Logical truth revisited

Journal of Philosophy 65 (17):495-500 (1968)
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Abstract

Thirty-two years ago W. V. Quine proposed a definition of 'logical truth' that has been widely repeated and reprinted. Quine himself seems to have recognized that this definition is wrong in detail; in section 1 we eliminate this fault. What has perhaps been less widely observed is that, in abandoning the model-theoretic account of logical truth in favor of a "substitutional" account, Quine's definition swells the ranks of the logical truths and makes the classification of a sentence as a logical truth dependent both on the interpretation of its extralogical words and on the extralogical vocabulary available in the language.

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Author Profiles

Stephen Stich
Rutgers - New Brunswick
Jaegwon Kim
Last affiliation: Brown University

Citations of this work

Why Is a Valid Inference a Good Inference?Sinan Dogramaci - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):61-96.
Metalogic and modality.Hartry Field - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 62 (1):1 - 22.
Formal Notes on the Substitutional Analysis of Logical Consequence.Volker Halbach - 2020 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 61 (2):317-339.
Substitutional Validity for Modal Logic.Marco Grossi - 2023 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic -1:1-26.

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