This article explores the overlap between systems biology and predictive neuroscience, placing them in their larger context, the contemporary trend of bioinformatic convergence across the sciences. These two domains overlap with respect to their interest in data accumulation and data integration; their reliance on computational statistical correlation; and their translational goals, that is, producing practical fruits and applications from the interscientific cross-pollination that contemporary data-integrative approaches make possible. The interventions that such translational conversations generate are medical and social in nature, (...) and are aimed at both prevention and treatment. It will be argued that such approaches, socially and medically applied, contain potential for conveying both agency-enhancing and agency-diminishing social messages. The article concludes with a call to balance the overwhelmingly quantitative focus characteristic of predictive neuroscience with more qualitative empirical methodologies. This would represent a double helical approach. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Rosalind Franklin is best known for her informative X-ray diffraction patterns of DNA that provided vital clues for James Watson and Francis Crick's double-stranded helical model. Her scientific career did not end when she left the DNA work at King's College, however. In 1953 Franklin moved to J. D. Bernal's crystallography laboratory at Birkbeck College, where she shifted her focus to the three-dimensional structure of viruses, obtaining diffraction patterns of Tobacco mosaic virus (TMV) of unprecedented detail and clarity. (...) During the next five years, while making significant headway on the structural determination of TMV, Franklin maintained an active correspondence with both Watson and Crick, who were also studying aspects of virus structure. Developments in TMV research during the 1950s illustrate the connections in the emerging field of molecular biology between structural studies of nucleic acids and of proteins and viruses. They also reveal how the protagonists of the “race for the double helix” continued to interact personally and professionally during the years when Watson and Crick's model for the double-helical structure of DNA was debated and confirmed. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Rosalind Franklin is best known for her informative X-ray diffraction patterns of DNA that provided vital clues for James Watson and Francis Crick's double-stranded helical model. Her scientific career did not end when she left the DNA work at King's College, however. In 1953 Franklin moved to J. D. Bernal's crystallography laboratory at Birkbeck College, where she shifted her focus to the three-dimensional structure of viruses, obtaining diffraction patterns of Tobacco mosaic virus (TMV) of unprecedented detail and clarity. (...) During the next five years, while making significant headway on the structural determination of TMV, Franklin maintained an active correspondence with both Watson and Crick, who were also studying aspects of virus structure. Developments in TMV research during the 1950s illustrate the connections in the emerging field of molecular biology between structural studies of nucleic acids and of proteins and viruses. They also reveal how the protagonists of the “race for the double helix” continued to interact personally and professionally during the years when Watson and Crick's model for the double-helical structure of DNA was debated and confirmed. (shrink)

We consider iterations of general elementary embeddings and, using this notion, point out helices of consistency-wise implications between large large cardinals.Up to now, large cardinal properties have been considered as properties which cannot be accessed by any weaker properties and it has been known that, with respect to this relation, they form a proper hierarchy. The helices we point out significantly change this situation: the same sequence of large cardinal properties occurs repeatedly, changing only the parameters.As results of our investigation (...) of this helical structure, we have new characterizations of extendible cardinals and of Vopěnkan cardinals in terms of elementary embeddings from the universe V, a new large large cardinal property which looks like Shelahness properly between Vopěnkaness and almost hugeness, and a more direct relation between Vopěnkaness and Woodinness than already known.We also consider limits of the helices and relations with the axioms I1–I3. (shrink)

The development of X-ray diffraction photography was central to the discovery of the helical structure of DNA in 1953. Unfortunately the story of how this technique was developed receded into the background as subsequent attention focused on the moment of discovery by Watson and Crick. As a result the importance of photography as ‘data’ and the role it plays in scientific discovery is underplayed. We seek to rectify this situation by presenting this story and by drawing conclusions about the importance (...) of this form of photography in scientific investigation as well as for the insights it gives us regarding the process of discovery. (shrink)

Debate over the nature of science has recently moved from the halls of academia into the public sphere, where it has taken shape as the "science wars." At issue is the question of whether scientific knowledge is objective and universal or socially mediated, whether scientific truths are independent of human values and beliefs. Ronald Giere is a philosopher of science who has been at the forefront of this debate from its inception, and Science without Laws offers a much-needed mediating perspective (...) on an increasingly volatile line of inquiry. Giere does not question the major findings of modern science: for example, that the universe is expanding or that inheritance is carried by DNA molecules with a double helical structure. But like many critics of modern science, he rejects the widespread notion of science--deriving ultimately from the Enlightenment--as a uniquely rational activity leading to the discovery of universal truths underlying all natural phenomena. In these highly readable essays, Giere argues that it is better to understand scientists as merely constructing more or less abstract models of limited aspects of the world. Such an understanding makes possible a resolution of the issues at stake in the science wars. The critics of science are seen to be correct in rejecting the Enlightenment idea of science, and its defenders are seen to be correct in insisting that science does produce genuine knowledge of the natural world. Giere is utterly persuasive in arguing that to criticize the Enlightenment ideal is not to criticize science itself, and that to defend science one need not defend the Enlightenment ideal. Science without Laws thus stakes out a middle ground in these debates by showing us how science can be better conceived in other ways. (shrink)

Certain sequences of double‐helical DNA can be recognized and tightly bound by oligonucleotides. The effects of such triple‐helical structures on DNA binding proteins have been studied. Stabilities of DNA triple‐helices at or near physiological conditions are sufficient to inhibit DNA binding proteins directed to overlapping sites. Such proteins include restriction endonucleases, methylases, transcription factors, and RNA polymerases. These and Other results suggest that oligonucleotide‐directed triple‐helix formation could provide the basis for designing artificial gene repressors. The general question of whether (...) biological systems employ RNA molecules for recognition and regulation of double‐helical DNA is discussed. (shrink)

Since the discovery of the double helical structure of DNA, the standard account of the inheritance of features has been in terms of DNA-copying and DNA-transmission. This theory is just a version of the old theory according to which the inheritance of features is explained by the transfer at conception of some developmentally privileged material from parents to offspring. This paper does the following things: (1) it explains what the inheritance of features is; (2) it explains how the DNA-centric (...) theory emerged; (3) it clarifies the relation between the DNA-centric theory and the ‘unfolding’ theory of development; (4) it argues that (given what we now know about developmental processes and genetic activity) the DNA-centric theory should be abandoned in favour of a pluralistic (but not holistic) theory of the inheritance of features. According to this pluralistic theory, the reliable reoccurrence of phenotypes must be explained by appealing not only to processes responsible for the reliable reoccurrence of genetic developmental factors but also to processes responsible for the reliable reoccurrence (or persistence) of nongenetic developmental factors. (shrink)

A common account sees the human genome sequencing project of the 1990s as a “natural outgrowth” of the deciphering of the double helical structure of DNA in the 1950s. The essay aims to complicate this neat narrative by putting the spotlight on the field of human chromosome research that flourished at the same time as molecular biology. It suggests that we need to consider both endeavors – the human cytogeneticists who collected samples and looked down the microscope and the (...) molecular biologists who probed the molecular mechanisms of gene function – to understand the rise of the human genome sequencing project and the current genomic practices. In particular, it proposes that what has often been described as the “molecularization” of cytogenetics could equally well be viewed as the turn of molecular biologists to human and medical genetics – a field long occupied by cytogeneticists. These considerations also have implications for the archives that are constructed for future historians and policy makers. (shrink)

The state of science at any given time is characterized, in part at least, by the theories that are accepted at that time. Presently accepted theories include quantum theory, the general theory of relativity, and the modern synthesis of Darwin and Mendel, as well as lower‐level (but still clearly theoretical) assertions such as that DNA has a double‐helical structure, that the hydrogen atom contains a single electron, and so on. What precisely is involved in accepting a theory?

A common account sees the human genome sequencing project of the 1990s as a “natural outgrowth” of the deciphering of the double helical structure of DNA in the 1950s. The essay aims to complicate this neat narrative by putting the spotlight on the field of human chromosome research that flourished at the same time as molecular biology. It suggests that we need to consider both endeavors – the human cytogeneticists who collected samples and looked down the microscope and the (...) molecular biologists who probed the molecular mechanisms of gene function – to understand the rise of the human genome sequencing project and the current genomic practices. In particular, it proposes that what has often been described as the “molecularization” of cytogenetics could equally well be viewed as the turn of molecular biologists to human and medical genetics – a field long occupied by cytogeneticists. These considerations also have implications for the archives that are constructed for future historians and policy makers. (shrink)

Famously, James Watson credited the discovery of the double-helical structure of DNA in 1953 to an X-ray diffraction photograph taken by Rosalind Franklin. Historians of molecular biology have long puzzled over a remarkably similar photograph taken two years earlier by the physicist and pioneer of protein structure William T. Astbury. They have suggested that Astbury’s failure to capitalize on the photograph to solve DNA’s structure was due either to his being too much of a physicist, with too little interest (...) in or knowledge of biology, or to his being misled by an erroneous theoretical model of the gene. Drawing on previously unpublished archival sources, this paper offers a new analysis of Astbury’s relationship to the problem of DNA’s structure, emphasizing a previously overlooked element in Astbury’s thinking: his concept of biological specificity. (shrink)

A common account sees the human genome sequencing project of the 1990s as a “natural outgrowth” of the deciphering of the double helical structure of DNA in the 1950s. The essay aims to complicate this neat narrative by putting the spotlight on the field of human chromosome research that flourished at the same time as molecular biology. It suggests that we need to consider both endeavors – the human cytogeneticists who collected samples and looked down the microscope and the (...) molecular biologists who probed the molecular mechanisms of gene function – to understand the rise of the human genome sequencing project and the current genomic practices. In particular, it proposes that what has often been described as the “molecularization” of cytogenetics could equally well be viewed as the turn of molecular biologists to human and medical genetics – a field long occupied by cytogeneticists. These considerations also have implications for the archives that are constructed for future historians and policy makers. (shrink)

The state of science at any given time is characterized, in part at least, by the theories that are accepted at that time. Presently accepted theories include quantum theory, the general theory of relativity, and the modern synthesis of Darwin and Mendel, as well as lower‐level (but still clearly theoretical) assertions such as that DNA has a double‐helical structure, that the hydrogen atom contains a single electron, and so on. What precisely is involved in accepting a theory?

“I myself was forced to call myself a molecular biologist because when inquiring clergymen asked me what I did, I got tired of explaining that I was a mixture of crystallographer, biophysicist, biochemist, and geneticist.” Thus explained Francis Crick, who with James Watson discovered in 1953 the double helical structure of DNA, the genetic material..

A hypothesis for the control of eukaryotic DNA replication at the chromosomal level is proposed. The specific regulatory problem arises from the subdivision of the genome into thousands of individually replicating units, each of which must be duplicated a single time during S‐phase. The hypothesis is based on the finding of direct repeats at replication origins. Such repeats can adopt, beyond the full‐length double helical structure, another configuration exposing two single‐stranded loops that provide suitable templates for the initiation of (...) DNA replication. Any further initiation at the same origin is excluded as the single strandedness is eliminated by the replication process. Restoration of the initiable loop structure is proposed to occur by DNA‐protein rearrangements involved in chromosome condensation and duplication of the chromosomal protein backbone during mitosis. A possible role of the maturation promoting factor (MPF) is suggested. (shrink)

In addition to double‐ and single‐strand DNA breaks and isolated base modifications, ionizing radiation induces clustered DNA damage, which contains two or more lesions closely spaced within about two helical turns on opposite DNA strands. Post‐irradiation repair of single‐base lesions is routinely performed by base excision repair and a DNA strand break is involved as an intermediate. Simultaneous processing of lesions on opposite DNA strands may generate double‐strand DNA breaks and enhance nonhomologous end joining, which frequently results in (...) the formation of deletions. Recent studies support the possibility that the mechanism of base excision repair contributes to genome stability by diminishing the formation of double‐strand DNA breaks during processing of clustered lesions. BioEssays 23:745–749, 2001. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

Concepts for sustainable bioeconomy systems are gradually replacing the ones on linear product chains. The reason is that continuously expanding linear chain activities are considered to contribute to climate change, reduced biodiversity, over-exploitation of resources, food insecurity, and the double burden of disease. Are sustainable bioeconomy systems a guarantee for a healthy planet? If yes, why, when, and how? In literature, different sustainability indicators have been presented to shed light on this complicated question. Due to high degrees of complexity (...) and interactions of actors in bioeconomy systems, trade-offs and non-linear outcomes became apparent. This fueled the debates about the normative dimensions of the bioeconomy. In particular, the behavior of actors and the utilization of products do not seem to be harmonized according to the environmental, social, and economic pillars of sustainability. Potential conflicts require a new conceptual framework that is here introduced. It consists of a ‘sustainability’ cylinder captured between an inner-cylinder, representing order, and an outer-cylinder for chaos, based on the laws of physics and complex adaptive systems. Such a framework permits (bioeconomy) systems to propagate in the sustainability zone only if they follow helical pathways serving as the new norms. Helices are a combination of two sinusoidal patterns. The first represents here the sustainable behavior of interacting actors and the second the balanced usage of resources and products. The latter counteracts current growth discourses. The applicability of the conceptual cylinder framework is positively verified via 9 cases in Europe, which encompass social-organizational and product-technological innovations. –. (shrink)

The RecA family proteins mediate homologous recombination, a ubiquitous mechanism for repairing DNA double‐strand breaks (DSBs) and stalled replication forks. Members of this family include bacterial RecA, archaeal RadA and Rad51, and eukaryotic Rad51 and Dmc1. These proteins bind to single‐stranded DNA at a DSB site to form a presynaptic nucleoprotein filament, align this presynaptic filament with homologous sequences in another double‐stranded DNA segment, promote DNA strand exchange and then dissociate. It was generally accepted that RecA family proteins (...) function throughout their catalytic cycles as right‐handed helical filaments with six protomers per helical turn. However, we recently reported that archaeal RadA proteins can also form an extended right‐handed filament with three monomers per helical turn and a left‐handed protein filament with four monomers per helical turn. Subsequent structural and functional analyses suggest that RecA family protein filaments, similar to the F1‐ATPase rotary motor, perform ATP‐dependent clockwise axial rotation during their catalytic cycles. This new hypothesis has opened a new avenue for understanding the molecular mechanism of RecA family proteins in homologous recombination. BioEssays 30:48–56, 2008. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

DNA glycosylases remove aberrant DNA nucleobases as the first enzymatic step of the base excision repair (BER) pathway. The alkyl‐DNA glycosylases AlkC and AlkD adopt a unique structure based on α‐helical HEAT repeats. Both enzymes identify and excise their substrates without a base‐flipping mechanism used by other glycosylases and nucleic acid processing proteins to access nucleobases that are otherwise stacked inside the double‐helix. Consequently, these glycosylases act on a variety of cationic nucleobase modifications, including bulky adducts, not previously associated (...) with BER. The related non‐enzymatic HEAT‐like repeat (HLR) proteins, AlkD2, and AlkF, have unique nucleic acid binding properties that expand the functions of this relatively new protein superfamily beyond DNA repair. Here, we review the phylogeny, biochemistry, and structures of the HLR proteins, which have helped broaden our understanding of the mechanisms by which DNA glycosylases locate and excise chemically modified DNA nucleobases. (shrink)

The RecA family proteins mediate homologous recombination, a ubiquitous mechanism for repairing DNA double‐strand breaks (DSBs) and stalled replication forks. Members of this family include bacterial RecA, archaeal RadA and Rad51, and eukaryotic Rad51 and Dmc1. These proteins bind to single‐stranded DNA at a DSB site to form a presynaptic nucleoprotein filament, align this presynaptic filament with homologous sequences in another double‐stranded DNA segment, promote DNA strand exchange and then dissociate. It was generally accepted that RecA family proteins (...) function throughout their catalytic cycles as right‐handed helical filaments with six protomers per helical turn. However, we recently reported that archaeal RadA proteins can also form an extended right‐handed filament with three monomers per helical turn and a left‐handed protein filament with four monomers per helical turn. Subsequent structural and functional analyses suggest that RecA family protein filaments, similar to the F1‐ATPase rotary motor, perform ATP‐dependent clockwise axial rotation during their catalytic cycles. This new hypothesis has opened a new avenue for understanding the molecular mechanism of RecA family proteins in homologous recombination. BioEssays 30:48–56, 2008. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

The traditional disputants in the free will discussion--the libertarian, soft determinist, and hard determinist--agree that free will is a coherent concept, while disagreeing on how the concept might be satisfied and whether it can, in fact, be satisfied. In this innovative analysis, Richard Double offers a bold new argument, rejecting all of the traditional theories and proposing that the concept of free will cannot be satisfied, no matter what the nature of reality. Arguing that there is unavoidable conflict within (...) our understanding of moral responsibility and free choice, Double seeks to prove that when we ascribe responsibility, blame, or freedom, we merely express attitudes, rather than state anything capable of truth or falsity. Free will, he concludes, is essentially an incoherent notion. (shrink)

Why is debate over the free will problem so intractable? In this broad and stimulating look at the philosophical enterprise, Richard Double uses the free will controversy to build on the subjectivist conclusion he developed in The Non-Reality of Free Will (OUP 1991). Double argues that various views about free will--e.g., compatibilism, incompatibilism, and even subjectivism--are compelling if, and only if, we adopt supporting metaphilosophical views. Because metaphilosophical considerations are not provable, we cannot show any free will theory (...) to be most reasonable. Metaphilosophy and Free Will deconstructs the free will problem and, by example, challenges philosophers in other areas to show how their philosophical argumentation can succeed. (shrink)

Confidence ratings have often been integrated into reasoning and intelligence tasks as a means for assessing meta-reasoning processes. Although it is often assumed that eliciting these judgements throughout reasoning tasks has no effect on the underlying performance outcomes, this is yet to be established empirically. The current study examines whether eliciting CR from participants during a fluid-reasoning task influences their performance and how this effect is moderated by their initial self-confidence in their own reasoning abilities. In a first experiment, we (...) found that participants performing CR during Raven's Progressive Matrices significantly outperformed a control group who did not provide ratings. Additionally, a second experiment demonstrated that CR only facilitated performance in participants who have a high level of initial self-confidence in their reasoning ability, whereas they were detrimental to participants low in self-confidence. (shrink)

The following is a criticism designed to apply to most libertarian free will theorists. I argue that most libertarians hold three beliefs that jointly show them to be unsympathetic or hard-hearted to persons whom they hold morally responsible: that persons are morally responsible only because they make libertarian choices, that we should hold persons responsible, and that we lack epistemic justification for thinking persons make such choices. Softhearted persons who held these three beliefs would espouse hard determinism, which exonerates all (...) persons of moral responsibility, or, at least, would not espouse libertarianism. I do not address the view held by some libertarians that we do have epistemic justification for thinking that persons make libertarian choices, a minority position that I believe cannot be sustained. (shrink)

Philosophers’ intuitions about what constitutes autonomy are largely driven by the exemplars or paradigms that we recognize. There are indefinitely many exemplars, inasmuch as there are relatively private personae that serve as autonomy exemplars such as our parents, third grade teacher, or, for the megalomaniac, oneself. But among Western philosophers there are doubtless some exemplars that are widely shared and broadly influential. Philosophical exemplars include Socrates, Aristotle’s magnanimous man, Kant’s noumenal self that is perfectly attuned to the moral law, Mill’s (...) anti-authoritarian non-conformist, Marx’s manin-society, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, and Sartre’s authentic youth who must decide whether to join the French resistance or stay at home for the sake of his mother. Exemplars from outside of philosophy include Antigone, Christ, Faust, Ibsen’s Enemy of the People, Winston Churchill, and even figures from popular culture such as the baseball player Ted Williams, the free spirited flower children of the 1960s, and practically any character that John Wayne ever played. (shrink)

In this article I consider when the question of whether entities exist subjectively (only in the minds of subjects) or objectively (in themselves, independently of the minds of subjects) is important, both theoretically and practically. I argue that when it comes to the metaphysics underlying three types of moral questions, broadly conceived, the subjectivity question does not matter practically, although it is widely thought to matter. Subjectivism does not matter in these moral questions in the same way(s) it matters in (...) some nonmoral metaphysical issues. The moral questions I consider are the meaning of life, normative ethics, and the free‐will problem. The nonmoral issues I address are the existence of God, the traditional mind/body problem, and personal identity. I explain the difference by noting that certain metaphysical issues on the fact side of the fact/value distinction impinge on persons' lives more prominently than do the metaphysics behind the three moral questions. (shrink)

The objection to R-S accounts that was raised by the possibility of external agents requires the acceptance of two premises, viz., that all R-S accounts allow for puppeteers and that puppeteers necessarily make us unfree. The Metaphilosophical reply shows that to the extent that puppeteers are more problematic than determinism per se, pup-peteers may be explicitly excluded since they violate our paradigm of free will. The Metaphilosophical reply also suggests that we should not expect our mature R-S account to supply (...) logically necessary and sufficient conditions for free will, but rather give us answers that agree with our intuitions regarding paradigms of free and unfree decisions. The Irrelevancy reply completed our reply to incompatibilists who continue to object that determinism per se destroys the R-S program. It may be debated whether my autonomy variable account is a satisfactory way to spell out the Irrelevancy reply, but I think that this type of approach suggests the way to vindicating the R-S view from an important type of objection. (shrink)

In “The Moral Hardness of Libertarianism”, I accuse libertarians of being morally unsympathetic if they hold three widely shared beliefs: that persons are morally responsible only if they make libertarian choices; that we should hold persons morally responsible; and that we lack epistemic justification for thinking persons make libertarian choices. In “Hard-Heartedness and Libertarianism”, John Lemos, relying on the Kantian principle of ends, suggests a way for libertarians to accept these three beliefs while avoiding the charge of hard-heartedness. In this (...) paper, I criticize Lemos’s rebuttal. (shrink)

Richard Double takes us through James' defence of belief in God, exposing a few fallacies along the way.

Psychiatry is increasingly dominated by the reductionist claim that mental illness is caused by neurobiological abnormalities such as chemical imbalances in the brain. Critical psychiatry does not believe that this is the whole story and proposes a more ethical foundation for practice. This book describes an original framework for renewing mental health services in alliance with people with mental health problems. It is an advance over the polarization created by the "anti-psychiatry" of the past.

The belief that only free will supports assignments of moral responsibility -- deserved praise and blame, punishment and reward, and the expression of reactive attitudes and moral censure -- has fueled most of the historical concern over the existence of free will. Free will's connection to moral responsibility also drives contemporary thinkers as diverse in their substantive positions as Peter Strawson, Thomas Nagel, Peter van Inwagen, Galen Strawson, and Robert Kane. A simple, but powerful, reason for thinking that philosophers are (...) correct in making moral responsibility the prize of the free will problem is this: If we disassociate free will from deserved praise, blame, punishment and reward, reactive attitudes and moral censure, then why care about free will? If free will is not pinned down as that degree of freedom in our choices that we need for moral responsibility, it is difficult to see why anyone would or should care about free will. In this article I argue that some of the most prominent recent writing on free will becomes sidetracked from this key issue. For this reason, a good deal of the literature is so much spilled ink as philosophers misdirect their energies. In section 1 I elaborate just what I believe the key issue in the free will problem is. In section 2 I illustrate what an answer to the key issue requires. In section 3 I suggest motivations for misdirection. In sections 4, 5, and 6 I provide detailed examples of misdirection from compatibilists and libertarians. In sections 7 and 8 I describe some non-misdirected answers to the key question. (shrink)

Psychologists and common sense recognize blaming the victim as a cognitive error (fallacy) that many of us use to support the just-world hypothesis — the view that life is basically fair. In this article Richard Double compares a related phenomenon, blaming the culprit. When we commit the fallacy of blaming the culprit we mistakenly conclude that judging a culprit to deserve blame for an action exonerates everyone else from blame for that action. Double provides several examples of the (...) fallacy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Eclecticism and Adolf Meyer’s Functional Understanding of Mental IllnessD. B. Double (bio)KeywordsAdolf Meyer, eclecticism, functionalism, biopsychosocial modelGhaemi’s Commentary and Meyer’s ‘Eclecticism’I am not against humanism. How could anyone be against the humanistic wisdom rooted in the worthy writings of Socrates, Hippocrates, Shakespeare, Cervantes, Osler, and the others listed by Nassir Ghaemi? Psychiatry should recognize the dignity and value of all people. The problem is that it may not (...) always do so, coming from a reductionist paradigm as it so often does.Ghaemi appreciates that Meyer’s compromising attitude meant that he was “unable to inoculate psychiatry from biological dogmatism.” My emphasis is on the challenge of Meyer’s psychobiology to biomedicine. In the same way, Engel’s biopsychosocial model acknowledged the need to neutralize the power of an impersonal and mechanical medicine. Doctors tend to overemphasize physical abnormalities at the expense of dealing with difficult personal issues.At the risk of oversimplification, I am juxtaposing biopsychosocial and biomedical models in psychiatry. Or in other terms, for our modern understanding, I am asserting a neo-Meyerian approach in contrast to neo-Kraepelinianism. Merely restating the Meyerian perspective will not do, because of Meyer’s ‘give and take,’ and his consequent failure to follow through the implication of his position. At least the ethical ramifications of his conceptual framework need to be acknowledged.Neo-Meyerianism also needs to be realized in the context of the reaction to anti-psychiatry. After anti-psychiatry’s attack, our modern understanding of mental illness has tended to be been subsumed into the binary opposition of ‘pro-psychiatry’ and ‘anti-psychiatry.’ But neo-Meyerianism is as much pro-psychiatric as biomedical psychiatry. It is in this sense that biopsychological approaches have been undermined by the biomedical reaction to anti-psychiatry. [End Page 355]I also agree with Ghaemi that there is a way in which the failures of the biopsychosocial model allowed the development of anti-psychiatry. For example, even though Laing quoted favorably from psychologically minded psychiatrists such as Manfred Bleuler, as far as I know he never made any reference to Meyer. There was never a systematic Meyerian theory to which Laing could refer. In fact, Laing wished to move beyond an interpretative understanding to abandon the metaphor of pathology (Double 2006). Perhaps if the biopsychosocial model had been more clearly defined, Laing would not have felt he needed to take this step. Or, at least in doing so, he would have been clearer about where he stood on this issue. When labeling Laing’s views as ‘anti-psychiatry,’ biomedical psychiatry would have had to state more precisely how Laing’s position was anti- rather than pro-psychiatric.My main disagreement with Ghaemi is his view of Meyer as eclectic. Meyer’s willingness to allow ‘anything goes’ in psychiatry meant that he did not oppose or challenge too much the views of those with whom he disagreed. Nonetheless, he did not combine together different sources to create an unintegrated philosophical and conceptual understanding. His theoretical position is internally consistent.Modern American psychiatry studied by participant observation is “of two minds,” in that there is a divided consciousness created between the practices of drug therapy and psychotherapy (Luhrmann 2000). In this sense, it is eclectic because there is no consistent theory that combines the two practice modes. True, psychiatry often claims that the foundation for this mixture is the biopsychosocial model. It asserts that everyday psychiatry is not as purely biomedical as is often maintained because it takes into account psychosocial factors that may precipitate mental disorders. It, therefore, says that it bring together the biological and psychosocial. This compromise avoids the adoption of any one model and was proposed to neutralize the dogmatism engendered by the anti-psychiatry debate (Clare 1980). I agree with Ghaemi that such eclecticism has outlived its usefulness.Where I think Ghaemi is mistaken is that he sees Meyer and Engel as the originators of this eclecticism. I regard the Meyerian approach as more genuinely pragmatic than Ghaemi suggests. Meyer’s dynamic psychology sought an integration of mind and brain as a way of dealing with the philosophical dilemma of the mind–body... (shrink)

Metaethical subjectivism, the idea that the truth or falsity of moral statements is contingent upon the attitudes or conventions of observers, is often regarded as a lurid philosophical doctrine which generates much psychological resistance to its acceptance. In this accessible book, Richard Double, presents a vigorous defense of metaethical subjectivism, arguing that the acceptance of this doctrine need have no deleterious effects upon theorizing either in normative ethics or in moral practice. Proceeding from a 'worldview' methodology Double criticizes (...) the rival doctrine of metaethical objectivism for lacking both 'completeness' and 'soundness', argues that a defense of metaethical subjectivism requires no special semantic analysis of moral language and defends the plausibility of metaethical subjectivism as explaining key intractable disagreements in moral philosophy. Double concludes by suggesting that the acceptance of metaethical subjectivism is better for constructing theories of normative ethics and moral practice than is metaethical objectivism. (shrink)