An inquiry drawing on the presence of Hellenistic philosophy in Philo provides a better knowledge of the diffusion of Hellenistic philosophy since the late ...

_Aristotle on Prescription_ explores Aristotle’s deep reflections on rule-making as a process that is both distinct from that of particular deliberation and decision-making and fundamental to it, operating at the level both of the individual and of society as a whole.

The paper compares the two components of the Stoic definition ofpathos, the logico-linguistic component and the physiological, ‘pneumatic’ one, in order to examine the role that each of them plays in the onset ofpathos, its persistence in the human soul, its possible eradication. The analysis is focused on anger (ὀργή) which reveals some peculiarities, especially as regards its logical structure, due to the fact that this passion seems to be the combination of two different feelings. The anger indeed is classified (...) as a species of desire but the description of its onset also includes pain. (shrink)

The article, after providing a general survey of prescriptive theories (or theories on rules) in Hellenistic philosophy, tries to offer a detailed analysis of the moral doxography of Philo of Larissa conserved in Stobaeus' Anthology (Stob. Ecl. II 7, 2, pp. 39-40 W.-H. = 25 Wiśniewski, 2 Mette, 32 Brittain). According to this evidence, Philo divided moral philosophy in three parts : hortatory, or protreptic, topos, therapeutic topos, prescriptive topos –; besides, he parted the prescriptive topos into general and particular (...) logos. This doctrine is contextualised in rhetoric reflection of Hermagorean school and also considered in the light of Academic probabilism. In particular, Carneades' theory of the representations attested by Sextus, M VII 184 is the background against which to evaluate Philo's position. (shrink)

In order to stress their Socratic inheritance, the Stoics, in their writings - dialogues, collections of maxims or « memorabilia » –, either drew upon the ancient Socratic literature or quoted Socratic sayings in their own moral treatises. Their authorities were not only Xenophon and Plato’s dialogues, but the works of Antisthenes and Aeschines of Sphettos, minor trends in ancient Socratic literature, such as Phaedo or Simon, and part of the later Socratic literature, in particular Diogenes of Sinope and Crates (...) fof Thebes. (shrink)

The article aims at clarifying the Stoic theory of ``prescription'', more specifically, the Stoic reflection about the method to formulate rules and directions for moral conduct. First, the possibility to provide particular precepts is considered in the frame of some major doctrines such as the equivalence between moral end and conformity to nature, the theory of the ``indifferents'', the partition of actions into katorthomata and kathekonta. Accordingly, both internal Stoic debate on the real value of particular precepts, and Hermagoras' classification (...) of zetemata, are considered in order to bring up the impact of early Stoic prescriptive theory on late Hellenistic ethics. Special attention is paid to Seneca's evidence from Epistles 94 and 95 - in their relation to Hermagoras' teachings -, and Plutarch's text from De Stoic. rep., ch. 11, with regard to Chrysippus' theory of prescription. (shrink)

The article proposes a renewed analysis of the texts in which Aristotle claims that the term ‘good’ is spoken of in many ways and more precisely in as many ways as there are categories. After a revision of the traditional interpretations, a new reading of the texts is advanced in the light of the theory of predication described in Top. 103 b20-38 and Metaph. 1017 a7-30. The conclusion is that in the Aristotelian passages on the multivocity of ‘good’, the word (...) ‘good’ should not be meant as the predicate of categorially distinct realities, and therefore as a qualifying adjective, but itself as the subject of the question what is it? (τί ἐστι;) In this way, it is possible to advance the hypothesis that the homonymous notion of ‘good’ performs a predicative function, useful to the formulation of practical and prescriptive propositions. (shrink)

Les Stoïciens formulent une conception de la «substance», ou ousia, qui tient un rôle très important dans différentes parties de leur système, parmi lesquelles la cosmologie, la psychologie et l'éthique. Au concept de substance est liée ce qu.on appelle la table des quatre 'catégories'. Cette dernière est considéréepar certains interprètes récents comme l'issue d'un processus historique relativement long, qui trouve sa formulation achevée seulement avec Chrysippe. Les sources relatives à la théorie des quatre catégories forment, comme on le sait, une (...) tradition indirecte et dans une large mesure également hostile, parce qu'elle est transmise surtout par Plutarque, Plotin et les commentateurs aristotéliciens des Catégories. Pourtant, ces sources permettent de saisir certaines des questions qui sont au centre de la réflexion stoïcienne sur l'être. Parmi les plus significatives, il y a la question du rapport entre substance et matière, et la question de la signification de la substance individuelle. (shrink)

L’article analyse les témoignages stoïciens qui définissent la divinité comme «intellect» et comme «âme du monde», et qui permettent de déterminer les contenus de la pensée divine comme logoi, c’est-à-dire certains «discours» ou «raisonnements». En premier lieu, on examine les mots νοερόν, et νοητόν pour établir à quelles réalités les Stoïciens confèrent les caractères d’intelligence et d’intelligibilité et comment ils décrivent la pensée scientifique à laquelle ils comparent la pensée divine. En second lieu, on examine la théorie des raisons séminales (...) et ses relations historiques avec le problème des objets de la pensée divine. Enfin, on tente de montrer que les Stoïciens, tout en suivant la théologie démiurgique du Timée, unifient ce que Platon a tenu bien séparé : le Démiurge lui-même, l’âme du monde, le «vivant intelligible». (shrink)

The question I deal with is Aristotle’s treatment of agathon in Metaphysics VII 6, as compared to the treatment of the same notion in famous passages from Ethics and Topics. In these latter agathon is considered as homonymous in that it assumes as many meanings as the categories, whereas in Metaphysics VII 6 Aristotle employes the example of agathon in order to examine the relationship between every reality in itself and its essence. In this context Aristotle uses the notion of (...) “good in itself ”, as an example of ἕκαστον which should be identical to its essence : as a consequence of such an identity, “good in itself ” shoud be a synonymous notion and have a univocal definition. Is the treatment of agathon in Metaphysics VII 6 opposed to what Aristotle claims in Ethics and Topics? In my opinion, what is to be pointed out is not a contradiction, but a difference in perspective, which has rarely been emphasised. My aim is to analyse the possible reasons for this difference in perspective. (shrink)

In Philo of Alexandria and Greek Myth: Narratives, Allegories, and Arguments, a fresh and more complete image of Philo of Alexandria as a careful reader, interpreter, and critic of Greek literature is offered. Greek mythology plays a significant role in Philo of Alexandria's exegetical oeuvre. Philo explicitly adopts or subtly evokes narratives, episodes and figures from Greek mythology as symbols whose didactic function we need to unravel, exactly as the hidden teaching of Moses' narration has to be revealed by interpreters (...) of Bible. By analyzing specific mythologems and narrative cycles, the contributions to this volume pave the way to a better understanding of Philo's different attitudes towards literary and philosophical mythology. (shrink)