This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related

Contents
98 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 98
  1. Imagining a Way Out of Dream Skepticism.Daniel Gregory - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.
    The problem of dream skepticism – i.e., the problem of what can justify one’s belief that they are not dreaming – is one of the most famous problems in philosophy. I propose a way of responding to the problem which is available if one subscribes to the theory that the sensory experiences that we have in dreams consist of images (as opposed to false percepts). The response exploits a particular feature of imagination, viz., that it is not possible to simultaneously (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2. Veridicalism and Scepticism.Yuval Avnur - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):393-407.
    According to veridicalism, your beliefs about the existence of ordinary objects are typically true, and can constitute knowledge, even if you are in some global sceptical scenario. Even if you are a victim of Descartes’ demon, you can still know that there are tables, for example. Accordingly, even if you don’t know whether you are in some such scenario, you still know that there are tables. This refutes the standard sceptical argument. But does it solve the sceptical problem posed by (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Safety and Dream Scepticism in Sosa’s Epistemology.J. Adam Carter & Robert Cowan - 2024 - Synthese (6).
    A common objection to Sosa’s epistemology is that it countenances, in an objectionable way, unsafe knowledge. This objection, under closer inspection, turns out to be in far worse shape than Sosa’s critics have realised. Sosa and his defenders have offered two central response types to the idea that allowing unsafe knowledge is problematic: one response type adverts to the animal/reflective knowledge distinction that is characteristic of bi-level virtue epistemology. The other less-discussed response type appeals to the threat of dream scepticism, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Why We Doubt: A Cognitive Account of Our Skeptical Inclinations.N. Ángel Pinillos - 2023 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This book, the first of its kind, puts forward a novel, unified cognitive account of skeptical doubt. Historically, most philosophers have tried to tackle this difficult topic by directly arguing that skeptical doubt is false. But N. Ángel Pinillos does something different. He begins by trying to uncover the hidden mental rule which, for better or worse, motivates our skeptical inclinations. He then gives an account of the broader cognitive purpose of having and applying this rule. Based on these ideas, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Cartesian Skepticism, Kantian Skepticism, and the Dreaming Hypothesis.Antonio Ianni Segatto - 2023 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 27 (1):101-116.
    Based on the distinction drawn by James Conant between Cartesian skepticism and Kantian skepticism, I intend to show that Wittgenstein’s remarks on dreaming should not be understood as a direct attack on the former, as commonly held, but as an indirect attack on it, for Wittgenstein approaches Descartes’ dreaming hypothesis by changing the very problematic at stake. Wittgenstein’s attack on skepticism takes one step back from a question about how to distinguish between dreaming that one is experiencing something and actually (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. The Cogito, Dreamt Characters, and Unreal Existence.Michael-John Turp - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (X):585-592.
    Borges’ The Circular Ruins tells the story of a magician who turns out to be a character in a dream. Leibowitz (2021) argues that this scenario undermines the rational indubitability of Descartes’ Cogito. The magician, he argues, is an unreal appearance and therefore does not exist. I argue that Borges drew a distinction between reality and existence and that he was right to do so. There are various senses of reality and the sense in which a dreamt character is unreal (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Wittgenstein on Dreaming and Skepticism.Antonio Ianni Segatto - 2022 - Topoi 41 (5):1033-1042.
    In this paper I aim to elucidate Wittgenstein’s claim that the so-called dream argument is senseless. Unlike other interpreters, who understand the sentence “I am dreaming” as contradictory or self-defeating, I intend to elucidate in what sense one should understand it as senseless or, more precisely, as nonsensical. In this sense, I propose to understand the above-mentioned claim in light of Wittgenstein’s criticism of skepticism from the _Tractatus logico-philosophicus_ to his last writings. I intend to show that the words “I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Cartesian Epistemology without Cartesian Dreams? Commentary on Jennifer Windt's Dreaming.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (5-6):30-43.
    Jennifer Windt’s Dreaming is an enormously rich and thorough book, developing illuminating connections between dreaming, the methodology of psychology, and various philosophical subfields. I’ll focus on two epistemological threads that run through the book. The first has to do with the status of certain assumptions about dreams. Windt argues that the assumptions that dreams involve experiences, and that dream reports are reliable — are methodologically necessary default assumptions, akin to Wittgensteinian hinge propositions. I’ll suggest that Windt is quietly pre-supposing some (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. De somnis i il·lusions. Llegim les Meditacions Metafísiques (1641) de Descartes (2018).Montserrat Crespin Perales - 2018 - Conferences.
    Texto presentación - Festival de Filosofia Barcelona Pensa 2018 Queda terminantemente prohibida la reproducción total o parcial de este documento, así como su uso indebido y/o su exhibición o comunicación a terceros. Código de registro 1912062630974 .
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. 1% Skepticism.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):271-290.
    A 1% skeptic is someone who has about a 99% credence in non-skeptical realism and about a 1% credence in the disjunction of all radically skeptical scenarios combined. The first half of this essay defends the epistemic rationality of 1% skepticism, appealing to dream skepticism, simulation skepticism, cosmological skepticism, and wildcard skepticism. The second half of the essay explores the practical behavioral consequences of 1% skepticism, arguing that 1% skepticism need not be behaviorally inert.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  11. Dreams in a Vat.Danilo Suster - 2016 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 12 (2):89-105.
    Putnam’s semantic argument against the BIV hypothesis and Sosa’s argument against dream skepticism based on the imagination model of dreaming share some important structural features. In both cases the skeptical option is supposed to be excluded because preconditions of its intelligibility are not fulfilled (affirmation and belief in the dream scenario, thought and reference in the BIV scenario). Putnam’s reasoning is usually interpreted differently, as a classic case of deception, but this feature is not essential. I propose to interpret BIV’s (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12. Whose Dream Is It Anyway?Avner Baz - 2014 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (3-4):263-287.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  13. The Self-Knowledge Gambit.Berislav Marušić - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):1977-1999.
    If we hold that perceiving is sufficient for knowing, we can raise a powerful objection to dreaming skepticism: Skeptics assume the implausible KK-principle, because they hold that if we don’t know whether we are dreaming or perceiving p, we don’t know whether p. The rejection of the KK-principle thus suggests an anti-skeptical strategy: We can sacrifice some of our self-knowledge—our second-order knowledge—and thereby save our knowledge of the external world. I call this strategy the Self-Knowledge Gambit. I argue that the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  14. The regress argument against Cartesian skepticism.Jessica M. Wilson - 2012 - Analysis 72 (4):668-673.
    I argue that Cartesian skepticism about the external world leads to a vicious regress of skeptical attitudes, the only principled and unproblematic response to which requires refraining from taking the very first skeptical step.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  15. The Cartesian Dreaming Argument for External‐World Skepticism.Stephen Hetherington - 2011-09-16 - In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments. Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 137–141.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Dream Skepticism and the Conditionality Problem.Kristoffer Ahlstrom - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (1):45-60.
    Recently, Ernest Sosa (2007) has proposed two novel solutions to the problem of dream skepticism. In the present paper, I argue that Sosa’s first solution falls prey to what I will refer to as the conditionality problem, i.e., the problem of only establishing a conditional—in this case, if x, then I am awake, x being a placeholder for a condition incompatible with dreaming—in a context where it also needs to be established that we can know that the antecedent holds, and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  17. The Cartesian dreaming argument for external-world skepticism.Stephen Hetherington - 2011 - In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Reality: a very short introduction.Jan Westerhoff - 2011 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    'What is real?' has been one of the key questions of philosophy since its beginning in antiquity. But it is not just a question that philosophers ask. This Very Short Introduction discusses what reality is by looking at a variety of arguments, theories, and thought-experiments from philosophy, physics, and cognitive science.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  19. Sosa’s dream.Nathan Ballantyne & Ian Evans - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):249-252.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  20. Descartes' resolution of the dreaming doubt.Brad Chynoweth - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):153-179.
    After resolving the dreaming doubt at the end of the Sixth Meditation, Descartes concedes to Hobbes that one could apply the criterion for waking experience in a dream and thus be deceived, but he no longer considers this possibility to have skeptical force. I argue that this is a legitimate response by Descartes since 1) the dreaming doubt in the Sixth Meditation is no longer a global skeptical hypothesis as it is in the First, and 2) the level of certainty (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21. Sosa's responses to dreaming skepticism.Claudia Lorena García - 2010 - Critica 42 (125):3-25.
    Ernest Sosa has proposed two different ways to respond to dreaming skepticism. In this paper I argue that Sosa's first response —which centers on holding that we have no beliefs in dreams— does not appear to be successful against either the hyperbolic or the realistic dreaming skeptic. I also argue that his second attempt to respond to the dreaming skeptic by arguing that perceptual knowledge indeed counts as what he calls "animal knowledge", may succeed but requires us to perform what (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  22. Review: Sosa on Scepticism. [REVIEW]Jessica Brown - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):397 - 405.
    In my remarks, I discuss Sosa's attempt to deal with the sceptical threat posed by dreaming. Sosa explores two replies to the problem of dreaming scepticism. First, he argues that, on the imagination model of dreaming, dreaming does not threaten the safety of our beliefs. Second, he argues that knowledge does not require safety, but a weaker condition which is not threatened by dreaming skepticism. I raise questions about both elements of his reply.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  23. Sosa on scepticism. [REVIEW]Jessica Brown - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):397--405.
    In my remarks, I discuss Sosa's attempt to deal with the sceptical threat posed by dreaming. Sosa explores two replies to the problem of dreaming scepticism. First, he argues that, on the imagination model of dreaming, dreaming does not threaten the safety of our beliefs. Second, he argues that knowledge does not require safety, but a weaker condition which is not threatened by dreaming skepticism. I raise questions about both elements of his reply.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  24. Sosa on skepticism.Otávio Bueno - 2009 - Metaphilosophy 40 (2):195-202.
    Abstract: Ernest Sosa has recently articulated an insightful response to skepticism and, in particular, to the dream argument. The response relies on two independent moves. First, Sosa offers the imagination model of dreaming according to which no assertions are ever made in dreams and no beliefs are involved there. As a result, it is possible to distinguish dreaming from being awake, and the dream argument is blocked. Second, Sosa develops a virtue epistemology according to which in appropriately normal conditions our (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  25. Security and Dreams in the Epistemology of Sosa.Juan Comesana - 2009 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):75-81.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. A refutation of global scepticism.Ken Gemes - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):218-219.
    Various possibilities, that one is dreaming, that one is being deceived by a deceitful demon, that one is a brain in the vat being stimulated to think one has a body and is in a regular world, have been invoked to show that all one's experience-based beliefs might be false. Descartes in Meditation I advises that in order not to lapse into his careless everyday view of things he, or at least his meditator, should pretend that all his experience-based beliefs, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  27. Skepticism and internalism.Halvor Nordby - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):pp. 35-54.
    The skeptical Dream argument appeals to the possibility of dreaming. The skeptic holds that states of being awake are subjectively indistinguishable from possible dream states and that this means that we do not know that we are awake. This, the skeptic then claims, means that we have to accept that we do not have external world knowledge.It is natural to assume that there must be a connection between the Dream argument and epistemic internalism, the view that a belief is justified (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. McDowell on Skepticism, Disjunctivism, and Transcendental Arguments.Paul F. Snowdon - 2009 - Philosophical Topics 37 (1):133-152.
  29. Dreaming, Philosophical Issues.Ernest Sosa & Jonathan Ichikawa - 2009 - In Patrick Wilken, Timothy J. Bayne & Axel Cleeremans (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Having fascinated some of the greatest philosophers from the earliest times, dreaming figures importantly in the history of philosophy, as in Plato’s Theaetetus, Augustine’s Confessions, and, perhaps most famously, Descartes’s Mediations. By far the greatest philosophical focus on dreaming has been epistemic: Socrates suggests to Theaetetus that since he cannot tell whether he is dreaming, he cannot trust his senses to know contingent facts about the world around him. And a similar worry drives Descartes’s radical doubt in the First Meditation. (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  30. Wittgenstein and the dream hypothesis.Avrum Stroll - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (4):681-690.
    The paper deals with Wittgenstein’s treatment of radical skepticism. He holds from his earliest work to his last that skepticism is senseless and therefore no rebuttal, such as G.E. Moore offered, is necessary.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  31. The internal problem of dreaming: Detection and epistemic risk.George Botterill - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):139 – 160.
    There are two epistemological problems connected with dreaming, which are of different kinds and require different treatment. The internal problem is best seen as a problem of rational consistency, of how we can maintain all of: Dreams are experiences we have during sleep. Dream-experiences are sufficiently similar to waking experiences for the subject to be able to mistake them for waking experiences. We can tell that we are awake. (1)-(3) threaten to violate a requirement on discrimination: that we can only (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Scepticism and the imagination model of dreaming.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):519–527.
    Ernest Sosa has argued that the solution to dream scepticism lies in an understanding of dreams as imaginative experiences – when we dream, on this suggestion, we do not believe the contents of our dreams, but rather imagine them. Sosa rebuts scepticism thus: dreams don’t cause false beliefs, so my beliefs cannot be false, having been caused by dreams. I argue that, even assuming that Sosa is correct about the nature of dreaming, belief in wakefulness on these grounds is epistemically (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  33. The Empirical Basis To Skepticism.Robert Hudson - 2007 - Minerva 11:101-112.
    Broadly speaking, there are two different ways in which one might defend skepticism – an a priori wayand an empirical way. My first task in this paper is to defend the view that the preferred way to defendskepticism is empirical. My second task is to explain why this approach actually makes sense. Iaccomplish this latter task by responding to various criticisms one might advance against the possibilityof empirically defending skepticism. In service of this response, I distinguish between two differentkinds of (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. On Dreaming and Being Lied To.Paul Faulkner - 2006 - Episteme 2 (3):149-159.
    As sources of knowledge, perception and testimony are both vulnerable to sceptical arguments. To both arguments a Moorean response is possible: both can be refuted by reference to particular things known by perception and testimony. However, lies and dreams are different possibilities and they are different in a way that undercuts the plausibility of a Moorean response to a scepticism of testimony. The condition placed on testimonial knowledge cannot be trivially satisfied in the way the Moorean would suggest. This has (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  35. What Descartes' Demon Can Do and his Dream Cannot.Ruth Weintraub - 2006 - Theoria 72 (4):319-335.
    The reason Descartes cites for invoking the demon argument in addition to the dream argument is that the demon argument is intended to broaden the scope of Descartes’ scepticism, to subsume additional beliefs under it. I present an additional, unfamiliar reason. There is, I argue, an important difference between the two sceptical arguments. It pertains not to their scope, but to their “depth”, to the kind of scepticism they are capable of inducing.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Jay Rosenberg: Thinking about knowing, OUP 2002. [REVIEW]Christian Helmut Wenzel - 2006 - European Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):453–456.
  37. The twisted matrix: Dream, simulation, or hybrid?Andy Clark - 2005 - In C. Grau (ed.), Philosophical Essays on the Matrix. Oxford University Press New York.
    “The Matrix is a computer-generated dreamworld built to keep us under control” Morpheus, early in The Matrix. “ In dreaming, you are not only out of control, you don’t even know it…I was completely duped again and again the minute my pons, my amygdala, my perihippocampal cortex, my anterior cingulate, my visual association and parietal opercular cortices were revved up and my dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was muffled” ” J. Allan Hobson, The Dream Drugstore, p.64 The Matrix is an exercise in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  38. Bad Dreams, Evil Demons, and the Experience Machine: Philosophy and The Matrix.Christopher Grau - 2005 - In Philosophers Explore the Matrix. Oxford University Press.
  39. Das Ende vom Problem des methodischen Anfangs: Descartes' antiskeptisches Argument.Hans Rott & Verena Wagner - 2005 - In Gereon Wolters & Martin Carrier (eds.), Homo Sapiens und Homo Faber: epistemische und technische Rationalität in Antike und Gegenwart ; Festschrift für Jürgen Mittelstrass. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter. pp. 133–145.
    Descartes' Meditations do not end up sceptical at all. In fact, the sixth meditation displays an intriguing epistemological optimism. Descartes affirms without reservation that knowledge of the external world is possible. The antisceptical argument at the end of the Meditations is often interpreted as a refutation of dream scepticism, with the conclusion that a person in the waking state can also determine that he or she is awake. We examine the logic of the argument in detail and find that this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. Dreams and philosophy.Ernest Sosa - 2005 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 79 (2):7 - 18.
    That conception is orthodox in today’s common sense and also historically. Presupposed by Plato, Augustine, and Descartes, it underlies familiar skeptical paradoxes. Similar orthodoxy is also found in our developing science of sleep and dreaming.[2] Despite such confluence.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  41. Natural Doubts: Williams's Diagnosis Of Scepticism.Reid Buchanan - 2002 - Synthese 131 (1):57-80.
    Michael Williams believes that scepticism about the externalworld seems compelling only because the considerations that underpin it are thoughtto be ``mere platitudes'' about e.g., the nature and source of human knowledge, and hence,that if it shown through a ``theoretical diagnosis'' that it does not rest upon suchplatitudes, but contentious theoretical considerations that we are no means bound toaccept, we can simply dismiss the absurd sceptical conclusion. Williams argues thatscepticism does presuppose two extremely contentious doctrines, however, he admits thatif these doctrines (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42. Die Struktur des skeptischen Traumarguments.Thomas Grundmann - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 64 (1):57-81.
    Skeptical dream-arguments are intended as general challenges to our epistemic claims concerning the world. They argue that we can never rule out the possibility of merely dreaming what we believe to perceive. In my paper I will scrutinize whether any kind of such argument is sound. On my view, many versions of this argument are defective. They are either too weak to challenge all kinds of our epistemic claims or they rely on implausibly strong epistemic principles. More plausible versions of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  43. Fallibilism and Knowing That One Is Not Dreaming.Stephen Hetherington - 2002 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):83 - 102.
    Of course, if infallibilism about such knowledge is true, then it is true that one can never know that one is not dreaming. But, of course, if infallibilism is true, then there is also no special difficulty posed for one’s having knowledge in general by one’s not knowing in particular that one is not dreaming: one would know either nothing or next to nothing anyway, regardless of one’s not knowing in particular that one is not dreaming. Yet epistemologists have generally (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  44. Fumerton’s Principle of Inferential Justification.Michael Huemer - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28:329--340.
    Richard Fumerton’s “Principle of Inferential Justification” holds that, in order to be justified in believing P on the basis of E, one must be justified in believing that E makes P probable. I argue that the plausibility of this principle rests upon two kinds of mistakes: first, a level confusion; and second, a fallacy of misconditionalisation. Furthermore, Fumerton’s principle leads to skepticism about inferential justification, for which reason it should be rejected. Instead, the examples Fumerton uses to motivate his principle (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  45. Scepticism and dreaming.Duncan Pritchard - 2001 - Philosophia 28 (1-4):373-390.
    In a recent, and influential, article, Crispin Wright maintains that a familiar form of scepticismwhich finds its core expression in Descartes’ dreaming argumentcan be defused (or, to use Wright’s own parlance, “imploded”), by showing how it employs self-defeating reasoning. I offer two fundamental reasons for rejecting Wright’s ‘implosion’ of scepticism. On the one hand, I argue that, even by Wright’s own lights, it is unclear whether there is a sceptical argument to implode in the first place. On the other, I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  46. Did I dream that or did it really happen? A phenomenological criterion for distinguishing remembered dream experiences from remembered waking experiences.David Ward - 2001 - Manuscrito 24 (1):85-101.
    Is there a way to tell whether what you remember was something you dreamt or something that really happened without making reference to coherence criteria? I suggest contra Descartes that there is a certain sign ‘by means of which one can distinguish clearly between being awake and being asleep’. This certain sign is the intensive magnitude associated with every sensation.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Deflationary Approaches to Scepticism.Robert Reid Buchanan - 1999 - Dissertation, Mcmaster University (Canada)
    This dissertation examines a traditional philosophical problem within a novel framework. The so-called "problem of the external world" is a problem about how knowledge, and even reasonable belief, about the world are possible, and it is best characterized as the challenge to show how and why scepticism about the external world---the absurd view that such knowledge is impossible---is incorrect. My framework for the examination of this problem involves two major elements. ;The first element involves a general characterization of the nature (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Meditations on the Dream Argument.Yakir Levin - 1999 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 57 (1):7-15.
    According to one fairly standard reconstruction Descartes' Dream Argument has two crucial premises. The paper starts by analysing two important failed attempts, discussed by Barry Stroud and Mark Steiner, at justifying one of these premises. On this basis then an alternative is suggested to the line of interpretation assumed by these attempts which easily resolves the problems they face. It is shown that this alternative and its rivals are on a par with respect to the other crucial premise of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  49. Only a wet dream? Hope and skepticism in Horace, Satire 1.5.Kenneth J. Reckford - 1999 - American Journal of Philology 120 (4):525-554.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  50. The Melon and the Dictionary: Reflections on Descartes's Dreams.Alan Gabbey - 1998 - Journal of the History of Ideas 59 (4):651-668.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Melon and the Dictionary:Reflections on Descartes's DreamsAlan Gabbey and Robert E. HallThe interpretation of dreams is rarely answerable to either evidential or settled theoretical control. When the phantasms of the dreaming mind seem unaccountable, as they often do, they seem to belong to a mental world beyond the reach of historical, philosophical, or scientific analysis, a world for which the rules of methodological engagement seem inappropriate, rather than (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 98