This volume is the second part of a project which hosts an interdisciplinary discussion about the relationship among law and language, legal practice and ordinary conversation, legal philosophy and the linguistics sciences. An international group of authors, from cognitive science, philosophy of language and philosophy of law question about how legal theory and pragmatics can enrich each other. In particular, the first part is devoted to the analysis of how pragmatics can solve problems related to legal theory: What can pragmatics (...) teach about the concept of law and its relationship with moral, and, in particular, about the eternal dispute between legal positivism and legal naturalism? What can pragmatics teach about the concept of law and/or legal disagreements? The second part is focused on legal adjudication: it aims to construct a pragmatic apparatus appropriate to legal trial and/or to test the tenure of the traditional pragmatics tools in the field. The authors face questions such as: Which interesting pragmatic features emerge from legal adjudication? What pragmatic theories are better suited to account for the practice of judgment or its particular aspects? Which pragmatic and socio-linguistic problems are highlighted by this practice? (shrink)

This essay investigates the applicability of Grice’s theory of conversational implicatures to legal interpretation, in order to highlight some of its characteristics. After introducing the notions of language and discourse, and briefly explaining the most salient aspects of Grice’s theory, I will analyse the interpretation of two types of legal acts; authoritative legal acts and acts of private autonomy. Regarding the first class, exemplified by statutes, I will argue against the applicability of Gricean theory due to the conflictual behaviour of (...) the addressees and, above all, to the insurmountable indeterminacy of the contextual elements. As far as acts of private autonomy are concerned, exemplified by contracts, I will argue that the cooperative principle is applicable, at least in those legal systems that include the principle of bona fides among the interpretative regulations of such acts. (shrink)

Ratio Juris, Volume 35, Issue 2, Page 191-222, June 2022.

This volume highlights important aspects of the complex relationship between common language and legal practice. It hosts an interdisciplinary discussion between cognitive science, philosophy of language and philosophy of law, in which an international group of authors aims to promote, enrich and refine this new debate. Philosophers of law have always shown a keen interest in cognitive science and philosophy of language in order to find tools to solve their problems: recently this interest was reciprocated and scholars from cognitive science (...) and philosophy of language now look to the law as a testing ground for their theses. Using the most sophisticated tools available to pragmatics, sociolinguistics, cognitive sciences and legal theory, an interdisciplinary, international group of authors address questions like: Does legal interpretation differ from ordinary understanding? Is the common pragmatic apparatus appropriate to legal practice? What can pragmatics teach about the concept of law and pervasive legal phenomena such as testimony or legal disagreements? (shrink)

Central to the legal positivism of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century was the dogma of the Ideal Legislator. Legal materials were to be interpreted as the work of an omniscient, coherent, consistent legislator. We argue that this dogma persists in the different guise of the competent speaker model, on which legal materials are the work of a competent speaker, who follows all the pertinent semantic and pragmatic rules. We will first lay out the Ideal Legislator (...) dogma as applied in legal interpretation, arguing that this dogma does not limit interpretive discretion but rather amplifies it by hiding it under the veil of an inexistent, purely instrumental rationality. We will then turn to the competent speaker model, showing that, despite its apparent neutrality, it proves to be a reincarnation of the Ideal Legislator dogma, for it, too, amplifies interpretive discretion, only it hides it under the veil of an inexistent, purely linguistic rationality. Finally, we will inquire into the different types of rationality and their relations, arguing that there is always a choice and value judgment involved in ascribing rationality to legislators, and that these choices and judgments need to be carefully inspected and normatively justified. (shrink)

The phenomenon of defeasibility has long been a central theme in legal literature. This essay aims to shed new light on that phenomenon by clarifying some fundamental conceptual issues. First, the most widespread definition of legal defeasibility is examined and criticized. The essay shows that such a definition is poorly constructed, inaccurate and generates many problems. Indeed, the definition hides the close relationship between legal defeasibility and legal interpretation. Second, this essay argues that no new definition is needed. I will (...) show that from an interpretative standpoint, there is nothing special about legal defeasibility. Contrary to what some authors maintain, no unique or privileged source of legal defeasibility exists, nor are there privileged arguments to justify it. Specifically, legal defeasibility refers to interpretative outcomes deriving from interpretative arguments that, on the one hand, are very different from one another, and, on the other, are often employed to justify different interpretative outcomes. In the legal field, the problems related to defeasibility have little in common with the problems that this label covers in other areas—such as logic or epistemology—and they are nothing but the well-known problems related to legal interpretation. In conclusion, this paper argues that as far as legal argumentation is concerned, the notion of legal defeasibility lacks explanatory power, and it should be abandoned. (shrink)

The relationship between legal interpretation and ordinary understanding has raised growing interest among legal scholars. According to the mainstream view, law is a communicative phenomenon and, therefore, the best theory of ordinary communication should also explain and guide legal interpretation. Certainly, it is very controversial which theory is the best one, but, even if there are many candidates, Grice’s conversation model has attracted a lot of attention. Some legal scholars claim that Grice’s theory of conversational maxims should be applied in (...) legal domain, while others dispute this claim. Izabela Skoczeń’s book, Implicatures within legal language provides an original contribution to this ongoing debate. Through an interdisciplinary approach that engages with the most recent advances in Pragmatics as well as with the most popular legal approaches, Skoczeń recasts Grice’s theory of conversational implicatures in order to explain the mechanisms behind court decisions. This review article provides a critical examination of Skoczeń’s book, highlighting its strengths as well as its problems. (shrink)

It is well known that Hermann Cohen was one of the first philosophers who engaged in the debate about non-Euclidean geometries and the concept of space. His relation to Hermann von Helmholtz, who played a major role in the same debate, is an illuminating example of how some of the leading ideas of Marburg neo-Kantianism, although motivated independently of scientific debates, naturally led to the examination of scientific works and scientists’ epistemological views. This paper deals with Cohen’s view of magnitudes (...) and measurement and with his – less known – review of Helmholtz’s paper “Zählen und Messen, erkenntnistheoretisch betrachtet”, which contains one of the first attempts to formulate a theory of measurement in the modern sense. The first part provides a brief introduction to this debate in its connection with the earlier discussion on geometrical axioms and the concept of space. The main sections deal with Helmholtz’s and Cohen’s approaches to the foundations of measurement. Cohen’s criticism of some of Helmholtz’s assumptions notwithstanding, my emphasis is on some unexpected affinities between these two approaches. In the concluding section, I rely on the constructive side of Cohen’s criticisms to reconsider the philosophical aspects of Helmholtz’s theory and draw a few comparisons with contemporary measurement theory. (shrink)

The global spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) or coronavirus disease 19 (COVID-19) has led to the imposition of severely restrictive measures by governments in the Western hemisphere. We feel a contrast between these measures and our freedom. This contrast, we argue, is a false perception. It only appears to us because we look at the issue through our contemporary moral philosophy of utilitarianism and an understanding of freedom as absence of constraints. Both these views can be (...) substituted with more sophisticated alternatives, namely an ethics of virtue and a notion of freedom of the will. These offer a fuller picture of morality and enable us to cooperate with the current restrictions by consciously choosing to adhere to them instead of perceiving them as draconian and immoral. We ask whether we should collaborate with the restrictions and argue that considerations of virtue will lead to an affirmative answer. More broadly, virtue ethics permits to deal with the practical concerns about how an individual should behave during this pandemic, given the current lockdown measures or lack thereof. -/- In section 1, we present how utilitarianism and a notion of freedom as negative liberty support the opposition to restrictive measures. In section 2, we outline an alternative based on an ethics of virtue and a more elaborated notion of free will. In the concluding section 3, we argue that considerations of virtue should guide the individual and public response to the emergency. (shrink)

What is a gene? Does it represent a natural kind, or is it just a tool for genomics? A clear answer to these questions has been challenged by postgenomic discoveries. In response, I will argue that the gene can be deemed a natural kind as it satisfies some requirements for genuine kindhood. Specifically, natural kinds are projectible categories in our best scientific theories, and they represent nodes in the causal network of the world (as in Khalidi. Natural Categories and Human (...) Kinds: Classification in the Natural and Social Sciences. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013; Khalidi. Synthese 195: 1379–1396, 2018; Khalidi. Are Sexes Natural Kinds, In: Dasgupta S, Weslake B (eds) Current Controversies in Philoso-phy of Science. Routledge, New York, 2020; Khalidi. Philos Sci 88:1–21, 2021). In Sect. 2, I will present a brief history of the gene and the controversy over its status. In Sect. 3, I will introduce the account of natural kinds considered in this paper. In Sect. 4, I will first present the relevant definition of genes and how they can be classified. Then, I will argue that the gene can be considered a natural kind as it satisfies the criteria for natural kindhood. Section 5 concludes. (shrink)

An inquiry drawing on the presence of Hellenistic philosophy in Philo provides a better knowledge of the diffusion of Hellenistic philosophy since the late ...

The topic tackled in this book is Philo's account of the complex, double-sided nature of God's acting - the two-sided coin of God as transcendent yet immanent, ...

This paper presents a model of persuasion in terms of goals and beliefs. Among the various ways to influence people, that is, to raise or lower the likelihood for them to pursue some goal, ranging from threat to suggestion, persuasion is viewed as a case of communicative non-coercive goal hooking. A persuader leads a persuadee to pursue some goal out of a free choice, i.e., by convincing him/her that the proposed goal is useful for some other goal that the persuadee (...) already has. It is argued that the Aristotelian persuasive strategies of logos, ethos and pathos are always present in every persuasive discourse, and that they are exploited to raise the value of the goal proposed and to strengthen the believability of the link between it and the persuadee's previous goals. The paper proposes an analysis of discourse in terms of a hierarchy of goals as a tool to single out these strategies within the discourse structure. By applying this model to different kinds of persuasive messages, it shows how, in the fragments presented, this kind of analysis allows to clarify the relationships between the persuader's and the persuadee's goals and to elucidate how much and how directly the persuader appeals to logos, ethos and pathos in his/her discourse. (shrink)

Function talk is a constant across different life sciences. From macro-evolution to genetics, functions are mentioned everywhere. For example, a limb’s function is to allow movement and RNA polymerases’ function is to transcribe DNA. Biochemistry is not immune from such a characterization; the biochemical world seems to be a chemical world embedded within biological processes. Specifically, biochemists commonly ascribe functions to biomolecules and classify them accordingly. This has been noticed in the recent philosophical literature on biochemical kinds. But while a (...) lot has been written on biological and psychological functions, little has been said explicitly about biochemical fuctions. Here, I explore functional attribution to biochemical molecules. I argue that if we accept this attribution, then biochemical functions are constituted by chemical dispositional properties that causally contribute to selected biological processes. In section 2, I discuss the controversy concerning the characterization of biochemical functions. In section 3, I consider whether a biological or a chemical under- standing of function can be applied to biochemical functions, illustrating the account with the example of vitamin B12. The result is that none of the theories on their own provides an adequate characterization. In section 4, I present an account of biochemical functions. In section 5, I assess this account taking into consideration common requirements for a theory of functions and an objection. (shrink)

In recent years, bioethical discourse around the topic of ‘genetic enhancement’ has become increasingly politicized. We fear there is too much focus on the semantic question of whether we should call particular practices and emerging bio-technologies such as CRISPR ‘eugenics’, rather than the more important question of how we should view them from the perspective of ethics and policy. Here, we address the question of whether ‘eugenics’ can be defended and how proponents and critics of enhancement should engage with each (...) other. (shrink)

Criminal liability for acts committed by AI systems has recently become a hot legal topic. This paper includes three different contributions. The first contribution is an analysis of the extent to which an AI system can satisfy the requirements for criminal liability: accomplishing an actus reus, having the corresponding mens rea, possessing the cognitive capacities needed for responsibility. The second contribution is a discussion of criminal activity accomplished by an AI entity, with reference to a recent case involving an online (...) bot, the Random Darknet Shopper. This discussion will provide the context for the analysis of commonalities and differences between criminal activities by humans and by artificial systems. The third contribution concerns the evaluation of different ways of addressing criminal activities by AI systems in a regulatory perspective. (shrink)

F. Brencio (2023), Embodied Attention. A phenomenological hypothesis, in D. Stoyanov (Ed.), Contemporary Neuropsychiatry: Implications from Cognitive Neuroscience, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Cambridge, pp. 26-42.

In this paper, we will explore the relation between molecular structure and functions displayed by biochemical molecules in complex physiological processes by using tools from the philosophy of science and the philosophy of scientific practice. We will argue that biochemical functions are weakly emergent from molecular structure by using an account of weak. In order to explore this thesis, we will consider the role of vitamin B12 in contributing to the process of erythropoiesis. The structure of the paper is the (...) following: First, we will consider biochemical functions and why they cannot be easily reduced to their chemical realisers. We will suggest weak emergence as an alternative while also accounting for the relevance of the context, in our case, systemic and organisational. The paper will conclude by considering (1) how the usage of tools from the philosophy of science, such as weak emergence, can aid our understanding of the relations between the components of complex phenomena, such as erythropoiesis, and (2) how the philosophy of scientific practice sheds light on the explanatory role of processes that are dynamically stabilised and the different levels of organisation implied. (shrink)

In his examination of the concepts of evil and impermanence, entitled “Evil and the Problem of Impermanence in Medieval Japanese Philosophy”, Yujin Nagasawa addresses four responses to the problem of impermanence, arguing that the only satisfactory response to the problem leads to an implication about supernaturalism. As Nagasawa puts it, “the problem of impermanence can be construed as a partial argument for supernaturalism and against naturalism”. In response to Nagasawa, I will take up the challenge of naturalism by trying to (...) deconstruct the arguments against indifferentism in order to reformulate and thus strengthen Nagasawa’s response to the problem of impermanence. I will then turn to the radicalization of this thesis by drawing out implications through a comparison with Dōgen’s thought. (shrink)

Metaphor has been considered as a cognitive process, independent of the verbal versus visual mode, through which an unknown conceptual domain is understood in terms of another known conceptual domain. Metaphor might instead be viewed as a cognitive process, dependent on the mode, which leads to genuinely new knowledge via ignorance. First, I argue that there are two main senses of ignorance at stake when we understand a metaphor: we ignore some existing properties of the known domain in the sense (...) that we disregard or neglect them; we ignore some “non-existing” properties of the known domain in the sense that they are not a piece of information belonging to the known domain, but emerge in metaphor interpretation. Secondly, I consider a metaphor as a reasoning device, guiding the interpreters along a path of inferences to a conclusion, which attributes to the target some properties of the source. In this path, interpreters might discover the ignored existing properties of the known domain and/or recover the “non-existing” properties, inferring or imagining the missing piece of information. Finally, I argue that, especially in visual metaphors, this process is guided by a “sentiment of rationality”, tracking a disruption of existing familiar conceptualisations of objects and/or actions and a recovery of ignored properties. (shrink)

Many studies have highlighted a substantial "bureaucracy domination" in procedures relating to migrants’ access to territory. This form of domination is marked by highly discretionary and arbitrary practices, enacted by the administrative authorities of the state. Only minor attention, however, has been devoted to the arbitrariness of judicial decisions and to the judicial role in general in the numerous proceedings that increasingly affect the path of migrants. This path is the main object of this paper. The study focuses on Italian (...) case law in expulsion and detention proceedings of irregular third country national citizens and asylum seekers and presents qualitative empirical research on decisions issued by the competent national authorities. The results have been analysed using a selection of theoretical tools, all referable to the general concept of the rule of law. The judicial decisions on pre-removal detention proceedings in two case studies are examined: the jurisprudence on detention of irregular migrants, in different offices of the Justice of the Peace in Italy; and the case law on detention of asylum seekers in the Ordinary Tribunal of Rome. The assumption underlying the research is that various conceptions of the rule of law may have different explanatory power when it comes to explaining the empirical results. To verify this hypothesis, the study proposes an overview of the main rule of law doctrines in the Western tradition of political and legal thought and applies the method of historical-conceptual analysis. As a result, the explanatory power of six theoretical models of the rule of law was verified against the data with the view to highlight the virtues and vices of the respective explanatory frameworks. This article reaches a two-fold conclusion. First, as far as the explanatory frameworks are concerned: the results of the two case studies cannot be fully explained by any of the models considered in this study. This fact alone casts doubts on the explanatory power of these theories and calls for further research on judicial decision-making more generally. Secondly, a key finding of the study regarding the notions of discretion and arbitrariness is that the judicial approach which assures the highest protection of rights is also the one that is most easily influenced by arbitrariness. The author argues that this paradox can be easily dissolved by paying attention to the plural dimensions of arbitrariness. If we consider arbitrariness from a legal point of view, i.e. as an illegal decision, it is unsurprising that the authority that most uses its discretionary powers is also the one most at risk of abusing these discretionary powers and hence of exercising arbitrary power. However, if we consider arbitrariness from the point of view of philosophical-political theory, i.e. as a form of domination characterised by the absence of sufficient justification, it is unsurprising that the judicial approach which assures the highest protection of rights is also the one that takes its own role as guarantor of these rights and of the constitutional democratic legal order as such most seriously. This judicial approach thus most often risks exercising its power in criticisable ways, as compared to an authority much more in line with the requirements of law enforcement agencies. Keywords: migration, discretion, justice, arbitrariness, civil rights, Rechtsstaat, expulsion, mixed constitution. (shrink)

Theory of Mind (ToM) or mentalization is the ability to understand and foresee the behavior referring to one's own and others' mental states (Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). This capacity, which is considered the most representative mechanism of social cognition, is a multifaceted set of competences liable to influence--and be influenced by--a manifold of psychosocial aspects. Studies on typical and atypical/clinical development during life showed that ToM is frequently delayed (e.g. in deafness) or impaired in many clinical (...) conditions (e.g. Autism Spectrum Disorder, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Schizophrenia, Borderline Personality Disorder, Parkinson's Disease, Alzheimer's Disease) and, on the other hand, may not be unequivocally a positive experience. It is therefore possible to consider the existence of multiple kinds of Theory of Mind. In fact, ToM may vary along a quantitative and a qualitative continuum. As for the quantitative dimension, the continuum is constituted by the fluctuation between high and low levels of ToM ability in different clinical conditions. Along this continuum, impairment can mean "not enough" ToM (for example in Autism Spectrum Disorder) as well as "too much" ToM (for example in Schizophrenia and Borderline Personality Disorder). The qualitative dimension--highly interrelated with the quantitative one--regards the shift between adaptive (e.g. prosocial, nice ToM) vs. unadaptive (e.g. antisocial, nasty ToM) mental states content. The issue is discussed in light of recent evidence from outstanding researchers working on typical and atypical/clinical populations along the life-span. Findings from the fields of psychology, neuropsychology and neuroscience enrich the research topic argumentation"--Page 2. (shrink)