Combat sports and martial arts are often associated with aggressiveness among the general public, although data on judo and/or martial arts and aggressiveness seem to be unclear. This research aims to compare athletes who have trained judo for a prolonged time and athletes from various team sports, primarily regarding the manifestation of aggression, but also regarding personality traits, emotional intelligence, and self-efficacy. Also, the potential predictive value of personality traits, emotional intelligence, and self-efficacy for aggression within subsamples of judokas and (...) team athletes was tested. The research findings showed that professional judo athletes are characterized by a low degree of aggression, especially low indirect and physical manifestations of aggression. In addition, the personality traits Honesty-Humility and Openness to experience are well expressed, contrary to Emotionality and Extraversion, which are less pronounced. They are also characterized by moderate general self-efficacy. On the other hand, members of team sports produced the opposite results, as they are characterized by increased aggression, pronounced traits of Emotionality and Extraversion, somewhat less pronounced traits of Honesty-Humility, Openness to new experience, and less pronounced general self-efficacy. The percentage of explained variability of aggression is slightly higher in the subsample of team sports and constitutes 49.9% of the variability, while in the subsample of judokas it constitutes 47.8% of the variability of the criteria. Practical implications, limitations, and future research directions were discussed. (shrink)

In Tulving’s initial characterization, episodic memory was one of multiple memory systems. It was postulated, in pursuit of explanatory depth, as displaying proprietary operations, representations, and substrates such as to explain a range of cognitive, behavioural, and experiential phenomena. Yet the subsequent development of this research program has, paradoxically, introduced surprising doubts about the nature, and indeed existence, of episodic memory. On dominant versions of the ‘common system’ view, on which a single simulation system underlies both remembering and imagining, there (...) are no processes unique to memory to support robust generalizations with inductive potential. Eliminativism about episodic memory seems to follow from the claim that it has no dedicated neurocognitive system of its own. After identifying this under-noticed threat, we push back against modern eliminativists by surveying recent evidence that still indicates specialized mechanisms, computations, and representations that are distinctly mnemic in character. We argue that contemporary realists about episodic memory can retain lessons of the common system approach while resisting the further move to eliminativism. (shrink)

Business Ethics: A European Review, EarlyView.

Technocracy is the economic and social control of the community and individuals that is noticeable in both the East and the West. The technetronic era involves the gradual appearance of a more controlled and directed society. Such a society would be dominated by an elite whose claim to political power would rest on allegedly superior scientific know-how. Technocrats have never cared about political ideology, but rather only about the best and most efficient solutions to problems. Science is to be admired (...) because it gives us power over nature, and the power comes wholly from technique. Technology becomes more biological, while biology becomes more technological. In the pandemic, biosurveillance contains abstract forms of the panopticon, as a category of power with a disciplinary function aimed at imposing certain behavior and exploiting the power of human capital, which includes the biopolitical body on the one hand, in Foucault’s perspective, and social control, as seen by Gilles Deleuze, on the other. In biosurveillance capitalism, corporate capital brings together controlled, dispersive, comprehensive, and ubiquitous networked power. Biosurveillance of individuals is not only carried out through ideologies but also through consciousness – both in and over the body in the spectacle of fear and media programming, through all aspects of social life. The article proves that technocracy has possessed every aspect of biosurveillance in society because it has gained instrumental power that tends to instrumentalize behavior, modification, prediction, and control. Through biosurveillance, technocracy tends to create obedient subjects and dominate the private sphere by domains of public interest. Technocracy has controlled the sovereign power that demands obedience, the disciplinary power that demands submission, and the regulative power that demands obedience and submission to the health of the class through an organized system of psychological intervention and legislative norms. (shrink)

We live, according to some, in the century of biology, where we now understand ourselves in radically new ways as the insights of genomics and neuroscience have opened up the workings of our bodies and our minds to new kinds of knowledge and intervention. Is a new figure of the human, and of the social, taking shape in the 21st century? With what consequences for the politics of life today? And with what implications, if any, for the social, cultural and (...) human sciences? These are the issues that are discussed in this article, which argues that a new relation is requred with the life sciences, beyond commentary and critique, if the social and human sciences are to revitalize themselves for the 21st century. (shrink)

The Galilean explanatory style is characterized by the search for the underlying structure of phenomena, the positing of "deep" explanatory principles, and a view of the relation between theory and data, on which the search for "crucial data" is of primary importance. In this paper, I trace the dynamics of adopting the Galilean style, focusing on the science of episodic memory. I argue that memory systems, such as episodic and semantic memory, were posited as underlying competences producing the observable phenomena (...) of memory. Considered in idealized isolation from other systems, episodic memory was taken to underlay the ability of individuals to remember events from their personal past. Yet, in reality, memory systems regularly interact, standing in many-to-many relations to actual memory tasks and experiences. Upon this backdrop, I explore a puzzle about the increasing prominence of the notion of autonoetic consciousness in Tulving's theory of episodic memory. I argue that, contrary to widespread belief, the prominence is not best explained by the purported essential link between autonoetic consciousness and episodic memory. Rather, it is explained by the fact that autonoetic consciousness, hypothesized to uniquely accompany episodic retrieval, was considered a source of crucial data, predictable only from theories positing a functionally distinct episodic memory system. However, with the emergence of a new generation of theories, positing wider memory systems for remembering and imagination, the question of the relation between episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness has been reopened. This creates a pressing need for de-idealization, triggering a new search for crucial data. (shrink)

In this chapter, we examine the naturalist approach in the philosophy of memory through the lens of the simulation theory of memory. On the theory, episodic memory is a kind of constructive simulation performed by a functionally specialized neurocognitive system. Taking naturalism to be a kind of methodological stance characterized by a cluster of epistemic guidelines, we illustrate the roles these guidelines have played in the development of the theory. We show how scientific evidence has guided both the selection of (...) the research question and the initial elaboration of the theory. We demonstrate how such evidence has led the simulationist to reject a familiar, commonsense picture of memory. We also trace the recent radicalization of the theory, highlighting the simulationist's continual reflection on their concepts and assumptions. In the spirit of such reflection, we end by outlining some outstanding challenges for the theory. (shrink)

In the philosophy of memory, singularism is the view that episodic memories are singular mental states about unique personally experienced past events. In this paper, I present an empirical challenge to singularism. I examine three distinct lines of evidence from the psychology of memory, concerning general event memories, the transformation of memory traces and the minimized role temporal information plays in major psychological theories of episodic memory. I argue that singularist views will have a hard time accommodating this evidence, facing (...) a problem of transitional gradation. I then look at some potential consequences for the larger debate, highlighting the way in which singularism has featured in three important recent arguments in the philosophy of memory. (shrink)

The human body was made legible long ago. But what of the human mind? Is it possible to ‘read’ the mind, for one human being to know what another is thinking or feeling, their beliefs and intentions. And if I can read your mind, how about others – could our authorities, in the criminal justice system or the security services? Some developments in contemporary neuroscience suggest the answer to this question is ‘yes’. While philosophers continue to debate the mind-brain problem, (...) a range of novel technologies of brain imaging have been used to argue that specific mental states, and even specific thoughts, can be identified by characteristic patterns of brain activation; this has led some to propose their use in practices ranging from lie detection and security screening to the assessment of brain activity in persons in persistent vegetative states. This article reviews the history of these developments, sketches their scientific and technical bases, considers some of the epistemological and ontological mutations involved, explores the ecological niches where they have found a hospitable environment, and considers some implications of this materialization of the readable, knowable, transparent mind. (shrink)

This article examines the global and worsening problem of research misconduct as it relates to bio-medico-legal education. While research misconduct has serious legal implications, few adequate legal remedies exist to deal with it. With respect to teaching, research ethics education should be mandatory for biomedical students and physicians. Although teaching alone will not prevent misconduct, it promotes integrity, accountability, and responsibility in research. Policies and law enforcement should send a clear message that researchers should adhere to the highest standards of (...) ethics in research. It is vital that researchers and physicians understand basic aspects of law and the legal system in order to develop understanding of the medico-legal issues not just in the legal context, but with a sound grounding in ethics, social and theoretical contexts so that they can practice good medicine. Routine and holistic research ethics education across the curriculum for medical students and resident physicians, and continuing medical education for practicing doctors, are probably the best ways to accomplish this goal. (shrink)

This article explores contemporary biopolitics in the light of Michel Foucault's oft quoted suggestion that contemporary politics calls `life itself' into question. It suggests that recent developments in the life sciences, biomedicine and biotechnology can usefully be analysed along three dimensions. The first concerns logics of control - for contemporary biopolitics is risk politics. The second concerns the regime of truth in the life sciences - for contemporary biopolitics is molecular politics. The third concerns technologies of the self - for (...) contemporary biopolitics is ethopolitics. The article suggests that, in these events, human beings have become `somatic individuals': personhood is increasingly being defined in terms of corporeality, and new and direct relations are established between our biology and our conduct. At the same time, this somatic and corporeal individuality has become opened up to choice, prudence and responsibility, to experimentation, to contestation and so to a politics of `life itself'. (shrink)

Social theory has much to gain from taking up the challenges of conceptualizing ‘mental health’. Such an approach to the stunting of human mental life in conditions of adversity requires us to open up the black box of ‘environment’, and to develop a vitalist biosocial science, informed by and in conversation with the life sciences and the neurosciences. In this paper we draw on both classical and contemporary social theory to begin this task. We explore human inhabitation – how humans (...) inhabit their ‘ecological niches’ – and examine a number of conceptual developments that ‘deconstruct’ the binary distinction between organism and environment. We argue that we must understand the neurological, ecological and social pathways and mechanisms that shape human (mental) life if we are to address the central concerns of our discipline with inequity and injustice as these are inscribed into the bodies and souls of human beings. (shrink)

The Hard Question of memory is the following: how are memory representations stored and organized so as to be made available for retrieval in the appropriate circumstances and format? In this essay, I argue that philosophical theories of memory should engage with the Hard Question directly and seriously. I propose that declarative memory is a faculty performing a kind of cognitive triage: management of information for a variety of uses under significant computational constraints. In such triage, memory representations are preferentially (...) selected and stabilized, but also systematically modified and integrated into generalized, model-like representational structures. Further, I propose a hybrid theory of remembering, which takes into account both the nature of the cognitive processes underlying remembering and the norms that govern representational success in relevant cognitive/epistemic contexts. (shrink)

This article argues that a new diagram is emerging in the criminal justice system as it encounters developments in the neurosciences. This does not take the form that concerns many ‘neuroethicists’ — it does not entail a challenge to doctrines of free will and the notion of the autonomous legal subject — but is developing around the themes of susceptibility, risk, pre-emption and precaution. I term this diagram ‘screen and intervene’ and in this article I attempt to trace out this (...) new configuration and consider some of the consequences. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that causal theories of memory are typically committed to two independent, non-mutually entailing theses. The first thesis pertains to the necessity of appropriate causation in memory, specifying a condition token memories need to satisfy. The second pertains to the explanation of memory reliability in causal terms and it concerns memory as a type of mental state. Post-causal theories of memory can reject only the first (weak post-causalism) or both (strong post-causalism) theses. Upon this backdrop, I (...) examine Werning’s (2020) causalist argument from probabilistic correlation. I argue that it doesn’t establish the necessity of appropriate causation and thus it can only target strong post-causalist theories. I end up by presenting some general considerations, suggesting that memories may not always be causally linked to past experiences. (shrink)

This paper offers a modeling account of episodic representation. I argue that the episodic system constructsmental models: representations that preserve the spatiotemporal structure of represented domains. In prototypical cases, these domains are events: occurrences taken by subjects to have characteristic structures, dynamics and relatively determinate beginnings and ends. Due to their simplicity and manipulability, mental event models can be used in a variety of cognitive contexts: in remembering the personal past, but also in future-oriented and counterfactual imagination. As structural representations, (...) they allow surrogative reasoning, supporting inferences about their constituents which can be used in reasoning about the represented events. (shrink)

People can have or lack ‘integrity’. But can public institutions? It is common to speak of the ‘integrity’ of such institutions: in popular discourse, legal decisions, law and regulations, and also increasingly, political theory, and proximate disciplines. Such integrity is often said to be at risk of being ‘subverted,’ ‘corroded,’ and ‘corrupted,’ by both forces within and without. Furthermore, the implication is that this is a very worrying thing. The integrity of our institutions, at least, needs to be preserved, supported, (...) and defended; against money, politics, power, and populists. However, despite such common usage, the concept itself has attracted little theoretical reflection. What can it mean, if anything sensible, for an institution itself – instead of a person (or even say, a body, process, territory or a bridge) – to have ‘integrity’? And, why might it be so important? This is the subject of this paper. It puts forward a substantive moral conception of institutional integrity as the robust disposition of an institution to pursue its purpose efficiently, within the constraints of legitimacy, consistent with its commitments. It argues that it is important because it provides the strongest grounding for a ‘duty of support’ owed by citizens to the institution. The strength of such support owed also gives content to a scalar dimension of the institution’s normative legitimacy, that is, the ‘strength’ (or weakness) of such legitimacy. Further, it illustrates how such a conception of institutional integrity will helpfully advance the current debate regarding institutional corruption. (shrink)

The topicality of Friedrich Nietzsche’s thought is reflected in his critique of mass culture, society and the state, and scientific methods, which later had a significant impact on modern discourse. Mass culture is the foundation of modern social reality as a force of decadence and nihilism that degrades the authentic and creates a mediocre culture. Nietzsche opposed a “culture” that implies a transcendence and sublimation of “nature” into the forms of “moral” ideals, and he called for a natural life without (...) harmful cultural influences that are an obstacle to a healthy human life. The idea of nihilism present in culture is relevant to our time because it manifests as a loss of depth or meaning in life itself, which, like nature, is chaos, without structure or empirical evidence. To understand the scientific revolution and its impressively devastating pace in the high-tech laboratories of our global research ecosystem, relevant is Nietzsche’s perspective aimed at demystifying science, especially positivism and naturalism, which seek to impose truth based on scientifically verified knowledge. Scientific interpretations and constructions are efforts to control and “humanise” nature by adapting chaos to our anthropomorphic expectations, needs, and concerns and making chaotic nature predictable. The paper shows that Nietzsche’s critique of culturalism and naturalism is based on the vision of the life of the “last man human” who rejects the culture of self-overcoming and dismantles reduces the fear of the uncertain and sudden and lives enframed in reality as presented by the scientific community. In the life of the contemporary human being, the will to live is merely maintained because he lacks the will to power. (shrink)

Taking the ‘Fridays for Future’ movement as its starting point, this article conceptualizes and defends youth disobedience, understood as principled disobedience by legal minors. The article first argues that the school strike for climate can be viewed as civil disobedience. Then, the article distinguishes between various forms of youth disobedience. Building on the democratic rationale for civil disobedience, the remainder of the article argues that there is a special justification for youth disobedience. To show this, it argues that children are (...) wrongfully excluded from political participation and that principled law-breaking can be an important remedy to this exclusion. The upshot is that adults should engage seriously and leniently with youth disobedience. (shrink)

Despite seeming uniformity in the law, end-of-life controversies have highlighted variations among state brain death laws and their interpretation by courts. This article provides a survey of the current legal landscape regarding brain death in the United States, for the purpose of assisting professionals who seek to formulate or assess proposals for changes in current law and hospital policy. As we note, the public is increasingly wary of the role of organ transplantation in determinations of death, and of the variability (...) of brain death diagnosing criteria. We urge that any attempt to alter current state statutes or to adopt a national standard must balance the need for medical accuracy with sound ethical principles which reject the utilitarian use of human beings and are consistent with the dignity of the human person. Only in this way can public trust be rebuilt. (shrink)

In Critique and Disclosure, Nikolas Kompridis argues provocatively for a richer and more time-responsive critical theory. He calls for a shift in the normative and critical emphasis of critical theory from the narrow concern with rules and procedures of Jürgen Habermas's model to a change-enabling disclosure of possibility and the enlargement of meaning. Kompridis contrasts two visions of critical theory's role and purpose in the world: one that restricts itself to the normative clarification of the procedures by which moral and (...) political questions should be settled and an alternative rendering that conceives of itself as a possibility-disclosing practice. At the center of this resituation of critical theory is a normatively reformulated interpretation of Martin Heidegger's idea of "disclosure" or "world disclosure." In this regard Kompridis reconnects critical theory to its normative and conceptual sources in the German philosophical tradition and sets it within a romantic tradition of philosophical critique.Drawing not only on his sustained critical engagement with the thought of Habermas and Heidegger but also on the work of other philosophers including Wittgenstein, Cavell, Gadamer, and Benjamin, Kompridis argues that critical theory must, in light of modernity's time-consciousness, understand itself as fully situated in its time--in an ever-shifting and open-ended horizon of possibilities, to which it must respond by disclosing alternative ways of thinking and acting. His innovative and original argument will serve to move the debate over the future of critical studies forward--beyond simple antinomies to a consideration of, as he puts it, "what critical theory should be if it is to have a future worthy of its past.". (shrink)

This essay investigates the notion of simulation and the role it plays in Kourken Michaelian's simulation theory of memory. I argue that the notion is importantly ambiguous and that this ambiguity may threaten some of the central commitments of the theory. To illustrate that, I examine two different conceptions of simulation: a narrow one (simulation as replication) and a broad one (simulation as computational modeling), arguing that the preferred narrow conception is incompatible with the claim that remembering involves the simulation (...) of past episodes. Investigating possible solutions, I suggest that, despite some relatively serious consequences, the theory may be better off subscribing to the broad notion of simulation. (shrink)

Taking the ‘Fridays for Future’ movement as its starting point, this article conceptualizes and defends youth disobedience, understood as principled disobedience by legal minors. The article first...

Wittgenstein započinje svoja Predavanja o religioznom vjerovanju tvrdeći kako ne bi proturječio religioznoj osobi koja vjeruje u Strašni sud, iako on osobno ne dijeli takva uvjerenja. Kasnije izjavljuje kako nije siguran mogu li religiozni vjernici i pojedinci koji ne vjeruju istinski razumjeti jedni druge. Neki filozofi tumače ove primjedbe kao dokaz da je Wittgenstein smatrao kako su religijski i nereligijski diskursi nesumjerljivi, u tom smislu da nereligiozna osoba ne može razumjeti religioznu kada ova govori o svojim vjerovanjima, kao i da (...) su religiozna vjerovanja imuna na kritiku izvana kao posljedica te navodne nesumjerljivosti. Hilary Putnam je tvrdio da je Wittgenstein vjerovao kako dijalog između religioznih i nereligioznih osoba podrazumijeva određeno nesporazumijevanje, koje međutim nije posljedica nesumjerljivosti. Predlažem drugačije sagledavanje „nesuprotstavljenosti“ i Wittgensteinovog shvaćanja religioznog vjerovanja, pri čemu se slažem s Putnamom da se teza o nesumjerljivosti ne može pripisati Wittgensteinu. (shrink)

At a time when nationalism is rising and support for democratic values is declining, this paper considers the role that businesses and corporations play in building and undermining social trust. It was published as part of the Future of the Corporation programme led by the British Academy.

Since the global financial crisis in 2007, social banks have been flooded with deposits. Previous studies have indicated that customers hold deposits with social banks due to social banks' special placement of assets. However, to date it has been far from clear how social banks select their investments, and consequently to what extent the placement of assets meets depositors' preferences. The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to investigate whether the characteristics of social banks’ placement of assets are relevant to (...) depositors’ choice of social banks. A two‐stage study is conducted, using data collected via a document analysis of social banks' investment criteria, a survey of social banks, and an online survey of 609 depositors. The results imply that the characteristics of social banks' placement of assets are indeed relevant to depositors' choice of social banks, but do not explain customer behaviour entirely. Furthermore, the findings indicate that a relevant proportion of customers hold deposits with social banks to avoid “evil” rather than necessarily creating “good.” Based on the findings, a theoretical framework of depositors' choice of social banks is presented that goes far beyond previous explanations by considering various types of social depositors, banks, and borrowers. (shrink)

This paper explores happiness as an aim of education, particularly schooling. What role does happiness play in philosophy of education? How do critics view the aims of public schooling today and its relation to happiness? Is happiness embedded in the concept of education as an aim of education? The paper explores happiness—understood inclusively as a positive mental state—by examining the relevant literature from various disciplines. It looks briefly at critical views of current trends in public school practice and concludes that (...) happiness is not a central concern in present public school practice. Turning to philosophy of education, the author finds that happiness has been considered in relation to the philosophical conception of the human self and consequently eudaimonia has been prioritized over hedonia. The paper concludes by proposing that happiness is an appropriate and valid aim of education and schooling based on the normative implications of the concept of education. (shrink)

Kripke-Armstrongovim argumentom tvrdi se da branilac postojanja temporalnih delova materijalnih objekata ne može da utvrdi da li usamljeni homogeni disk sačinjen od kontinuirane materije rotira oko svoje ose ili miruje. Perdurantista ne može da razlikuje dve mogućnosti pozivajući se na različite trenutne brzine trenutnih temporalnih delova diska, zbog toga što bi time prekršio tezu hjumovske supervenijencije. U ovom radu ću, sledeći Džeremija Baterfilda, pokazati kako se na KripkeArmstrongov izazov može odgovoriti zadržavajući hjumovsku supervenijenciju: pozivanjem na različite trenutne brzine netrenutnih temporalnih (...) delova Kripke-Armstrongovog usamljenog diska. (shrink)

Autor ovoga clanka bavi se problemom kulturne razlicitosti kroz analizu odnosa Mi - Drugi. On traga za odgovorom na pitanje zasto se kulture drugih naroda ili pojedinaca u mnogim drustvima smatraju inferiornim. Takvim tretmanom dolazi se do krajnosti kojom se pozicija Drugog srozava na nivo?primitivnog?. U tom kontekstu autor analizuje teorijske koncepte prosvetiteljskog racionalizma 18. veka i antropoloskog evolucionizma 19. veka, smatrajuci da se u njima mogu naci zameci negativnog vrednovanja Drugog. Naime, u vecini ovih teorija vrsi se hijerarhizacija kulture (...) po vremenskom i vrednosnom principu, a odatle je moguce razvrstavanje naroda i kultura na?primitivne? i?civilizovane?. Evropski modernizam uprilicio je viziju istorije kao linearnog rasta, cime su savremene kulture a priori proglasavane vrednijim i kulturno uzvisenijim. Ali i savremene kulture razvrstavaju se medju sobom po vrednosnim principima. Diferencijacija kultura vrsi se uz pomoc raznih stereotipa, a ideja progresa kao racionalnog napretka u sferi materijalne kulture, nauke i tehnike ozakonjuje transformaciju razlicitog u primitivno. Iz tih predrasuda, prema misljenju autora, izranja evrocentricna misao o izuzetnosti evropske kulture, cime se latentno opravdava kolonijalizam i druge negativne pojave potekle iz evropske civilizacije. Primitivizam se pokusava predstaviti kao objektivno stanje, a zapravo se radi o socijalnoj konstrukciji kojom se?drugo? zeli proglasiti za?primitivno?. (shrink)

Austin’s destructive contextualist criticism of the theory of knowledge, as grounded on foundationalism, is presented. It is claimed that incorrigibility is not a secondary issue for the foundationalist conception of knowledge and justification, even if the hallmark of foundationalism is not to be sought in the so-called ‘quest for certainty’, but rather in the idea of epistemological realism.