Réponses à Juliette Grange sur ses remises en cause peu argumentées d'une partie de la philosophie en France.

There is a strong claim that the world’s createdness, if true, cannot be known but through revelation. In this paper we try to dismiss this claim by arguing that creation cannot be merely a revealed truth (revelabile tantum), since it is on the contrary the very preamble to any genuine revelation. Ontologically, no revelation can happen in a self-existent world. No creation, no revelation. Epistemically, no revelation is to be admitted but on the assumption that the world depends, for its (...) existence and operation, on a supernatural agent. No admittance of creative power, no justified identification of any revelatory activity. (shrink)

There is a claim that the natural capacity for knowledge of God is presupposed by the acceptance of any revelation. We inquire into whether this restriction is satisfactory. There is a stronger claim that natural knowledge has to be exercised for someone to welcome revelation. There is an additional claim that natural knowledge of the preambles to the articles of faith may not obtain. We try to make sense of this doctrine of impeached preambles to faith, by considering its phrasing (...) not only in the first person singular, nor in the third person, but in the first plural person, where it may suggest a kind of social division of tasks among believers. (shrink)

Theories of truthmaking have been introduced quite recently in epistemology. Having little to do with truth serums, or truths drugs, their concern is to define truth in terms of a certain relation between truthbearers and truthmakers. Those theories make an attempt to remedy what is supposed to be lacking in classical theories of truth, especially in Alfred Tarski’s semantic theory.

v. 1. L'introduction en philosophie du concept de création -- v. 2. Scénarios de "sortie de la création.".

Il faut, dit-on, de tout pour faire un monde. Mais à force de tout comprendre, ce concept de monde ne recouvre plus rien de précis. Il désigne une somme de parties hétérogènes, comprenant pêle-mêle : constituants matériels, propriétés physiques, événements, personnes, actions... Ces fragments du monde, nous ne les connaissons qu'à travers le prisme de nos besoins ou de nos habitudes linguistiques et culturelles. Faudra-t-il renoncer à définir un concept de monde, au profit d'une multiplicité de perceptions du monde? Ce (...) livre propose d'examiner les principales tentatives, classiques ou contemporaines, de déterminer le concept de monde. Il évalue les grandes thèses métaphysiques sur la réalité du monde par rapport à nos représentations. Il discute les constructions esthétique, morale ou religieuse d'autres mondes possibles. Il affronte la question d'une science de l'univers. Habiter le monde pourrait nous interdire d'en être le spectateur impartial. Avons-nous, en définitive, affaire à un monde commun? (shrink)

While inquiring into the acceptability of witnessing a purported miracle, Hume formulates a simple criterion: S is credible in purporting M to the extent that the probability of S’s lying is weaker than the probability of M’s not having happened. Nevertheless, applying the criterion reveals to be very uneasy. It puts Hume himself in an awkward position, as regards his own account of laws of nature. Experience, that was supposed to be open to every non-contradictory event, suddently turns out to (...) be “solid an unalterable”. Moreover, Hume is suggesting two definitions of miracle, but employs the one which precludes supernatural intervention. Hume is assessing the probability of miracle without considering the reasons a deity would have to produce them, and on which frequency. Clearly, there is a prejudicial refusal to accept. (shrink)

Longtemps éclipsée, la question de la compatibilité de la (pre)science divine avec la liberté a été exhumée dans les débats de philosophie analytique. Les promoteurs de la logique temporelle ont proposé un argument d’incompatibilité qui continue d’exercer la sagacité des commentateurs. L’objet de cet article est de suggérer que la conception atemporaliste de Dieu, dont on explique pourquoi elle est si peu en vogue aujourd’hui, est à même, sinon de résoudre complètement, au moins d’atténuer considérablement ces problèmes de compatibilité, qui (...) rejoignent le problème de l’articulation de la souveraineté absolue de Dieu avec la contribution authentique des causes secondes. (shrink)

Il ne suffit pas d'écarter la confusion entre création et nouveauté du monde pour donner droit de cité en philosophie à la thèse de la création. Le dogme de la création est-il un corps étranger jadis imposé aux philosophes dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions? Tel est le préjugé schopenhauerien dont on voudrait d'abord faire justice. La création n'est-elle pas alors, à tout le moins, une marotte ethnocentrique, tributaire de la seule révélation biblique? On décrira et discutera alors la prétendue inassimilabilité (...) de la thèse de la création par la philosophie selon de nombreux historiens de la philosophie qui relancent un débat ancien mais peut-être pas périmé: la thèse de la création est-elle soluble dans la philosophie? It is not enough to dispel the confusion that might exist between the idea of creation and that of the novelty of the world to provide the creationist thesis with a legitimate place in philosophy. Is the dogma of creation a foreign body that used to be imposed on philosophers as part of their professional duties? Such is the Schopenhauerian prejudice we would like to dispose of. Yet, cannot one argue that creation is an ethnocentric fad, depending on biblical revelation alone? We will describe and discuss the claim of the alleged non-assimilability of the creationist thesis by philosophy, which is advocated by many historians of philosophy who have reopened an old but maybe not outdated debate: is the creationist thesis soluble in philosophy? (shrink)

Résumé Sans tomber dans le piège des débats pseudo-scientifiques sur l’entropie de l’univers ou la cosmologie de « l’atome primitif », Sartre et Sertillanges font tous les deux un sort au véritable concept métaphysique de création, c’est-à-dire le concept de dépendance ontologique. Tandis que Sartre nie que le créé puisse avoir la moindre consistance propre tant qu’il dépend d’un créateur, Sertillanges inverse la donne en affirmant que c’est parce que le créé a une consistance propre qu’il peut être dit dépendre (...) d’un créateur. Deux réponses symétriques formulées dans un schème conceptuel presque commun. (shrink)

En dépit de toutes les proclamations sur la " mort de la métaphysique ", la philosophie ne peut aujourd'hui, pas plus qu'hier, se passer de l'interrogation métaphysique. Si elle décidait d'abandonner l'enquête sur les questions au-delà de l'expérience, elle laisserait le champ libre à toutes les spéculations irrationnelles, aux charlatanismes de la quête spirituelle, aux marchands d'illusion illuminée. La question " Pourquoi y a-t-il quelque chose plutôt que rien? " semble réunir à elle seule quelques vertus et tous les péchés (...) que l'on prête à la métaphysique. Certainement insoluble, elle en montre bien le caractère ridicule, dépassé, voire inepte. Evidemment radicale, elle indique ce que la métaphysique a d'inévitable, de nécessaire, voire d'ultime. Elle est en tout cas un nœud de difficultés et de concepts dont les doctrines classiques sont loin d'avoir épuisé les possibles et sur lesquels la discussion s'avère encore féconde. La première partie de ce livre interroge donc la question elle-même : est-elle une ou multiple, a-t-elle un sens ou non, quelles raisons a-t-on pu avancer pour la disqualifier ou pour prétendre y avoir répondu? C'est à approfondir quelques réponses nouvelles, et possibles, qu'est consacrée la seconde partie qui fait surgir d'autres problèmes : la plausibilité des réponses théistes et naturalistes, la pensabilité du néant, l'impossibilité d'un monde vide, les limites du principe de raison suffisante. Francis Wolff, pour le groupe MENS. (shrink)

Descartes is widely portrayed as the arch proponent of “the epistemological transparency of thought” (or simply, “Transparency”). The most promising version of this view—Transparency-through-Introspection—says that introspecting (i.e., inwardly attending to) a thought guarantees certain knowledge of that thought. But Descartes rejects this view and provides numerous counterexamples to it. I argue that, instead, Descartes’s theory of self-knowledge is just an application of his general theory of knowledge. According to his general theory, certain knowledge is acquired only through clear and distinct (...) intellection. Thus, in his view, certain knowledge of one’s thoughts is acquired only through clear and distinct intellection of one’s thoughts. Introspection is a form of intellection and it can be clear and distinct. Ordinarily, however, introspection isn’t clear and distinct but is instead confused with dubitable perceptions of bodies. To make introspection clear and distinct, we need to “sharply separate” it from all perceptions of bodies by doubting all perceptions of bodies. Without such radical doubt, introspection remains confused and we lack certain knowledge not just of the specific features of our thoughts, but even of the minimal claim that a thought exists. Far from being the high priest of Transparency, Descartes is radically opposed to it. (shrink)

In _Matter and Consciousness_, Paul Churchland presents a concise and contemporary overview of the philosophical issues surrounding the mind and explains the main theories and philosophical positions that have been proposed to solve them. Making the case for the relevance of theoretical and experimental results in neuroscience, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence for the philosophy of mind, Churchland reviews current developments in the cognitive sciences and offers a clear and accessible account of the connections to philosophy of mind. For (...) this third edition, the text has been updated and revised throughout. The changes range from references to the iPhone's "Siri" to expanded discussions of the work of such contemporary philosophers as David Chalmers, John Searle, and Thomas Nagel. Churchland describes new research in evolution, genetics, and visual neuroscience, among other areas, arguing that the philosophical significance of these new findings lies in the support they tend to give to the reductive and eliminative versions of materialism. Matter and Consciousness, written by the most distinguished theorist and commentator in the field, offers an authoritative summary and sourcebook for issues in philosophy of mind. It is suitable for use as an introductory undergraduate text. (shrink)

The options in a decision problem generally have outcomes with common features. Putting aside the common features simplifies deliberations, but the simplification requires a philosophical justification that this book provides.

This book demonstrates how children's imagination makes a continuing contribution to their cognitive and emotional development.

The twentieth century has witnessed an unprecedented 'crisis in the foundations of mathematics', featuring a world-famous paradox (Russell's Paradox), a challenge to 'classical' mathematics from a world-famous mathematician (the 'mathematical intuitionism' of Brouwer), a new foundational school (Hilbert's Formalism), and the profound incompleteness results of Kurt Gödel. In the same period, the cross-fertilization of mathematics and philosophy resulted in a new sort of 'mathematical philosophy', associated most notably (but in different ways) with Bertrand Russell, W. V. Quine, and Gödel himself, (...) and which remains at the focus of Anglo-Saxon philosophical discussion. The present collection brings together in a convenient form the seminal articles in the philosophy of mathematics by these and other major thinkers. It is a substantially revised version of the edition first published in 1964 and includes a revised bibliography. The volume will be welcomed as a major work of reference at this level in the field. (shrink)

Zusammenfassungen der Referate in französischer Sprache.

An agent often does not have precise probabilities or utilities to guide resolution of a decision problem. I advance a principle of rationality for making decisions in such cases. To begin, I represent the doxastic and conative state of an agent with a set of pairs of a probability assignment and a utility assignment. Then I support a decision principle that allows any act that maximizes expected utility according to some pair of assignments in the set. Assuming that computation of (...) an option's expected utility uses comprehensive possible outcomes that include the option's risk, no consideration supports a stricter requirement. (shrink)

Schelling und Hegel benutzen in ihren philosophischen Texten mathematische und naturwissenschaftliche Modelle wie Unendlichkeit oder Gleichgewicht. Die Strukturen dieser Begriffe liefern einen Massstab fur den Vergleich der Positionen Schellings und Hegels, der fur Schellings Identitatsphilosophie und Hegels erste Jenaer Schriften durchgefuhrt wird. Als wichtigstes Resultat kann eine grundlegende Differenz zwischen beiden Positionen bereits um 1801 nachgewiesen und gezeigt werden, dass diese auf einer unterschiedlichen Auffassung der Rolle des Absoluten beruht.

Like Plato, Protagoras held that young children learn virtue from fine examples in poetry. Unlike Plato, Protagoras taught adults by correcting the diction of poets. In this paper I ask what his standard of correctness might be, and what benefit he intended his students to take from exercises in correction. If his standard of correctness is truth, then he may intend his students to learn by questioning the content of poems; that would be suggestive of Plato’s program in Republic III. (...) But his standard is more likely to be the accurate use of language; in that case he would intend his students to learn to express their thoughts clearly enough that their audience would understand what they were saying. That standard would be independent of the truth of what they are saying; and that would be a precursor to modern techniques by which we try to teach speaking and writing. Truth is not so easy to escape, however, and we shall see that Protagoras’ exercise must assume that the poet is trying to tell the truth. (shrink)

Die MISCELLANEA MEDIAEVALIA präsentieren seit ihrer Gründung durch Paul Wilpert im Jahre 1962 Arbeiten des Thomas-Instituts der Universität zu Köln. Das Kernstück der Publikationsreihe bilden die Akten der im zweijährigen Rhythmus stattfindenden Kölner Mediaevistentagungen, die vor über 50 Jahren von Josef Koch, dem Gründungsdirektor des Instituts, ins Leben gerufen wurden. Der interdisziplinäre Charakter dieser Kongresse prägt auch die Tagungsakten: Die MISCELLANEA MEDIAEVALIA versammeln Beiträge aus allen mediävistischen Disziplinen - die mittelalterliche Geschichte, die Philosophie, die Theologie sowie die Kunst- und (...) Literaturwissenschaften sind Teile einer Gesamtbetrachtung des Mittelalters. (shrink)

I argue that supervenience is an inadequate device for representing relations between different levels of phenomena. I then provide six criteria that emergent phenomena seem to satisfy. Using examples drawn from macroscopic physics, I suggest that such emergent features may well be quite common in the physical realm.

According to many, to have epistemic justification to believe P is just for it to be epistemically permissible to believe P. Others think it is for believing P to be epistemically good. Yet others think it has to do with being epistemically blameless in believing P. All such views of justification encounter problems. Here, a new view of justification is proposed according to which justification is a kind of composite normative status. The result is a view of justification that offers (...) hope of solving some longstanding epistemological problems. (shrink)

Extends the ideas of social constructivism to the philosophy of mathematics, developing a powerful critique of traditional absolutist conceptions of mathematics, and proposing a reconceptualization of the philosophy of mathematics.