Realism, method and truth

In Michele Marsonet (ed.), The Problem of Realism. Aldershot: Ashgate. pp. 64-81 (2002)
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Abstract

What is the relation between method and truth? Are we justified in accepting a theory that satisfies the rules of scientific method as true? Such questions divide realism from anti-realism in the philosophy of science. Scientific realists take the methods of science to promote the realist aim of correspondence truth. Anti-realists either claim that the methods of science promote lesser epistemic goals than realist truth, or else they reject the realist conception of truth altogether. In this paper, I propose a realist theory of the relation between method and truth. The theory consists of three basic elements: (a) a naturalistic treatment of epistemic normativity, (b) an instrumentalist conception of the nature of methodological rules, and (c) an abductive argument for the truth-conduciveness of the rules of scientific method.

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2009-01-28

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Howard Sankey
University of Melbourne

Citations of this work

Realism and the Epistemic Objectivity of Science.Howard Sankey - 2021 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):5-20.
Scientific Realism And The Inevitability Of Science.Howard Sankey - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):259-264.
Epistemic Objectivity and the Virtues.Howard Sankey - 2020 - Filozofia Nauki 28 (3):5-23.
La relatividad conceptual y el problema de la verdad.Antonio Diéguez - 2020 - Scientia in Verba Magazine 6 (1):105-120.

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