This book is for those searching for an ethics engine with enough philosophical power to drive healthcare reform toward a balance between medical technology and human compassion. Jos Welie's project is to This is an important goal that has eluded others. Jos Welie has more nearly succeeded in this book than any other author who has come to my attention.

(1997). Considering moral sensitivity in media ethics courses and research: An essay review by Robert F. Potter. Journal of Mass Media Ethics: Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 51-57. doi: 10.1207/s15327728jmme1201_4.

The 1980s, it is often claimed, was the decade when experimentation finally became a philosophical topic. This was the responsibility, the claim continues, of one particular movement within philosophy of science, called “new experimentalism.” The aim of this article is to complicate this historical narrative. We argue that in the 1980s, the study of experimentation was carried out not by one movement with one particular aim but rather in a diverse and open-ended way by people with different aims and backgrounds. (...) We then argue that from the late 1990s onward, this diversity disappeared and made room for disciplinary divisions—questions concerning experimentation became philosophical, others sociological, and so on. The reason for this, we claim, was that science and technology studies, philosophy of technology, and philosophy of science took over aspects of the 1980s study of experimentation. In this way, we argue, these elements became institutionalized, whereas others were forgotten. The importance of this process of institutionalization is illustrated by means of a discussion of other, similar approaches to the philosophy of experimentation that have not been able to ensure continuity because they did not find an institutional home. (shrink)

When The Ad Hoc Committee of Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death began meeting in 1967, I was a graduate student, with committee member Ralph Potter and committee chair Henry Beecher as my mentors. The question of when to stop life support on a severely compromised patient was not clearly differentiated from the question of when someone was dead. A serious clinical problem arose when physicians realized that a patient's condition was hopeless but life support (...) perpetuated body function. Thus, the committee stated that its first purpose was to deal with the burdens on patients and families as well as on hospitals and on patients needing hospital beds occupied by comatose patients. They intuited the strategy of “defining” these patients as dead, thus legitimating treatment stoppage. They noted that this would also serve a second purpose. Although the dead donor rule had not yet been clearly articulated, they claimed that defining patients as dead would also address controversy over obtaining organs for transplant.My mentors’ discussions related to my interest in the intersection between questions primarily of medical fact (When has a human brain irreversibly ceased functioning?) and nonmedical questions of social policy (Should we treat individuals with dead brains and beating hearts as dead humans?). It quickly became clear that most committee members did not appreciate the interplay of these questions. (shrink)

This collection of thirteen essays, when viewed together, offers a unique perspective on the history of American philosophy. It illuminates for the first time in book form, how thirteen major American philosophical thinkers viewed a problem of special interest in the American philosophical tradition: the relationship between experience and reflection. Written by well-known authorities on the figure about which he or she writes, the essays are arranged chronologically to highlight the changes and developments in thought from Puritanism to Pragmatism to (...) Process Philosophy. While Doctrine and Experience will be of particular interest to specialists in American Philosophy, there is also much to offer anyone interested in the intellectual and cultural history of the United States. In order of appearance, the essays are: "Jonathan Edwards and the Great Awakening" by John E. Smith "Heart and Head: The Mind of Thomas Jefferson" by Andrew J. Reck"Emerson and the American Future" by Robert C. Pollock"Chauncey Wright and the Pragmatists" by Edward Madden"Charles S. Peirce: Action Through Thought – The Ethics of Experience" by Vincent G. Potter"Life Is in the Transitions’: Radical Empiricism and Contemporary Concerns" by John J. McDermott"John Dewey and the Metaphysics of American Democracy" by Ralph W. Sleeper"Individualization and Unification in Sartre and Dewey" by Thelma Z. Levine"Josiah Royce: Anticipator of European Existentialism and Phenomenology" by Jacqueline Ann K. Kegley"The Transcendence of Materialism and Idealism in American Thought" by John Lachs"C. I. Lewis and the Pragmatic Tradition in American Philosophy" by Sandra Rosenthal"The Social Philosophy of George Herbert Mead" by David Miller"Existence as Transaction: A Whiteheadian Study of Causality" by Elizabeth Kraus. (shrink)

Feminist science scholars need models of science that allow feminist accounts, not only of the inception and reception of scientific theories, but of their content as well. I argue that a "Network Model," properly modified, makes clear theoretically how race, sex and class considerations can influence the content of scientific theories. The adoption of the "corpuscular philosophy" by Robert Boyle and other Puritan scientists during the English Civil War offers us a good case on which to test such a (...) model. According to these men, the minute corpuscles constituting the physical world are dead, not alive; passive, not active. I argue that they chose the principle that matter is passive in part because its contrary, the principle that matter is alive and self-moving, had a radical social meaning and use to the women and men working for progressive change in mid-seventeenth century England. (shrink)

In previous works such as Thinking Through the Imagination: Aesthetics in Human Cognition and Idealism, Pragmatism, and Feminism: The Philosophy of Ella Lyman Cabot, John Kaag firmly established his "street cred" as a scholar and interpreter of American philosophy. His name will also be familiar to readers of the Chronicle of Higher Education, The New York Times, and sundry other publications as he endeavors to impact a larger audience, off campus, to serve as a public intellectual, one we need (...) now more than ever—Richard Hofstadter's 1964 Anti-Intellectualism in American Life is all too relevant as challenges cloud our democratic vistas.An ambitious work, American... (shrink)

The Merchant's Tale is by most accounts Chaucer's bleakest and most savagely ironic story in the Canterbury Tales. Rivaled perhaps in its cynical appraisal of human motives by the Pardoner's nervy gambit to separate the Canterbury pilgrims from their currency and other valuables, it is a story that seemingly lacks a ground of moral belief and leaves little room for sympathy with its characters. Its imaginary world is one that nobody would care to inhabit. Some modern readers offer a temperate (...) view of the tale, seeing it as an artfully contrived, lighthearted farce about marriage; but most accept the terms, if not the conclusions, that led George Lyman Kittredge to characterize the tale as “a frenzy of contempt and hatred” and J. S. P. Tatlock to remark on its “unrelieved acidity.”. (shrink)

I am Associate Professor of Science & Technology Studies at Michigan State University’s Lyman Briggs School of Science and Associate Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy. I’m also a faculty member in MSU’s Ecology & Evolutionary Biology and Behavior Program and in the Department of Computer Science.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.1 (2003) 29-31 [Access article in PDF] On the Border:Reflections on the Meaning of Self-Injury in Borderline Personality Disorder Robert L. Woolfolk Keywords borderline personality disorder, values, psychotherapy, diagnosis IT IS A PLEASURE to comment on Nancy Potter's elegantly written, provocative paper. Professor Potter raises important and intriguing issues that have not only clinical implications for practitioners, but also are of theoretical (...) significance for those who ponder the conceptual status of mental illnesses and their manifestations.Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is the mental health professional's bête noire. In the diagnostic context, borderline is an adjective that is evocative, albeit imprecise. Persons with BPD tend to the worst of multiple pathological worlds, to fall through the diagnostic cracks, to occupy the boundaries of decorum and safety. Even such intrepid and astute folk as Marsha Linnehan and Otto Kernberg, who have devoted careers to understanding and treating those with BPD, have acknowledged the limited state of current knowledge. Justice Stewart's theory of natural concepts seems to apply to patients to whom we give the label borderline personality disorder: we cannot define the disorder readily, but we know one when we see one. And when we see such a patient it is costly in time and stress and corrosive of one's sense of professional efficacy. So with these patients, any assistance in conceptualizing the problem or in modification of therapeutics is welcome.Professor Potter's phenomenological formulation of self-injury is cogent and helpful in a number of ways. Self-injurious behavior is, when conventionally interpreted, a prototype for irrationality and affliction. It is also dramatic, graphic, and often repugnant. Professor Potter's analysis brings us face to face with what most of us know but sometimes forget or fail to apply: Psychotherapy is a value-laden endeavor. Early on, both Max Weber and Carl Jung were eloquent on this point and we have been reminded often enough of it in the last four decades (Rieff 1966; Woolfolk 1998; Woolfolk and Murphy, in press). Usually it is the moral values residing in the underlying ideologies of treatment and diagnosis that are brought to our attention. The axiological underpinnings of psychotherapy, however, are aesthetic as well as ethical. Professor Potter successfully argues that, as therapists, we may be in the thrall of a parochial aesthetic that produces [End Page 29] a kind of tunnel vision inimical to therapeutic effectiveness and to the ethical treatment of the human beings who are our patients. She has impeccable advice for therapists on this topic: Although none of us can step outside of culture altogether, we can evaluate our attitudes, beliefs, and values from a second-order level (Taylor 1989; Frankfurt 1971). Complete objectivity is an unlikely ideal. But clinicians can, and should, think critically about ways in which prevailing norms and values may be influencing their understanding of the world and their ways of being in it. (Potter 2003, 11) Professor Potter also quite effectively persuades that a comprehensive understanding of disorders that occur mostly in women (e.g., somatization disorder) must effectively comprehend feminist scholarship and the sociocultural realities of gender. The concept of the commodification of the female body has been informative in both the epidemiology and treatment of yet another woman's disorder, anorexia nervosa. And although the linkages of somatic commodification to self-injurious behavior may not appear to be so straightforward, the paper points the way to deeper and possibly richer explanations of phenomena that seem at first glance to be inexplicable.The introduction of the concept of uptake into clinical contexts is also a valuable contribution. Those of us familiar with the traditions of psychotherapy recognize a concept both familiar and central. Uptake has family resemblance to the empathic attitude so extensively discussed by both Rogers and Kohut. Those with hermeneutic leanings will recognize affinities with Verstehen and the Gadamerian anticipation of completeness (Vorgriff der Vollkommenheit). Any truly humanistic approach to treatment or diagnosis must encompass the lived experience of the patient. This is not to... (shrink)

Nach den Anschlagen in Paris, Brussel und Nizza und den verzweifelten Erklarungsversuchen sind die Baden-Badener Reden von Alfred Grosser, Hans Gert-Pottering und Robert Zollitsch eine grosse Hilfe. Eine Hilfe, die schmerzenden Erfahrungen des Augenblicks in einen grosseren Zusammenhang zu bringen. Wenn etwa Alfred Grosser in seiner Rede den Bogen zu seiner eigenen Biografie hin zu den Banlieues unserer Tage in Paris spannt. "Ich bin seit 1937 Franzose, unsere Erziehungsministerin ist Franzosin seit 1995, unser Premierminister seit 1982, die Burgermeisterin von (...) Paris seit 1973, Nicolas Sarkozy ist Fluchtlingssohn. Niemand wird sagen, sie sind nicht Franzosen. Aber die jungen Leute in den sogenannten "Vororten" sind fast alle franzosische Staatsburger und werden total diskriminiert. Also, sie haben die franzosische Identitat, gewiss, aber sie suchen eine andere Identitat und das ist der Islam. Nicht der Islam war zuerst da, sondern die Diskriminierung.". (shrink)

This essay explores and recalls my relationship with Lyman Tower Sargent, an adviser and reader for my 1996 Master of Architecture thesis “A Plan for Wellington Until the Destruction” undertaken at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. The discussion is set against multiple backdrops: Wellington, the capital city of New Zealand, a place that I considered to be an ideal armature for a utopian construct; the “continent” ; the Jonestown agricultural commune, Guyana; and the work of artist Robert (...) Mapplethorpe. (shrink)

In her recent case study, Elizabeth Potter attempts to show how Boyle's experimental method was biased by gender considerations. Part of her argument focuses on the combination of the “invisibility” of women in Boyle's published work together with his unpublished comments on female chastity, and part concerns Boyle's rejection of the animistic explanation of his air pump experiments by Francis Line. I argue that the historical and biographical elements of the case make Potter's arguments questionable. In addition, I (...) address whether and how such historical cases can shed light on current debates about gender issues and argue that Boyle's methodological writings could be used to better advantage in the feminist cause. (shrink)

Dr Robert Chambers has recently argued that a loan on Quistclose terms does not actually create a trust, but rather the borrower receives the entire beneficial ownership of the funds subject only to a contractual right (enforceable by an injunction) on the part of the lender to prevent the loan being employed other than for the specified purpose. Chambers' approach, or at least something broadly similar, has received some obiter support from Potter LJ in Twinsectra Ltd v. Yardley. (...) This article maintains that Chambers' analysis leaves unresolved a number of significant issues. It does not explain Potter LJ's emphasis on the requirement to segregate the Quistclose funds from the borrower's general assets. Similarly, it seems not applicable outside the typical Quistclose scenario; for instance, where the funds are wrongfully transferred to a third party before the failure of the specified purpose, where the Quistclose arrangement arises outside a contractual setting, and where the dispute involves a third party holding a (pre‐existing) charge. Accordingly, it is suggested that it would be quite premature to conclude that more orthodox explanations of the Quistclose trust should now be jettisoned. (shrink)

Life, on a day to day basis, is a sequence of emotional states: hope, disappointment, irritation, anger, affection, envy, pride, embarrassment, joy, sadness and many more. We know intuitively that these states express deep things about our character and our view of the world. But what are emotions and why are they so important to us? In one of the most extensive investigations of the emotions ever published, Robert Roberts develops a novel conception of what emotions are and then (...) applies it to a large range of types of emotion and related phenomena. In so doing he lays the foundations for a deeper understanding of our evaluative judgments, our actions, our personal relationships and our fundamental well-being. Aimed principally at philosophers and psychologists, this book will certainly be accessible to readers in other disciplines such as religion and anthropology. (shrink)

According to proponents of the extended mind, bio-external resources, such as a notebook or a smartphone, are candidate parts of the cognitive and mental machinery that realises cognitive states and processes. The present chapter discusses three areas of ethical concern associated with the extended mind, namely mental privacy, mental manipulation, and agency. We also examine the ethics of the extended mind from the standpoint of three general normative frameworks, namely, consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics.

Michael Almeida has recently tried to show that if S5 correctly represents metaphysical necessity, there can be no non-trivial evidence for or against the existence of the traditional God. Evidence would thus be irrelevant to the reasonability of traditional theistic belief. Almeida's argument has implications beyond its announced target: it amounts to a new argument for sweeping scepticism. Almeida's argument for the irrelevance of evidence to the existence of God would apply to any state of affairs that entails some metaphysical (...) necessity. In S5, every state of affairs entails some metaphysical necessity, so Almeida should conclude that non-trivial evidence for or against any state of affairs is impossible. I argue that the problem is not with S5 but with inadequately motivated assumptions about evidential support. Avoiding those assumptions disables the argument for sweeping scepticism and without foreclosing the possibility of non-trivial evidence for or against the existence of the traditional God. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

The existence of a self seems both mysterious and inevitable. On the one hand, philosophers from the Buddha to Sartre doubt its existence. As Hume writes, when we introspect we find thoughts, feelings, and conscious states, but nothing that has them. The subject of experience is elusive, but its existence seems certain. Descartes’ cogito is beyond doubt and the thought that “I am thinking” involves an undeniable form of self-awareness. Self-Awareness and the Elusive Subject develops and defends the claim that (...) we don’t find ourselves in introspection, and that consciousness is, in general, impersonal. It then develops an account of self-awareness that takes these phenomenological data seriously. Our grasp of ourselves is epistemically robust but introspectively slight: we know ourselves most fundamentally as the bearers of our conscious states. (shrink)

Nozick argues, in “Anarchy, State, and Utopia”, correctly I think, that we can go from an equal distribution of wealth to an unequal one through just means. Nozick then asks: If people voluntarily move from a just distribution of wealth, D1, to a different distribution, D2, “isn’t D2 also just?” While Nozick thinks the new distribution of wealth, D2, is just, I think that it is at least possible to go from a just state of affairs to an un-just state (...) of affairs by just means. I then argue that any unequal distribution of wealth can not maximize the good derived from wealth. Therefore, on the basis of plausible utilitarian ideas, any distribution of wealth that isn’t at least roughly equal is un-just, even it was arrived at by just means from aa equal and just distribution of wealth. (shrink)

Historically, philosophers of biology have tended to sidestep the problem of development by focusing primarily on evolutionary biology and, more recently, on molecular biology and genetics. Quite often too, development has been misunderstood as simply, or even primarily, a matter of gene activation and regulation. Nowadays a growing number of philosophers of science are focusing their analyses on the complexities of development, and in Embryology, Epigenesis and Evolution Jason Scott Robert explores the nature of development against current trends in (...) biological theory and practice and looks at the interrelations between development and evolution, an area of resurgent biological interest. Clearly written, this book should be of interest to students and professionals in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of biology. (shrink)

Philosophers often consider problems of free will and moral luck in isolation from one another, but both are about control and moral responsibility. One problem of free will concerns the difficult task of specifying the kind of control over our actions that is necessary and sufficient to act freely. One problem of moral luck refers to the puzzling task of explaining whether and how people can be morally responsible for actions permeated by factors beyond their control. This chapter explicates and (...) assesses skeptical, compatibilist, and libertarian approaches to moral luck. First, I argue that what makes the above problems of free will and moral luck distinct is largely their emphasis on different kinds of luck. Second, I describe and evaluate skeptical arguments from constitutive and circumstantial luck that it is impossible to act freely. Third, I explicate and assess various support and implication relationships between various kinds of compatibilism and libertarianism, on the one hand, and causal, constitutive, circumstantial, and resultant moral luck, on the other. (shrink)

Typically, although it’s notoriously hard to define, autism has been represented as a biologically-based mental disorder that can be usefully investigated by biomedical science. In recent years, ho...

Autonomy -- Hydrodynamics -- Brownian motion -- From Brownian motion to bending beams -- An engineering approach -- The right variables and natural kinds.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Preface: Virtual Entities in ScienceRobert Harlander, Jean-Philippe Martinez, Friedrich Steinle, and Adrian WüthrichIt is not only since the sudden increase of online communication due to the COVID-19 situation that the concept of the “virtual” has made its way into everyday language. In this context, it mostly denotes a digital substitute for a real object or process. Virtual reality is perhaps the best-known term in this respect. With these digital (...) connotations, “virtuality” has also been used in science and research: Chemists use virtual laboratories, biologists do virtual scanning of molecular structures, and geologists engage in virtual field trips. But the concept of the virtual has a much longer tradition, dating back to long before the dawn of the digital age. Virtual images and virtual displacements were introduced in classical physics already in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, respectively. They represent auxiliary objects or processes without instantiation, with the purpose of efficiently describing specific physical systems. In today’s physics, the term “virtual” is mostly associated with the quantum world, first and foremost with the “virtual particle” of quantum field theory. It has become such an integral part of modern high energy physics that its ontological character may be considered to go beyond the purely auxiliary, which is typically associated with the virtual. [End Page 263]In other disciplines, however, use of the term virtual without a digital connotation is much rarer. While concepts like “virtual adrenaline” show up in physiological research around 1940s, and Charles Darwin, in a private note in January 1840,1 spoke of “virtual change” in the context of embryology, these examples seem to be singular occurrences of entities that were explicitly called “virtual.” The basic idea behind the terminology of the virtual, however, might be much more common, even outside of physics. The “invisible hand” in economics, or the “vital force” in biology, for instance, may carry aspects of a virtual entity, even if they have not been referred to that way.These different observations raise several questions about the status of virtual entities in science. What has led scientists to call one entity “virtual” and not another? Do all virtual entities in science have the same roots and meet the same characteristics? Are they more than auxiliary objects or processes? Why does physics seem to occupy a specific position with respect to the use of the notion of virtuality? These are some points that led us to discuss virtual entities in science during a workshop, out of which grew the present collection. We invited contributions that addressed the historical formation and philosophical interpretation of concepts of virtual entities in physics and other disciplines—in whatever terms they may come. The main goal of the workshop was to bring to the fore similarities and differences in the meanings and functions of these concepts, so as to be able to precisely characterize why certain entities are considered virtual in specific contexts, why a different terminology was often used in each individual case, and in what sense the virtual entities relate to the real world.The organization of the workshop was part of our project “The formation and development of the concept of virtual particles,” a subproject of the Research Unit “The Epistemology of the Large Hadron Collider,” funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) and Der Wissenschaftsfonds (FWF). The workshop took place online on four consecutive Fridays in March 2021. It brought together contributors who discussed the role of the concept of the virtual in theoretical as well as experimental activities, and investigated into the origins of the terminology of the virtual as it was applied to the various disciplines of natural science. Dealing with historical, philosophical, but also methodological questions, the presentations covered a wide time range, from the Middle Ages to the present day. While physics naturally emerged as the dominant field, natural philosophy, computer science and biology were also addressed. The papers in this volume were contributed by participants in this workshop and approach the subject from different angles. [End Page 264]First, Friedrich Steinle provides us with an introductory piece that reflects on the specific meaning of the use of the term ‘virtual’ in science. He highlights and... (shrink)