Lorsque l’on réfléchit à la signification positive que Foucault a pu octroyer à l’ontologie, en plaidant pour que la philosophie s’impose comme une « ontologie historique », ou bien une « ontologie critique de nous-mêmes », il peut être utile au préalable de préciser ce que le recours foucaldien à une telle notion ne doit pas, et ne souhaite pas devoir à l’autre grand projet de pensée qui, au XXe siècle,...

Cet ouvrage met en œuvre une confrontation philosophique entre Heidegger et Patočka, deux figures majeures de la tradition phénoménologique, en prenant pour fil conducteur leurs interprétations respectives des concepts fondamentaux de la Physique d’Aristote. Mais tout d’abord, le point d’accord : l’herméneutique de l’aristotélisme représente aux yeux de Heidegger et de Patočka une première entrée pensante dans l’affaire même de la pensée, où le mouvement, irréductible au déplacement d’un étant dans l’espace, désigne le procès d’advenue au paraître qui sous-tend l’éclosion (...) à l’être des choses. Aristote met au jour la différence ontologique entre l’être et l’étant, en sorte que la Physique constitue de ce point de vue pour Heidegger et Patočka le véritable Grundbuch de la philosophie occidentale. Cependant, Heidegger et Patočka ne comprennent pas de la même manière le sens de ce mouvement ontologique au cœur de l’être. À travers l’examen de ces différences, l’enjeu de cet ouvrage est de mettre en évidence un point de tension au sein de la phénoménologie qui n’a pas encore été suffisamment remarqué, entre d’une part l’approche heideggérienne qui soumet l’être au sens, et s’expose de la sorte au risque d’un anthropocentrisme ontologique larvé. Et d’autre part, la tentative d’un réalisme phénoménologique, dont Patočka fut l’un des représentants, dans la double mesure où il brise l’identité classique de l’être et de l’intelligibilité, et où il pense l’homme comme radicalement décentré, prétendant en finir ainsi avec le sujet et tous ses avatars ; réalisme radical dont on peut toutefois se demander s’il ne met pas à mal le paradigme phénoménologique de l’a priori de la corrélation entre l’apparaître et ses modes subjectifs de donnée, et s’il ne remet pas en cause ainsi la possibilité même de la phénoménologie en la poussant au-delà de sa propre limite. (shrink)

La tolérance pose certaines questions essentielles aux analyses phénoménologiques de l’intersubjectivité. Tout d’abord, comme Sartre ou Heidegger l’avaient souligné, dans quelle mesure la tolérance ne se retourne-t‑elle pas toujours en une intolérance plus profonde, sous les formes de l’indifférence à l’égard de l’autre ou bien d’une domination qui réduit l’altérité d’autrui à des propriétés imposées, le privant de sa liberté? Mais si l’on prend au contraire le parti de construire un concept positif de tolérance pour penser la relation éthique, alors (...) le problème est de maintenir une double exigence : celle d’accueillir autrui en s’ouvrant à son altérité par rapport à moi, mais aussi celle de ne pas traiter cette altérité comme une différence abstraite. Il s’agit de reconnaître que la manifestation d’autrui est toujours située dans le monde, impliquant un ensemble de valeurs et de croyances susceptibles d’être en inadéquation avec les miennes, et qui doivent être supportées ou endurées malgré tout dans certaines limites sûrement impossibles à fixer a priori. Ainsi le phénomène de la tolérance demande que l’on envisage les normes absolues de la rationalité éthique comme toujours déjà particularisées dans des situations sociales concrètes, avec leurs caractéristiques politiques, culturelles, cultuelles et historiques contingentes. Nous montrons dans cet article que c’est précisément ce que Levinas (et Derrida à sa suite) comprend lorsqu’il aborde la question de l’intersubjectivité à partir du problème du tiers. La tolérance donne ainsi l’opportunité de penser les conditions du cosmopolitisme comme structure phénoménologique de la relation intersubjective (le rapport à l’autre comme rapport situé mondainement), même si l’on pourra alors se demander, en conclusion, si la tolérance abordée dans une perspective de l’émancipation, au sein d’une « histoire universelle d’un point de vue cosmopolitique », n’appartient pas à la vision philosophique des Modernes et de l’ Aufklärung, et si elle est encore tenable dans un monde de plus en plus dominé par l’essence de la technique. (shrink)

La tolérance pose certaines questions essentielles aux analyses phénoménologiques de l’intersubjectivité. Tout d’abord, comme Sartre ou Heidegger l’avaient souligné, dans quelle mesure la tolérance ne se retourne-t‑elle pas toujours en une intolérance plus profonde, sous les formes de l’indifférence à l’égard de l’autre ou bien d’une domination qui réduit l’altérité d’autrui à des propriétés imposées, le privant de sa liberté? Mais si l’on prend au contraire le parti de construire un concept positif de tolérance pour penser la relation éthique, alors (...) le problème est de maintenir une double exigence : celle d’accueillir autrui en s’ouvrant à son altérité par rapport à moi, mais aussi celle de ne pas traiter cette altérité comme une différence abstraite. Il s’agit de reconnaître que la manifestation d’autrui est toujours située dans le monde, impliquant un ensemble de valeurs et de croyances susceptibles d’être en inadéquation avec les miennes, et qui doivent être supportées ou endurées malgré tout dans certaines limites sûrement impossibles à fixer a priori. Ainsi le phénomène de la tolérance demande que l’on envisage les normes absolues de la rationalité éthique comme toujours déjà particularisées dans des situations sociales concrètes, avec leurs caractéristiques politiques, culturelles, cultuelles et historiques contingentes. Nous montrons dans cet article que c’est précisément ce que Levinas (et Derrida à sa suite) comprend lorsqu’il aborde la question de l’intersubjectivité à partir du problème du tiers. La tolérance donne ainsi l’opportunité de penser les conditions du cosmopolitisme comme structure phénoménologique de la relation intersubjective (le rapport à l’autre comme rapport situé mondainement), même si l’on pourra alors se demander, en conclusion, si la tolérance abordée dans une perspective de l’émancipation, au sein d’une « histoire universelle d’un point de vue cosmopolitique », n’appartient pas à la vision philosophique des Modernes et de l’ Aufklärung, et si elle est encore tenable dans un monde de plus en plus dominé par l’essence de la technique. (shrink)

Cet essai propose de contribuer au développement d'une cosmologie phénoménologique, dans la voie ouverte par Fink, Patocka ou Renaud Barbaras. Au regard de cette approche, il faut combattre le naturalisme, car les choses (les phénomènes) ne sont pas des systèmes matériels réductibles en dernière instance à leurs constituants élémentaires. Mais face au subjectivisme, les phénomènes ne sont pas non plus assimilables à leur sens constitué dans la conscience. Celle-ci, comme toute chose, est située dans le monde, lequel seul fait apparaître (...) tout ce qui est. Apparaître signifie entrer en présence, accéder à l'individuation par un mouvement qui a pour fond producteur le monde lui-même, mouvement dont on soutient dans ce travail qu'il est une structure essentielle de l'apparaître, ou ce que Husserl aurait nommé un a priori matériel. Reste à comprendre comment la conscience peut accéder à de telles structures, si elle est elle-même limitée par la constitution finie des facultés anthropologiques qui médiatisent son ouverture. La cosmologie phénoménologique d'inspiration réaliste doit-elle réinvestir l'opposition kantienne entre choses en soi et phénomènes? Il faut surtout montrer comment la conscience, en dépit de sa finitude, a accès à l'absolu en tant qu'il se montre, et envisager ainsi la phénoménologie comme voie méthodologique vers une forme renouvelée de métaphysique. (shrink)

Introduction L’objet de ce travail est de réfléchir à la signification d’une philosophie phénoménologique de la nature, et aux différents problèmes qu’elle suscite. Nous entendrons pour commencer la philosophie phénoménologique au sens que lui confère Patočka dans Platon et l’Europe : « La philosophie phénoménologique se distingue de la phénoménologie dans la mesure où elle ne veut pas seulement analyser les phénomènes en tant que tels, mais encore en tirer des conséquences “métaphysiques” »....

In their recent article, scholars Keisha Ray and Jane Fallis Cooper claim that “bioethicists should not be deterred from advocating for a healthy environment […] instead, […] underscore the importa...

Jennifer Blumenthal-Barby (2024) argues that “[i]t is time for bioethics to end talk about personhood” (11). The author calls on the field to ask different kinds of normative questions about the mo...

The insulin/insulin‐like growth factor‐1 (IGF‐1) signaling (IIS) pathway is a pivotal genetic program regulating cell growth, tissue development, metabolic physiology, and longevity of multicellular organisms. IIS integrates a fine‐tuned cascade of signaling events induced by insulin/IGF‐1, which is precisely controlled by post‐translational modifications. The ubiquitin/proteasome‐system (UPS) influences the functionality of IIS through inducible ubiquitylation pathways that regulate internalization of the insulin/IGF‐1 receptor, the stability of downstream insulin/IGF‐1 signaling targets, and activity of nuclear receptors for control of gene expression. An age‐related (...) decline in UPS activity is often associated with an impairment of IIS, contributing to pathologies such as cancer, diabetes, cardiovascular, and neurodegenerative disorders. Recent findings identified a key role of diverse ubiquitin modifications in insulin signaling decisions, which governs dynamic adaption upon environmental and physiological changes. In this review, we discuss the mutual crosstalk between ubiquitin and insulin signaling pathways in the context of cellular and organismal homeostasis. (shrink)

Comprehensive work on Hindu philosophy and spiritual life.

We often feel powerless in our lives. We have many desires but are limited in our ability to transform those wishes into tangible results. We are confused and unsure about what will really make us happy. In Eternal Dharma, Vishnu Swami guides you on a journey to align yourself with the natural flow of existence through the ancient Eastern knowledge of Veda. Eternal Dharma distills 5,000 years of spiritual wisdom so you can learn to live an enlightened, effective, and (...) fulfilled life. Vishnu Swami inspires you to take action and manifest your fullest spiritual potential in everything you do: Explore the subtle and physical domains to achieve a totally new relationship with reality. Learn the radical new system of effectiveness. Gain clarity on all spiritual and religious paths. Free yourself from pain and suffering to reach pure, transcendental love. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.

Explains the concept of legal competence (or power). This book then discusses the analysis and definition of legal concepts in general; the relation between the concept of competence and (in)validity; what it means to exercise competence; different types of competence; and competence norms.

The basic principles of scientific research from the great French physiologist whose contributions in the 19th century included the discovery of vasomotor nerves; nature of curare and other poisons in human body; more.

In this paper, I present a puzzle about the connection between an agent’s knowledge and her rationality and a way to solve it. The puzzle is that, intuitively, many of us want to accept both that it is rational for an agent to act on what she knows and that it is irrational for an agent to take what she knows for granting in her practical reasoning. These two claims about rationality present us with a puzzle because, holding fixed our (...) interpretation of rationality, we cannot accept them both. According to my view, the most compelling way of solving this puzzle is to distinguish between our primary and dispositional evaluations of actions. By making this distinction, we not only gain a unique perspective on the relationship between knowledge and rationality, we also see how doing what we know is best might still manifest an undesirable habit. (shrink)

In both the Consequences of Compassion and his response to my article, Goodman outlines a consequentialist theory that is both coherent and, in many ways, compelling. One can imagine that out of a concern toward—as Goodman puts it—“the impersonal events which fill the world”, we will accept “momentary experiences as the morally significant units”, and our actions will aim to promote the existence of “good dharmas.” However, as this brief reply argues, Goodman’s equating of a consequentialism focused on good dharmas (...) to a consequentialism focused on individual well-being is unjustified, and, as a consequence, the textual evidence he presents does not support his consequentialist view... (shrink)

In this article, I argue,inter alia, that Kelsen’s mature view—as expressed in, and around the time of, the second edition ofReine Rechtslehre—was that of a metaethical relativist, and that the commitment to metaethical relativism was the reason why Kelsen defended democracy as well as tolerance in the shape of a constitutionally guaranteed freedom of thought. I also consider the possibility that in his post‐1960 phase Kelsen abandoned metaethical relativism for moral fictionalism, but argue that, on the whole, a relativist interpretation (...) of Kelsen’s late legal philosophy is to be preferred to a fictionalist interpretation. (shrink)

There is an emerging consensus that human behavior is governed by two types of processes: System 1 processes, which are quicker, automatic, and run in parallel, and System 2 processes, which are slower, more conscious, and run in serial. Among such “dual-process” theorists, however, there is disagreement about whether the premises we use in our conscious, S2 reasoning should be considered as beliefs. In this exchange, one facet that has been largely overlooked is how conscious beliefs are structurally and functionally (...) similar to episodic memories. This article will argue that the similarities between beliefs and episodic memories, specifically in light of Daniel Schacter’s widely influential constructive memory framework, highlight a heretofore unexamined empirical weakness of dispositional accounts of S2 beliefs. In addition, this perspective helps situate beliefs within our broader understanding of how information is encoded and retrieved in the brain. (shrink)

In the latest years of the 6th/12th century, two chains of affiliation of a distinctive kind make their appearance in the Muslim world, in the East on one hand, and in the West on the other: the first is referred to in the sources as silsilat al-muṣāfaḥa, the second as silsilat al-mushābaka. These ‘chains’, mentioned mostly in works pertaining to the genre of prosopographic literature in the largest sense, experienced a broad and rapid expansion throughout the dār al-islām. They are (...) linked to a specific ritual aimed at perpetuating, across generations, a physical contact with the Prophet. Widespread among the ʿulamāʾ, they become conflated with the musalsalāt ḥadīths, or ‘chained traditions’, during the Ottoman era. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe aim of this article is to see whether we can account for the normativity of law within the framework of legal positivism and whether the idea of a social convention could be of help in this endeavour. I argue, inter alia, that we should distinguish between the problem of accounting for the normativity of law, conceived as a necessary property of law, and the problem of accounting for the use of normative legal language on the part of legal actors; (...) that the debate about the normativity of law, which mainly concerns, is more or less identical to the debate between legal positivists and non-positivists; that one cannot account for the normativity of law, conceived along the lines of, within the framework of legal positivism, and that the question of the normativity of law considered within the framework of legal positivism is not an open question. (shrink)

A number of scholars have attempted to situate the Buddha’s teachings within the primary Western ethical theories, namely consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. One challenge that each has confronted is Buddhism’s emphasis on the ultimate non-existence of the self. In his writings, Charles Goodman has put forward an account of how the realization of the ultimate non-existence of the self would lead a practitioner to consequentialism. The present comment challenges the account offered by Goodman, and argues that an ethical-particularist account (...) better squares Buddhist ethics with Buddhist metaphysics. This comment also shows how Goodman’s more recent work, while constituting a significant retreat from his.. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss Alf Ross's claim that the concept of a legal right is best understood as a technical tool of presentation, which ties together a disjunction of operative facts and a conjunction of legal consequences, and that rights statements render the content of a number of legal norms in a convenient manner. I argue that while Ross's analysis is appealing, it is problematic in at least three respects. I also argue, however, that despite these difficulties Ross's analysis (...) deserves our continued attention, because the fundamental idea—that the concept of a legal right must be understood functionally—is sound. (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2017 Heft: 214 Seiten: 249-257.

There’s more to meriting praise than doing what’s objectively right. After all, one might do what’s objectively right as the result of a fluke or with malicious intent. While doing what’s objectively right is not enough to merit praise, it’s natural to think that some list of sufficient conditions can be assembled. The most common approach to such lists entails that, when one does what is objectively right with the appropriate epistemic state and/or motivation, one merits praise for one’s action. (...) In other words, according to the most influential extant views, if one both does what’s right and meets certain additional criteria, one will not only succeed in doing what is morality required but will also succeed in deserving positive moral evaluation for what one has done. In this paper, I use the example of extended actions to show that drawing any sort of link between doing what’s objectively right and being worthy of praise is much more difficult than has been previously appreciated. (shrink)

It’s widely accepted that whether or not an agent merits praise for performing a particular action importantly depends on her motivation in doing so. What has received less attention is the importance of an agent’s moral understanding to whether she merits praise for performing a particular action, or whether her action has ‘moral worth.’ The first task of this paper is relatively straightforward: to show that two prominent attempts to address the importance of moral understanding to moral worth, namely that (...) of Zoe Johnson King and Paulina Sliwa, are unsuccessful. The second task of this paper, which is more novel and ambitious, is to show that agents who lack moral understanding are a challenge to more accounts of moral worth than has been previously recognized. My goal in this paper is largely negative: to show that extant accounts of such conditions are unable to account for the relevance of an agent’s understanding to her praiseworthiness for performing a particular action. In making clear these shortcomings, however, I also hope to make clear just how complicated it is to pin down exactly when an agent merits praise for her actions. (shrink)

In this article, I distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of legal normativity, and argue that legal positivists can account for law's normativity in the strictly legal but not in the moral sense, while pointing out that normativity in the former sense is of little interest, at least to lawyers. I add, however, that while the moral conception of law's normativity is to be preferred to the strictly legal conception from the rather narrow viewpoint of the study (...) of law's normativity, it is less attractive than the latter from the broader viewpoint of the study of the nature of law. I then distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of the normative force of legal justification, and argue that legal positivists may without contradiction embrace the moral conception, and that therefore the analysis of the normative force of legal justification need not be a problem for legal positivists. I conclude that, on the whole, we have reason to prefer legal positivism to natural law theory. I begin by introducing the subject of jurisprudence . I then introduce the natural law/legal positivism debate, suggesting that we ought to understand it as a debate about the proper way to explicate the concept of law . I proceed to argue that legal decision‐making is a matter of applying legal norms to facts, and that syllogistic reasoning plays a prominent role in legal decision‐making thus conceived . Having done that, I discuss law's normativity , the normative force of legal justification , and the relation between the former and the latter . I conclude with a critical comment on Joseph Raz’ understanding of the question of law's normativity. (shrink)

Social movements driven by a combination of religious nationalism and economic fundamentalism are globally grabbing the levers of political, economic, and intellectual control. The consequence is a policy climate premised on polarization in which inequality and destruction of the natural environment are condoned. This creates demands on key academic institutions like business schools, with stakeholders who are complicit in the sustenance of these social movements. Scholars in these schools have an opportunity to respond through curricula that facilitate reflection on the (...) ideological preferences of such groups under their influence. However, stakeholders influenced by religious nationalism tend to reject the premises of liberal secular vocabulary as elitist or alien and hence suspicious. This article considers a teaching strategy to instill values of equality and respect for nature among the stakeholders by grounding curriculums in the tenets of the same religion valorized by the social movements. The consequences of such a strategy is discussed through its application to the business curriculums taught in India, where a regressive social movement with totalitarian pretensions—Hindutva—combined with neoliberalism has secured unparalleled power. Elements of this strategy could inform educators in other democratic societies facing similar challenges. (shrink)

Bastin et al. present a framework that draws heavily on existing ideas of dual processes in memory in order to make predictions about memory deficits in clinical populations. It has been difficult to find behavioral evidence for multiple memory processes but we offer some evidence for dual processes in a related domain: memory for the time-of-occurrence of events.

Context is an important construct in many domains of cognition, including learning, memory, and emotion. We used dynamical systems methods to demonstrate the episodic nature of experience by showing a natural separation between the scales over which within-context and between-context relationships operate. To do this, we represented an individual's emails extending over about 5 years in a high-dimensional semantic space and computed the dimensionalities of the subspaces occupied by these emails. Personal discourse has a two-scaled geometry with smaller within-context dimensionalities (...) than between-context dimensionalities. Prior studies have shown that reading experience and visual experience have a similar two-scaled structure. Furthermore, the recurrence plot of the emails revealed that experience is predictable and hierarchical, supporting the constructs of some influential theories of memory. The results demonstrate that experience is not scale-free and provide an important target for accounts of how experience shapes cognition. (shrink)

In his book The Opacity of Mind, Peter Carruthers presents the Interpretive Sensory Awareness theory, which holds that while we have direct access to our own sensory states, our access to “self-knowledge” is almost always interpretive. In presenting his view, Carruthers also claims that his account is the first of its kind; after a cursory examination of major theories of mind, he concludes that “transparent access” accounts of self-knowledge—the alternative to ISA—have been endorsed throughout history. This paper challenges this latter (...) claim. Contrary to Carruthers’ view, the paper argues that Buddhist theories of mind are not “transparent access” accounts. Instead, they not only have an analysis of sensory processing and conscious experience similar to that of ISA, but also share what Carruthers sees as ISA’s central tenet: individuals lack transparent, conscious access to most of their propositional attitudes. Given this fundamental alignment, the Buddhist perspective can offer u.. (shrink)

In exploring the impact of cognitive science findings on compatibilist theories of moral responsibility such as Fischer and Ravizza’s, most attention has focused on whether agents are, in fact, responsive to reasons. In doing so, however, we have largely ignored our improved understanding of agents’ epistemic access to their reasons for acting. The “ownership” component of Fischer and Ravizza’s theory depends on agents being able to see the causal efficacy of their conscious deliberation. Cognitive science studies make clear that a (...) variety of situational factors, implicit attitudes, and unconscious mental states influence agents’ behavior, and that they are generally unaware of their impact. If an agent is skeptical of the extent to which her conscious deliberation has causal upshots in the world, then she – like a natural incompatibilist – may not take ownership over her action-generating mechanism. Instead, she may seek a more general account of moral responsibility or revise her moral intuitions altogether. (shrink)