In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.2 (2001) 193-210 [Access article in PDF] Zeno Against Mathematical Physics Trish Glazebrook Galileo wrote in The Assayer that the universe "is written in the language of mathematics," and therein both established and articulated a foundational belief for the modern physicist. 1 That physical reality can be interpreted mathematically is an assumption so fundamental to modern physics that chaos and super-strings are (...) examples of physical theories developed on the basis of success in mathematics. The mathematics came first, then the physical theory. Quantum theory is an awkward and similar case in point. Despite the fact that there is much agreement among physicists about the mathematical theory, its physical interpretation remains a matter of controversy. There are several interpretations, all of which challenge our everyday assumptions about reality. This led Bohr in 1935 to call for "a radical revision of our attitude towards the problem of physical reality." 2 Arthur Fine, originally a staunch defender of realist interpretations of quantum theory, saw the success of Bohr's Copenhagen interpretation as the end of Einsteinian realism, and subsequently Fine declared that "realism is well and truly dead." 3 Mathematical operators simply do not correspond with real entities in any conceivable way.Ilkka Niiniluoto has argued convincingly, however, that realism is alive and well in quantum theory. 4 The problem is that Bohr is right: quantum theory can be considered to concern the real only upon radical revision of ordinary conceptions of reality. Quantum theory does not describe the real in any meaningful sense of "the real." Rather, it is mathematical projection: ideal rather than real. [End Page 193]Aristotle did not hold that the physicist deciphers nature mathematically. He distinguished the physicist from the mathematician at Physics 2.2 by analogy to the definitions of "snub nose" and "curved." 5 The definition of "snub nose" requires the mention of a nose, that is, of matter which is inseparable from motion, whereas "curved" and other mathematical concepts like " 'odd' and 'even', 'straight'... 'number,' 'line,' and 'figure,' " which are separable from matter and from motion, are investigated by the mathematician. 6 Aristotle claims that physics is different from mathematics because the mathematician investigates physical lines, but not qua physical, and the physicist investigates mathematical lines "but qua physical, not qua mathematical." 7A peculiar consequence of my argument is that it establishes a common principle between two thinkers whose beliefs are otherwise so fundamentally in opposition. Zeno's paradoxes are commonly read as a denial of motion. For Aristotle, that move is axiomatic to the physicist. At 185a15 he considers arguments against this assumption outside the realm of objections to which the physicist must reply. If I am right that Zeno's paradoxes of motion challenge the very notion of mathematical physics, then he and Aristotle agree, contra Galileo, that the universe is not written in the language of mathematics. They simply come to this point from opposite directions, Zeno from an Eleatic thesis that physical reality is illusion, Aristotle from the natural scientist's pragmatic commitment to a truth about nature.I intend to use Zeno's paradoxes of motion to argue that the application of mathematical concepts to the physical world results in paradox. Zeno's arguments are limited within mathematics to geometry. This paper is accordingly a beginning from which I hope more work can be done later. Furthermore, Zeno's paradoxes are standardly read as directed against anyone who disagrees with Parmenides' thesis that there is but one thing which is motionless and indivisible. The paradoxes achieve this end by means of a reductio against the possibility of dividing space and time. That there are four paradoxes is accordingly explicable by the fact that there are four possibilities for the divisibility of space and time. The Achilles argues against the possibility that space and time are both infinitely divisible; the Dichotomy, against the infinite divisibility of space and finite divisibility of time; the Arrow, against the infinite divisibility of time and the finite divisibility of space; and finally, the Stadium shows that time and space cannot both... (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to examine what heals and harms the client in the psychotherapeutic encounter, from the client's perspective. The experience of eight clients was explicated using a model based on Giorgi and Schweitzer. The counselling experienced as healing by clients has at its core a vibrantly warm and honest relationship where the client feels held in the safety of the good heart space of the counsellor. The counsellor is experienced as providing an intense beingness for the (...) client that embraces the client's suffering and provides solid ground created out of the crucible of the counsellor's own encounter with his or her shadow. The counsellor is emptied out of his/her own agenda and provides space for the client's experience. The counsellor can evoke the higher resources of the client. The counselling is experienced as renewing and reconnecting the clients to his/her sense of self, of other and the lifeworld. The counselling relationship experienced as harming is described as being drained of human presence and transforming power. There is no alive human connection. The counsellor is experienced as insubstantial, and has no ability to hold traumatic experience. The counsellor's cold reception to the client's vulnerabilities has the power to shatter, fragment and splinter the client. The counsellor is full of self. This fullness may be ego that manifests as dry intellectualising or playing manipulative games as a substitute for human presence. This may lead the client to terror, sickness and anxiety. The counsellor may be full of their own fears and are experienced by the client as chaotic, avoidant and overwhelmed. Their unavailability leads clients to experience emotional depletion, exhaustion and frustration. The counsellor's self-righteousness, judgement and critical disengagement are experienced by clients as being belittled, condemned and diminished. The therapeutic encounter results in a weakening of the human potential for recovery. Both client and counsellor emerge as lesser human beings, with weakened relationships to self, others and the world. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 1, Edition 2 September 2001. (shrink)

Cet essai relate le cheminement, à travers la Bible, d'une pensée libre, en opposition à la "rétention honteuse, chez les musulmans, pour aller à la découverte de la Torah et des Evangiles" (Youssef Seddik), et à leur "indifférence pour ce qui relève de la connaissance du monde juif, de son passé ou de sa pensée" (Victor Malka). En relevant, à travers l'épopée du peuple "inventeur du dieu unique", les codes qui fondent la morale juive, l'auteur a eu le sentiment de (...) découvrir en YHWH un "Grand Ordonnateur de feuilles de route". Une route rigoureusement balisée, avec ses bornes et ses "haies" de protection - qu'en hébreu on appelle des syagim. Ainsi, après quatre années passées à glaner sur les "terres" du judaïsme biblique, telle Ruth glanant sur les terres de Booz, après avoir étudié plus de cent textes juifs, anciens et contemporains, l'auteur interroge ici le rapport du Juif à son prochain (parent, voisin, étranger, allié ou ennemi). Une découverte. (shrink)

We study some representations of real numbers. We compare these representations, on the one hand from the viewpoint of recursive functionals, and of complexity on the other hand.The impossibility of obtaining some functions as recursive functionals is, in general, easy. This impossibility may often be explicited in terms of complexity: - existence of a sequence of low complexity whose image is not a recursive sequence, - existence of objects of low complexity but whose images have arbitrarily high time- complexity .Moreover, (...) some representations of real numbers that are equivalent from the viewpoint of recursive functionals, are very distinct from the viewpoint of complexity.We make a particular study of representations via continued fractions . We precise exactly what part of information available in the x's dfc is equivalent to the information available in its Dedekinds cut. We show that the sum of two reals whose dfcs are polynomial-time computable may be a real whose dfc has time complexity arbitrarily high.This work confirms that the unique representation of real numbers suitable for the ordinary calculus is via explicit Cauchy sequences of rationals.RésuméNous étudions différentes manières de présenter les nombres réels. Nous comparons ces présentations du point de vue des fonctionnelles récursives d'une part, et de celui des classes de complexité d'autre part.L'impossibilité d'obtenir certaines fonctions sous forme de fonctionnelles récursives est en général facile à établir. Cette impossiblité peut souvent être explicitée en termes de complexité: - il existe une suite de faible complexité dont l'image est une suite non récursive, - il existe des objets de faible complexité mais dont les images sont des objets de complexité arbitrairement grande .En outre, certaines présentations des réels équivalentes du point de vue des fonctionnelles récursives se distinguent nettement du point de vue de la complexité.Nous faisons une étude particulière concernant les développements en fraction continue . Nous précisions exactement quelle est la partie de l'information disponible dans le dfc d'un réel x qui équivaut à l'information disponible dans sa coupure de Dedekind. Nous montrons également que la somme de deux réels dont le dfc est calculable en temps polynomial peut être un réel dont le dfc est de complexité arbitrairement grande.Ce travail confirme que seule une présentation des réels via des suites de rationnels explicitement de Cauchy est adaptée aux calculs avec les réels. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethics & the Environment 8.1 (2003) 22-36 [Access article in PDF] Art or Nature?Aristotle, Restoration Ecology, and Flowforms Trish Glazebrook He to whom nature begins to reveal her open secrets will feel an irresistible yearning for her most worthy interpreter: Art. 1Aristotle believed strongly in a distinction between artifact (technê) and nature (physis). He intended by "technê" more than is generally understood by the contemporary term "art," for (...) he meant anything produced by human intention. For example, for Aristotle medicine was technê in that the doctor produces health. The key point in distinguishing art from nature for him was that things in nature grow and develop on the basis of an internal principle of change, whereas artistic production requires an outside agent. There are some complications with the Aristotelian account: are the spider's web and the bird's nest art or nature? Aristotle can respond to this problem easily enough by arguing that spiders and birds create on the basis of instinct, while reason is requisite for artistic production. Yet some art may not meet this definition: artists may not always have a full conception of the work to be produced prior to its execution. Creativity can be emergent rather than intentional during the productive process, and may arise, for example, from the artist's interaction with the chosen material. [End Page 22]Despite these objections to the Aristotelian distinction, however, his analysis of the differences between art and nature can be usefully applied to recent debates in restoration ecology in order to argue that the human capacity to restore nature does not justify its destruction. Nature cannot be "faked," that is, recreated through art. Furthermore, the Aristotelian analysis has been influential historically by providing a conceptual basis for the technological domination of nature, as if nature were nothing more than matter upon which form can be imposed. Yet there are alternative possibilities in Aristotle's account that ecologically-minded art can bring to fruition. I will use Aristotle's analysis to suggest a potential resolution of the "faking nature" debate, and accordingly to show how contemporary, ecologically-minded art can promote an ideology of production that works with rather than against nature.Robert Elliot argues that restoration ecology does not justify environmental destruction, because faked nature (that is, nature re-created by human artifice) is not as valuable as the original. 2 I will call this claim, which is based on the idea that restoration is analogous to artistic production, "the Elliot view." I will first assess the Elliot view, and give reasons why I sympathize with his conclusions, yet find his arguments unconvincing. Second, I will present Aristotle's distinction between nature and art, with emphasis on his arguments that nature is goal-directed, in order to give content to the claim that nature has intrinsic value. Third, I will look at restoration policies and practices in the oil industry in Alberta, Canada, to establish a praxical notion of restoration, and to support Elliot's claim that nature cannot be faked. I have chosen oilfield restoration as a working example for the sake of the general methodological principle that praxes without reflections are blind, while reflections that transcend the lifeworld are empty; and specifically because Alberta leads the industry in restoration standards and practices. Finally, I will use Flowforms to argue that ecologically-minded art can demonstrate how production of artifacts need not affirm a logic of domination, but rather can open a space for an alternative conception of the human relation to nature. The Elliot View Elliot's view depends on distinguishing nature from art, and attributing a greater value to the natural. On what basis should we accept this value-hierarchy? The reasons Elliot gives are less than convincing. Ultimately his arguments rest on two points: that copies are not as good as [End Page 23] originals; and that even if an ecosystem's value could be fully restored, the value lost in the time between despoilation and restoration is irrecoverable. He simply finds "naturalness" to be more valuable than artifice. But he is not alone in... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethics & the Environment 8.1 (2003) 22-36 [Access article in PDF] Art or Nature?Aristotle, Restoration Ecology, and Flowforms Trish Glazebrook He to whom nature begins to reveal her open secrets will feel an irresistible yearning for her most worthy interpreter: Art. 1Aristotle believed strongly in a distinction between artifact (technê) and nature (physis). He intended by "technê" more than is generally understood by the contemporary term "art," for (...) he meant anything produced by human intention. For example, for Aristotle medicine was technê in that the doctor produces health. The key point in distinguishing art from nature for him was that things in nature grow and develop on the basis of an internal principle of change, whereas artistic production requires an outside agent. There are some complications with the Aristotelian account: are the spider's web and the bird's nest art or nature? Aristotle can respond to this problem easily enough by arguing that spiders and birds create on the basis of instinct, while reason is requisite for artistic production. Yet some art may not meet this definition: artists may not always have a full conception of the work to be produced prior to its execution. Creativity can be emergent rather than intentional during the productive process, and may arise, for example, from the artist's interaction with the chosen material. [End Page 22]Despite these objections to the Aristotelian distinction, however, his analysis of the differences between art and nature can be usefully applied to recent debates in restoration ecology in order to argue that the human capacity to restore nature does not justify its destruction. Nature cannot be "faked," that is, recreated through art. Furthermore, the Aristotelian analysis has been influential historically by providing a conceptual basis for the technological domination of nature, as if nature were nothing more than matter upon which form can be imposed. Yet there are alternative possibilities in Aristotle's account that ecologically-minded art can bring to fruition. I will use Aristotle's analysis to suggest a potential resolution of the "faking nature" debate, and accordingly to show how contemporary, ecologically-minded art can promote an ideology of production that works with rather than against nature.Robert Elliot argues that restoration ecology does not justify environmental destruction, because faked nature (that is, nature re-created by human artifice) is not as valuable as the original. 2 I will call this claim, which is based on the idea that restoration is analogous to artistic production, "the Elliot view." I will first assess the Elliot view, and give reasons why I sympathize with his conclusions, yet find his arguments unconvincing. Second, I will present Aristotle's distinction between nature and art, with emphasis on his arguments that nature is goal-directed, in order to give content to the claim that nature has intrinsic value. Third, I will look at restoration policies and practices in the oil industry in Alberta, Canada, to establish a praxical notion of restoration, and to support Elliot's claim that nature cannot be faked. I have chosen oilfield restoration as a working example for the sake of the general methodological principle that praxes without reflections are blind, while reflections that transcend the lifeworld are empty; and specifically because Alberta leads the industry in restoration standards and practices. Finally, I will use Flowforms to argue that ecologically-minded art can demonstrate how production of artifacts need not affirm a logic of domination, but rather can open a space for an alternative conception of the human relation to nature. The Elliot View Elliot's view depends on distinguishing nature from art, and attributing a greater value to the natural. On what basis should we accept this value-hierarchy? The reasons Elliot gives are less than convincing. Ultimately his arguments rest on two points: that copies are not as good as [End Page 23] originals; and that even if an ecosystem's value could be fully restored, the value lost in the time between despoilation and restoration is irrecoverable. He simply finds "naturalness" to be more valuable than artifice. But he is not alone in... (shrink)

This book concerns itself with an issue that is not sufficiently addressed in the literature: Heidegger’s philosophy of science. Although a great deal of attention is paid to Heidegger’s later critique of technology, no one has systematically studied how he understood “science.” Many readers will be surprised to learn, through this book, that Heidegger developed the essentials of a fairly sophisticated philosophy of science, one that in many ways invites comparison with that of Thomas Kuhn. Glazebrook demonstrates that Heidegger’s philosophy (...) of science is not neatly divided into “early” and “late” (or “Heidegger I” and “Heidegger II”) but is, rather, an ongoing development over at least three periods, bound together as an analysis of modern science and an uncovering of other possibilities for understanding nature. Glazebrook states in her introduction, “This reading of Heidegger is radical. It cuts to the root of his thinking, for I argue that what are taken to be Heidegger’s many and significant contributions to philosophy—that is, his overcoming of metaphysics, his rereading of the ancients, his critique of technology and representational thinking, his vision and revision of language, truth, and thinking—have at their core an inquiry into science that drove his thinking for sixty years. I am not arguing for a new reading of a few texts, or for adjustments and refinements of existing readings of Heideggger. Rather, I am bringing to light a new basis on which to interpret his work as a whole.”. (shrink)

This paper describes Heidegger as a robust scientific realist, explains why his view has received such conflicting treatment, and concludes that the special significance of his position lies in his insistence upon linking the discussion of science to the question of its relation with technology. It shows that Heidegger, rather than accepting the usual forced option between realism and antirealism, advocates a realism in which he embeds the antirealist thesis that the idea of reality independent of human understanding is unintelligible. (...) This reading is defended against Rorty's antirealist interpretation, as well as Dreyfus' depiction of him as a deflationary realist, and his assessment of background realism is contrasted with Fine's. Further, the robustness of Heidegger's realism is laid out across several texts from 1912 to 1976, in order to show that he is neither an instrumental realist nor an internal realist. Finally, the point is made that the development of his view concerning realism gives rise to a critique of objectivity that is now being similarly advocated by numerous thinkers from a variety of disciplines, and that this critique is inevitably ethical and political. (shrink)

This paper deals with the mystical experiences in Virginia Woolf’s artistic creation. Woolf denies any form of modernism that cannot transcend reality. There are moments, where reality is never what it is but a vision — a perspective — whose meaning is beyond the graspable. Reality, thus, becomes un-reality — a halo, and the artist becomes a contemplator — a devotee to such visionary manifestation. Virginia Woolf does not make an exception to this rule. She is par excellence a mystic. (...) The artistic design of her novels, mainly, To the Lighthouse, is of transcendental dimension. Both, Mrs Ramsay’s and Lily Briscoe’s perceptions of life are beyond the palpable: their selves merge within a process of sublimation comparable to that of mysticism. In other words, art (mainly fiction) becomes a process of change from the factual to the transmutable. (shrink)

The aim of this contribution is to examine and unveil the Augustinian time process and self-examination in Virginia Woolf’s “To the Lighthouse.” The latter is a successful (re)presentation of the interrelation between human consciousness and time “control”. The self cannot be defined without time dimension. Woolf seems to confirm that time is more interior than exterior and is an essential part of human being: it is through it that human being is felt as a part of the world. There are (...) some powerful statements of her characters that show strange similarities to Augustine’s doctrine of time, memory and existence. This triad characterizes his works, mainly “Confessions.” Woolf’s characters are so contemplative. We find them looking outward in order to discover their inside. The internal and the external are the focus of time knowledge and self-discovery. They are dialogically interrelated and define one another. The self is an ever “IS” within the presentness of the present: the “was” (past) is only a memory (“the no-longer”) and the “will be” (future) is only the “not-yet” that has to come in order to become a present. In Augustine’s doctrine, the past and the future do not exist because they are absent in the present. Yet, their only existence is the present – the NOW. Consciousness preserves one’s past within itself. The individual meets and examines himself through consciousness. Mrs. Ramsay in “To the Lighthouse” experiments these dimensions and tries to define herself through time. (shrink)

Does translation of the literary text really need a theory? If yes which one among so many, which complicate more than simplify the matter? Which strategy do we adopt to at least communicate something of the original to a target reader, who does not know anything of the source language? The key problem is the meaning. Is it really grasped? If yes, is it of the text, or of the author, or of the reader? Meaning is not restricted to linguistic (...) parameters; it is more cognitive and essentially based on the interpreter’s own world knowledge. The text is not only a product but essentially an on-going process of meaning. Though it has precise time and space when produced, it is, nonetheless, timeless and spaceless. When we animate it, through reading, it becomes a text within the scope of a new space and a new time. That is, the meaning in the process of translation becomes anew. The text is autonomous and its autonomy makes it have its own specificity and existence. And so, the meaning in/of the text is ever-changing: there is no one meaning in/of the text, as there is no one reader of the text. (shrink)

(2003). U¨bermenschen, mestizas, nomads The onotology of becoming and the scene of transnational citizenship in anzaldu´a and nietzsche. Angelaki: Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 41-57.

Welcome to Angelaki’s general issue 2018 II. Submissions for our general issues are accepted year-round. In view of an ever-rising rate of high-quality article submission, Angelaki is happy to anno...

This paper argues that there is ethical and practical necessity for including women's needs, perspectives, and expertise in international climate change negotiations. I show that climate change contributes to women's hardships because of the conjunction of the feminization of poverty and environmental degradation caused by climate change. I then provide data I collected in Ghana to demonstrate effects of extreme weather events on women subsistence farmers and argue that women have knowledge to contribute to adaptation efforts. The final section surveys (...) the international climate debate, assesses explanations for its gender blindness, and summarizes the progress on gender that was made at Copenhagen and Cancun in order to document and provoke movement toward climate justice for women. (shrink)

This book concerns itself with an issue that is not sufficiently addressed in the literature: Heidegger's philosophy of science. Although a great deal of attention is paid to Heidegger's later critique of technology, no one has systematically studied how he understood "science." Many readers will be surprised to learn, through this book, that Heidegger developed the essentials of a fairly sophisticated philosophy of science, one that in many ways invites comparison with that of Thomas Kuhn. Glazebrook demonstrates that Heidegger's philosophy (...) of science is not neatly divided into "early" and "late" but is, rather, an ongoing development over at least three periods, bound together as an analysis of modern science and an uncovering of other possibilities for understanding nature. Glazebrook states in her introduction, "This reading of Heidegger is radical. It cuts to the root of his thinking, for I argue that what are taken to be Heidegger's many and significant contributions to philosophy--that is, his overcoming of metaphysics, his rereading of the ancients, his critique of technology and representational thinking, his vision and revision of language, truth, and thinking--have at their core an inquiry into science that drove his thinking for sixty years. I am not arguing for a new reading of a few texts, or for adjustments and refinements of existing readings of Heideggger. Rather, I am bringing to light a new basis on which to interpret his work as a whole.". (shrink)

À travers le présent entretien, Salah Stétié, écrivain au carrefour d’au moins deux traditions culturelles, envisage son rapport singulier à la question de l’entre-deux. Il évoque en particulier le lien très étroit qui l’unit aux civilisations de la Méditerranée ; la question de l’intervalle l’amène à parler du sens de son écriture poétique, de son rapport à la langue et à la traduction. Plus surprenant sans doute est le contexte premier qu’il donne à son exploration poétique, selon une inspiration (...) très orientale : une physique spirituelle de l’énergie — de la danse de l’énergie, au centre de laquelle le poète se tient, à « la source des vertiges ». C’est une entité quasi impersonnelle et insituable qui écrit, à la croisée des dimensions mentales, spirituelles et verbales — et d’un inconscient qui serait beaucoup plus large que le personnel. Cependant, pour Salah Stétié, le poète, loin de ne résider nulle part, développe une « citoyenneté surplombante » qui lui permet de circuler dans toute l’étendue du réel, de l’embrasser dans son ensemble et d’en témoigner sans exclusive. Through this interview, Salah Stétié, writer in the crossroads of at least two cultural traditions, envisages his singular relationship in the question of the in-between. He evokes in particular the very narrow link which unites him with the civilizations of the Mediterranean Sea ; the question of the interval leads him to speak about the sense of its poetic writing, about its relationship in the language and in the translation. More surprising doubtless is the first context which he gives to his poetic exploration, according to a very oriental inspiration: a spiritual physics of the energy—of the dance of the energy, in the center of which the poet stands, near to “the spring of the dizzinesses”. It is a quasi-impersonal and insituable entity who writes, between the mental, spiritual and verbal dimensions—and of an unconsciousness which would be much wider than the personal one. However, for Salah Stétié, the poet, far from livig in Utopia, develops an “overhanging citizenship” who allows him to travel in all the areas of the reality, to embrace them and to testify of them without any exclusive. (shrink)

This paper deals with the study of the existence of weak positive solutions for sublinear Kirchhoff elliptic systems with zero Dirichlet boundary condition in bounded domainΩ⊂ℝNby using the subsuper solutions method.

As a conceptual approach in art practice, the female body has represented both a cultural barrier and a source of inspiration throughout art history. The adoption of the female body as an art theme is prevalent across many different artistic movements, using varying conceptual approaches. Women struggle against paradigms of inferiority to this day, though their individual cultural identity varies according to their society’s beliefs and customs – for example, many contemporary Middle Eastern cultures and customs are based on a (...) patriarchal past, when men wielded power over women. Women all over the world experience subjugation to varying degrees in the fields of employment, education, sexuality and reproductive choice. The female body in Middle Eastern societies is a red line that artists are not allowed to cross. Though many Middle Eastern civilizations have dealt freely with the female body, as can be seen in the paintings and sculptures of ancient Egypt, many social and religious factors made the female body taboo in most Middle Eastern cultures. However, on close scrutiny of modern art history in Middle Eastern and Islamic countries, we can identify outstandingly courageous female artists who succeeded in breaking the rules. They chose to express themselves through their own own form of art as an expression of freedom. They chose to use their own bodies as an art medium, which made them pioneers in their countries, and many female artists followed their example. Media art has flourished in Arab countries since the 1990s, especially in Egypt. Many of these female artists distinguished themselves as pioneers, aligning themselves with new art forms and challenging the prevailing stereotypical notion of the female artist at that time. This new mode of female self-expression and identity has developed over time and remains an ongoing process in the twenty-first century. This article considers how Middle Eastern female media artists have struggled to transform stereotypes of women by using their own bodies as an artistic element, and how they have expressed the concept of freedom through their self-body image. (shrink)

It is known that when Boabdil, the last of the Abencerrages, left Granada definitively, driven out by the reconquest, he gave a final look at his admirable city and, at that precise moment, sighed deeply. That sigh—el suspiro del Moro—has come down to us through history and after us will no doubt touch and disturb the sensibility of our descendants until the end of time. However, is it really a matter of Boabdil‘s sigh only, or is it the one, coming (...) from Adam, of those who have lost Paradise? Here, Boabdil seems to be one relay among others of that lament issuing from the depths of the species and rising, as regret and never-ceasing nostalgia, to the easily-agitated surface of our ocean of domesticity. Since that first garden, we have been the unloved children of this regret and this nostalgia. The angel with the fiery sword changes nothing: he does not have our memory that, alone, makes us every day a little less original and, in doing so, expels us, making us a little more defenseless than we were when we came out of the void. To remember is obviously to lose oneself, and we are at every moment in this vertiginous situation. As Heidegger said, to remember is to contemplate oblivion. (shrink)

Ghana is aware of women farmers’ climate adaptation challenges in meeting the country’s food security needs and has strong intentions to support these women, but is stymied by economic limitations, poor organization in governance, persistent social gender biases, and either little or counter-productive support from international policy makers and advisory bodies. Focal issues are the global impacts of climate change on agriculture, Africa’s growing hunger crisis, and women’s contribution to food production in Ghana. Of special importance are the issues of (...) gender-inclusiveness and gender-sensitivity of Ghana’s climate and climate-related policies, including its integration of United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change policy, as well as the influence of international economic policy on Ghana’s gender development. Because women farmers provide the majority of the country’s national food-basket, Ghana should focus on building women subsistence farmers’ adaptation needs to avert mass starvation. People should understand that starvation in Africa is not a future event but is already underway. (shrink)

We give a polynomial time controlled version of a theorem of M. Hall: every real number can be written as the sum of two irrational numbers whose developments into a continued fraction contain only 1, 2, 3 or 4.

The first collection of essays devoted to Heidegger’s contribution to understanding modern science.

Computer and communication technologies created new modes of creating and sharing arts. In this paper, we apply ‘diffusion of innovation’ theory to investigate how artistic content travels in an online social network site called deviantArt, a site designed for sharing user-generated artworks. We first define what innovation corresponds to in such a context, and then discuss how it can be measured with the help of network, image and text analysis methods. We propose to use user-shared resources as relatively easy targets (...) of tracking innovation. (shrink)

Lean design and agile design paradigms have been proposed for designing robots; yet, none of them could strike a balance between cost-effectiveness and short duration of the design process without compromising the quality of performance. The present article identifies the key determinants of the mobile robots development process. It also identifies empirically the mobile robot design activities and strategies with the most influence on mobile robot performance. The study identified statistically the mobile robot design activities and strategies most positively correlated (...) with mobile robot performance. The results showed that 65% of typical mobile robot design activities and strategies are affiliated with the lean design paradigm, while the remaining 35% are affiliated with the agile design paradigm. In addition, it was found that 22% of the lean mobile robot design activities and strategies and 25% of the agile mobile robot design activities and strategies, significantly with 99% confidence, are among the design activities and strategies most positively correlated with improving mobile robot performance. A hybrid lean-agile design paradigm is thus proposed. (shrink)