Austin and the Very Idea of the Theory of Knowledge

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):145-153 (2003)
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Abstract

Austin’s destructive contextualist criticism of the theory of knowledge, as grounded on foundationalism, is presented. It is claimed that incorrigibility is not a secondary issue for the foundationalist conception of knowledge and justification, even if the hallmark of foundationalism is not to be sought in the so-called ‘quest for certainty’, but rather in the idea of epistemological realism.

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