According to Kant, all events in nature are subject to the principle of causality. Nevertheless, free actions are possible, because freedom and the universal law of causality are compatible without contradiction. Quantum mechanics is indeterministic, i.e. it implies a violation of causality. It is shown that: 1) this indeterminism can be understood by means of a continuation of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, as it is, like determinism, just a special type of universal causality, occurring when objects are not completely determined, 2) (...) quantum mechanical indeterminacy must not be identified with freedom, because it occurs only within the realm of sensible appearances existing in space and time, whereas freedom belongs to an intelligible substratum that is not part of the sensuous world. (shrink)

Summary The question underlying this article is whether the Kantian transcendental philosophy is wide enough to constitute the objects of quantum physics as objects of possible experience and consequently to found the objectivity of quantum physical knowledge. It is shown that the Kantian determinations of the categories (quality, substance, causality) can be interpreted and elaborated in such a way that the quantum physical concept of an object characterized by nonobjectivity of properties is conceived. Therefore the categories are valid in quantum (...) mechanics and warrant the objectivity of quantum physical experience. By the interpretation of the Kantian infinite judgement as an indefinite proposition it is possible to define the non-objectivity of properties categorially as indefiniteness of qualities. In particular by the indefiniteness of the position-quality the non-permanent localizability of quantum mechanical objects can be understood a priori. However the object of possible experience, especially the quantum mechanical object is underdetermined by the categories of substance and causality: If the object is determined to be a substance it is not yet conceived to be an individual; its characterization by means of probability laws is categorially indeterminate. In so far the significance of transcendental philosophy for the foundation of quantum physics is limited. (shrink)

In unraveling the long-hidden issues of the most famous free speech case of all time, noted author I.F. Stone ranges far and wide over Roman as well as Greek history to present an engaging and rewarding introduction to classical antiquity and its relevance to society today. The New York Times called this national best-seller an "intellectual thriller.".

"A tribute to Chedva Zilberfarb, a "h, "Chedva of Shemiras Ha-lashon.".

In this article we consider certain elements of the normative theory of Jürgen Habermas in the light of the proposals of Bruce Ackerman, with a view to strengthening a concept of deliberative democracy applied to the legitimation of juridical rules. We do not construct a hierarchy of the two positions, but seek to bring together certain elements to achieve a common project. As the starting point for examining the work of the two authors, we take the scheme proposed by Habermas (...) in Faktizität und Geltung. In this connection, through the work of Ackerman, we intend to fill in some of the gaps that Habermas appears to have left in the theory of radical democracy applied to the law. The work of Ackerman can make a significant contribution to deliberative democracy, to the discourse principle that Habermas defines, and to the contractualist theories from a liberal perspective. The study of these contributions makes possible a critical judgment that enables the legitimation of juridical rules carried out by Habermas to acquire greater practicity. In examining the epistemological status of juridical science and law, we attempt to determine the weight and the performance of normative democracy. In Tarr's view, it is a matter for philosophers to examine direct democracy and its desirability. (shrink)

James I. The Political Works of James I. Reprinted from the Edition of 1616. With an Introduction by Charles Howard McIlwain. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918. cxi, 354 pp. Reprinted 2002 by The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.