The law is an extremely complex phenomenon. It is very difficult to determine it precisely as the complete comprehension and ultimate definition of the law are beyond human capabilities. Also, the law never coincides with its concept, nor does the concept of the law coincide with its definition. This fact shows that the real human capabilities for the comprehension, determination and definition of the law are very limited and the limits are unreliable. The concept of the law is relative as (...) well, which is why all the definitions of the law are also relative. The concept and the definition of the law are also relative because they are of necessity subjective. It is for this reason that they are never truthful. However, even when they are not truthful, they are always useful. Because of these essential cognitive shortcomings and limitations, the law is determined and defined realistically – in a conventional and operative manner – whenever it is possible to do so. Additional difficulties are created by the fact that the number of conventional concepts and definitions of the law is almost limitless. Fortunately, only a number of them, considered operative, are used in the law. And all this because of a possible usefulness. Should the law be useful, then its realistic concept can be determined by the establishment of its common characteristics. On the basis of having at its disposal the mentioned common characteristics, the concept of the law can be operationally determined in both the expanded sense and the restricted sense. Also, it is possible to tell the difference between the three main layers in the concept of the law: complete , incomplete and unfinished law. Obviously, the realistically determined concept of the law is not one-sided, nor is it monolithic, but complex, detailed and as a whole composed of layers of different degrees of being legal. They are used to finely tune the ordering of the relationships between different importance and the degree of the conflict and, which is also important, to legally regulate even those social areas that would otherwise be exclusively regulated with the state or with the social norms. Otherwise, even the Ten Commandments alone would be insufficient to regulate all human relationships. However, the law did not come into being out of leisure time, but out of dire human need to protect the society from self-destruction. Contrary to the realistic concept of the law, there also exist its idealistic, idealized and ideal concepts. However, the idealistic concept of the law is inoperative, the idealized concept of the law is not correct, while the ideal concept of the law is out of human reach.Das Recht stellt ein immens vielfältiges Phänomen dar. Ihn präzise festzulegen entpuppt sich als unsäglich schwierig, denn eine lückenlose Erkenntnis sowie endgültige Definition des Rechts liegt jenseits des menschlichen Vermögens. Zudem geht weder das Recht mit dessen Begriff konform, noch tut es der Begriff des Rechts mit eigener Bestimmung. Dieser Tatbestand lässt durchblicken, die wahre menschliche Befähigung zum Erkennen, Determinieren sowie Definieren des Rechts sei höchst begrenzt, wobei sich ebendiese Schranken als unzuverlässig erzeigen. Die Notion des Rechts ist ebenso relativ, weswegen hiernach sämtliche Begriffsbestimmungen des Rechts relativ sind. Der Begriff einschließlich der Definition des Rechts ist auch aufgrund der ihnen notwendigerweise innewohnenden Subjektivität relativ. Aus diesem Grund sind sie niemals wahrheitsgetreu. Allerdings, auch wenn sie der Wahrheit nicht entsprechen, sind sie stets von Nützlichkeit. Wegen der angebrachten essenziellen erkenntnismäßigen Unzulänglichkeiten und Limitierungen wird das Recht realistisch bestimmt und definiert – in einer konventionellen bzw. operativen Manier – wann immer dies durchführbar ist. Zusätzliche Erschwernisse werden von der Tatsache geschaffen, dass die Zahl der gebräuchlichen Begriffe und Definitionen des Rechts schier unermesslich ist. Glücklicherweise werden lediglich etliche, als operativ angesehene, im Bereich von Recht eingesetzt. Und all dies der denkbaren Nützlichkeit halber. Sollte das Recht nützlich sein, dann lässt sich dessen realistischer Begriff per Gründung seiner gemeinsamen Wesenszüge festsetzen. Auf der Basis der vorhin angeschnittenen, ihm zu Gebote stehenden angehörigen Merkmale, kann der Begriff des Rechts operational determiniert werden, sowohl im erweiterten als auch im engeren Sinne. Ebenfalls ist der Unterschied erkennbar zwischen drei Hauptschichten in dem Begriff des Rechts: vollständiges Recht , unvollständiges Recht und unvollendetes Recht . Augenscheinlich ist der realistischerweise bestimmte Begriff des Rechts weder einseitig noch monolithisch, stattdessen ist er komplex, detailliert und als Ganzes aus Schichten von ungleichem Rechtlichkeitsgrad zusammengestellt. Man gebraucht sie zur Feinabstimmung der Beziehungsordnung zwischen der unterschiedlichen Wichtigkeit und dem Grad des Konflikts, und, was genauso Gewicht hat, um sogar jene Gesellschaftszonen rechtmäßig zu regeln, die anderenfalls ausschließlich seitens der staatlichen bzw. gesellschaftlichen Normen geregelt würden. Ansonsten würden selbst die Zehn Gebote nicht genügen, um menschliche Verhältnisse in ihrer Gänze zu ordnen. Jedoch ist das Recht nicht als Freizeitaktivität entstanden, sondern im Gegenteil als unentbehrliches menschliches Bedürfnis nach Bewahrung der Menschheit vor Selbstauflösung. Der realistischen Notion des Rechts entgegengesetzt existieren parallel dessen idealistische, idealisierte und ideale Begriffe. Dabei gilt der idealistische Begriff als inoperativ, der idealisierte als inkorrekt, während der ideale Begriff außerhalb der menschlichen Reichweite liegt. (shrink)

Naša stvarnost bilježi dramatične promjene u moralnim stavovima ljudi. Kršćanskim i pravno-filozofskim pristupom nastojimo, u svjetlu tih promjena, promišljati pitanje etičkog aspekta zahtjeva kompetentnog pacijenta da umre te odluke liječnika povodom toga zahtjeva. Ovo promišljanje spada u područje ispitivanja osnovnih ljudskih vrijednosti. Ističemo da ljudsko dostojanstvo – kao središnja vrijednost – nije određeno vanjskim uzrocima i ne ovisi o stanju čovjekova zdravlja ili bolesti, ono je nešto unutrašnje, bitno i neotuđivo. Dakle, izvire iz cjelokupne kvalitete čovjekovog života kao osobe, kao (...) duhovno-tjelesnog bića, obdarenog razumom i slobodom, samoodgovornošću i mogućnošću samoodređenja – ukoliko prihvaćamo da je stvoren na sliku Božju . Historijska prizma promatranja ovog problema je zaista šarolika, od potpunog opravdavanja ovakvih zahtjeva, preko jedinstvene osude, sve do danas kada ovo pitanje dovodi do vrlo teških i skoro nerješivih rasprava na područjima morala i prava, uz naglašavanje da dekriminalizacija ovakvih postupaka može dovesti do »klizave nizbrdice«.Naš je polazni stav, s kršćanske pozicije, da ne postoji tako nešto kao što je život bez vrijednosti. Dakle, ističemo kršćanski pristup ljudskom životu i dostojanstvu, koji podrazumijeva postavku da čovjek ne dodjeljuje život te ga samim time niti ne može oduzeti, bez obzira na okolnosti i teškoće koje ga prate.Our reality is facing dramatic changes in the moral attitudes of people. In the light of those changes we are trying to consider the issue of ethical aspect of the competent patient’s request to die and the physician’s decision about it. This elaboration is situated within the field of questioning the basic human values. It is emphasized that the human dignity – being the central value – is not determined by external causes and not dependable on the condition of a person’s health or illnesses. Human dignity is something integral, essential, and inalienable. Thus human dignity springs from the overall quality of human life as of a unique human being, spiritual and physical being gifted with reason and freedom, self-responsibility, and the possibility of self-defining – in case we accept that a man is created in the image and likeness of God . The historical prism of considering this problem comes in varieties of forms, from the complete justifications of these requests, or their condemnation, till the contemporary disputes in the field of morality and law, with an emphasis on the possibility of “slippery slope” argumentation this decriminalization might lead to.Our starting point, from the Christian position, is that something like life without the value does not exist. Therefore we are pointing out the Christian approach to human life and dignity which presupposes the thesis saying that man does not give a life and therefore can not take it away, regardless of the hardship he might be experiencing. (shrink)

Ever since Bishop Stillingfleet accused John Locke of having unwittingly paved the way with his Essay for the alleged heresy promulgated in John Toland's Christianity Not Mysterious, the latter two thinkers and works have been consistently joined in histories of philosophy covering the rise of natural religion in England. While scholars have generally thought that Locke got the better of the good bishop in their subsequent written exchanges initiated by the charge, they appear merely to assume that Stillingfleet correctly read (...) Toland and that Locke accepts that reading. Perhaps the most obvious piece of evidence favoring that stance is that while Locke clearly admits "above reason" doctrines, Toland dismisses them: Christianity is not mysterious! It is curious, however, that Toland scholars readily point out many concepts that Toland used as being the same as or different from Lockean notions about which many Locke scholars are admittedly perplexed. Through patient exposition of relevant texts and letters, deconstruction of scholarly works, and careful reasoning, this book shows that Toland's deviations from Locke regarding reason and faith are far more minor than anyone has concluded. Stillingfleet was correct to connect them, but was incorrect in the way that he did it. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that Robert Boyle does not hold that true religion requires us to believe doctrines that are in violation of the law of noncontradictionor that it yields logical contradictions. Rather, due to the epistemological limitations of human reason, we are sometimes called to believe doctrines orpropositions that are at first blush contradictory but, upon further inspection, not definitively so. This holds for doctrines considered singly or together and is animportant qualifier to the traditional line of scholarship’s (...) flat claim that Boyle’s limits of belief are logical contradictions. My conclusions here are at odds withJan W. Wojcik’s claim, in her important, revisionist work on the famous natural philosopher, that he teaches that sometimes we are required to believe religiousdoctrines that violate the law of noncontradiction. (shrink)

This chapter serves as an introduction to the book, offering a description of problems in Lockean scholarship, the book's overall argument and approach, and more. Locke scholarship tends to be compartmentalized, which is problematic since Locke was a systematic polymath. Scholarship also tends to over-simplify the intense debates in which Locke found himself. Furthermore, scholars typically fail to make a distinction between Locke's programmatic and personal views. As a result of these tendencies, some label Locke as heterodox, others as orthodox, (...) and still others try to identify him as defending a particular sect, all depending on the narrative or issue the scholar is exploring. Most Lockean scholars approach him as being religiously surreptitious, sectarian, or sincere. This book adds to the voices that think Locke was forthright in his writings. This chapter also articulates the thesis for the entire book and the theses and coherence of the following chapters. (shrink)

It is my contention here that the chapter “Of Power,” in John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, is not a metaphysical pronouncement upon the liberty-necessity debates but more along the lines of what those like James Harris portray it to be: a description of our experience of freedom of the will. It is also prescriptive since it is descriptive of the right use of the will. My claims are based upon two key pieces of evidence that are responses to (...) William Molyneux’s oft noted critique of the first edition of the chapter: 1) an admission by Locke in his correspondence: at least part of the reason he is attempting to avoid metaphysical pronouncements is that trying to reconcile divine and human agency is too difficult; and 2) the theological message of “Of Power”—the truly free agent is reasonable, and the truly reasonable agent will have her eyes fixed on the afterlife, thus aiming for herself to be a slave and determined, therefore, by her ever-cultivated desire for righteousness and not by her fleshly desires—and his development of it throughout the chapter eludes sectarian categorization by the avoidance of theological issues that are not unrelated to the metaphysical question of human free agency. To frame his chapter otherwise makes him out to be a theological novice or, perhaps, unconcerned with the religious background of his readership. (shrink)

This essay argues that Locke’s presentation of justification and the soteriological framework in which it is placed in The Reasonableness of Christianity is broad enough to encompass all “Christian” views on the topics except antinomian ones. In other words, the focus of the treatise is not Locke’s personal views of justification and the broader doctrine of salvation but an ecumenical statement of them. Locke’s personal conclusions on certain theological issues discussed in the opening pages of The Reasonableness of Christianity has (...) led most to assume that the soteriological discussion that follows reveals Locke’s own personal theological position despite clear indications of his ecumenical intent in The Reasonableness of Christianity and elsewhere. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that Robert Boyle does not hold that true religion requires us to believe doctrines that are in violation of the law of noncontradiction or that it yields logical contradictions. Rather, due to the epistemological limitations of human reason, we are sometimes called to believe doctrines or propositions that are at first blush contradictory but, upon further inspection, not definitively so. This holds for doctrines considered singly or together and is an important qualifier to the traditional (...) line of scholarship’s flat claim that Boyle’s limits of belief are logical contradictions. My conclusions here are at odds with Jan W. Wojcik’s claim, in her important, revisionist work on the famous natural philosopher, that he teaches that sometimes we are required to believe religious doctrines that violate the law of noncontradiction. (shrink)

In this article I argue that the 1729 Dissertation on Liberty and Neces­sity should be attributed to Anthony Collins. This was the prevailing view until the publication of James O’Higgins’s 1970 biography of Collins. Since then, most have followed Collins’s modern-day biographer in denying that Collins penned the Dissertation. After reviewing O’Higgins’s six reasons for rejecting Collins as the author, I respond to the substantive issues in what follows. Part I is a historical positioning of the Clarke-Collins liberty-necessity debate where (...) I discuss the debate’s context, Collins’s methods and disposition, and timeline issues pertinent to ascribing authorship of the Dissertation to Collins. Part II is a demonstration of the fittingness of the Dissertation as Collins’s response to the earlier debate regarding liberty and necessity he had with Samuel Clarke. (shrink)

In this article I argue that the 1729 Dissertation on Liberty and Neces­sity should be attributed to Anthony Collins. This was the prevailing view until the publication of James O’Higgins’s 1970 biography of Collins. Since then, most have followed Collins’s modern-day biographer in denying that Collins penned the Dissertation. After reviewing O’Higgins’s six reasons for rejecting Collins as the author, I respond to the substantive issues in what follows. Part I is a historical positioning of the Clarke-Collins liberty-necessity debate where (...) I discuss the debate’s context, Collins’s methods and disposition, and timeline issues pertinent to ascribing authorship of the Dissertation to Collins. Part II is a demonstration of the fittingness of the Dissertation as Collins’s response to the earlier debate regarding liberty and necessity he had with Samuel Clarke. (shrink)

Both G.F.W. Hegel and Carl Schmitt took seriously the problem of political sovereignty entailed by liberal political theories. In Dictatorship (1919) and Political Theology (1922), Schmitt rejects liberal political theories that argue for the immediate unity of democracy and legality i.e., popular sovereignty, because he thinks they cannot secure political sovereignty. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel denounces popular sovereignty for similar reasons. Yet given Schmitt’s negative assessment of Hegel their positions are seldom related to one another. I argue in (...) this paper that Schmitt’s analysis of liberal political theories is similar to Hegel’s analysis of Rousseau’s liberal ideas. I contend, however, that Schmitt’s solution, which collapses the distinction between the executive and the legislative power in favor of the former, fails to secure political sovereignty. Contrary to Schmitt, Hegel conceives of the liberal predicament as a basic determination of any political state that rests on the division of the legislative and executive power. Hegel argues that the constitutional monarchy is a genuine instantiation of political sovereignty that can maintain not only the division of these powers, but also their unity. In this regard, I argue that Hegel’s conception of the division of powers provides a more convincing theory of the problem afflicting modern states than Schmitt’s and at least deserves to be taken more seriously by critics of Schmitt’s solution such as Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, Jurgen Habermas, Andreas Kalyvas and Chantal Mouffe. (shrink)

In response to Albrecht et al.’s (J Agric Environ Ethics 26(4):827–845, 2013) discussion on the ethics of assisted migration, we emphasize the issues of risk and scientific uncertainty as an inextricable part of a comprehensive ethical evaluation. Insisting on a separation of risk and ethical considerations, although arguably common in many policy contexts, is at best misguided and at worst damaging.

Jedno od najznačajnijih pitanja u filozofiji morala jest predstavljaju li moralni zahtjevi ujedno i razloge za djelovanje prema kojima se trebaju ravnati sve racionalne osobe. Prema jednoj koncepciji, moralni apsolutizam tvrdi da sve racionalne osobe imaju dovoljan razlog da poštuju moralne zahtjeve. Prema tom shvaćanju, moralni relativizam je tvrdnja da neće svi racionalni djelatnici imati dovoljan razlog da poštuju iste moralne zahtjeve. manje je istraženo pitanje što se događa ako pokušamo povezati filozofski naturalizam s pitanjem daju li moralni zahtjevi razloge (...) za djelovanje svim racionalnim djelatnicima. u ovom radu bavimo se potonjim pitanjem. neki autori smatraju da prihvaćanje filozofskog naturalizma nije važno za ovo pi- tanje. Drugi autori smatraju da filozofski naturalizam implicira relativizam u pogledu praktičnih razloga koji nije spojiv s moralnim apsolutizmom. u radu argumentiramo za to da su oba gledišta donekle ispravna. tvrdimo da ako se naturalizam shvati kao ontološka tvrdnja onda se možemo složiti s time da naturalizam ne igra ulogu u razrješenju debate između relativista i apsolutista. međutim, ako se naturalizam shvati kao metodološko gledište, onda smatramo da naturalizam podržava relativizam u pogledu praktičnih razloga, tj. ideju da moralni zahtjevi ne pružaju razloge za djelovanje svim racionalnim djelatnicima. (shrink)

We provide a novel Bayesian justification of inference to the best explanation. More specifically, we present conditions under which explanatory considerations can provide a significant confirmatory boost for hypotheses that provide the best explanation of the relevant evidence. Furthermore, we show that the proposed Bayesian model of IBE is able to deal naturally with the best known criticisms of IBE such as van Fraassen?s?bad lot? argument.

Political extremism remains relatively insufficiently explored due to the fact that the phenomenon is controversial and hard to define. Its ambiguity and variability depending on time and spatial point of view further complicates its definition. Its structure is amorphous and eclectic as it often includes elements from different ideologies and connects incompatible ideas. A multidimensional conceptualization and an interdisciplinary approach - sociological, social, psychological and historical, are the Author’s tools in explaining the phenomenon of political extremism in Serbia, hopefully contributing (...) to its clarification and laying a foundation for its further explanatory theoretical studies. (shrink)

The article explores the specific conception of art developed by Danko Grlić, a prominent member of the Yugoslav Praxis School. Grlić conceptualised art beyond both aesthetic norms and technological determinism. Within the context of praxis philosophy, a distinct theory of the subject and a Marxist humanist approach, he reconceptualised art as a distinct type of praxis, a revolutionary and creative practice of changing existing living conditions. The article explains how his unique understanding of art leads Grlić to analyse, criticise and (...) refute various Marxist approaches to art: art as an ideology, art as a reflection of the objective world, art as sociological analysis. Moreover, while sharing many ideas and conceptions with Walter Benjamin’s materialist conception of art, Grlić reached the point where he became critical due to Benjamin’s belief in technology concerning processes of emancipation, which Grlić viewed with scepticism. (shrink)

In an intriguing but neglected passage in the Transcendental Deduction, Kant appears to link the synthetic activity of the understanding in experience with the phenomenon of attention (B156-7n). In this paper, we take up this hint, and draw upon Kant's remarks about attention in the Anthropology to shed light on the vexed question of what, exactly, the understanding's role in experience is for Kant. We argue that reading Kant's claims about synthesis in this light allows us to combine two aspects (...) of Kant's views that many commentators have thought are in tension with one another: on the one hand, Kant's apparent commitment to naïve realism about perception and, on the other, his apparent commitment to the necessity of synthetic activity by the understanding for any kind of cognitive contact with external objects. (shrink)

In this paper, we will attempt to describe an integrative model that links stress, trauma, and post-traumatic health disorders through biological, psychological, and behavioral mechanisms of influence. Each of these phenomena has its specificities but also shares common characteristics (sources, symptoms, and consequences) related to health and an individual’s functioning. Prolonged stress and sudden experiences can lead to trauma, and repeated experiences of trauma over time can result in the development of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). This key mechanism illustrates how (...) long-term stress and trauma can lead to severe health impairment. A review of the literature on this topic, along with our many years of experience and research in these areas, reveals that the majority of authors in their research primarily focus on one of these topics, usually stress. There are fewer studies that provide a comprehensive representation of both stress and trauma. We have not come across any research that unifies all three topics in their presentation, highlighting the common elements as well as the specificities and differences. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate, through an integrative approach, the combined impact of these three phenomena on health and an individual’s functioning. First, we will describe each of these phenomena along with their respective specifications. Finally, we will attempt to integrate the knowledge of physiological and psychological mechanisms for dealing with stress, trauma, and post-traumatic stress disorder. Although challenging, we will also touch upon prevention strategies towards the end. (shrink)

Monetary intelligence theory asserts that individuals apply their money attitude to frame critical concerns in the context and strategically select certain options to achieve financial goals and ultimate happiness. This study explores the dark side of monetary Intelligence and behavioral economics—dishonesty. Dishonesty, a risky prospect, involves cost–benefit analysis of self-interest. We frame good or bad barrels in the environmental context as a proxy of high or low probability of getting caught for dishonesty, respectively. We theorize: The magnitude and intensity of (...) the relationship between love of money and dishonest prospect may reveal how individuals frame dishonesty in the context of two levels of subjective norm—perceived corporate ethical values at the micro-level and Corruption Perceptions Index at the macro-level, collected from multiple sources. Based on 6382 managers in 31 geopolitical entities across six continents, our cross-level three-way interaction effect illustrates: As expected, managers in good barrels, mixed barrels, and bad barrels display low, medium, and high magnitude of dishonesty, respectively. With high CEV, the intensity is the same across cultures. With low CEV, the intensity of dishonesty is the highest in high CPI entities —the Enron Effect, but the lowest in low CPI entities. CPI has a strong impact on the magnitude of dishonesty, whereas CEV has a strong impact on the intensity of dishonesty. We demonstrate dishonesty in light of monetary values and two frames of social norm, revealing critical implications to the field of behavioral economics and business ethics. (shrink)

This paper considers the question of whether the influential distinction between levels of explanation introduced by David Marr can be used as a general framework for contemplating levels of explanation in cognitive sciences. Marr introduced three levels at which we can explain cognitive processes: the computational, algorithmic, and implementational levels. Some argue that Marr’s levels of explanation can only be applied to modular cognitive systems. However, since many psychological processes are non-modular, it seems that Marr’s levels of explanation cannot explain (...) such psychological processes. To show that the latter claim is not convincing, the paper draws upon an influential paradigm from cognitive sciences that is based on the principle of free energy. Based on this paradigm, the paper argues that even non-modular psychological processes can be computationally analyzed and algorithmically implemented. The conclusion of the paper is that, at least under the assumption that the func- tion of the mind is to minimize free energy, Marr’s levels of explanation can be successfully used as a general framework for understanding psychological processes at different levels of description. (shrink)

In this new book, Marko Zlomislić argues that Slavoj Žižek's work does not contain any sort of radical emancipatory project, especially as it passes through the ideology of communism and Lacanian psychoanalysis. The evidence for the failure of communism is vast and includes the more than six hundred mass graves recently located in Žižek's homeland of Slovenia. Zlomislić demonstrates that the way out of the capitalist dilemma is not a repetition of communism but a return to the late medieval (...) notion of haecceity or "individual thisness" that was rejected by modernity. Haecceity, or the indescribable and indefinite here and now of the person, shows that the late medieval Franciscans were already "postmodernists." It is no wonder that the totalitarianism of the modernist Hegel is embraced by thinkers such as Žižek, Badiou, Hardt, Negri, and Laclau and was already rejected by Leibnitz, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Levinas, Deleuze, and Derrida. This important book shows that Žižek's work must be rejected because it does not uphold the dignity, worth, and uniqueness of the person. (shrink)

This paper deals with the problem of the subject in Bachelard?s concept of surrationalism. Focusing on the epistemological character of surrational creativity, the issue of the subject is approached through the analysis of the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity in the surrational act. Comparing the character of novelty in surrealism and surrationalism, the paper introduces Bachelard?s distinction between formal and material imagination, with the latter further discussed through the prepositions?against? [contre] and?in? [dans]. Bachelard?s theory of the internal dialectic - the (...) theory of subdivision of the subject - is analyzed through his concept of reverie. The last chapter deals with the dialectic between the apodictic and the assertoric subject, aiming to reconsider the idea of interiority and repose. (shrink)

This paper spells out and discusses four assumptions of the deficit model type of thinking. The assumptions are: First, the public is ignorant of science. Second, the public has negative attitudes towards (specific instances of) science and technology. Third, ignorance is at the root of these negative attitudes. Fourth, the public’s knowledge deficit can be remedied by one-way science communication from scientists to citizens. It is argued that there is nothing wrong with ignorance-based explanations per se. Ignorance accounts at least (...) partially for many cases of opposition to specific instances of science and technology. Furthermore, more attention needs to be paid to the issue of relevance. In regard to the evaluation of a scientific experiment, a technology, or a product, the question is not only who knows best?, but also what knowledge is relevant and to what extent?. Examples are drawn primarily from the debate on genetic engineering in agriculture. (shrink)

The paper explores Sreten Petrović’s contribution to Marxist aesthetics. Petrović developed his theory within the framework of the Yugoslav Praxis School, although he was not a member of it. Petrović followed Danko Grlić, a prominent member of the Praxis School, in explaining art as a specific emanation of praxis – free, creative, autonomous and self-emancipatory activity beyond the commodity form of capitalist society. Art was thus understood as the liberation and emancipation of Being and its essence. However, Petrović also introduced (...) a novelty – he claimed that art can never be fully understood nor explained. According to him, the only true Marxist aesthetics, given our limited cognitive abilities and the capitalist imperative of producing commodities, would be to limit aesthetics to meta-aesthetics and affirm the ‘critique of the aesthetic mind’. We argue that by limiting aesthetics to meta-aesthetics Petrović is following the young Wittgenstein and his proposition that the world is unintelligible to philosophy. Accordingly, we claim that Petrović’s contribution should be seen as an important contribution to Marxist aesthetics. (shrink)

Monetary Intelligence theory asserts that individuals apply their money attitude to frame critical concerns in the context and strategically select certain options to achieve financial goals and ultimate happiness. This study explores the bright side of Monetary Intelligence and behavioral economics, frames money attitude in the context of pay and life satisfaction, and controls money at the macro-level and micro-level. We theorize: Managers with low love of money motive but high stewardship behavior will have high subjective well-being: pay satisfaction and (...) quality of life. Data collected from 6586 managers in 32 cultures across six continents support our theory. Interestingly, GDP per capita is related to life satisfaction, but not to pay satisfaction. Individual income is related to both life and pay satisfaction. Neither GDP nor income is related to Happiness. Our theoretical model across three GDP groups offers new discoveries: In high GDP entities, “high income” not only reduces aspirations—“Rich, Motivator, and Power,” but also promotes stewardship behavior—“Budget, Give/Donate, and Contribute” and appreciation of “Achievement.” After controlling income, we demonstrate the bright side of Monetary Intelligence: Low love of money motive but high stewardship behavior define Monetary Intelligence. “Good apples enjoy good quality of life in good barrels.” This notion adds another explanation to managers’ low magnitude of dishonesty in entities with high Corruption Perceptions Index. In low GDP entities, high income is related to poor Budgeting skills and escalated Happiness. These managers experience equal satisfaction with pay and life. We add a new vocabulary to the conversation of monetary intelligence, income, GDP, happiness, subjective well-being, good and bad apples and barrels, corruption, and behavioral ethics. (shrink)

This paper examines the social theory of Lester Frank Ward, one of the most significant representatives of early American social theory, with particular attention to his conception of the state, which can be described as Hegelian. The first part of the paper gives a brief overview of early American social theory: its basic features, the issues that were the focus of attention during this period in the development of sociology in the US, and its most significant representatives. The basic features (...) of Ward’s social theory are then presented and examined in more detail. It is pointed out that it is: conceptual and essentially based on the natural sciences; based on the distinction between pure and applied sociology; systematic; supportive of progressive and pro-social reforms. It was directed against the individualist tradition. His theory was based on the belief that the human mind can direct social progress and that the order based on social inequalities, which is a product of the laissez-faire doctrine, cannot guarantee freedom and prosperity. The fundamental institution capable of doing so is the state. Therefore, the central part of this paper is devoted to his conception of the state and makes a comparison with Hegel’s theory of the ethical state contained in Hegel’s philosophy of objective spirit – philosophy of law and philosophy of history. It concludes by pointing out that Ward’s theory indicated the general direction of development of social circumstances towards the era of collectivism, and was also atypical of American social theory in some of its features. (shrink)

The article is a summary of recent experimental data on anchoring heuristic and models that seek to explain it. Anchoring heuristic represents one of the mechanisms of decision making in situations of limited information or time, by using a comparison standard called – an anchor. Given the supposed wide usage of this heuristic, authors explore the unconscious character of the heuristic and ways of making its biasing effects less prominent. Apart from the standard experimental design in which anchor is directly (...) connected to the judgment in question, evidence shows that people can be anchored indirectly, even when the anchor is perceived unconsciously. Newest data show that anchoring effect should be explained by two distinct processes. In the concluding remarks, authors consider broader implications of anchoring for the field of social cognition.U članku se opisuju noviji eksperimentalni nalazi vezani uz heuristiku sidrenja kao i modeli koji ih objašnjavaju. Heuristika sidrenja označava jedan od načina na koji ljudi donose odluke u nedostatku informacija i/ili vremena, a podrazumijeva korištenje standarda usporedbe kako bi se došlo do željene procjene. S obzirom na pretpostavljenu široku upotrebu ove heuristike, u članku se istražuju teoretska objašnjenja, razjašnjavaju razlozi zbog kojih je utjecaj te heuristike nedostupan svijesti te kako umanjiti njome izazvanu pristranost u razmišljanju. Osim standardnog nacrta kojim se ispituje ovaj fenomen opisani su i dokazi prema kojima sidro može vršiti svoj utjecaj i kad se ne dovodi u direktnu vezu s procjenom, čak i kada je percipirano nesvjesnim putem. Najnoviji skup istraživanja pak pokazuje da se heuristika sidrenja, prvotno zamišljena kao jedinstveni mehanizam, zapravo može podijeliti na dva bitno različita procesa. Zaključno se razmatraju kakve bi implikacije ovaj razvoj u istraživanjima mogao imati za područje socijalne kognicije općenito. (shrink)

In their paper “Is psychopathy a mental disease?”, Thomas Nadelhoffer and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argue that according to any plausible account of mental disorder, neural and psychological abnormalities correlated with psychopathy should be regarded as signs of a mental disorder. I oppose this conclusion by arguing that at least on a naturalistically grounded account, such as Wakefield’s ‘Harmful Dysfunction’ view, currently available empirical data and evolutionary considerations indicate that psychopathy is not a mental disorder.

Corruption involves greed, money, and risky decision-making. We explore the love of money, pay satisfaction, probability of risk, and dishonesty across cultures. Avaricious monetary aspiration breeds unethicality. Prospect theory frames decisions in the gains-losses domain and high-low probability. Pay dissatisfaction (in the losses domain) incites dishonesty in the name of justice at the individual level. The Corruption Perceptions Index, CPI, signals a high-low probability of getting caught for dishonesty at the country level. We theorize that decision-makers adopt avaricious love-of-money aspiration (...) as a lens and frame dishonesty in the gains-losses domain (pay satisfaction-dissatisfaction, Level 1) and high-low probability (CPI, Level 2) to maximize expected utility and ultimate serenity. We challenge the myth: Pay satisfaction mitigates dishonesty across nations consistently. Based on 6500 managers in 32 countries, our cross-level three-dimensional visualization offers the following discoveries. Under high aspiration conditions, pay dissatisfaction excites the highest- (third-highest) avaricious justice-seeking dishonesty in high (medium) CPI nations, supporting the certainty effect. However, pay satisfaction provokes the second-highest avaricious opportunity-seizing dishonesty in low CPI entities, sustaining the possibility effect—maximizing expected utility. Under low aspiration conditions, high pay satisfaction consistently leads to low dishonesty, demonstrating risk aversion—achieving ultimate serenity. We expand prospect theory from a micro and individual-level theory to a cross-level theory of monetary wisdom across 32 nations. We enhance the S-shaped Curve to three 3-D corruption surfaces across three levels of the global economic pyramid, providing novel insights into behavioral economics, business ethics, the environment, and responsibility. (shrink)

Derrida has been interpreted as a nihilist and relativist. This study demonstrates that he has an ethics and a concern for religion that goes beyond the structures of the philosophical tradition.

The philosophical literature on reasoning is dominated by the assumption that reasoning is essentially a matter of following rules. This paper challenges this view, by arguing that it misrepresents the nature of reasoning as a personal level activity. Reasoning must reflect the reasoner’s take on her evidence. The rule-following model seems ill-suited to accommodate this fact. Accordingly, this paper suggests replacing the rule-following model with a different, semantic approach to reasoning.

Introduction. Going digital: cinema's new age -- The reality of the index, or where does the truth lie? -- Physical presences: reality, materiality, corporeality -- Spatial coordinates: in between celluloid strips and codified pixels -- Rediscovering cinematic time -- Tracing an ethics of the movie image -- Conclusion. change: a point of constant departure.

Aristotle was the founder not only of logic but also of modal logic. In the Prior Analytics he developed a complex system of modal syllogistic which, while influential, has been disputed since antiquity--and is today widely regarded as incoherent. Combining analytic rigor with keen sensitivity to historical context, Marko Malink makes clear that the modal syllogistic forms a consistent, integrated system of logic, one that is closely related to other areas of Aristotle's philosophy. Aristotle's modal syllogistic differs significantly from (...) modern modal logic. Malink considers the key to understanding the Aristotelian version to be the notion of predication discussed in the Topics--specifically, its theory of predicables and the ten categories. The predicables introduce a distinction between essential and nonessential predication. In contrast, the categories distinguish between substantial and nonsubstantial predication. Malink builds on these insights in developing a semantics for Aristotle's modal propositions, one that verifies the ancient philosopher's claims of the validity and invalidity of modal inferences. While it acknowledges some limitations of this reconstruction, Aristotle's Modal Syllogistic brims with bold ideas, richly supported by close readings of the Greek texts. (shrink)

Background and Aims: The COVID-19 pandemic has led to radical and unexpected changes in everyday life, and it is plausible that people’s psychophysical health has been affected. This study examined the relationship between COVID-19 related knowledge and mental health in a Croatian sample of participants.MethodsAn online survey was conducted from March 18 until March 23, 2020, and a total of 1244 participant responses were collected. Measures included eight questions regarding biological features of the virus, symptoms, and prevention, the Hospital Anxiety (...) and Depression Scale, and Optimism-Pessimism Scale. According to the answers given on the questions on COVID-19 related knowledge, participants were divided in two groups: informed and uninformed on each question. They were then compared in the expressed levels of anxiety, depression, pessimism, and optimism. Full vs. partial mediation models with optimism/pessimism as a mediator in the relationship between anxiety/depression and the accuracy of responses for questions about handwashing and ways of transmission were estimated.ResultsParticipants who responded correctly on the question about handwashing had higher levels of anxiety, depression, and pessimism than those participants whose answer was incorrect, while participants who answered correctly on the question about the percentage of patients who develop serious breathing problems had higher levels of depression than those who answered incorrectly. Lower levels of anxiety and pessimism were observed in the participants who answered correctly about ways of transmission. Higher levels of pessimism were found in participants who scored incorrectly on questions about the efficiency of antibiotics, most common symptoms, and the possibility of being infected by asymptomatic carriers. Higher levels of knowledge about handwashing were predicted by higher levels of anxiety and pessimism. Higher levels of knowledge about ways of transmission were predicted by lower levels of anxiety and lower levels of pessimism. The examined relationships between anxiety/depression and knowledge were mediated by pessimism.ConclusionThe findings of this study suggest that knowledge about COVID-19 may be useful to reduce anxiety and depression, but it must be directed to the promotion of health behaviors and to the recognition of fake news. (shrink)

Regress arguments have convinced many that reasoning cannot require beliefs about what follows from what. In this paper I argue that this is a mistake. Regress arguments rest on dubious (although deeply entrenched) assumptions about the nature of reasoning — most prominently, the assumption that believing p by reasoning is simply a matter of having a belief in p with the right causal ancestry. I propose an alternative account, according to which beliefs about what follows from what play a constitutive (...) role in reasoning. (shrink)