say, as the net balance of agreeable over disagreeable consciousness.... (shrink)

The debate on the possibility of attaining metaphysical knowledge by the method of reasoning began with the ancient Greek philosophers and continues to this day. This article aims to examine how Râzî argues for the possibility of attaining metaphysical knowledge through the method of reasoning. He first argues that existence has two parts, the sensed and the thought, in order to demonstrate that metaphysical knowledge can be obtained through the method of reasoning. Then he tries to prove that existence is (...) not limited to the material. After presenting evidence for the existence of things other than the sensible in existence that can be perceived with the intellect, he tries to discuss our devices to relate to this sphere of existence in a comparative manner. In this comparison, two possible devices for attaining metaphysical knowledge emerge: the theoretical intellect and the purified soul. After revealing the positive and negative aspects of both in this comparison, he argues that the most reliable device is the theoretical intellect and the technique is the method of reasoning Râzî gives various answers to those who object to the possibility of obtaining metaphysical knowledge through the method of reasoning. Râzî tries to put forward the grounds on which the groups who object to the method of reasoning are based. He then evaluates their justifications in terms of accuracy and consistency. Thus, he tests both the relevance of each group's objection to the subject and its consistency with the group's other beliefs. He then presents the justifications for his own opinion on the method of reasoning and the consistency of this method with his other beliefs. Following this method, Râzî first divides those who object to the method of reasoning into two categories according to whether or not they accept a metaphysical sphere of existence. According to this division, those who object to the method because they do not accept a metaphysical sphere of existence are the Sophists, Sumeniyya, Mujasimah, Dhahriyya, and Hashawiyya. Although this group does not accept a metaphysical sphere of existence, they are divided into two classes: those who believe in God and those who do not. According to Râzî, the group that accepts the metaphysical sphere of existence but objects to the method of reasoning is the Talimiyya. They claim that metaphysical knowledge can only be attained through the teaching of an innocent instructor, not by the method of reasoning. The different approaches of these groups are the reason why Râzî sometimes emphasizes accuracy, sometimes consistency, and sometimes proving the metaphysical domain of existence in his answers to those who object to the method of reasoning. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show the unity and consistency of Kant’s reflections throughout all three sections of the Canon of Pure Reason. More specifically, I argue that Section 3, which is devoted to the issue of Fürwahrhalten, or taking-to-be-true, is crucial to achieving the methodological goal of the Canon, which is to justify the legitimacy of the speculative assumptions of pure reason. After examining the historical roots of Kant’s notion of a transcendental doctrine of method, I focus (...) on the methodological role that the practical element plays in the first two sections of the Canon. I then show how the limitations of Kant’s argument necessitate the introduction of a third crucial section, which serves both an analytic and an orientative function. (shrink)

Given the prominent position Habermas' philosophy has gained, it is surprising that his method, rational reconstruction, has not caused more debate. This article clarifies what this method consists of, and shows how it is used in two of Habermas' research programs. The method is an interesting, but problematic way of confronting some of the basic epistemological questions in the social sciences. It represents an alternative to both the empirical-analytical and the hermeneutic tradition. On the basis of this methodology, Habermas' work (...) is situated between the transcendental and the empirical approach. A fundamental problem is that it remains unclear how to test the hypothesis put forward through rational reconstruction. (shrink)

The Theme. Strong forcing axioms like Martin’s Maximum give a reasonably satisfactory structural analysis of $H(\omega _2)$. A broad program in modern Set Theory is searching for strong forcing axioms beyond $\omega _1$. In other words, one would like to figure out the structural properties of taller initial segments of the universe. However, the classical techniques of forcing iterations seem unable to bypass the obstacles, as the resulting forcings axioms beyond $\omega _1$ have not thus far been strong enough! However, (...) with his celebrated work on generalised side conditions, I. Neeman introduced us to a novel paradigm to iterate forcings. In particular, he could, among other things, reprove the consistency of the Proper Forcing Axiom using an iterated forcing with finite supports. In 2015, using his technology of virtual models, Veličković built up an iteration of semi-proper forcings with finite supports, hence reproving the consistency of Martin’s Maximum, an achievement leading to the notion of a virtual model.In this thesis, we are interested in constructing forcing notions with finitely many virtual models as side conditions to preserve three uncountable cardinals. The thesis constitutes six chapters and three appendices that amount to 118 pages, where Section 1 is devoted to preliminaries, and Section 2 is a warm-up about the scaffolding poset of a proper forcing. In Section 3, we present the general theory of virtual models in the context of forcing with sets of models of two types, where we, e.g., define the “meet” between two virtual models and prove its properties.The main results are joint with Boban Veličković, and partly appeared in Guessing models and the approachability ideal, J. Math. Log. 21 (2021).Pure Side Conditions. In Section 4, we use two types of virtual models (countable and large non-transitive ones induced by a supercompact cardinal, which we call Magidor models) to construct our forcing with pure side conditions. The forcing covertly uses a third type of models that are transitive. We also add decorations to the conditions to add many clubs in the generic $\omega _2$. In contrast to Neeman’s method, we do not have a single chain, but $\alpha $ -chains, for an ordinal $\alpha $ with $V_\alpha \prec V_\lambda $. Thus, starting from suitable large cardinals $\kappa <\lambda $, we construct a forcing notion whose conditions are finite sets of virtual models described earlier. The forcing is strongly proper, preserves $\kappa $, and has the $\lambda $ -Knaster property. The relevant quotients of the forcing are strongly proper, which helps us prove strong guessing model principles. The construction is generalisable to a ${<}\mu $ -closed forcing, for any given cardinal $\mu $ with $\mu ^{<\mu }=\mu <\kappa $.The Iteration Theorem. In Section 5, we use the forcing with pure side conditions to iterate a subclass of proper and $\aleph _2$ -c.c. forcings and obtain a forcing axiom at the level of $\aleph _2$. The iterable class is closely related to Asperó–Mota’s forcing axiom for finitely proper forcings.Guessing Model Principles. Section 6 encompasses the main parts of the thesis. We prove the consistency of the guessing principle $\mathrm {GMP}^+(\omega _3,\omega _1)$ that states for any cardinal ${\theta \geq \omega _3}$, the set of $\aleph _2$ -sized elementary submodels M of $H(\theta )$, which are the union of an $\omega _1$ -continuous $\in $ -chain of $\omega _1$ -guessing, I.C. models is stationary in $\mathcal P_{\omega _3}(H(\theta ))$. The consistency and consequences of this principle are demonstrated in the following diagram. We also prove that one can obtain the above guessing models in a way that the $\omega _1$ -sized $\omega _1$ -guessing models remain $\omega _1$ -guessing model in any outer transitive model with the same $\omega _1$, and we denote this principle by $\rm{SGMP}^+(\omega_3,\omega_1)$.In the following diagram, $\mathrm{TP}$ stands for the tree property; $w\mathrm{KH}$ stands for the weak Kurepa Hypothesis; $\mathrm{MP}$ stands for Mitchell property, i.e., the approachability ideal is trivial modulo the nonstationary ideal; $\mathrm{AP}$ stands for the approachability property; $\mathrm {AMTP}(\kappa ^+)$ states that if $2^\kappa <\aleph _{\kappa ^+}$, then every forcing which adds a new subset of $\kappa ^+$ whose initial segments are in the ground model, collapses some cardinal $\leq 2^{\kappa }$. The dotted arrow denotes the relative consistency, while others are logical implications.Appendices. Appendix A includes merely the above diagram. Appendix B presents a proof of the Mapping Reflection Principle with finite conditions under $\mathrm {PFA}$. Appendix C contains open problems. Finally, the thesis’s bibliography consists of 42 items.Abstract prepared by Rahman MohammadpourE-mail: [email protected]: https://theses.hal.science/tel-03209264. (shrink)

Many philosophers claim to employ intuitions in their philosophical arguments. Others contest that no such intuitions are used frequently or at all in philosophy. This article suggests and defends a conception of intuitions as part of the philosophical method: intuitions are special types of philosophical assumptions to which we are invited to assent, often as premises in argument, that may serve an independent function in philosophical argument and that are not formed through a purely inferential process. A series of philosophical (...) case studies shows that intuitions in these arguments contain the relevant features. The view has implications for philosophical method, offering a compromise between opponents on the divisive debate of the merits of experimental philosophy: experimental philosophy provides an especially useful role in philosophical assumption analysis. (shrink)

What is the relation between method and truth? Are we justified in accepting a theory that satisfies the rules of scientific method as true? Such questions divide realism from anti-realism in the philosophy of science. Scientific realists take the methods of science to promote the realist aim of correspondence truth. Anti-realists either claim that the methods of science promote lesser epistemic goals than realist truth, or else they reject the realist conception of truth altogether. In this paper, I propose a (...) realist theory of the relation between method and truth. The theory consists of three basic elements: (a) a naturalistic treatment of epistemic normativity, (b) an instrumentalist conception of the nature of methodological rules, and (c) an abductive argument for the truth-conduciveness of the rules of scientific method. (shrink)

The concept of Christian Philosophy is not new in the history of philosophy. However, since the mid-twentieth century the idea of Christian Philosophy gained momentum and has become an object of explicit discussion among philosophers. The historical circumstances leading to its emergence as a distinct type of philosophy are not here discussed, and the existence of Christian Philosophy with a distinct content and purpose that sets it apart from other philosophies is here presupposed. Instead, the paper focuses on the concept (...) and methods of practising Christian Philosophy with specific reference to the methodology developed by Stanisław Kamiński. The paper argues for the suitability of his method of philosophising within the context of Christian Philosophy. Kamiński proposes a unique style that is strictly philosophical but also Christian. This methodology was based on the classical theory of being which fulfils the demand for the autonomy of philosophy but in relationship to faith. Kamiński’s doctrinal standpoints in philosophy are rational, objective, and universal. But is also most friendly and compatible with the Christian faith. In this sense, one can speak of his Christian philosophy and the suitability of his methodology for the practice of Christian philosophy. (shrink)