Schelling's 1806 polemic against Fichte, and his last major work on the philosophy of nature. The heat of anger can concentrate the mind. Convinced that he had been betrayed by his former collaborator and colleague, Schelling attempts in this polemic to reach a final reckoning with Fichte. Employing the format of a book review, Schelling directs withering scorn at three of Fichte’s recent publications, at one point likening them to the hell, purgatory, and would-be paradise of Fichtean philosophy. The central (...) bone of contention is the understanding of nature: Fichte sees it as lifeless matter in motion, sheer opposition to be overcome, while Schelling waxes poetic in his defense of a living, organic nature of which humanity is a vital part. Indeed, we do not know ourselves without understanding our connection to nature, argues Schelling, anticipating many thinkers in contemporary environmental ethics. Dale E. Snow’s introduction sets the stage and explains the larger context of the conflict, which was already visible in the correspondence of the two philosophers, which broke off by 1802. Notes are included throughout the text, providing background information and identifying the many references to Fichte. Dale E. Snow is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University of Maryland and the author of Schelling and the End of Idealism, also published by SUNY Press. (shrink)

Research examining firm and industry effects on performance has primarily focused on the financial aspects of firm performance. Corporate social performance is a major aspect of firm performance that has been under-examined empirically in the literature to date. Adding to the fundamental debate regarding firm versus industry effects on performance, this study uses data drawn from the Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini Co. database to examine the degree to which CSP is related to firm, industry, and temporal factors. The results of (...) these analyses suggest that CSP tends to change in a linear manner over time; however, the slope of this line varies across firms and industries. These findings are supported by several robustness checks accounting for autocorrelation, alternative measures of industry, different samples commonly used when using KLD data to measure CSP, and alternative measures of CSP when using the KLD database. The authors also directly compare firm, industry, and temporal effects between CSP and financial performance. (shrink)

The rise of the phenomenon of virtue ethics in recent years has increased at a rapid pace. Such an explosion carries with it a number of great possibilities, as well as risks. This volume has been written to contribute a multi-faceted perspective to the current conversation about virtue. Among many other thought-provoking questions, the collection addresses the following: What are the virtues, and how are they enumerated? What are the internal problems among ethicists, and what are the objections and replies (...) to contemporary virtue ethics? Additionally, the practical implications following from the answers to these questions are discussed in new and fascinating research. Fundamental concepts such as teleology and eudaimonism are addressed from both a historical and dialectical approach. This tome will contribute not only to providing further clarity to the current horizons in virtue ethics, but also to the practical conclusion following from the study: to challenge the reader toward a greater pursuit of the virtuous life. (shrink)

F.W.J. von Schelling was the philosopher whom Hegel accused of conducting his philosophical education in public, and Joseph Lawrence's title neatly captures and acknowledges a fundamental tension running throughout Schelling's nearly sixty years of philosophical productivity. Schelling was indeed a philosopher of many beginnings, and always returned to a concern with beginnings, in a way one might have thought Kant had rendered permanently unfashionable; yet in many ways the very profusion of his philosophies was, as Heidegger has observed, evidence of (...) his unrelenting and stubborn desire to get to the root of being. What Lawrence calls "die Unvordenklichkeit des Seins" was always Schelling's primary concern. (shrink)

The “Treatise on the Relationship of the Real and the Ideal in Nature, or the Development of the First Principles of the Philosophy of Nature and the Principles of Gravity and Light” is one of the last essays on Naturphilosophie that Schelling wrote. It was a topic that had occupied his attention since 1796, and as such it marks the end of an era. It is distinguished by its unusual approach to the problem of matter, which becomes, in his discussion, (...) the problem of force or energy. Without being able to avail himself of the language of the conservation of energy or mass, it can be argued that Schelling makes a valiant attempt to express that insight, using the terminology of the bond and the entities bound by it. The text reaffirms Schelling’s strong affinities with Spinoza, anticipates Schopenhauer, and continues his quarrel with Fichte. (shrink)

F.W.J. von Schelling was the philosopher whom Hegel accused of conducting his philosophical education in public, and Joseph Lawrence's title neatly captures and acknowledges a fundamental tension running throughout Schelling's nearly sixty years of philosophical productivity. Schelling was indeed a philosopher of many beginnings, and always returned to a concern with beginnings, in a way one might have thought Kant had rendered permanently unfashionable; yet in many ways the very profusion of his philosophies was, as Heidegger has observed, evidence of (...) his unrelenting and stubborn desire to get to the root of being. What Lawrence calls "die Unvordenklichkeit des Seins" was always Schelling's primary concern. (shrink)

I first sketch an account of humility as a character trait in which we are unimpressed with our good, envied, or admired features, achievements, etc., where these lack significant salience for our image of ourselves, because of the greater prominence of our limitations and flaws. I situate this view among several other recent conceptions of humility (also called modesty), dividing them between the inward-directed and outward-directed, distinguish mine from them, pose problems for each alternative account, and show how my understanding (...) of humility captures truths present but exaggerated in several of them. Responding to some problems for my view, including what I call “Driver’s Paradox”(i.e., the strangeness of someone’s proclaiming ‘I’m humble!’), I suggest that some over-ambitious claims about our moral responsibilities may indicate a lack of proper humility. I discuss the relationship of the character trait of humility both to what humiliates and to what humbles, concluding with consideration of the background assumptions against which, and the circumstances in which, humility may reasonably be classified as a moral virtue. (shrink)

While some film theorists and philosophers have seen motion as a necessary element of cinema, this view is challenged by a body of avant-garde films which offer little or no movement. These experiments—by film-makers such as Andy Warhol, Larry Gottheim, and Michael Snow—challenge essentialist definitions of film, while simultaneously foregrounding the crucial role played by duration in cinema’s ontology.

Mr. Agar in Homerica, Preface ix., has suggested that κακι γλνηι was the original reading, ‘Be off with the evil eye upon you.’ I have searched, but in vain, for any formula of imprecation corresponding to the formula of blessing, τύχγαθι, though I should like to see it in κακι τѵχι of the Treacherous Hound in Agamemnon 1230. Mr. T. C. Snow, objecting to Mr. Agar's alterations of the Homeric text, once suggested to me that we should rather retain (...) the vocative, and translate it, ‘Be off, evil eye.’ Others also may have thought of this, but it does not appear to have got into print. (shrink)

Returning to the text of his phrase-making Rede lecture Sir Charles Snow, surely an experienced explorer of the corridors of power, confesses to the awe of the sorcerer’s apprentice at the flood of comment, hostile and appreciative, near and far in origin, which his unpretentiously original thoughts upon the current rift in cultural communication conjured from the practitioners of literature and science, who broadly divide higher education in England today and whom he addressed at Cambridge in May 1959. The (...) widespread spontaneity of reaction has led him to conclude that his analysis touched a nerve, ‘something which people, all over the world, suspect is relevant to present actions’. His original lecture refused to relate itself to the political waging of ‘the cold war’ as ‘the prime absolute of our age’ and it castigated modernist literature for its neglect of the currently scientific stage of the industrial revolution, which is producing a new egalitarian society in our own time. Now he restates his major theme: the pressing need for a new education to promote common understanding between these two dominant cultures, so that the expanding social force of applied science be directed with the minimum danger and the maximum good for humanity. He does not minimise the danger of leaving a mystic status to the initiates of science. (shrink)

Studies of reasoning have often invoked a distinction between a natural or ordinary consideration of the premises, in which they are interpreted, and even distorted, in the light of empirical knowledge, and an analytic or logical consideration of the premises, in which they are analysed in a literal fashion for their logical implications. Two or three years of schooling have been seen as critical for the spontaneous use of analytic reasoning. In two experiments, however, 4-year-olds who were given brief instructions (...) that prompted use of an analytic approach continued to adopt this approach one week later. Thus, when given syllogistic problems in which the major premise was incongruent with their empirical knowledge (e.g. "All snow is black"), instructed children reasoned more accurately from that premise both immediately and a week later as compared to children given only a basic introduction. A third experiment showed that instructions also improved 4-year-olds' performance on hard-to-imagine, abstract material (e.g."All mib is white"). Similarities between the effects of brief instruction and of schooling are discussed. (shrink)

During the late twentieth century, drawing on C. P. Snow’s well-known concept of a “two cultures” divide between scientists and humanists, many psychologists identified polarizing divergences in their discipline. This essay traces how purported professional divides affected the understanding and management of mental retardation in clinical psychology. Previous work in the history of science has compared the differing cultures of disciplines, demonstrating that there is no one, unified science. Through an examination of multiple “two cultures” divides within the discipline (...) of psychology, the essay demonstrates that perceived divergences in the field were animated by considerations of professional identity, ambitions, and goals. It argues that differing views among clinical psychologists about mental retardation, and crucially the localization of its causes—in individual bodies, minds, and genomes or within social institutions—reflected their position among the multiple “cultures” of psychology. References to Snow’s two cultures spanned the late twentieth-century scientific and clinical literature and were often used to encourage a conversation about the nature and goals of research in a field. In considering these purported “two cultures” divides, the essay proposes that historians of science must take care to look beyond constructed polarities, to instead analyze the resulting discussions about professional training and purpose. (shrink)

My first book, The Physicists, was conceived when I. I. Rabi visited Princeton in 1961–1962 as a Shreve Fellow in the History Department. Some two years earlier C. P. Snow had published his influential provocation, The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution, and the academic world was abuzz with initiatives aimed at achieving better literacy in science among liberal arts majors. Rabi was a Nobel laureate in physics at Columbia University and his visit was one of Princeton's efforts to (...) this end. It had been arranged by my mentor, Eric F. Goldman, a historian of modern America who had gotten to know Rabi through their mutual engagement with current issues in American democracy. (shrink)

I agree with Gibbs that the message of the base rate literature reads differently depending on which null hypothesis is used to frame the issue. But I argue that the normative null hypothesis, H0: “People use base rates in a Bayesian manner,” is no longer appropriate. I also challenge Adler's distinction between unused and ignored base rates, and criticize Goodie's reluctance to shift research attention to the field. Macchi's arguments about textual ambiguities in traditional base rate problems suggest that empirical (...) testing is needed to tease apart the effects of problem clarification and problem framing. Macdonald's, Fletcher's and Snow's skepticism about the value of Bayesian methods in real world judgment tasks is treated as a challenge for the next generation of empirical base rate studies. (shrink)

ve r since the appearance of Ontogeny and Phylogeny a decade ago, Stephen Jay Gould has continued to delight and inform a wide spectrum of readers and, in doing so, to defy C.P. Snow's lament about the "two cultures" of the sciences and the humanities. Gould's monthly column in Natural History magazine, published under the heading "This View of Life," has led to a series of highly praised volumes of essays—Ever Since Darwin (1977), The Panda's Thumb (1980), Hen's Teeth (...) and Horse's Toes (1983), and most recently The Flamingo's Smile (1985). In addition, Gould's The Mismeasure of Man (1981), which won the National Book Critics' Circle Award, analyzed the questionable character of intelligence testing and emphasized the many personal and cultural biases that have led researchers astray in this field. Given the sheer amount of Gould's publications, which include numerous scientific publications as well, Gould's readers have been kept busy indeed absorbing his prodigious output. (shrink)

There is a puzzle about Hume's is-ought gap involving an epistemic `ought'. From the premise `Snow is white,' we can infer `Sophia's belief that snow is white is correct.' `Snow is white' is paradigmatically non-normative, and that Sophia's belief is correct, a claim about what belief she ought to have, seems to be normative. The argument seems valid, so the is-ought gap is supposed to block this kind of inference. The puzzle is over whether we should give (...) up on the is-ought game or find another way to resolve the conflict. In the first chapter, I provide a formulation of the is-ought gap in a general semantic framework that avoids some other known problems. I turn in chapter 2 to discussing the puzzle about correct belief. I cast doubt on a solution proposed by Allan Gibbard by showing that it can admit of no epistemology of the normative. In chapter 3, I defend a solution to the puzzle while more directly tackling the question of the nature of oughts for belief. I offer a new explanation of why we ought to believe the truth. At the heart of the account is the idea that it's a conceptual truth beliefs ought to be true, which I provide a new argument for. I then claim that being an agent requires being subject to this norm of belief. This results in a non-moral, distinctly doxastic, account of why we ought to believe the truth. My conclusion is that asking why we ought to believe the truth is like asking why a bachelor must be unmarried: the answer is contained in the ideas that make up the question. In the final chapter, I respond to Gibbard's claim that an analogous story cannot work for `ought' claims for degreed belief. I pose a worry for Gibbard's proposed alternative explanation, and I undermine Gibbard's motivation for pursuing such an account in the first place. By taking belief to have an aim in a normative sense, I sketch how we can make sense of epistemic rationality in terms of that aim. (shrink)

With this publication, Harvard University Press completes its ten-volume Loeb Classical Library edition of Seneca. Professor Corcoran has provided a complete text of the Naturales Quaestiones, Seneca’s last work; he has supplied detailed annotation of most of the classical authorities whom Seneca usually cites only by name; he has given many of the major mss variants, and made a lucid and readable translation. The first volume contains a brief introductory summary. There is a subject-index but, unfortunately, there is no bibliography. (...) He has put the fragmentary Nile-book as fourth, although both Diels and Gercke call it liber secundus and Oltramare assigns it eighth place. The five books in this volume concern: the Nile and its sources, flora and fauna, and the periodicity of its flooding; Hail and Snow; Winds; Earthquakes; and Comets. The form of these treatises is that of a series of letters or addresses to Lucilius, Rome’s procurator in Sicily about 62 A.D., and the same Lucilius to whom the more famous Epistulae are addressed. (shrink)

Gilbert and colleagues point out the discrepancy between the limited empirical data illustrating changes in personality following implantation of deep brain stimulating electrodes and the vast number of conceptual neuroethics papers implying that these changes are widespread, deleterious, and clinically significant. Their findings are reminiscent of C. P. Snow’s essay on the divide between the two cultures of the humanities and the sciences. This division in the literature raises significant ethical concerns surrounding unjustified fear of personality changes in the (...) context of DBS and negative perceptions of clinician-scientists engaged in DBS. These concerns have real world implications for funding future innovative, DBS trials aimed to reduce suffering as well as hampering true interdisciplinary scholarship. We argue that the philosophical tradition of pragmatism and the value it places on empirical inquiry, experiential knowledge, and inter-disciplinary scholarship – reflecting diverse ways of knowing – provides a framework to start to address the important questions Gilbert and colleagues raise. In particular, we highlight the importance of expert clinician knowledge in contributing to the neuroethical questions raised by Gilbert and colleagues. Finally, we provide illustrative examples of some of our interdisciplinary empirical research that demonstrate the iterative cycle of inquiry characteristic of pragmatism in which conceptual neuroethics questions have led to empirical studies whose results then raise additional conceptual questions that give rise to new empirical studies in a way that highlights the contributions of the humanities and the sciences. (shrink)

Gilbert and colleagues point out the discrepancy between the limited empirical data illustrating changes in personality following implantation of deep brain stimulating electrodes and the vast number of conceptual neuroethics papers implying that these changes are widespread, deleterious, and clinically significant. Their findings are reminiscent of C. P. Snow’s essay on the divide between the two cultures of the humanities and the sciences. This division in the literature raises significant ethical concerns surrounding unjustified fear of personality changes in the (...) context of DBS and negative perceptions of clinician-scientists engaged in DBS. These concerns have real world implications for funding future innovative, DBS trials aimed to reduce suffering as well as hampering true interdisciplinary scholarship. We argue that the philosophical tradition of pragmatism and the value it places on empirical inquiry, experiential knowledge, and inter-disciplinary scholarship – reflecting diverse ways of knowing – provides a framework to start to address the important questions Gilbert and colleagues raise. In particular, we highlight the importance of expert clinician knowledge in contributing to the neuroethical questions raised by Gilbert and colleagues. Finally, we provide illustrative examples of some of our interdisciplinary empirical research that demonstrate the iterative cycle of inquiry characteristic of pragmatism in which conceptual neuroethics questions have led to empirical studies whose results then raise additional conceptual questions that give rise to new empirical studies in a way that highlights the contributions of the humanities and the sciences. (shrink)

Gilbert and colleagues point out the discrepancy between the limited empirical data illustrating changes in personality following implantation of deep brain stimulating electrodes and the vast number of conceptual neuroethics papers implying that these changes are widespread, deleterious, and clinically significant. Their findings are reminiscent of C. P. Snow’s essay on the divide between the two cultures of the humanities and the sciences. This division in the literature raises significant ethical concerns surrounding unjustified fear of personality changes in the (...) context of DBS and negative perceptions of clinician-scientists engaged in DBS. These concerns have real world implications for funding future innovative, DBS trials aimed to reduce suffering as well as hampering true interdisciplinary scholarship. We argue that the philosophical tradition of pragmatism and the value it places on empirical inquiry, experiential knowledge, and inter-disciplinary scholarship – reflecting diverse ways of knowing – provides a framework to start to address the important questions Gilbert and colleagues raise. In particular, we highlight the importance of expert clinician knowledge in contributing to the neuroethical questions raised by Gilbert and colleagues. Finally, we provide illustrative examples of some of our interdisciplinary empirical research that demonstrate the iterative cycle of inquiry characteristic of pragmatism in which conceptual neuroethics questions have led to empirical studies whose results then raise additional conceptual questions that give rise to new empirical studies in a way that highlights the contributions of the humanities and the sciences. (shrink)

Modern information communication technology eradicates barriers of geographic distances, making the world globally interdependent, but this spatial globalization has not eliminated cultural fragmentation. The Two Cultures of C.P. Snow (that of science– technology and that of humanities) are dri6ing apart even faster than before, and they themselves crumble into increasingly specialized domains. Disintegrated knowledge has become subservient to the competition in technological and economic race leading in the direction chosen not by the reason, intellect, and shared value-based judgement, but (...) rather by the whims of autocratic leaders or fashion controlled by marketers for the purposes of political or economic dominance. If we want to restore the authority of our best available knowledge and democratic values in guiding humanity, first we have to reintegrate scattered domains of human knowledge and values and offer an evolving and diverse vision of common reality unified by sound methodology. This collection of articles responds to the call from the journal Philosophies to build a new, networked world of knowledge with domain specialists from different disciplines interacting and connecting with other knowledge-and-values-producing and knowledge-and-values- consuming communities in an inclusive, extended, contemporary natural–philosophic manner. In this process of synthesis, scientific and philosophical investigations enrich each other—with sciences informing philosophies about the best current knowledge of the world, both natural and human-made—while philosophies scrutinize the ontological, epistemological, and methodological foundations of sciences, providing scientists with questions and conceptual analyses. This is all directed at extending and deepening our existing comprehension of the world, including ourselves, both as humans and as societies, and humankind. -/- Print copies (17. (shrink)

We present an experimental test of the validity of the Pauli Exclusion Principle for electrons based on the concept put forward a few years ago by Ramberg and Snow. In this experiment we perform a very accurate search of X-rays from the Pauli-forbidden atomic transitions of electrons in the already filled 1S shells of copper atoms. Although the experiment has a simple structure, it poses deep conceptual and interpretational problems. Here we describe the experimental method and recent experimental results, (...) which we interpret as an upper limit for the probability to violate the Pauli Exclusion Principle. We present also future plans to upgrade the experimental apparatus using Silicon Drift Detectors. (shrink)

In this paper we describe an experimental test of the validity of the Pauli Exclusion Principle (for electrons) which is based on a straightforward idea put forward a few years ago by Ramberg and Snow (Phys. Lett. B 238:438, 1990). We perform a very accurate search of X-rays from the Pauli-forbidden atomic transitions of electrons in the already filled 1S shells of copper atoms. Although the experiment has a very simple structure, it poses deep conceptual and interpretational problems. Here (...) we describe the experimental method and recent experimental results, which we interpret in the framework of quon theory. We also present future plans to upgrade the experimental apparatus using Silicon Drift Detectors. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest analiza motywu snu i śnienia w komiksach o przygodach Tytusa, Romka i A’Tomka autorstwa Henryka J. Chmielewskiego (1923–2021). Wybór tematu wynika nie tylko popularności tego motywu w jego pracach, lecz także z wieloaspektowości i mnogości odniesień kulturowych. Artykuł podzielony jest na dwie części, w których kolejno będziemy analizować motywy i typy snów pojawiające się w komiksach Chmielewskiego oraz to, jak je rozumiał. Istotne miejsce w tekście zajmować będzie wyjaśnienie czterech funkcji snów, jakimi posługiwał się Chmielewski. Po pierwsze, (...) sen ograniczony jest do spania i traktowany tylko i wyłącznie jako proces fizjologiczny. Po drugie, sen jest motywem powodującym konstruowanie i rozwijania przygód trójki bohaterów. Po trzecie, sen związany jest z praktycznymi aspektami życia codziennego. Po czwarte, Chmielewski posługiwał się snami do objaśnienia struktury psychologicznej bohaterów i przewidywania przyszłości. (shrink)

In this wise and creative book, Wright, Warren, and Snow propose a path-breaking interdisciplinary research program that promises to ground a mature science of moral virtue. Their theoretical framework and ideas for measurement are designed to guide psychologists as they study the individual traits that people have, the ways that traits interact or conflict, and the ways they change over time. While lauding the authors’ impressive achievements, I criticize the contentious Aristotelian assumptions they build into their program. I argue (...) that the science of virtue will be better served if researchers restrict themselves to more neutral assumptions and convert philosophically contentious views into competing empirical hypotheses. (shrink)

The article compares the famous fairy tale “Th e Snow Queen” by the Danish writer Hans Christian Andersen with a Soviet play of the same title by Evgenij Schwartz. Schwartz changed the original ideas and narrative structure of Andersen’s complex and religious text in order to make the play more attractive, spectacular and relatable for Soviet viewers. With the help of A. J. Greimas’ actantial model and semiotic square, the article tries to distinguish and analyse the discursive transformations of (...) the source text in the process of adaptation.В данной статье мы сравниваем знаменитую сказку Ханса Кристиана Андерсена ≪Снежная Королева≫ и одноименную пьесу, написанную советским драматургом Евгением Шварцем. Шварц переосмыслил и переработал нарративную структуру и основные идеи сложной религиозной сказки с целью сделать ее более понятной, захватывающей и привлекательной для советского зрителя. При помощи актантной модели и семиотического квадрата А. Ж. Греймаса мы попытались проанализировать дискурсивные трансформации текста-источника в процессе интерпретации.Artiklis vorreldakse Taani kirjaniku Hans Christian Anderseni kuulsat muinasjuttu “Lumekuninganna” Noukogude kirjaniku Jevgeni Švartsi samanimelise naidendiga. Švarts muutis Anderseni keeruka ning religioosse teksti algseid ideid ja narratiivset struktuuri, et muuta seda Noukogude publikule koitvamaks ja vaatemangulisemaks ning holbustada sellega suhestumist. A. J. Greimase aktantide mudeli ja semiootilise ruudu abil puutakse artiklis eristada ja analuusida lahteteksti diskursiivseid teisenemisi adapteerimise kaigus. (shrink)

Suppose that you are wandering across the tundra, and you find an infant, all alone, in the snow. She is incapable of discourse, and yet she has the same human rights as anyone who is capable of discourse. Those rights do not depend on the practices or conventions of your people, or hers. Human discourse and human conventions play no role in human rights. I elaborate these claims through a critique of J.W. Harris’s groundbreaking analytical account of human rights. (...) I conclude that some welfare rights are paradigms of human rights, while rights of freedom of expression, privacy, and assembly, and rights to vote, and rights to independent tribunals are not human rights at all, except in a distantly metaphorical sense. Moreover, human rights can be explained with no reference at all to state authorities (though state authorities may have various special roles in observing and promoting some of them). (shrink)