This article offers the first critical edition of the most important version of Francis of Marchia's famous question 1 of his commentary on Book IV of the Sentences, in which the Franciscan theologian puts forth his virtus derelicta theory of projectile motion. The introduction attempts to place Marchia's theory in its proper context. The theory might seem to us an obvious improvement on Aristotle, but rather than an immediate and complete break with tradition that all scholastics quickly adopted, Marchia's virtus (...) derelicta was more a stage in a gradual process that had begun many decades before and did not find universal acceptance among his first successors. Moreover, Marchia himself did not take the theory to what might seem the obvious conclusion that Jean Buridan would draw, because Marchia employed the virtus derelicta to explain more phenomena than just projectile motion. (shrink)

Le franciscain Guiral Ot inclut, dans son commentaire sur I Corinthiens, des questions discutées aussi dans son commentaire sur l’ Éthique et dans ses questions parisiennes sur les Sentences (1327-1328). Cet article fournit une tabula quaestionum des commentaires de Guiral Ot sur I Cor. et sur l’Épître aux Galates, ainsi que l’édition de deux questions, l’une tirée du commentaire sur l’ Éthique et l’autre des questions sur l’ Éthique et sur les Sentences. Une analyse révèle que les lectures sur I (...) Cor., données à Toulouse entre l’automne 1323 et le printemps 1326, ont suivi la composition du commentaire sur l’ Éthique, également rédigé à Toulouse, probablement pas avant l’année universitaire 1322-1323. (shrink)

This article offers the first critical edition of the most important version of Francis of Marchia's famous question 1 of his commentary on Book IV of the Sentences, in which the Franciscan theologian puts forth his virtus derelicta theory of projectile motion. The introduction attempts to place Marchia's theory in its proper context. The theory might seem to us an obvious improvement on Aristotle, but rather than an immediate and complete break with tradition that all scholastics quickly adopted, Marchia's virtus (...) derelicta was more a stage in a gradual process that had begun many decades before and did not find universal acceptance among his first successors. Moreover, Marchia himself did not take the theory to what might seem the obvious conclusion that Jean Buridan would draw, because Marchia employed the virtus derelicta to explain more phenomena than just projectile motion. (shrink)

This research note identifies for the first time the principium on book I of the Sentences by the prolific polymath Henry of Langenstein. This discovery, when combined with the four principia of the Augustinian Denis of Modena, provides the evidence necessary to demonstrate that Langenstein lectured on the Sentences at Paris in 1371-1372. The note also establishes the identity of the other eight bachelors of theology who participated in the principial debates that year.

Dans cette question sur le livre II des Sentences, Guiral Ot demande si la créature, avant sa création, a un être propre, distinct de celui du Créateur : d’une part, Dieu crée ex nihilo ; avant la création, il n’y a donc rien, hormis Dieu ; d’autre part, Dieu connaît et veut de toute éternité ce qu’il produira avant de le produire ; les créatures ont bien un être-connu et un être-voulu en Dieu. Pour répondre à cette difficulté, Duns Scot (...) avait admis un être possible et un être relatif des créatures dans la pensée divine. Mais, avec plus de subtilité encore, Guiral Ot aperçoit neuf manières pour les choses d’être dans la pensée divine avant d’être créées. C’est le déploiement de ces modes d’être ainsi que leur articulation que nous révèle l’édition de cette question. (shrink)

Cet article propose une édition critique des questions 7-9 de la Lectura sur les Sentences (Oxford, 1332-1333) de Thomas Bradwardine, où sont abordés la grâce et le mérite avant la publication de son monumental De causa Dei en 1344. La plus longue des trois, la question 7, a également été attribuée à Richard FitzRalph. Après avoir examiné les arguments en faveur de l’attribution à Bradwardine, l’article démontre comment le futur archevêque de Cantorbéry commençait seulement à réagir aux tendances pélagiennes dont (...) il avait été témoin l’année précédente. (shrink)

Pierre Duhem and Eugenio Randi have investigated the later-medieval history of the problem of whether the existence of more than one world is possible, determining that Aristotle's denial of that possibility was rejected on theological grounds in the second half of the thirteenth century, but it was Nicole Oresme in the mid-fourteenth century who gave the strongest philosophical arguments against the Peripatetic stance, opting instead for Plato's position. For different reasons, neither Duhem nor Randi was able to examine Gerald Odonis' (...) question on the subject. In this text, edited here, Odonis also opposes Aristotle for philosophical reasons and sides explicitly with Plato. Was Oresme aware of Odonis' opinion? (shrink)

Pierre Duhem and Eugenio Randi have investigated the later-medieval history of the problem of whether the existence of more than one world is possible, determining that Aristotle's denial of that possibility was rejected on theological grounds in the second half of the thirteenth century, but it was Nicole Oresme in the mid-fourteenth century who gave the strongest philosophical arguments against the Peripatetic stance, opting instead for Plato's position. For different reasons, neither Duhem nor Randi was able to examine Gerald Odonis' (...) question on the subject. In this text, edited here, Odonis also opposes Aristotle for philosophical reasons and sides explicitly with Plato. Was Oresme aware of Odonis' opinion? (shrink)

This article presents a critical edition from the six surviving witnesses of Landulph Caracciolo’s , Scriptum in I Sententiarum, d. 23, a text that has never appeared in print before. A short introduction begins to set Landulph’s treatment of intentions and intentionality in this text into its historical, philosophical, and theological context, in particular linking it to the positions of John Duns Scotus and Peter Auriol.

The famous Epistola Luciferi, written in late 1351 or early 1352, caused quite a stir in the Avignon of Pope Clement vi, quickly became a medieval best-seller, and thereafter remained topical, being copied and printed down to the present day. Traditionally ascribed to Nicole Oresme or Henry of Langenstein, the letter was attributed to the Cistercian Pierre Ceffons by Damasus Trapp in 1957. Trapp merely took Ceffons’ authorship for granted, however, and in the most thorough study of the Epistola Luciferi (...) and of the entire genre of Devil’s letters, her 1982 PhD dissertation, Helen C. Feng rejected the attribution. Presenting codices and works of Ceffons of which Trapp was unaware, this article argues in favor of Ceffons’ responsibility for the Epistola Luciferi, while offering a new critical edition of the letter, an English translation, and a supplemental list of manuscripts and editions. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 56, Issue 1-2, pp 126 - 175 The famous _Epistola Luciferi_, written in late 1351 or early 1352, caused quite a stir in the Avignon of Pope Clement VI, quickly became a medieval best-seller, and thereafter remained topical, being copied and printed down to the present day. Traditionally ascribed to Nicole Oresme or Henry of Langenstein, the letter was attributed to the Cistercian Pierre Ceffons by Damasus Trapp in 1957. Trapp merely took Ceffons’ authorship for granted, however, (...) and in the most thorough study of the _Epistola Luciferi_ and of the entire genre of Devil’s letters, her 1982 PhD dissertation, Helen C. Feng rejected the attribution. Presenting codices and works of Ceffons of which Trapp was unaware, this article argues in favor of Ceffons’ responsibility for the _Epistola Luciferi_, while offering a new critical edition of the letter, an English translation, and a supplemental list of manuscripts and editions. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 55, Issue 4, pp 340 - 359 Gerard of Abbeville was a secular master of theology at the University of Paris and a contemporary of Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure. In the context of reviewing Stephen Metzger’s new two-volume book on Gerard, this paper first adds some new information about Gerard’s early career, notably concerning benefices he claimed in Saint-Omer, Tournai, and Amiens. Afterwards, the salient features of Metzger’s volumes are presented: his placement of Gerard in his institutional (...) context; his characterization of Gerard’s doctrines of wisdom, knowledge, and contemplation in comparison with those of Gerard’s contemporaries; and his editions of texts. In the end, the chronological repercussions of maintaining that Vat. lat. 1015 reflects the original sequence of Gerard’s _Quodlibeta_, Metzger’s future focus, are discussed. (shrink)

The first of two volumes on special theological disputations from ca. 1230-1330 in which audience members asked the era's greatest intellectuals questions de quolibet, "about anything." The variety of the material and the authors’ stature make the genre uniquely fascinating.

The second of two volumes on special theological disputations from ca. 1230-1330 in which audience members asked the era’s greatest intellectuals questions de quolibet, “about anything.” The variety of the material and the authors’ stature make the genre uniquely fascinating.

The Neo-Moorean Deduction (I have a hand, so I am not a brain-in-a-vat) and the Zebra Deduction (the creature is a zebra, so isn’t a cleverly disguised mule) are notorious. Crispin Wright, Martin Davies, Fred Dretske, and Brian McLaughlin, among others, argue that these deductions are instances of transmission failure. That is, they argue that these deductions cannot transmit justification to their conclusions. I contend, however, that the notoriety of these deductions is undeserved. My strategy is to clarify, attack, defend, (...) and apply. I clarify what transmission and transmission failure really are, thereby exposing two questionable but quotidian assumptions. I attack existing views of transmission failure, especially those of Crispin Wright. I defend a permissive view of transmission failure, one which holds that deductions of a certain kind fail to transmit only because of premise circularity. Finally, I apply this account to the Neo-Moorean and Zebra Deductions and show that, given my permissive view, these deductions transmit in an intuitively acceptable way—at least if either a certain type of circularity is benign or a certain view of perceptual justification is false. (shrink)

The metaphor of weighing reasons brings to mind a single (double-pan balance) scale. The reasons for φ go in one pan and the reasons for ~φ go in the other. The relative weights, as indicated by the relative heights of the two pans of the scale, determine the deontic status of φ. This model is simple and intuitive, but it cannot capture what it is to weigh reasons correctly. A reason pushes the φ pan down toward permissibility (has justifying weight) (...) only insofar as it pushes the ~φ pan up toward impermissibility (has requiring weight). Thus, Single Scale is committed to Single Proportion (first pass): all reasons have the same proportion of justifying and requiring weight. Many normative theories reject Single Proportion, and they are not thereby confused about how to weigh reasons. One can be mistaken about the weight of a reason without being confused about how reasons are to be weighed. Single Scale is problematic, not because it appeals to the image of a scale, but because it appeals to the image of a single scale. We need two scales to capture what it is to weigh reasons correctly. (shrink)

States claim the right to choose who can come to their country. They put up barriers and expose migrants to deadly journeys. Those who survive are labelled ‘illegal’ and find themselves vulnerable and unrepresented. The international state system advantages the lucky few born in rich countries and locks others into poor and often repressive ones. In this book, Christopher Bertram skilfully weaves a lucid exposition of the debates in political philosophy with original insights to argue that migration controls must be (...) justifiable to everyone, including would-be and actual immigrants. Until justice prevails, states have no credible right to exclude and no-one is obliged to obey their immigration rules. Bertram’s analysis powerfully cuts through the fog of political rhetoric that obscures this controversial topic. It will be essential reading for anyone interested in the politics and ethics of migration. (shrink)

A timely, well-grounded analysis that reveals an inconvenient truth: we can't save capitalism and save the planet.

"Feminism, Theory and the Politics of Difference" looks at the question of difference across the full spectrum of feminist theory from liberal, radical, lesbian ...

Recent clinical trials show that psychedelics such as LSD and psilocybin can be given safely in controlled conditions, and can cause lasting psychological benefits with one or two administrations. Supervised psychedelic sessions can reduce symptoms of anxiety, depression, and addiction, and improve well-being in healthy volunteers, for months or even years. But these benefits seem to be mediated by "mystical" experiences of cosmic consciousness, which prompts a philosophical concern: do psychedelics cause psychological benefits by inducing false or implausible beliefs about (...) the metaphysical nature of reality? This book is the first scholarly monograph in English devoted to the philosophical analysis of psychedelic drugs. Its central focus is the apparent conflict between the growing use of psychedelics in psychiatry and the philosophical worldview of naturalism. Within the book, Letheby integrates empirical evidence and philosophical considerations in the service of a simple conclusion: this "Comforting Delusion Objection" to psychedelic therapy fails. While exotic metaphysical ideas do sometimes come up, they are not, on closer inspection, the central driver of change in psychedelic therapy. Psychedelics lead to lasting benefits by altering the sense of self, and changing how people relate to their own minds and lives-not by changing their beliefs about the ultimate nature of reality. The upshot is that a traditional conception of psychedelics as agents of insight and spirituality can be reconciled with naturalism (the philosophical position that the natural world is all there is). Controlled psychedelic use can lead to genuine forms of knowledge gain and spiritual growth-even if no Cosmic Consciousness or transcendent divine Reality exists. Philosophy of Psychedelics is an indispensable guide to the literature for researchers already engaged in the field of psychedelic psychiatry, and for researchers-especially philosophers-who want to become acquainted with this increasingly topical field. (shrink)

Using a vague predicate can make commitments about the appropriate use of that predicate in the remaining part of the discourse. For instance, if I assert that some particular pig is fat, I am committed to judging any fatter pig to be fat as well. We can model this update effect by recognizing that truth depends both on the state of the world and on the state of the discourse: the truth conditions of ‘This pig is fat’ rule out evaluation (...) points for which the pig in question in world w is thinner than the cutoff for fatness in the discourse d. Then disagreements about taste are disagreements about the discourse. Unlike disagreements about the world, disagreements about the discourse can be faultless, given that none of the discourse participants has privileged authority to make pronouncements about conventions for appropriate use of a predicate. Thus on the dynamic view developed here, whether or not a dispute about taste turns out to be faultless depends in part on predictable features of the previous discourse. On this account, faultless disagreement involving predicates of personal taste does not force relativizing truth to a judge or assessor. (shrink)

Looking out the window, I see that it's raining outside. Do I know that it’s raining outside? According to proponents of the Entailment Thesis, I do. If I see that p, I know that p. In general, the Entailment Thesis is the thesis that if S perceives that p, S knows that p. But recently, some philosophers (McDowell 2002, Turri 2010, Pritchard 2011, 2012) have argued that the Entailment Thesis is false. On their view, we can see p and not (...) know that p. In this paper, I argue that their arguments are unsuccessful. (shrink)

What is the nature of deep disagreement? In this paper, I consider two similar albeit seemingly rival answers to this question: the Wittgensteinian theory, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over hinge propositions, and the fundamental epistemic principle theory, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over fundamental epistemic principles. I assess these theories against a set of desiderata for a satisfactory theory of deep disagreement, and argue that while the fundamental epistemic principle theory does better than the Wittgensteinian (...) theory on this score, the fundamental epistemic principle theory nevertheless struggles to explain the variety of deep disagreement. (shrink)

Users of psychedelic drugs often report that their sense of being a self or ‘I’ distinct from the rest of the world has diminished or altogether dissolved. Neuroscientific study of such ‘ego dissolution’ experiences offers a window onto the nature of self-awareness. We argue that ego dissolution is best explained by an account that explains self-awareness as resulting from the integrated functioning of hierarchical predictive models which posit the existence of a stable and unchanging entity to which representations are bound. (...) Combining recent work on the ‘integrative self' and the phenomenon of self-binding with predictive processing principles yields an explanation of ego dissolution according to which self-representation is a useful Cartesian fiction: an ultimately false representation of a simple and enduring substance to which attributes are bound which serves to integrate and unify cognitive processing across levels and domains. The self-model is not a mere narrative posit, as some have suggested; it has a more robust and ubiquitous cognitive function than that. But this does not mean, as others have claimed, that the self-model has the right attributes to qualify as a self. It performs some of the right kinds of functions, but it is not the right kind of entity. Ego dissolution experiences reveal that the self-model plays an important binding function in cognitive processing, but the self does not exist. (shrink)

This book takes concepts developed by researchers in theoretical computer science and adapts and applies them to the study of natural language meaning. Summarizing over a decade of research, Chris Barker and Chung-chieh Shan put forward the Continuation Hypothesis: that the meaning of a natural language expression can depend on its own continuation.

Philosophers often treat racist and sexist slurs as a special sort of puzzle. What is the difference between a slur and its correlates? In attempting to answer this question, a second distinction has been overlooked: that between slurs and insults. What makes a term count as a slur? This is not an unnecessary taxonomical question as long as ableist terms such as ‘moron’ are dismissed as mere insults. Attempts to resolve the insult/slur distinction by considering the communicative content of slurs (...) are not promising. A better solution is offered by speech act theory, and this paper develops a novel way to describe ordinary slurring utterances as oppressive speech acts. This can both explain the difference between slurs and insults, and challenge the dismissal of ableist terms. (shrink)

If dangerous climate change is to be avoided, it is vital that carbon sinks such as tropical rainforests are protected. But protecting them has costs. These include opportunity costs: the potential economic benefits which those who currently control rainforests have to give up when they are protected. But who should bear those costs? Should countries which happen to have rainforests within their territories sacrifice their own economic development, because of our broader global interests in protecting key carbon sinks? This essay (...) develops an argument from the “principle of fairness,” which seeks to establish that outsiders should pay states with rainforests so as to share the costs of protection. If they do not, they can be condemned for free-riding on forest states. The argument is, I suggest, compelling and also capable of enjoying support from adherents of a wide variety of positions on global justice. (shrink)