Mind and Language 37 (2):177-193 (2022)

Authors
Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen
University of Toronto at Mississauga
Abstract
Psychopathy has been theorized as a disorder of emotion, which impairs moral judgments. However, these theories are increasingly being abandoned as empirical studies show that psychopaths seem to make proper moral judgments. In this contribution, these findings are reassessed, and it is argued that prevalent emotion‐theories of psychopathy appear to operate with the unjustified assumption that psychopaths have no emotions, which leads to the hypothesis that psychopaths are completely unable to make moral judgments. An alternative and novel explanation is proposed, theorizing psychopathy as a degree‐specific emotional deficiency, which causes degree‐specific differences in moral judgments.
Keywords emotion  forensic psychology  moral psychology  moral sentimentalism  psychopathy
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/mila.12317
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 68,944
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Emotional Construction of Morals.Jesse Prinz - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):701-704.
How Does Moral Judgment Work?Joshua Greene & Jonathan Haidt - 2002 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (12):517-523.
The Emotional Basis of Moral Judgments.Jesse Prinz - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):29-43.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Internalism, Emotionism, and the Psychopathy Challenge.Lei Zhong - 2013 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (4):329-337.
What Can Philosophers Learn From Psychopathy?Heidi L. Maibom - 2018 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 14 (1):63-78.
Conscience as the Rational Deficit of Psychopaths.Marijana Vujošević - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (8):1219-1240.
Moral Reasoning and Emotion.Joshua May & Victor Kumar - 2018 - In Karen Jones, Mark Timmons & Aaron Zimmerman (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 139-156.
Psychopaths and Moral Knowledge.Vargas Manuel & Nichols Shaun - 2007 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):157-162.
Moral Unreason: The Case of Psychopathy.Heidi Lene Maibom - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):237-57.
Psychopathy and Internalism.Victor Kumar - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):318-345.
Moral Unreason: The Case of Psychopathy.Heidi L. Maibom - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):237-257.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-09-23

Total views
26 ( #436,160 of 2,498,012 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #63,047 of 2,498,012 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes