Background This article describes the issues encountered when designing a study to evaluate recruitment of minority ethnic groups into clinical cancer research in order to monitor adherence to the principles for good practice set out in the Department of Health, Research Governance Framework, England. Methods (i) A review of routine data sources to determine whether their usefulness as a source of data on prevalence of cancer in the population by ethnic category. (ii) A local case study at one hospital trust (...) to ascertain whether the ethnicity of cancer trial participants was representative of admitted cancer patients. Results (i) The lack of a comparator population makes it problematic to assess recruitment levels by ethnic group in clinical research. (ii) The odds of being in a trial were 30% lower for a member of a minority ethnic group compared to a white cancer patient after adjusting for disease, age and gender, OR 0.70 (0.53 to 0.94). These results differed for each ethnic group; Asian patients did not appear under-represented while Black and Chinese did so. However, there are important caveats to the findings based on the limited recording of ethnicity. Conclusions The lack of available data on the ethnicity of participants in clinical research and the prevalence of cancer in the population according to ethnicity makes it difficult to design a study to monitor representation of minority ethnic groups. This information is necessary to assess adherence to the Research Governance Framework principle that research evidence reflects the diversity of the population. (shrink)

The idea that the mass m of an elementary particle is explained in the semi-classical approximation by quantum-mechanical zero-point vacuum fluctuations has been applied previously to spin-1/2 fermions to yield a real and positive constant value for m, expressed through the spinorial connection Γ i in the curved-space Dirac equation for the wave function ψ due to Fock. This conjecture is extended here to bosonic particles of spin 0 and spin 1, starting from the basic assumption that all fundamental fields (...) must be conformally invariant. As a result, in curved space-time there is an effective scalar mass-squared term $m_{0}^{2}=-R/6=2\varLambda_{\mathrm{b}}/3$ , where R is the Ricci scalar and Λ b is the cosmological constant, corresponding to the bosonic zero-point energy-density, which is positive, implying a real and positive constant value for m 0, through the positive-energy theorem. The Maxwell Lagrangian density $\mathcal{L} =- \sqrt{-g}F_{ij}F^{ij}/4$ for the Abelian vector field F ij ≡A j,i −A i,j is conformally invariant without modification, however, and the equation of motion for the four-vector potential A i contains no mass-like term in curved space. Therefore, according to our hypothesis, the free photon field A i must be massless, in agreement with both terrestrial experiment and the notion of gauge invariance. (shrink)

The Schrödinger equation for a particle of rest mass $m$ and electrical charge $ne$ interacting with a four-vector potential $A_i$ can be derived as the non-relativistic limit of the Klein–Gordon equation $\left( \Box '+m^2\right) \varPsi =0$ for the wave function $\varPsi $ , where $\Box '=\eta ^{jk}\partial '_j\partial '_k$ and $\partial '_j=\partial _j -\mathrm {i}n e A_j$ , or equivalently from the one-dimensional action $S_1=-\int m ds +\int neA_i dx^i$ for the corresponding point particle in the semi-classical approximation $\varPsi \sim (...) \exp {(\mathrm {i}S_1)}$ , both methods yielding the equation $\mathrm {i}\partial _0\varPsi \approx \left( \frac{1}{2m}\eta ^{\alpha \beta }\partial '_{\alpha }\partial '_{\beta } + m + n e\phi \right) \varPsi $ in Minkowski space–time , where $\alpha ,\beta =1,2,3$ and $\phi =-A_0$ . We show that these two methods generally yield equations that differ in a curved background space–time $g_{ij}$ , although they coincide when $g_{0\alpha }=0$ if $m$ is replaced by the effective mass $\mathcal{M}\equiv \sqrt{m^2-\xi R}$ in both the Klein–Gordon action $S$ and $S_1$ , allowing for non-minimal coupling to the gravitational field, where $R$ is the Ricci scalar and $\xi $ is a constant. In this case $\mathrm {i}\partial _0\varPsi \approx \left( \frac{1}{2\mathcal{M}'} g^{\alpha \beta }\partial '_{\alpha }\partial '_{\beta } + \mathcal{M}\phi ^{(\mathrm g)} + n e\phi \right) \varPsi $ , where $\phi ^{(\mathrm g)} =\sqrt{g_{00}}$ and $\mathcal{M}'=\mathcal{M}/\phi ^{(\mathrm g)} $ , the correctness of the gravitational contribution to the potential having been verified to linear order $m\phi ^{(\mathrm g)} $ in the thermal-neutron beam interferometry experiment due to Colella et al. Setting $n=2$ and regarding $\varPsi $ as the quasi-particle wave function, or order parameter, we obtain the generalization of the fundamental macroscopic Ginzburg-Landau equation of superconductivity to curved space–time. Conservation of probability and electrical current requires both electromagnetic gauge and space–time coordinate conditions to be imposed, which exemplifies the gravito-electromagnetic analogy, particularly in the stationary case, when div ${{\varvec{A}}}=\hbox {div}{{\varvec{A}}}^{(\mathrm g)}=0$ , where ${{\varvec{A}}}^{\alpha }=-A^{\alpha }$ and ${{\varvec{A}}}^{(\mathrm g)\alpha }=-\phi ^{(\mathrm g)}g^{0\alpha }$ . The quantum-cosmological Schrödinger (Wheeler–DeWitt) equation is also discussed in the $\mathcal{D}$ -dimensional mini-superspace idealization, with particular regard to the vacuum potential $\mathcal V$ and the characteristics of the ground state, assuming a gravitational Lagrangian $L_\mathcal{D}$ which contains higher-derivative terms up to order $\mathcal{R}^4$ . For the heterotic superstring theory , $L_\mathcal{D}$ consists of an infinite series in $\alpha '\mathcal{R}$ , where $\alpha '$ is the Regge slope parameter, and in the perturbative approximation $\alpha '|\mathcal{R}| \ll 1$ , $\mathcal V$ is positive semi-definite for $\mathcal{D} \ge 4$ . The maximally symmetric ground state satisfying the field equations is Minkowski space for $3\le {\mathcal {D}}\le 7$ and anti-de Sitter space for $8 \le \mathcal {D} \le 10$. (shrink)

Some ordinary language philosophers, including Stanley Cavell, have attacked certain tendencies of traditional philosophers as follows. E.g., when we say that something looks red to us, we imply that we think it isn't really red. Thus we arc breaking a rule of language when we say that something looks red to us when we know it is red. And thus there is something logically wrong with the traditional attempt, to say that what justifies us in thinking that something is red (...) is its looking red to us. In this article it is maintained that the ?implication? invoked above is a contingent relation having to do with what makes a fact noteworthy, and that the existence of this implication does not show that there is anything logically wrong with the traditional positions being attacked. (shrink)

This paper addresses the logical foundations of goal-regression planning in autonomous rational agents. It focuses mainly on three problems. The first is that goals and subgoals will often be conjunctions, and to apply goal-regression planning to a conjunction we usually have to plan separately for the conjuncts and then combine the resulting subplans. A logical problem arises from the fact that the subplans may destructively interfere with each other. This problem has been partially solved in the AI literature (e.g., in (...) SNLP and UCPOP), but the solutions proposed there work only when a restrictive assumption is satisfied. This assumption pertains to the computability of threats. It is argued that this assumption may fail for an autonomous rational agent operating in a complex environment. Relaxing this assumption leads to a theory of defeasible planning. The theory is formulated precisely and an implementation in the OSCAR architecture is discussed. (shrink)

Agents are entities that act upon the world. Rational agents are those that do so in an intelligent fashion. What is essential to such an agent is the ability to select and perform actions. Actions are selected by planning, and performing such actions is a matter of plan execution. So the essence of a rational agent is the ability to make and execute plans. This constitutes practical cognition. In order to perform its principal function of practical cognition, a rational agent (...) must also be able to acquire the knowledge of the world that is required for making and executing plans. This is done by epistemic cognition. Rational agents embedded in a realistically complicated world (e.g., human beings) may devote more time to epistemic cognition than to practical cognition, but even for such agents, epistemic cognition is in an important sense subservient to practical cognition. (shrink)

What do we mean when we say we "know" something? What is this knowledge and how do we come by it? What exactly counts as an object of knowledge? And on what basis do we defend our claims to know against thosethe skepticswho deny that knowledge is possible or that our criteria for knowing can ever be satisfied? These questions and many others are addressed in this fascinating collection of essays by leading philosophers, who discuss the nature, meaning, and extent (...) of human knowledge. Included are works by Robert Almeder, William P. Alston, Robert P. Amico, Roderick M. Chisholm, Edmund L. Gettier, Richard Feldman, Peter D. Klein, Keith Lehrer, Kenneth G. Lucey, John Pollock, and others. Several essays are original to this collection and break new ground on such issues as the Problem of the Criterion. (shrink)

This collection of thirteen essays, when viewed together, offers a unique perspective on the history of American philosophy. It illuminates for the first time in book form, how thirteen major American philosophical thinkers viewed a problem of special interest in the American philosophical tradition: the relationship between experience and reflection. Written by well-known authorities on the figure about which he or she writes, the essays are arranged chronologically to highlight the changes and developments in thought from Puritanism to Pragmatism to (...) Process Philosophy. While Doctrine and Experience will be of particular interest to specialists in American Philosophy, there is also much to offer anyone interested in the intellectual and cultural history of the United States. In order of appearance, the essays are: "Jonathan Edwards and the Great Awakening" by John E. Smith "Heart and Head: The Mind of Thomas Jefferson" by Andrew J. Reck"Emerson and the American Future" by Robert C. Pollock"Chauncey Wright and the Pragmatists" by Edward Madden"Charles S. Peirce: Action Through Thought – The Ethics of Experience" by Vincent G. Potter"Life Is in the Transitions’: Radical Empiricism and Contemporary Concerns" by John J. McDermott"John Dewey and the Metaphysics of American Democracy" by Ralph W. Sleeper"Individualization and Unification in Sartre and Dewey" by Thelma Z. Levine"Josiah Royce: Anticipator of European Existentialism and Phenomenology" by Jacqueline Ann K. Kegley"The Transcendence of Materialism and Idealism in American Thought" by John Lachs"C. I. Lewis and the Pragmatic Tradition in American Philosophy" by Sandra Rosenthal"The Social Philosophy of George Herbert Mead" by David Miller"Existence as Transaction: A Whiteheadian Study of Causality" by Elizabeth Kraus. (shrink)

Evidentiary propositions E 1 and E 2, each p-positively relevant to some hypothesis H, are mutually corroborating if p > p, i = 1, 2. Failures of such mutual corroboration are instances of what may be called the corroboration paradox. This paper assesses two rather different analyses of the corroboration paradox due, respectively, to John Pollock and Jonathan Cohen. Pollock invokes a particular embodiment of the principle of insufficient reason to argue that instances of the corroboration paradox are (...) of negligible probability, and that it is therefore defeasibly reasonable to assume that items of evidence positively relevant to some hypothesis are mutually corroborating. Taking a different approach, Cohen seeks to identify supplementary conditions that are sufficient to ensure that such items of evidence will be mutually corroborating, and claims to have identified conditions which account for most cases of mutual corroboration. Combining a proposed common framework for the general study of paradoxes of positive relevance with a simulation experiment, we conclude that neither Pollock’s nor Cohen’s claims stand up to detailed scrutiny. I am quite prepared to be told…”oh, that is an extreme case: it could never really happen!” Now I have observed that this answer is always given instantly, with perfect confidence, and without any examination of the proposed case. It must therefore rest on some general principle: the mental process being something like this—“I have formed a theory. This case contradicts my theory. Therefore, this is an extreme case, and would never occur in practice.”Rev. Charles L. Dodgson. (shrink)

Joel Feinberg : In Memoriam. Preface. Part I: INTRODUCTION TO THE NATURE AND VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY. 1. Joel Feinberg: A Logic Lesson. 2. Plato: "Apology." 3. Bertrand Russell: The Value of Philosophy. PART II: REASON AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF. 1. The Existence and Nature of God. 1.1 Anselm of Canterbury: The Ontological Argument, from Proslogion. 1.2 Gaunilo of Marmoutiers: On Behalf of the Fool. 1.3 L. Rowe: The Ontological Argument. 1.4 Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Five Ways, from Summa Theologica. 1.5 Samuel (...) Clarke: A Modern Formulation of the Cosmological Argument. 1.6 William L. Rowe: The Cosmological Argument. 1.7 William Paley: The Argument from Design. 1.8 Michael Ruse: The Design Argument. 1.9 David Hume: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. 2. The Problem of Evil. 2.1 Fyodor Dostoyevsky: Rebellion. 2.2 J. L. Mackie: Evil and Omnipotence. 2.3 Peter van Inwagen: The Argument from Evil. 2.4 Michael Murray and Michael Rea: The Argument from Evil. 2.5 B. C. Johnson: God and the Problem of Evil. 3. Reason and Faith. 3.1 W. K. Clifford: The Ethics of Belief. 3.2 William James: The Will to Believe. 3.3 Kelly James Clark: Without Evidence or Argument. 3.4 Blaise Pascal: The Wager. 3.5 Lawrence Shapiro: Miracles and Justification. 3.6 Simon Blackburn: Infini-Rien. Part III. HUMAN KNOWLEDGE: ITS GROUNDS AND LIMITS. 1. Skepticism. 1.1 John Pollock: A Brain in a Vat. 1.2 Michael Huemer: Three Skeptical Arguments. 1.3 Robert Audi: Skepticism. 2. The Nature and Value of Knowledge. 2.1 Plato: Knowledge as Justified True Belief. 2.2 Edmund Gettier: Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? 2.3 James Cornman, Keith Lehrer, and George Pappas: An Analysis of Knowledge. 2.4 Gilbert Ryle: Knowing How and Knowing That. 2.5 Plato: "Meno". 2.6 Linda Zagzebski, Epistemic Good and The Good Life. 3. Our Knowledge of the External World. 3.1 Bertrand Russell: Appearance and Reality and the Existence of Matter. 3.2 René Descartes: Meditations on First Philosophy. 3.3 John Locke: The Causal Theory of Perception. 3.4 George Berkeley: Of the Principles of Human Knowledge. 3.5 G. E. Moore: Proof of an External World. 4. The Methods of Science. 4.1 David Hume: An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding. 4.2 Wesley C. Salmon: An Encounter with David Hume. 4.3 Karl Popper: Science: Conjectures and Refutations. 4.4 Philip Kitcher: Believing Where We Cannot Prove. Part IV: MIND AND ITS PLACE IN NATURE. 1. The Mind-Body Problem. 1.1 Brie Gertler: In Defense of Mind--Body Dualism. 1.2 Frank Jackson: The Qualia Problem. 1.3 David Papineau: The Case for Materialism. 1.4 Paul Churchland: Functionalism and Eliminative Materialism. 2. Can Non-Humans Think? 2.1 Alan Turing: Computing Machinery and Intelligence. 2.2 John R. Searle: Minds, Brains, and Programs. 2.3 William G. Lycan: Robots and Minds. 3. Personal Identity and the Survival of Death. 3.1 John Locke: The Prince and the Cobbler. 3.2 Thomas Reid: Of Mr. Locke’s Account of Our Personal Identity. 3.3 David Hume: The Self. 3.4 Derek Parfit: Divided Minds and the Nature of Persons. 3.5 Shelly Kagan: What Matters. 3.6 John Perry: A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality. Part V: DETERMINISM, FREE WILL, AND RESPONSIBILITY. 1. Libertarianism: The Case for Free Will and Its Incompatibility with Determinism. 1.1 Roderick M. Chisholm: Human Freedom and the Self. 1.2 Robert Kane: Free Will: Ancient Dispute, New Themes. 2. Hard Determinism: The Case for Determinism and its Incompatibility with Its Incompatibility with Any Important Sense of Free Will. 2.1 James Rachels: The case against Free Will. 2.2 Derk Pereboom: Why We Have No Free Will and Can Live Without It. 3. Compatibilism: The Case for Determinism and Its Compatibility with the Most Important Sense of Free Will. 3.1 David Hume: Of Liberty and Necessity. 3.2 Helen Beebee: Compatibilism and the Ability to do Otherwise. 4. Freedom and Moral Responsibility. 4.1 Galen Strawson: Luck Swallows Everything. 4.2 Harry Frankfurt: Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility. 4.3 Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck. 4.4 Susan Wolf: Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility. Part VI: MORALITY AND ITS CRITICS. 1. Changes to Morality. 1.1 Joel Feinberg: Psychological Egoism. 1.2 Plato: The Immoralist’s Challenge. 1.3 Friedrich Nietzche: Master and Slave Morality. 1.4 Richard Joyce: The Evolutionary Debunking of Morality. 2. Proposed Standards and Right of Conduct. 2.1 Russ Shafer-Landau: Ethical Subjectivism. 2.2 Mary Midgley: Trying Out One’s New Sword. 2.3 Aristotle: Virtue and the Good Life. 2.4 Thomas Hobbes: Leviathan. 2.5 Plato: Euthyphro. 2.6 Immanuel Kant: The Good Will and the Categorical Imperative. 2.7 J.S. Mill: Utilitarianism, Chapters 2 and 4. 2.8 W. D. Ross: What Makes Right Acts Right? 2.9 Hilde Lindemann: What Is Feminist Ethics? 3. Ethical Problems. 3.1 Kwame Anthony Appiah: What Will Future Generations Condemn Us For? 3.2 Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence and Morality. 3.3 John Harris: The Survival Lottery. 3.4 James Rachels: Active and Passive Euthanasia. 3.5 Mary Anne Warren: The Moral and Legal Status of Abortion. 3.6 Don Marquis: Why Abortion Is Immoral. 4. The Meaning of Life. 4.1 Epicurus: Letter to Menoeceus. 4.2 Richard Taylor: The Meaning of Life. 4.3 Richard Kraut: Desire and the Human Good. 4.4 Leo Tolstoy: My Confession. 4.5 Susan Wolf: Happiness and Meaning. 4.6 Thomas Nagel: The Absurd. (shrink)

Toulmin’s scheme for the layout of arguments (1958, The Uses of Argument, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) represents an influential tool for the analysis of arguments. The scheme enriches the traditional premises-conclusion model of arguments by distinguishing additional elements, like warrant, backing and rebuttal. The present paper contains a formal elaboration of Toulmin’s scheme, and extends it with a treatment of the formal evaluation of Toulmin-style arguments, which Toulmin did not discuss at all. Arguments are evaluated in terms of a so-called (...) dialectical interpretation of their assumptions. In such an interpretation, an argument’s assumptions can be evaluated as defeated, e.g., when there is a defeating reason against the assumption. The present work builds on recent research on defeasible argumentation (cf. e.g. the work of Pollock, Reiter, Loui, Vreeswijk, Prakken, Hage and Dung). More specifically, the author’s work on the dialectical logic DEFLOG and the argumentation tool ARGUMED serve as starting points. (shrink)

This comprehensive anthology draws together classic and contemporary readings by leading philosophers on epistemology. Ideal for any philosophy student, it will prove essential reading for epistemology courses, and is designed to complement Robert Audi's textbook _Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction_. Themes covered include, perception, memory, inductive inference, reason and the a priori, the architecture of knowledge, skepticism, the analysis of knowledge, testimony. Each section begins with an introductory essay, guiding students into the topic. Includes articles by: Russell, Hume, Berkeley, Malcolm, Quine, (...) Carnap, J.L. Austin, Pollock, Nozick, Putnam, G.E. Moore, Huemer, Reid, Plato, BonJour, Coady, Carroll, Fumerton, Edwards, Foster, Howson, Urbach, Stove, Empiricus, Oakley, Alston, Gettier, Clark, Goldman, Lehrer, Paxson, DeRose, Dretske, Klein and Chisholm. (shrink)

Internalist, direct realist epistemologies have the conceptual wherewithal to both handle the new evil demon problem and explain how actual perceptual beliefs are justified. Despite this initial plausibility, I argue that direct realist accounts of perceptual justification seem to allow more beliefs to be characterized as justified perceptual beliefs than some philosophers would like. In specific, it seems that it is possible for human agents to have justified perceptual beliefs of a religious nature (e.g. that God is present). In this (...) paper I will examine two contemporary versions of direct realism—that of John Pollock (2005) and that of Peter Markie (2006)—and show that each account is amenable to an explanation of why some religious beliefs are both perceptual and justified. Whether or not this is a virtue or vice of direct realism will depend on one’s religious epistemology. (shrink)

This essay recounts a fascinating if complicated piece of Anglo-American debate. My aim is to reach a conclusion about the importance of the notion of changing one's normative position as part of the act of giving sufficient consideration for a legal contract. In several journals and textbooks between 1894 and 1918 the major contract scholars of the time, e.g., Langdell, Anson, Pollock, Williston, Ames, and Corbin, discussed a special example which was thought to reveal a paradox in the common (...) law of consideration. The problem had shown itself in the textbooks of Pollock in England and Langdell in the United States. The example is of two contracts made by three persons in which one contract with the third party repeats the content of an existing contract with the second party. It would appear that the party at the pivot experiences no new detriment in merely performing, or promising to perform, his pre-existing duty. If so, such oblique contracts with third parties must fail for want of consideration extended from the first party. About this difficulty the experts were anything but agreed. The cases were not consistent. At the root of this uncertainty is an ambivalence about the concept of consideration itself. Should it be conceived in terms of normative relations and changes of moral position or should it be conceived in valuative terms, as harms and benefits? The differences of opinion about the legal validity of oblique contracts is explained by this ambiguity, one which the common lawyer has not yet resolved. (shrink)

Common-sense philosophers typically maintain that common-sense propositions have a certain kind of epistemic privilege that allows them to evade the threats of skepticism or radical revisionism. Butwhydo they have this special privilege? In response to this question, the “Common-Sense Tradition” contains many different strands of arguments. In this paper, I will develop a strategy that combines two of these strands of arguments. First, the “Dynamic Argument” (or the “starting-point argument”), inspired by Thomas Reid and Charles S. Peirce (but which will (...) be strengthened with the help of Gilbert Harman’s epistemology of belief revision). Second, G.E. Moore’s “greater certainty argument” (interpreted along the lines of Soames’ and Pollock’s construal). This combined strategy, I will argue, is the strong core of Common-Sense Philosophy, and relies on extremely modest and widely held assumptions. (shrink)

Common-sense philosophers typically maintain that common-sense propositions have a certain kind of epistemic privilege that allows them to evade the threats of skepticism or radical revisionism. But why do they have this special privilege? In response to this question, the “Common-Sense Tradition” contains many different strands of arguments. In this paper, I will develop a strategy that combines two of these strands of arguments. First, the “Dynamic Argument” (or the “starting-point argument”), inspired by Thomas Reid and Charles S. Peirce (but (...) which will be strengthened with the help of Gilbert Harman’s epistemology of belief revision). Second, G.E. Moore’s “greater certainty argument” (interpreted along the lines of Soames’ and Pollock’s construal). This combined strategy, I will argue, is the strong core of Common-Sense Philosophy, and relies on extremely modest and widely held assumptions. (shrink)

One point that definitions of art experience disagree about is whether this kind of experience is qualitatively different from experiences related to ordinary objects and everyday contexts. Here, we follow an ecological approach assuming that art experience has its own specific quality that is, not least, determined by typical contexts of art presentation. Practically, we systematically observe typical phenomena of experiencing art in ecologically valid or real-world settings such as museum contexts. Based on evidences gained in this manner, we emulate (...) and implement essential properties of ecological contexts (e.g., free choice of viewing distance and time, large scale of artworks and exhibition-like context) in controlled laboratory experiments. We found, for instance, that for large scale paintings by Pollock and Rothko preferred viewing distances as well as distances inducing most intense art experiences including Aesthetic Aha insights were much larger than typical viewing distances realized in lab studies. Following Carbon’s (2019) terminology of measurement strategies of art experience, the combined use of “Path #1” (real-world context) and “Path #2” (mildly controlled, still ecologically valid settings and contexts), enables us to understand and investigate much closer what is really happening when people experience art. (shrink)

James Connelly and Giuseppina D'Oro present a new edition of R. G. Collingwood's classic work of 1933, supplementing the original text with important related writings from Collingwood's manuscripts which appear here for the first time. The editors also contribute a substantial new introduction. The volume will be welcomed by all historians of twentieth-century philosophy.

Recent advances in neuroscience lead to a wider realm for philosophy to include the science of the Darwinian-evolved computational brain, our inner world producing organ, a non-recursive super- Turing machine combining 100B synapsing-neuron DNA-computers based on the genetic code. The whole system is a logos machine offering a world map for global context, essential for our intentional grasp of opportunities. We start from the observable contrast between the chaotic universe vs. our orderly inner world, the noumenal cosmos. So far, philosophy (...) has been rehearsing our thoughts, our human-internal world, a grand painting of the outer world, how we comprehend subjectively our experience, worked up by the logos machine, but now we seek a wider horizon, how humans understand the world thanks to Darwinian evolution to adapt in response to the metaphysical gap, the chasm between the human animal and its environment, shaping the organism so it can deal with its variable world. This new horizon embraces global context coded in neural structures that support the noumenal cosmos, our inner mental world, for us as denizens of the outer environment. Kant’s inner and outer senses are fundamental ingredients of scientific philosophy. Several sections devoted to Heidegger, his lizard debunked, but his version of the metaphysical gap & his doctrine of the logos praised. Rorty and others of the behaviorist school discussed also. (shrink)

COVID-19 is unique in that it is the first global pandemic occurring amidst a crowded information environment that has facilitated the proliferation of misinformation on social media. Dangerous misleading narratives have the potential to disrupt ‘official’ information sharing at major government announcements. Using an interrupted time-series design, we test the impact of the announcement of the first UK lockdown on short-term trends of misinformation on Twitter. We utilise a novel dataset of all COVID-19-related social media posts on Twitter from the (...) UK 48 hours before and 48 hours after the announcement. We find that while the number of tweets increased immediately post announcement, there was no evidence of an increase in misinformation-related tweets. We found an increase in COVID-19-related bot activity post-announcement. Topic modelling of misinformation tweets revealed four distinct clusters: ‘government and policy’, ‘symptoms’, ‘pushing back against misinformation’ and ‘cures and treatments’. (shrink)

G. C. J. Midgley; XIV—Linguistic Rules, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 59, Issue 1, 1 June 1959, Pages 271–290, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristot.

Thirty-two years ago W. V. Quine proposed a definition of 'logical truth' that has been widely repeated and reprinted. Quine himself seems to have recognized that this definition is wrong in detail; in section 1 we eliminate this fault. What has perhaps been less widely observed is that, in abandoning the model-theoretic account of logical truth in favor of a "substitutional" account, Quine's definition swells the ranks of the logical truths and makes the classification of a sentence as a logical (...) truth dependent both on the interpretation of its extralogical words and on the extralogical vocabulary available in the language. (shrink)

G Langford; Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 2, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 31–41, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1968.tb00442.x.

G Reddiford; Conceptual Analysis and Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 6, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 193–215, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.146.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

We prove that the statement “there is aksuch that for everyfthere is ak-bounded diagonally nonrecursive function relative tof” does not imply weak König’s lemma over${\rm{RC}}{{\rm{A}}_0} + {\rm{B\Sigma }}_2^0$. This answers a question posed by Simpson. A recursion-theoretic consequence is that the classic fact that everyk-bounded diagonally nonrecursive function computes a 2-bounded diagonally nonrecursive function may fail in the absence of${\rm{I\Sigma }}_2^0$.