Are the objects and events that take place in Virtual Reality genuinely real? Those who answer this question in the affirmative are realists, and those who answer in the negative are irrealists. In this paper we argue against the realist position, as given by Chalmers (2017), and present our own preferred irrealist account of the virtual. We start by disambiguating two potential versions of the realist position—weak and strong— and then go on to argue that neither is plausible. We then (...) introduce a Waltonian variety of ictionalism about the virtual, arguing that this sort of irrealist approach avoids the problems of the realist positions, fits with a unifying theory of representational works, and offers a better account of the phenomenology of engaging in virtual experiences. (shrink)

A sequel to the author’s book /Frege’s Puzzle/ (1986).

A thorough critique (extracted from the author’s 1979 doctoral dissertation) of Kripke’s purported derivation, in footnote 56 of his philosophical masterpiece /Naming and Necessity/, of nontrivial modal essentialism from the theory of rigid designation.

_Philosophy of Molecular Medicine: Foundational Issues in Theory and Practice_ aims at a systematic investigation of a number of foundational issues in the field of molecular medicine. The volume is organized around four broad modules focusing, respectively, on the following key aspects: What are the nature, scope, and limits of molecular medicine? How does it provide explanations? How does it represent and model phenomena of interest? How does it infer new knowledge from data and experiments? The essays collected here, authored (...) by prominent scientists and philosophers of science, focus on a handful of mainstream topics in the philosophical literature, such as _causation_, _explanation_, _modeling_, and _scientific inference_. These previously unpublished contributions shed new light on these traditional topics by integrating them with problems, methods, and results from three prominent areas of contemporary biomedical science: _basic research_, _translational_ and _clinical research_, and _clinical practice_. (shrink)

Autism spectrum disorders (ASD) are thought to result in part from altered cortical excitatory-inhibitory balance; this pathophysiology may impact the generation of oscillations on EEG. We investigated premotor-parietal cortical physiology associated with praxis, which has strong theoretical and empirical associations with ASD symptomatology. 25 children with high-functioning ASD (HFA) and 33 controls performed a praxis task involving the pantomiming of tool use, while EEG was recorded. We assessed task-related modulation of signal power in alpha and beta frequency bands. Compared with (...) controls, subjects with HFA showed 27% less left central (motor/premotor) beta (18-22 Hz) event-related desynchronization (ERD) (p = 0.030), as well as 24% less left parietal alpha (7-13 Hz) ERD (p = 0.046). Within the HFA group, blunting of central ERD attenuation was associated with impairments in clinical measures of praxis imitation (r = -0.4; p = 0.04) and increased autism severity (r = 0.48; p = 0.016). The modulation of central beta activity is associated, among other things, with motor imagery, which may be necessary for imitation. Impaired imitation has been associated with core features of ASD. Altered modulation of oscillatory activity may be mechanistically involved in those aspects of motor network function that relate to the core symptoms of ASD. (shrink)

The structural approach to alternatives :669–690, 2007; Fox and Katzir in Nat Lang Semant 19:87–107, 2011; Katzir in Semantics, pragmatics and the case of scalar implicatures, Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp 40–71, 2014) is the most developed attempt in the literature at solving the symmetry problem of scalar implicatures. Problematic data with indirect and particularised scalar implicatures have however been raised :249–270, 2015). To address these problems, Trinh and Haida proposed to augment the theory with the Atomicity Constraint. Here we show (...) that this constraint falls short of explaining minimal variants of the original problems, and moreover that it runs into trouble with the inferences of sentences involving gradable adjectives like full and empty. We furthermore discuss how the structural approach suffers at times from the problem of ‘too many lexical alternatives’ pointed out by Swanson :31–36, 2010), and at other times from the opposite problem of ‘too few lexical alternatives’. These three problems epitomise the challenge of constructing just enough alternatives under the structural approach to solve the symmetry problem in full generality. Finally, we also sketch another recent attempt at solving the symmetry problem, Bergen et al., 2016), which is based on relative informativity and complexity. We argue that Bergen et al. do not provide a general solution to the symmetry problem either, by pointing to some of the open problematic cases that remain for this approach as well. We conclude that while important progress has been made in the theory of alternatives for scalar implicatures in the last few years, a full solution to the symmetry problem has not yet been attained. (shrink)

On Kripke’s intended definition, a term designates an object x rigidly if the term designates x with respect to every possible world in which x exists and does not designate anything else with respect to worlds in which x does not exist. Kripke evidently holds in Naming and Necessity, hereafter N&N (pp. 117–144, passim, and especially at 134, 139–140), that certain general terms – including natural-kind terms like ‘‘water’’ and ‘‘tiger’’, phenomenon terms like ‘‘heat’’ and ‘‘hot’’, and color terms like (...) ‘‘blue’’ – are rigid designators solely as a matter of philosophical semantics (independently of empirical, extra-linguistic facts). As a consequence, Kripke argues, identity statements involving these general terms are like identity statements involving proper names (e.g., ‘‘Clark Kent=Superman’’) in that, solely as a matter of philosophical semantics, they express necessary truths if they are true at all. But whereas it is reasonably clear what it is for a (first-order) singular term to designate, Kripke does not explicitly say what it is for a general term to designate. General terms are standardly treated in modern logic as predicates, usually monadic predicates. There are very forceful reasons – due independently to Church and Godel, and ultimately to Frege – for taking predicates to designate their semantic extensions. But insofar as the extension of the general term ‘‘tiger’’ is the class of actual tigers (or its characteristic function), it is clear that the term does not rigidly designate its extension, since the class of tigers in one possible world may differ from the class of tigers in another. What, then, is it for ‘‘tiger’’ to be rigid? (shrink)

The structural approach to alternatives :669–690, 2007; Fox and Katzir in Nat Lang Semant 19:87–107, 2011; Katzir in Semantics, pragmatics and the case of scalar implicatures, Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp 40–71, 2014) is the most developed attempt in the literature at solving the symmetry problem of scalar implicatures. Problematic data with indirect and particularised scalar implicatures have however been raised :249–270, 2015). To address these problems, Trinh and Haida proposed to augment the theory with the Atomicity Constraint. Here we show (...) that this constraint falls short of explaining minimal variants of the original problems, and moreover that it runs into trouble with the inferences of sentences involving gradable adjectives like full and empty. We furthermore discuss how the structural approach suffers at times from the problem of ‘too many lexical alternatives’ pointed out by Swanson :31–36, 2010), and at other times from the opposite problem of ‘too few lexical alternatives’. These three problems epitomise the challenge of constructing just enough alternatives under the structural approach to solve the symmetry problem in full generality. Finally, we also sketch another recent attempt at solving the symmetry problem, Bergen et al., 2016), which is based on relative informativity and complexity. We argue that Bergen et al. do not provide a general solution to the symmetry problem either, by pointing to some of the open problematic cases that remain for this approach as well. We conclude that while important progress has been made in the theory of alternatives for scalar implicatures in the last few years, a full solution to the symmetry problem has not yet been attained. (shrink)

“Intervention” is not synonymous with “care.” For an intervention to constitute care—which patients should have a right to access—it must be technically feasible and licit. Now these criteria do not prove sufficient; numerous archaic interventions remain feasible and legally permissible, yet are now bywords for spurious care. Therefore, we propound another necessary condition for an intervention to become care: the physician must rationally judge the intervention to be conducive to the patient’s good. Consequently, the right of access-to-care relies on physicians (...) being free to practice medicine in accord with their consciences, conscience being the rational faculty with which they judge the reasonableness of even mundane medical decisions. Since physicians operate as part of a community, it is further necessary to consider when central bodies may reasonably compel physicians to engage in interventions that the physician believes are not consistent with the patient’s good and/or are not congruent with the purposes of medicine. (shrink)

A distinction is drawn among predicates, open sentences (or open formulas), and general terms, including general-term phrases. Attaching a copula, perhaps together with an article, to a general term yields a predicate. Predicates can also be obtained through lambda-abstraction on an open sentence. The issue of designation and semantic content for each type of general expression is investigated. It is argued that the designatum of a general term is a universal, e.g., a kind, whereas the designatum of a predicate is (...) a class (or its characteristic function) and the designatum of an open sentence is a truth-value. Predicates and open sentences are therefore typically non-rigid designators. It is argued further that certain general terms, including phrases, are invariably rigid designators, whereas certain others (general definite descriptions) are typically non-rigid. Suitable semantic contents for predicates, open sentences, and general terms are proposed. Consequences for the thesis of compositionality are drawn. (shrink)

Although Professor Schiffer and I have many times disagreed, I share his deep and abiding commitment to argument as a primary philosophical tool. Regretting any communication failure that has occurred, I endeavor here to make clearer my earlier reply in “Illogical Belief” to Schiffer’s alleged problem for my version of Millianism.1 I shall be skeletal, however; the interested reader is encouraged to turn to “Illogical Belief” for detail and elaboration. I have argued that to bear a propositional attitude de re (...) is to bear that attitude toward the corresponding singular proposition, no more and no less. If this is right, then according to Millianism every instance of the following modal schema is true. (shrink)

A detailed interpretation is provided of the ‘Gray's Elegy’ passage in Russell's ‘On Denoting’. The passage is suffciently obscure that its principal lessons have been independently rediscovered. Russell attempts to demonstrate that the thesis that definite descriptions are singular terms is untenable. The thesis demands a distinction be drawn between content and designation, but the attempt to form a proposition directly about the content (as by using an appropriate form of quotation) inevitably results in a proposition about the thing designated (...) instead of the content expressed. In light of this collapse, argues Russell, the thesis that definite descriptions are singular terms must accept that all propositions about a description's content represent it by means of a higher-level descriptive content, so that knowledge of a description's content is always ‘by description’, not ‘by acquaintance’. This, according to Russell, renders our cognitive grip on definite descriptions inexplicable. Separate responses on behalf of Fregeans and Millians are offered. (shrink)

A Russellian notion of what it is for a proposition to be “directly about” something in particular is defined. Various strong and weak, and mediate and immediate, Russellian notions of general aboutness are then defined in terms of Russellian direct aboutness. In particular, a proposition is about something iff the proposition is either directly, or strongly indirectly, about that thing. A competing Russellian account, due to Kaplan, is criticized through a distinction between knowledge by description and denoting by description. The (...) epistemological significance of Russellian aboutness is assessed. A Russellian substitute for de re propositional attitude is considered. (shrink)

A puzzle concerning fractional and mixed numbers of things (e.g., two and a half oranges) is examined.

The ancient practice of alchemy, which thrived in Europe until the seventeenth century, dealt with the phenomenon of transformation--not only of materials but also of the human spirit. Through their work in the material realm, alchemists discovered personal rebirth as well as a linking between outer and inner dimensions.C. G. Jung first turned to alchemy for personal illumination in coping with trauma brought on by his break with Freud. Alchemical symbolism eventually suggested to Jung that there was a process in (...) the unconscious, one that had a goal beyond discharging tension and hiding pain. In this book, Nathan Schwartz-Salant, a leading Jungian analyst with an interest in alchemy, brings together a key selection of Jung's writings on the subject. These writings expose us to Jung's fascinating reflections on the symbols of alchemy--such as the three-headed Mercurial dragon, hermaphrodites, and lions devouring the sun--and brings us closer to the spirit of his approach to the unconscious, closer than his purely scientific concepts often allow. (shrink)

A nominalist account of statements of number (e.g., ‘There are exactly two moons of Mars’) is rebutted.

[Book review article for Creativity and Art: Three Roads to Surprise by Boden, Margaret A, no abstract is available.].

In the following fictional interview, the Abbé Jean-Baptiste Du Bos’ ideas about the representational arts are applied to relevant aspects of the cinema. Du Bos argues that normally works of cinematic fiction are designed to give rise to ‘artificial passions’ that have the function of providing relief from boredom without the negative consequences that many alternative pursuits would have. Du Bos’ solution to the paradox of negative affect and his position on Aristotle’s doctrine of catharsis are also set forth in (...) the interview. The question of whether films have philosophical significance is also taken up. The upshot is a somewhat unfamiliar early 18th-century perspective on some contemporary issues. (shrink)

The study of bioethics has always been conducted by multiple disciplines. However the interaction between these disciplines has sometimes been marked by division, discord and disagreement, especially so between philosophically and sociologically minded contributors. This has been particularly true in recent years, and post the ‘empirical turn’ in bioethics. In our introduction we trace these disagreements and then take a wider look at the nature of disciplines and of interdisciplinary relations. These considerations are then brought back to the disciplines that (...) contribute work to bioethics as an explanation of why relationships within the field are difficult, and how we can start to address these divides. (shrink)

In the introduction to this volume we have argued that being an interdisciplinary scholar involves managing a complex interplay of disciplinary identities, as well as the ontologies and ways of knowing and understanding that are associated with the subject matter. We argued that trying to force a bioethical interdiscipline without a special regard to the individual epistemological, ontological and social aspects of the disciplines is unlikely to bear fruit in the long-term. Although bioethics has always been a multidisciplinary activity, the (...) relations between the various disciplines involved have traditionally been fraught, particularly so at the intersection between sociological and philosophical bioethics. We therefore proposed approaching bioethical interdisciplinarity in a manner that is careful and measured. This does not involve abandoning disciplines or disciplinarity, rather we are advocating for an increased level of cross-fertilisation between established disciplines or the way in which research is done, in the broadest sense. (shrink)

_Human Dignity in Bioethics _brings together a collection of essays that rigorously examine the concept of human dignity from its metaphysical foundations to its polemical deployment in bioethical controversies. The volume falls into three parts, beginning with meta-level perspectives and moving to concrete applications. Part 1 analyzes human dignity through a worldview lens, exploring the source and meaning of human dignity from naturalist, postmodernist, Protestant, and Catholic vantages, respectively, letting each side explain and defend its own conception. Part 2 moves (...) from metaphysical moorings to key areas of macro-level influence: international politics, American law, and biological science. These chapters examine the legitimacy of the concept of dignity in documents by international political bodies, the role of dignity in American jurisprudence, and the implications—and challenges—for dignity posed by Darwinism. Part 3 shifts from macro-level topics to concrete applications by examining the rhetoric of human dignity in specific controversies: embryonic stem cell research, abortion, human-animal chimeras, euthanasia and palliative care, psychotropic drugs, and assisted reproductive technologies. Each chapter analyzes the rhetorical use of ‘human dignity’ by opposing camps, assessing the utility of the concept and whether a different concept or approach can be a _more_ productive means of framing or guiding the debate. (shrink)

A classical model of an elementary particle is considered in the framework of the bimetric general relativity theory. The particle is regarded as a spherically symmetric object filling its Schwarzschild sphere and made of matter having mass density, pressure, and charge density. The mass is taken to be the Planck mass, and possible values of the charge are taken as zero, ±1/3e, ±2/3e, and ±e, with e the electron charge.

A number of different forms of the Schwarzschild solution are considered. The static forms all have a singularity at the Schwarzschild radius. This Schwarzschild singularity can be eliminated if one goes over to a stationary or time-dependent form of solution. However, the coordinate transformations needed for this have singularities. It is stressed that coordinate systems connected by singular transformations are not equivalent and the corresponding metrics may describe different physical situations.

Let us start with a short description of the phenomenon of will, and in this we shall naturally take advantage of Aristotle’s analysis. Let us say in the first place that will has two basic features. It is a factor or an actor bringing about effects. As such, it is a factor inside the agent, moving the agent, giving momentum to his attitudes or approaches, as well as giving direction to his attitudes and their manifestation in action. Will also connotes (...) a choice and, thus, is close to a decision focusing on a certain course or objective. The actions or the deeds are in this sense a manifestation of will as both a driving force and a choice or decision. From the point of view of the manifest action, will is closer to being a disposition, not in the passive sense, but one which is an active attitude. In so far as objectives of action or will are concerned, the question arises—and as we shall see, this is the crux of the controversy—whether objectives are only pursued or whether they are also set and posited. There is the additional question whether will is spontaneous, that is to say, is its own source; or whether, as an activity directed towards an objective, it in turn is motivated, bewaring from the pitfall of an infinite regression. (shrink)

This is a systematic philosophy of politics and the state. As few contemporary books do, Order and Might provides a general theory, exploring the structure of socio-political experience.

Kant’s reference, a critical one at that, to Edmund Burke is a well-known paragraph in the General Remark on the Exposition of Aesthetic Reflective Judgments, which follows paragraph 29 of The Critique of Judgment. Kant calls Burke’s exposition physiological since, according to Burke, the feeling of the sublime is grounded on the impulse towards self-preservation and on fear. Concomitantly, the beautiful according to Burke is grounded on love which, in turn, is reduced to the relaxing, slackening, and enervating of the (...) fibers of the body. Kant believes that as psychological observations these analyses of our mental phenomena are extremely fine. But he takes exception to them by stressing that any reliance on psychological data rests ultimately upon the immediate feeling of personal well-being or on personal feelings in general. Against this, which he calls egoistic validity, a pluralistic validity is called for. Laws of that character yield a knowledge not only of how we do judge, but they give us a command as to how we ought to judge. What is lacking in Burke, Kant concludes, is a transcendental examination. (shrink)

HISTORY is a sphere or a phenomenon ever present, though we may question whether historical awareness always accompanies the succession of human generations. The ever-presence of history can be taken as a universal human phenomenon, yet there is a question whether there is a correlation between the spheric universality of history and a thematic universality of features, trends, directions of process, etc. This will be the concern of our exploration. We may distinguish here between universality and universalism; the former connoting (...) a situation, the latter, the focus. (shrink)

These essays engage Jin Y. Park’s recent translation of the work of Kim Iryŏp, a Buddhist nun and public intellectual in early twentieth-century Korea. Park’s translation of Iryŏp’s Reflections of a Zen Buddhist Nun was the subject of two book panels at recent conferences: the first a plenary session at the annual meeting of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy and the second at the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association on a group program session sponsored by the (...) International Society for Buddhist Philosophy. This exchange also includes a response from Park. (shrink)

In this essay, I reply to the above four critics of In Defense of Kant’s Religion (IDKR). In reply to George di Giovanni, I highlight the interpretive differencesthat divide the authors of IDKR and di Giovanni, and argue that di Giovanni’s atheist reading of Kant does not follow, even granting his premises. In reply to Pamela Sue Anderson, I show that if her reading of Kant is accurate, Kant’s own talk of God becomes empty and contemptible by his own lights, (...) and I then show how her empirical bias prompts a significant misreading of IDKR. In reply to Stephen Palmquist, I expose four fallacious maneuvers in his paper, which comprise the bulk of his essay. And in reply to Michalson, I address a series of minor concerns raised in his essay, and then set the record straight on the motives behind IDKR in general and my own take on Kant’s compatibility (or lack thereof) with Christianity in specific. (shrink)

Whether intentional suppression of an unpleasant or unwanted memory reduces the ability to recall that memory subsequently is a contested issue in contemporary memory research. Building on findings that similar processes are recruited when individuals remember the past and imagine the future, we measured the effects of thought suppression on memory for imagined future scenarios. Thought suppression reduced the ability to recall emotionally negative scenarios, but not those that were emotionally positive. This finding suggests that intentionally avoiding thoughts about emotionally (...) negative episodes may inhibit representations of those memories, progressively reducing their availability to recall. (shrink)

I demonstrate that a "speech act" theory of meaning for imperatives is—contra a dominant position in philosophy and linguistics—theoretically desirable. A speech act-theoretic account of the meaning of an imperative !φ is characterized, broadly, by the following claims. -/- LINGUISTIC MEANING AS USE !φ’s meaning is a matter of the speech act an utterance of it conventionally functions to express—what a speaker conventionally uses it to do (its conventional discourse function, CDF). -/- IMPERATIVE USE AS PRACTICAL !φ's CDF is to (...) express a practical (non-representational) state of mind—one concerning an agent's preferences and plans, rather than her beliefs. -/- Opposed to speech act accounts is a preponderance of views which deny that a sentence's linguistic meaning is a matter of what speech act it is used to perform, or its CDF. On such accounts, meaning is, instead, a matter of "static" properties of the sentence—e.g., how it depicts the world as being (or, more neutrally, the properties of a model-theoretic object with which the semantic value of the sentence co-varies). On one version of a static account, an imperative 'shut the window!' might, for instance, depict the world as being such that the window must be shut. -/- Static accounts are traditionally motivated against speech act-theoretic accounts by appeal to supposedly irremediable explanatory deficiencies in the latter. Whatever a static account loses in saying (prima facie counterintuitively) that an imperative conventionally represents, or expresses a picture of the world, is said to be offset by its ability to explain a variety of phenomena for which speech act-theoretic accounts are said to lack good explanations (even, in many cases, the bare ability to offer something that might meet basic criteria on what a good explanation should be like). -/- I aim to turn the tables on static accounts. I do this by showing that speech act accounts are capable of giving explanations of phenomena which fans of static accounts have alleged them unable to give. Indeed, for a variety of absolutely fundamental phenomena having to do with the conventional meaning of imperatives (and other types of practical language), speech act accounts provide natural and theoretically satisfying explanations, where a representational account provides none. (shrink)

In this case report, we describe a woman with advancing dementia who still retained decisional capacity and was able to clearly articulate her request for deactivation of her implanted cardiac pacemaker—a scenario that would result in her death. In this case, the patient had the autonomy to make her decision, but clinicians at an outside hospital refused to deactivate her pacemaker even though they were in unanimous agreement that the patient had capacity to make this decision, citing personal discomfort and (...) a belief that her decision seemed out of proportion to her suffering. We evaluated her at our hospital, found her to have decision-making capacity, and deactivated her pacer resulting in her death about 9 days later. While some clinicians may be comfortable discussing patient preferences for device deactivation in patients who are imminently dying, we can find no reports in the literature of requests for device deactivation from patients with terminal diagnoses who are not imminently dying. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 7, July 2020, Page 196-198.

Pornography is no longer an activity confined to a small group of individuals or the privacy of one’s home. Rather, it has permeated modern culture, including the work environment. Given the pervasive nature of pornography, we study how viewing pornography affects unethical behavior at work. Using survey data from a sample that approximates a nationally representative sample in terms of demographics, we find a positive correlation between viewing pornography and intended unethical behavior. We then conduct an experiment to provide causal (...) evidence. The experiment confirms the survey—consuming pornography causes individuals to be less ethical. We find that this relationship is mediated by increased moral disengagement from dehumanization of others due to viewing pornography. Combined, our results suggest that choosing to consume pornography causes individuals to behave less ethically. Because unethical employee behavior has been linked to numerous negative organization outcomes including fraud, collusion, and other self-serving behaviors, our results have implications for most societal organizations. (shrink)

In recent decades there has arisen what Keith Yandell labels the “new wave” of Kant interpretation. These “new wavers” argue that Kant has a more robust view of God and religion than traditionally granted. This article is part of an exchange with Chris Firestone, originally presented at the AAR’s annual meeting, on the question “Can the New Wave Baptize Kant’s Deism?” In what follows, I argue no, contending that the theologically robust Kant of the new wave still builds on a (...) foundation that is fundamentally incompatible with historical Christianity. Thus, Kant’s theology and Christianity can never be brought into harmony. (shrink)

Upholding cooperative norms via punishment is of central importance in organizations. But what effect does punishing have on the reputation of the punisher? Although previous research shows third parties can garner reputational benefits for punishing transgressors who violate social norms, we proposed that such reputational benefits can vary based on the perceived motive for the punishment. In Studies 1 and 2, we found that individuals who endorsed a consequentialist (versus deontological) motive for punishing were seen as more trustworthy. In Study (...) 3, the results showed that when pitted against one another, a person who endorsed a consequentialist (versus deontological) motive for punishing was chosen more often as a partner in a Trust Game. In Study 4, we found that a manager who expressed a consequentialist reason for punishing an employee was seen as having less psychopathic tendencies, and this related to the manager being perceived as more trustworthy and a superior cooperation partner. Using a recall methodology, Study 5 results showed that employees who perceived their managers as having more consequentialist (versus deontological) motives for punishing also perceived their managers as being less psychopathic and more trustworthy. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. (shrink)

Upholding cooperative norms via punishment is of central importance in organizations. But what effect does punishing have on the reputation of the punisher? Although previous research shows third parties can garner reputational benefits for punishing transgressors who violate social norms, we proposed that such reputational benefits can vary based on the perceived motive for the punishment. In Studies 1 and 2, we found that individuals who endorsed a consequentialist motive for punishing were seen as more trustworthy. In Study 3, the (...) results showed that when pitted against one another, a person who endorsed a consequentialist motive for punishing was chosen more often as a partner in a Trust Game. In Study 4, we found that a manager who expressed a consequentialist reason for punishing an employee was seen as having less psychopathic tendencies, and this related to the manager being perceived as more trustworthy and a superior cooperation partner. Using a recall methodology, Study 5 results showed that employees who perceived their managers as having more consequentialist motives for punishing also perceived their managers as being less psychopathic and more trustworthy. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. (shrink)

Lane et al.'s proposal that psychotherapeutic change comes about through memory reconsolidation is compelling; however, the model would be strengthened by the inclusion of predictions regarding additional factors that might influence treatment response, predictions for improving outcomes for non-responsive patients, and a discussion of how the proposed model might explain individual differences in vulnerability for mental health problems.

Scholars have focused on algorithms used during sentencing, bail, and parole, but little work explores what we term “carceral algorithms” that are used during incarceration. This paper is focused on the Pennsylvania Additive Classification Tool used to classify prisoners’ custody levels while they are incarcerated. Algorithms that are used during incarceration warrant deeper attention by scholars because they have the power to enact the lived reality of the prisoner. The algorithm in this case determines the likelihood a person would endure (...) additional disciplinary actions, can complete required programming, and gain experiences that, among other things, are distilled into variables feeding into the parole algorithm. Given such power, examining algorithms used on people currently incarcerated offers a unique analytic view to think about the dialectic relationship between data and algorithms. Our examination of the PACT is two-fold and complementary. First, our qualitative overview of the historical context surrounding PACT reveals that it is designed to prioritize incapacitation and control over rehabilitation. While it closely informs prisoner rehabilitation plans and parole considerations, it is rooted in population management for prison securitization. Second, on analyzing data for 146,793 incarcerated people in PA, along with associated metadata related to the PACT, we find it is replete with racial bias as well as errors, omissions, and inaccuracies. Our findings to date further caution against data-driven criminal justice reforms that rely on pre-existing data infrastructures and expansive, uncritical, data-collection routines. (shrink)