This essay considers, among other paintings, two of the most important of Caravaggio's works in reference to the theological debate concerning the inspiration of the Bible and of the Gospel of Matthew, a lively debate among contemporaries of the painter. The focus of the essay is to demonstrate a method for the analysis of figurative representations of religious themes. Liberating these works from the confines of art history, it analyzes them in the context of the Christian experience, as it was (...) in the period in which these paintings were made. (shrink)

In christian experience, the flesh of Christ is not only a theological concept relating to Church or Eucharisty, but a place where spiritual an psychological desires establish themselves. In this essay we would illustrate the artistic and visionary access to an essential section of Christ's body, his protective and nourishing breast.

God's Word cannot be interpreted within a Church that is constituted either of scholars or of simple faithful, especially when both need to operate within exclusive linguistic and conceptual coordinates. Thanks to its inexhaustible wealth of imagery, Scripture has throughout the centuries been inspiring many artists who launched themselves into a true and proper 'visual' exegesis, as they tried to communicate Truth through the images they created. This articles studies one of Nicolas Poussin's paintings as an example of this interpretative (...) genre. Poussin is one of the fathers of visual exegesis in the West. The paper tries to illustrate how, by painting some Gospel narrative, the artist situates his very person within an interpretative tradition that calls for attention. On the other hand, though, it is the artist himself or herself who rephrases the content of the narrative through techniques of the imagination that do shed new light on Christ's own action. (shrink)

The first full-scale commentary on the Cratylus, one of Plato's most difficult and intriguing dialogues.

In this book we offer a theory of the self, whose core ideas are that the self is a process of self-representing, and this process aims mainly at defending the self-conscious subject against the threat of its metaphysical inconsistence. In other words, the self is essentially a repertoire of psychological manoeuvres whose outcome is a self-representation aimed at coping with the fundamental fragility of the human subject. Our picture of the self differs from both the idealist and the eliminative approaches (...) widely represented in contemporary discussion. Against the idealist approach, we deny that the self is something primitive and logically prior. Rather, we take it to be the result of a process of construction that starts with subpersonal unconscious processes. On the other hand, we also reject the anti-realistic, eliminative argument that, from the non-primary, derivative nature of the self, infers its status as an illusory by-product of real neurobiological events, devoid of any explanatory role. (shrink)

After an introduction in which I rehearse some of the main elements of Stoic physics and psychology, I set out the evidence for the Stoic doctrine that the individual soul is both analogous to the cosmic soul and a part of it, as was held by the early exponents of the school (Section I). I argue that the doctrine threatened to land the Stoics in trouble, unless they were ready to qualify it by applying to it certain distinctions (Section II). (...) Then I consider the doctrine’s historical origins, discussing several possible antecedents of it, with a focus on a Socratic report in Xenophon and on Plato’s dialogues, and showing that the Stoics went beyond all their predecessors (Section III). After this historical excursus I turn to examine some of the arguments advanced by the early Stoics to prove that the cosmos has a soul, including one which compares the relation between the cosmos and the individual human beings to that between a father and his offspring (Section IV). This leads me to analyse in more detail this comparison, which occurs also in other contexts and is sometimes problematically connected with the notion that the individual soul is a part of the cosmic soul (Section V). One of the texts which are relevant to this issue, a report in Sextus Empiricus, is the object of a separate discussion in the final Appendix. (shrink)

This paper investigates two related aspects of Aristotle’s conception of primary substances in the Categories. In Section 1 I distinguish different interpretations of the relation between a primary substance and its accidental attributes: one (A) according to which a primary substance encompasses all of its attributes, including the accidental ones; another (B) according to which a primary substance encompasses only its essential attributes, whereas the accidental attributes are extrinsic to the substance, though related to it; and a third, intermediate one (...) (C) according to which a primary substance encompasses neither all of its attributes nor only the essential ones, but all the necessary ones. I trace the history of all three interpretations and argue in favour of (B). In Section 2 I defend the view that a particular human being, their soul, and their body all count as primary substances, and that the relation between these three substances is that soul and body are parts of the substance. I show that this hypothesis harmonizes both with some views advanced in the Categories and with some passages from other Aristotelian works. I conclude by drawing a comparison between this view and Aristotle’s mature hylomorphic doctrine. (shrink)

As Artificial Intelligence (AI) becomes more and more pervasive in our everyday life, new questions arise about its ethical and social impacts. Such issues concern all stakeholders involved in or committed to the design, implementation, deployment, and use of the technology. The present document addresses these preoccupations by introducing and discussing a set of practical obligations and recommendations for the development of applications and systems based on AI techniques. With this work we hope to contribute to spreading awareness on the (...) many social challenges posed by AI and encouraging the establishment of good practices throughout the relevant social areas. As points of novelty, the paper elaborates on an integrated view that combines both human rights and ethical concepts to reap the benefits of the two approaches. Moreover, it proposes innovative recommendations, such as those on redress and governance, which add further insight to the debate. Finally, it incorporates a specific focus on the Italian Constitution, thus offering an example of how core legislations of Member States might contribute to further specify and enrich the EU normative framework on AI. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that in several passages Plato sympathizes with the following view: sensible particulars undergo continuous, pervasive physical change; as a consequence, where there seems to be one and the same object which is identical through time, there is in fact a succession of impermanent objects numerically distinct from each other but similar to each other. I illustrate the difference between this view—which invites interesting comparisons with modern and contemporary theories—and other, superficially similar views which Plato criticizes. (...) I also suggest that this view might contribute to explaining Plato’s contention that sensible particulars lack being and are confined to coming to be. Finally, I show that my interpretation was well attested in antiquity; and I put forward the hypothesis that part of the aim of certain Aristotelian claims about substance might be to correct Plato in this respect. (shrink)

In De int. 9 Aristotle argues that some declarative sentences are neither true nor false. This raises the problem of how we should understand the words of ch. 4, which introduces the declarative sentence as ‘that in which being true or being false holds’. In this paper I remove the contradiction by arguing that in ch. 4 Aristotle does not intend to claim that *all* declarative sentences are either true or false, but rather that *only* they are either true or (...) false, unlike other kinds of sentence; I defend the soundness of this interpretation on the linguistic and textual level; and I show how we can make good philosophical sense of it. (shrink)

In this article we explore the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious as it has taken shape within contemporary cognitive science - meaning by this term the mature cognitive science, which has fully incorporated the results of the neurosciences. In this framework we first compare the neurocognitive unconscious with the Freudian one, emphasizing the similarities and above all the differences between the two constructs. We then turn our attention to the implications of the centrality of unconscious processes in cognitive science (...) for the classical conception of the self. Our analysis will bring to light a bit of claustrophobic dialectic between an eliminative variety of naturalism and an anti-naturalistic form of hermeneutics. Hence we conclude by recommending the pursuit of a mediation between such extreme stances. (shrink)

Scientific philosophy is a sui generis project and it is not possible to assimilate it into analytic philosophy tout court, nor, a fortiori, into the philosophy of science. Scientific philosophy was practised during the early stage of the Vienna Circle before the influence of Wittgenstein’s thought became decisive. Afterwards, there was a quick transition to philosophy intended as subsidary to science, as a mere classification of meaning, coming, in the end, to its liquidation with Carnap’s logical syntax. Different was the (...) path of the Lvov-Warsaw School, which remained committed to Brentano’s original programme and never abandoned the idea of the possibility of scientific philosophy. Decisive, here, was the absence of Wittgenstein’s influence and the utter irrelevance of that of Mach. It is in Poland that at the present days it has its strongest roots and there we find considerable trends of thought inspired by it. (shrink)

Designing models of complex phenomena is a difficult task in engineering that can be tackled by composing a number of partial models to produce a global model of the phenomena. We propose to embed the partial models in software agents and to implement their composition as a cooperative negotiation between the agents. The resulting multiagent system provides a global model of a phenomenon. We applied this approach in modelling two complex physiological processes: the heart rate regulation and the glucose-insulin metabolism. (...) Beyond the effectiveness demonstrated in these two applications, the idea of using models associated to software agents to give reason of complex phenomena is in accordance with current tendencies in epistemology, where it is evident an increasing use of computational models for scientific explanation and analysis. Therefore, our approach has not only a practical, but also a theoretical significance: agents embedding models are a technology suitable both to representing and to investigating reality. (shrink)

This book examines the phenomenological anthropology of Edith Stein. It specifically focuses on the question which Stein addressed in her work Finite and Eternal Being: What is the foundational principle that makes the individual unique and unrepeatable within the human species? Traditional analyses of Edith Stein's writings have tended to frame her views on this issue as being influenced by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, while neglecting her interest in the lesser-known figure of Duns Scotus. Yet, as this book shows, with (...) regard to the question of individuality, Stein was critical of Aquinas' approach, finding that of Duns Scotus to be more convincing. In order to get to the heart of Stein's readings of Duns Scotus, this book looks at her published writings and her personal correspondence, in addition to conducting a meticulous analysis of the original codexes on which her sources were based. Written with diligence and flair, the book critically evaluates the authenticity of Stein's sources and shows how the position of Scotus himself evolved. It highlights the originality of Stein's contribution, which was to rediscover the relevance of Mediaeval scholastic thought and reinterpret it in the language of the Phenomenological school founded by Edmund Husserl. (shrink)

Le contrôle de constitutionnalité, dont la magistrature parlementaire de l’Ancien Régime revendiquait le plein droit, n’était pas fondé uniquement sur les lois fondamentales du royaume, mais sur l’ensemble des principes (« les maximes ») tirés de la « Tradition ». Cette dernière était composée en premier lieu par le droit divin et le droit naturel, c’est-à-dire par des systèmes juridiques qui nécessitaient, tous les deux, une interprétation juridictionnelle ‘sapientiale’. Cette activité interprétative était ‘révélatrice’ d’un corpus de valeurs métaphysiques à laquelle (...) seule la Scientia Juris des magistrats pouvait puiser. Mais dans la sphère de la Tradition juridique rentraient aussi le « dépôt légal », c’est-à-dire l’ensemble de toutes les lois, même des lois ainsi dites « ordinaires », c’est-à-dire celles qui avaient été produites par la simple manifestation de volonté souveraine d’un roi prédécesseur « car tel avait été son plaisir » (moderne formulation du brocarde de droit romain : « quidquid principi placuit legis habet vigorem »). Ainsi la juridiction parlementaire donnait lieu à un jugement de constitutionnalité qui était normalement exercé de manière très flexible par le corps de la magistrature, dépendant des circonstances et des intérêts politiques momentanés des situations juridiques qu’elle voulait protéger. La hiérarchie des normes était ainsi un formidable instrument de protection de cet ordre juridique dont les legum doctores se sentaient les tuteurs. Elle était, donc, directement liée au gouvernement politique des juges. (shrink)

I discuss a textual problem at Cratylus 393bc and, after establishing the correct text, argue that the MSS readings point to the existence of a textual variant in the margin of an ancestor of the common source of our MSS, presumably an ancient edition of the dialogue. Then I make the further hypothesis that both readings originated as alternative attempts to interpret Plato's ambiguous orthography.

The pseudo-Platonic Definitions seems to ascribe to ὄνοµα, ‘name’, the function of signifying two kinds of predicate. This is problematic, and I propose an emendation of the text, arguing that a definition of ῥῆµα, ‘verb’, has fallen out.

Antoine Arnauld, dit le Grand Arnauld, théologien janséniste, grammairien et logicien, a bien servi la philosophie : interlocuteur de Descartes ; correspondant de Leibniz, éditeur des Pensées de Pascal, il est l'un de ceux qui ont le plus contribué à légitimer le cartésianisme. Foucault et Chomsky se sont intéressés à sa Logique ou art de penser et à sa Grammaire générale et raisonnée de Port Royal, nées de la controverse qui a opposé Jansénistes, jésuites et Curie romaine au XVIIe siècle. (...) Sa théorie des idées, construite en opposition à celle de Malebranche, constitue une étape importante dans la constitution du problème de l'idéalité - qui trouvera son aboutissement chez Kant. Plusieurs raisons, par conséquent, de revenir sur une œuvre méconnue. On commence par rappeler le contexte dans lequel le jansénisme est né ; on situe ensuite Arnauld relativement à Descartes, au cartésianisme et à la philosophie en général ; on précise sa doctrine, principalement sa conception de l'homme déchu ; on détaille également sa morale. Après quoi, on restitue les grands thèmes de sa Logique et de sa Grammaire. On examine enfin la théorie des idées d'Arnauld et on fait le point sur son retour dans le champ des sciences cognitives. (shrink)

pt. I. Autori noti. V. 1* [Academici-Cyrenaici] V. 1*** in 2 vols. (v. 2(?): Nicolaus Damascenus-PLatonis Fragmenta; pt. 1. 2. Cultura e filosofia (Galenus-Isocrates) (2 v.); v. 3(?) : Platonis Testimonia-Zeno Tarsensis) -- pt. 3. Commentari -- pt. 4.1. Indici -- pt. 4.2. Tavole (I.1 e III). Tavole (I.2 Galenus-Isocrates).

1. La formazione del pensiero filosofico dalle origini a Platone, VI-IV a.C. -- 2. Filosofia, cultura, scuole tra Aristotele e Augusto, IV-II secolo a.C. -- 3. Pensiero, culture e concezioni religiose, II secolo a.C.-II secolo d.C. -- 4. Cultura, filosofia, politica e religiosità, II-VI secolo d.C.