Luca M. Possati, Jean Grondin, Paul Ricoeur ; Aurore Dumont, François Dosse et Catherine Goldenstein, Paul Ricoeur: penser la mémoire ; Paul-Gabriel Sandu, Gert-Jan van der Heiden, The Truth of Language. Heidegger, Ricoeur and Derrida on Disclosure and Displacement ; Paul Marinescu, Marc-Antoine Vallée, Gadamer et Ricoeur. La conception herméneutiquedu langage ; Witold Płotka, Saulius Geniusas, Th e Origins of the Horizon in Husserl’s Phenomenology ; Delia Popa, Annabelle Dufourcq, La dimension imaginaire du réel dans la philosophie de Husserl ; (...) Maria GyemantDenis Seron, Ce que voir veut dire. Essai sur la perception ; Christian Ferencz-Flatz, Hans Friesen, Christian Lotz, Jakob Meier, Markus Wolf, Ding und Verdinglichung. Technik- und Sozialphilosophie nach Heidegger und der Kritischen Th eorie ; Bogdan MincăLarisa Cercel, John Stanley, Unterwegs zu einer hermeneutischen Übersetzungswissenschaft. Radegundis Stolze zu ihrem 60. Geburtstag ; Denisa Butnaru Johann Michel, Sociologie du soi. Essai d’herméneutique appliquée ; Ovidiu Stanciu, Jan Patočka, Aristote, ses devanciers, ses successeurs. Trad. fr. Erika Abrams ; Mădălina Diaconu, Emmanuel Alloa, Das durchscheinende Bild. Konturen einer medialen, Phänomenologie. (shrink)
The purpose of this paper is to lay out the similarities between the philosophical projects of Patočka and Merleau-Ponty, with respect to the question of the “limits of phenomenology”. We suggest that both these authors propose two complementary strategies in their attempt of overcoming the Husserlian phenomenology. The first one consists in extending the field of phenomenology so as for it to be able to encompass phenomena either insufficiently explored or misinterpreted by the conceptuality that Husserl put forth; the second (...) strategy, more ambitious, aims to overpass the very standpoint of phenomenology in favour of an ontological approach. We try to show that what profoundly motivates these attempts is a radical – and hence, ontological – reinterpretation of the Lebenswelt. (shrink)
The main goal of my inquiry is to lay out the proximity between Patočka’s and Ricœur’s readings of Husserl’s Krisis and to stress the role played by the concept of the life-world in the unfolding of their original philosophical undertakings. In the first part, I show the importance both Patočka and Ricœur assignedto the Husserlian project of an “ontology of the life-world”. In the second part, I expose the criticism these two authors addressed to Husserl’s understanding of the life-world and, (...) more precisely, to the idea that the exploration of the life-world is merely another way of gaining access to transcendental subjectivity. In the last part, I show how the concrete descriptions of the life-world given by Patočka and Ricœur depart massively from the Husserlian perspective. (shrink)
My paper aims at laying out the main tenets of Patočka’s unusual and highly provocative position with regard to the question of history, drawing essentially on his Heretical Essays on the Philosophy of History, while also gathering insights from other works such as Eternity and Historicity and Europe and post-Europe. In the first part, I set in place the overall framework of this analysis, and show that three distinct, yet entwined concepts of history are operative in Patočka’s work: the understanding (...) of history as a specific regime of meaning, as an existential possibility of the human Dasein, and as a “epochal” dynamic. In the second part, I reconstruct the criticism Patočka mounts against the classical philosophies of history and indicate that his rejection of a teleological account of history is compatible with the attempt of establishing an intrinsic correlation between meaning and history. In the final part, I stress the importance acquired by the experience of the “shattering of meaning” for Patočka’s threefold understanding of history and argue for the possibility of crafting a unitary framework which would encompass his analysis. (shrink)
Le projet d’une «cosmologie philosophique» que Fink formule dans ses écrits de l’après-guerre est animé par l’exigence de «penser le monde lui-même». Je me propose de faire ressortir l’originalité de ce programme philosophique à travers un examen critique de deux conceptions du monde concurrentes. Ainsi, j’explicite les critiques que Fink adresse à la compréhension du monde comme «totalité de l’étant», centrale pour la tradition métaphysique, et à l’entente existentiale comme «horizon de la praxis humaine», déterminante pour l’ontologie fondamentale de Heidegger. (...) Au terme de cette enquête, il apparaît que la conception finkéenne du monde comme «processus d’individuation» représente une voie singulière, située par-delà l’alternative entre un concept chosique et un concept existential de monde. (shrink)
Subjectivity and Project. Patočka's critique of Heidegger's concept "project of possibilities" The purpose of this article is to lay out the way the main aspects of Patočka's critical reading of Heidegger's fundamental ontology. More precisely, I intend to restate the central arguments Patočka raised against Heidegger's characterization of "understanding" as a "project". In the first part, I will single out Patočka's project of an "asubjective phenomenology" by distinguishing it from another asubjective project and from the subjective phenomenology. In the second (...) part, I will examine some central theses Heidegger puts forth in §31 of Being and Time in order to show the inescapable difficulties they bring about. In the final part, I will describe the tenets around which Patočka's critical reading of Heidegger revolves. I will explore the two directions of this critique that correspond to the double orientation of asubjective phenomenology: a) on the one hand, the priority of the phenomenal field with regard to any subjective sense-bestowal; b) the importance of the phenomenon of corporeity for an accurate apprehension of subjectivity. (shrink)
The purpose of this enquiry is to lay out the core features of Garelli’s conception of the world as a “pre-individual field,” as they emerge from his confrontation with Heidegger’s thought. In the first part, I am exploring Garelli’s interpretation of the “poetical expression” and the consequences he draws from it with regard to the process of “worlding”. Then, I am restating his criticism with regard to the concept of the world Heidegger developed within the framework of “fundamental ontology” and (...) show why, on Garelli’s account, an understanding of the world as an “existential structure of Dasein” fails to grasp its proper meaning. In the final part, I expose Garelli’s objections to Heidegger’s later understanding of the world as “Fourfold” and underline the dependency of this conception on a set of assumptions which perpetuate the theoretical privilege of individual being. (shrink)
This article embodies the result of a collective work that seeks to understand the manner in which the notion of conflict is transformed by the attempt to apply it to reality, according to the doctrines hereby comprise as “ontologies of conflict”. It seems that there are three resulting “logics of conflict” which may receive the following qualifications: logic of contradiction, logic of contrariety and logic of difference.