The Resilience of Illogical Belief

Noûs 40 (2):369–375 (2006)
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Abstract

Although Professor Schiffer and I have many times disagreed, I share his deep and abiding commitment to argument as a primary philosophical tool. Regretting any communication failure that has occurred, I endeavor here to make clearer my earlier reply in “Illogical Belief” to Schiffer’s alleged problem for my version of Millianism.1 I shall be skeletal, however; the interested reader is encouraged to turn to “Illogical Belief” for detail and elaboration. I have argued that to bear a propositional attitude de re is to bear that attitude toward the corresponding singular proposition, no more and no less. If this is right, then according to Millianism every instance of the following modal schema is true

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Nathan Salmón
University of California, Santa Barbara

Citations of this work

Mental Graphs.James Pryor - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):309-341.
Propositional attitude reports.Thomas McKay - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Illogical, but rational.David Braun - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):376–379.

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