New translations of the central mediaeval texts on the problem of universals are presented here in an affordable edition suitable for use in courses in mediaeval philosophy, history of mediaeval philosophy, and universals. Includes a concise Introduction, glossary of important terms, notes, and bibliography.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Cambridge Companion to OckhamJeffrey E. BrowerPaul Vincent Spade, editor. The Cambridge Companion to Ockham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. xii + 400. Cloth, $54.95.Contemporary analytic philosophers have always been among the most enthusiastic audiences for the volumes in the Cambridge Companion series. And of all the great philosophers of the Middle Ages, perhaps none has appealed more to their sensibilities than William Ockham. It is (...) fitting, therefore, that after the publication of the Companion to Aquinas—the first volume in the series devoted to a medieval philosopher—there should appear a Companion to Ockham.The fifteen chapters comprising this volume survey the entire range of Ockham's thought and may conveniently be divided into four main parts. The first part (chaps. 2-7) deals with Ockham's most enduring legacy: his contribution to issues falling within the domain of logic, philosophy of language, and metaphysics. The second part (chaps. 8-9) is devoted to issues in epistemology and philosophy of mind/cognition. The third part (chaps. 10-13) focuses on Ockham's views in ethics, action theory, and political philosophy. And the fourth part (chaps. 14-15) considers aspects of his philosophical theology. In addition, there is also an historical chapter (chap. 1), placing Ockham's life and works in their late-medieval intellectual context, and a brief editor's introduction, including a very useful list of all Ockham's writings, together with the best (sometimes, the only) Latin editions and English translations available.The volume is well organized and beautifully conceived. Some chapters are quite difficult, and in places contain material that is likely to be unfamiliar even to specialists in medieval philosophy. But the way in which they have been organized maximizes their usefulness and accessibility to specialists and non-specialists alike. The earlier parts of the volume lay the foundation for later ones, and the individual chapters within each part are arranged so as to build on and complement one another. This is perhaps most evident in the five chapters comprising the first part. Calvin Normore's presentation ofOckham's logic (in chap. 2) nicely prepares the reader for Claude Panaccio's discussion (in chap. 3) of Ockham's theory of mental language. Panaccio's chapter, in turn, provides the framework for David Chalmer's analysis (in chap. 4) of the debate over whether [End Page 588] Ockham's mental language permits synonymous expressions. Again, these three chapters taken together provide important background for Paul Spade's treatment (in chap. 5) of Ockham's views in metaphysics, which are closely related to his logic and philosophy of language. Finally, Gyula Klima's discussion (in chap. 6) ofhow Ockham's views in semantics and ontology differ from those of his predecessors, and André Goddu's discussion (in chap. 7) of Ockham's philosophy of nature, can be fully appreciated only against the background of the preceding chapters.What is perhaps most impressive about the volume, however, is the extent to which it succeeds at providing a systematic introduction to Ockham's philosophical achievement. All the chapters are, to some extent, concerned with matters of textual analysis and interpretation. But most of them involve much more than a mere survey of Ockham's texts. For example, in each of the four main parts, there is at least one chapter that attempts to locate Ockham's views in relation to those of his predecessors or contemporaries (such as Aquinas and Scotus), with the result that we get a sense of Ockham's place in the major medieval debates to which he contributed. At the same time, the volume introduces us to some of the most lively current debates in Ockham scholarship. It does this, not merely by summarizing them, but by actually carrying them out over the course of its chapters. For example, Eleonore Stump provides a sophisticated defense (in chap. 8) of what has become a standard interpretation of Ockham's theory of intuitive and abstractive cognition. In the following chapter, however, Elizabeth Karger rejects the standard interpretation on the basis of a re-reading of certain key texts. Again, in the first part of the volume there is a running debate... (shrink)

_Akkadian Loanwords in Biblical Hebrew_ is an in-depth examination of Hebrew words that are of Akkadian origin or transmitted via Akkadian into the Hebrew lexicon.

Physicist David Bohm and biochemist Ilya Prigogine began a dialogue that implied a deep, structuring, primordial harmony within life. In classical Chinese this harmony is referred to as Li, which also designates the elegant, natural pattern found in jade. This article emphasizes the ways that perception of primordial harmony gives way to a vision of possibility and to the creative intelligence and action necessary for meeting the challenges we face. Insights from Bohm, Prigogine, and others on releasing outmoded thinking and (...) actions are integrated with contemplative traditions, Eastern and Western philosophy, and pragmatic strategy making. (shrink)

In the early 1980s, Paul V. Spade advanced the thesis that obligational reasoning was counterfactual reasoning, based upon his interpretation of the obligationes of Walter Burley, Richard Kilvington, and Roger Swyneshed. Eleonore Stump in a series of contemporary papers argued against Spade’s thesis with respect to Burley and Swyneshed, provisionally admitting it for Kilvington with the caveat that Kilvington’s theory is by no means clear or non-idiosyncratic. In this paper, we revisit the connection between counterfactual reasoning and (...) obligationes, focusing on one particular treatise, the anonymous early twelfth-century Obligationes Parisienses edited by L.M. de Rijk in the late 70s. We show that while positio in this treatise does not involve counterfactual reasoning, the species sit verum or rei veritas apparently does, and it is precisely this which distinguishes the two species in this treatise. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Apostolic Letter of Our Most Holy Father PAUL VI, by Divine Providence, POPE to Our Venerable Brethren, Cardinal John Carmel Heenan, Archbishop of Westminster, and Gordon Joseph Gray, Archbishop of Saint Andrews and Edinburgh and to the other Archbishops and Bishops of England, Wales and Scotland. On the Occasion of the Second Scholastic Congress held at Oxford and Edinburgh on the Seventh Centenary of the Birth of John (...) Duns Scotus. Venerable Brethren, Greetings and Apostolic Blessing: A devoted mother of valiant men, Great Britain is distinguished by a quality no less estimable than the honour and the feats of her glorious children, for she knows how to cherish fondly the memory of her glorious sons and, when tradition demands that recurrences be celebrated solemnly, she knows how to sing their praises as though striving to repay them a debt of honour. These were the thoughts that sprang to our mind, and gave no slight satisfaction as we dwelt upon them, when we first learned the details of the Second International Scholastic Congress which is being prepared in your countries in memory of the Venerable John Duns Scotus on the seven hundredth anniversary of his birth. This Congress will be held at Oxford and Edinburgh under your patronage, Venerable Brethren, with lively interest and careful organization. One can already foresee that it will produce excellent results and will be of considerable importance, in view both of the arguments that will be discussed and of the distinguished persons who will take part in the sessions. Universities of England and Scotland and, from abroad, the universities of Paris and Cologne where he lectured, and many others, will send official representatives; apart from Catholics, there will be outstanding members of the Anglican Communion, of the Church of Scotland, of other Christian Communities of Great Britain, and well known exponents of sacred learning from every part of the world. As We voice our wishes for a successful Congress and abundant fruits to follow from it, we express frankly our satisfaction at the particular character of this Congress and certain features with which it is intended to distinguish it. Its principal and definite purpose is to shed 6 POPE PAUL VI. a brilliant light on the person of John Duns Scotus, on his philosophical and theological doctrine, and his moral and ascetic principles. Avoiding the reefs of discussion and controversy which so often stood in the way in times gone by, the critico-historical method has been adopted in accordance with modern preferences, a method which, employed by learned men in discovering which are the genuine works of the Subtle Doctor and what are really and truly his teachings, has yielded excellent results. For this reason combined efforts are being made to produce the broad outline of a panorama, namely a unified vision of the whole family of the Scholastic doctors, in which it will be possible to measure and understand the variety, the richness, and the fecundity of the philosophical and theological doctrine which flourished in the Middle Ages. There is no doubt that in this panorama Saint Thomas Aquinas with his "Summa theologica" rises like a lofty peak dominating the mountains in the vicinity, that is, the whole world of sacred learning developed during his time. The synthesis created bythe Angelic Doctor in describing the relationship between Faith and Reason, between Faith seeking understanding (as your own Saint Anselm of Canterbury had already expressed it1) and understanding seeking Faith, achieved such universal agreement that he is recognised as leader in the ranks of the Scholastics and is rightly celebrated by the name of Doctor Communis. Side by side with him, however, other prominent Scholastic teachers and doctors stand out, like stars illuminating the Catholic learning of the period. In the encyclical letter Aeterni Patris, in which Our Predecessor of happy memory, Pope Leo XIII, pleads for the revival of Scholasticism under the leadership of Saint Thomas Aquinas in opposition to modern errors, after the statement that "Saint Thomas towers above all others",2 other Scholastic doctors are enumerated and a prominent place is reserved for Saint Bonaventure, whom Saint Pius X afterwards called "the second leader of Scholasticism",3 and it is universally recognised... (shrink)

_Readings in Ethics_ offers a vast collection of carefully edited readings arranged chronologically across five historical periods. The selections cover many major Western and non-Western schools of thought, including Daoism, virtue ethics, Buddhism, natural law, deontology, utilitarianism, contractarianism, liberalism, Marxism, feminism, and communitarianism. In addition to texts from canonical philosophers such as Plato, Mill, Wollstonecraft, and Rawls, the volume draws from other sources of wisdom: stories, fables, proverbs, medieval mystical treatises, literature, and poetry. The editors have also written substantial introductions, (...) annotations, discussion questions, and suggestions for further reading, making for a thorough guided tour of our ethical past and present. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:I. William of Ockham and Mental SynonymyIn recent years an important point of discussion among the scholars of William of Ockham has been the possibility of accounting for a reductionist interpretation of Ockham's mental language. Especially, the debate focused on the legitimacy of eliminating connotative simple terms from mental language by reducing them to their nominal definition. The distinction between absolute and connotative terms plays an important role in (...) Ockham's philosophy of language. Ockham introduces it as a subdivision of the class of categorematic terms, i.e. of the terms provided with signification, and such a distinction overlaps that between concrete and abstract terms. In the Summa Logicae, Part I, chap. 10, devoted to the explanation of such a distinction, Ockham makes three major claims concerning connotative terms.First, unlike absolute simple terms, connotative simple terms signify something primarily and something else secondarily. Paradigmatic examples of connotative simple terms are 'white' and 'father,' while instances of absolute terms are 'animal,' 'man,' and 'whiteness.' The term 'white' is connotative for it signifies something primarily while co-signifying something else secondarily .Second, unlike absolute simple terms, connotative simple terms do not have a real definition but only a nominal one. While a real definition is intended to capture the real essence of the defined thing, a nominal definition is none other than a linguistic explication of a name's signification. Only concrete and abstract terms of the category of substance, and abstract terms of the category of quality, can have a real definition. The reason is that, for Ockham, only individual substances and qualities can exist outside the mind, therefore only such entities can be grasped immediately and directly, by means of acts of intelligible intuitive cognition. Any other term can have only a nominal definition, for each of them can make reference to nothing but to fictive or only putatively existent entities. A nominal definition, in particular, is made in such a way that something is expressed in recto and something else in obliquo . Ockham indicates 'something having whiteness' as the nominal definition of 'white': in it, 'something' is expressed in recto, while 'whiteness' in obliquo.Third and finally, Ockham says that a connotative term has only one nominal definition, while an absolute term can have several real definitions.According to these claims, the problem of the existence of connotative terms in mental language might be reconstructed as follows. Ockham holds to two fundamental tenets about mental language and connotation: first, synonymous terms cannot be found in mental language and second, each connotative simple term can have only one nominal definition, as was said. Ockham is unequivocal about these principles in his works. But if an interpreter also supposes Ockham subscribing to the view that connotative simple terms are synonymous with their nominal definitions, the interpreter must conclude that, for Ockham, connotative simple terms and their nominal definitions cannot both be present in mental language. Nonetheless, since Ockham seems to admit the existence of both connotative simple terms and their nominal definitions in mental language, one of the previous sentences needs to be revised.Up to this day many proposals of revision have been put on the table, but it seems to me that they can be reduced to three principal ones.The first proposal suggests reconsidering claim , while preserving the reasoning -, since - are claims Ockham indisputably states. As is known, this was Paul V. Spade's initial position. The gist of Spade's influential argument was that connotative simple terms cannot exist in mental language for if they did, they would be synonymous with their fully expanded nominal definitions. According to , though, synonymy cannot be found in mental language. But Ockham grants the.. (shrink)

This paper defends the thesis that the mediaeval genre of logical treatises De obligatiombus contained a theoretical account of counterfacutal reasoning, perhaps the first such account in the history of philosophy. This interpretation helps to explain some of the theoretical disputes in the obligationes literature in the first half of the fourteenth century. Section 1 is introductory. Section 2 presents Walter Burley's theory, while section 3 argues for the counterfactual interpretation of obligationes and section 4 discusses difficulties with Burley's theory. (...) Section 5 presents the textual basis for Richard Kilvington's theory, and section 6 outlines that theory. Section 7 discusses Roger Swyneshed's theory. Section 8 contains a summary and conclusion. (shrink)

'This sentence is false' - is that true? The 'Liar paradox' embodied in those words exerted a particular fascination on the logicians of the Western later Middle Ages, and, along with similar 'insoluble' problems, forms the subject of the first group of articles in this volume. In the following parts Professor Spade turns to medieval semantic theory, views on the relationship between language and thought, and to a study of one particular genre of disputation, that known as 'obligationes'. The (...) focus is on the Oxford scholastics of the first half of the 14th century, and it is the name of William of Ockham which dominates these pages - a thinker with whom Professor Spade finds himself in considerable philosophical sympathy, and whose work on logic and semantic theory has a depth and richness that have not always been sufficiently appreciated. (shrink)

This is a supplement my original 2005 article "Insolubles" in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Mediaeval logicians often wrote about changes between contradictory states, for example a switch’s changing from being on to not being on. One of the questions discussed in these writings was whether at the moment the change occurs the changing thing is in the earlier or the later state. The present paper investigates the general setting for that question, and discusses the answer given by Walter Burley, an important early-fourteenth century author whose theory was a standard one. Burley’s theory at first (...) seems arbitrary, and moreover committed to serious theoretical problems. The last part of the paper therefore considers what unspoken factors may have motivated Burley. Certain causal principles are suggested that would remove the apparent arbitrariness and avoid the theoretical problems with his theory, but only at the expense of revising it in a substantive way. (shrink)

What I want to talk about here is a puzzle for historians of philosophy who, like me, have spent a fair amount of time studying the history of mediaeval logic and semantic theory. I don’t know how to solve it, but in various forms it has come up repeatedly in my own work and in the work of colleagues I have talked with about it. I would like to share it with you now.