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El presente escrito discute la plausibilidad de la admisión de términos generales rígidos no naturales. Enunciados de identidad teórica que incluyen términos generales rígidos no naturales no expresan necesidad a posteriori: son enunciados analíticos, necesarios y a priori. Sólo los enunciados de identidad que incluyen términos generales rígidos naturales son enunciados necesarios a posteriori. Los problemas de la trivialización y sobre generalización suponen que la aplicación de la rigidez a los términos de clase no natural resta importancia a la rigidez (...) No categories |
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The linguistic meaning of a word in a language is what fully competent speakers of the language have a grasp of merely in virtue of their semantic competence. The meanings of words sometimes change over time. 'Meat' used to mean 'solid food', but now means 'animal flesh eaten as food'. This type of meaning change comes with change of topic, what we’re talking about. Many people interested in conceptual engineering have claimed that there is also meaning change where topic is (...) |
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Kripke holds the thesis that identity statements containing natural kind terms are if true, necessarily true; these statements can be denominated theoretical identities. Kripke alleges that the necessity of theoretical identities grounds on the linguistic feature that natural kind terms are rigid designators. Nevertheless, I argue that the conception of natural kind terms as rigid designators, in one of their most natural views, hinders the establishment of the truth of theoretical identities and thus of their necessity. However, in Kripke’s works (...) No categories |
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This paper aims to solve the following twofold problem. Suppose that a rational speaker, Ralph, mistakenly takes (for some reason) the Roman orator Cicero and the World War II German spy Cicero to be the same individual. By sincerely uttering the sentence “Cicero is an orator and a spy”, (a) does Ralph use the name “Cicero” of the Roman orator or the name “Cicero” of the German spy or another name of the genus “Cicero”? And (b) which Cicero does Ralph (...) |
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Millianism is the doctrine according to which the semantic content of a proper name is exhausted by its referent. This article raises and attempts to solve a dilemma for Millians: either a proper name of a truth bearer is in turn a truth bearer ; or having a truth bearer as semantic content is not sufficient for a linguistic expression to be a truth bearer. As it will be shown in the manuscript, the dilemma does not arise with “that”-clauses in (...) |
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_ Source: _Page Count 28 In his article “Opacity”, David Kaplan propounded a counterexample to the thesis, defended by Quine and known as _Quine’s Theorem_, that establishes the illegitimacy of quantifying from outside into a position not open to substitution. He ingeniously built his counterexample using Quine’s own philosophical material and novel devices, _arc quotes_ and _$entences_. The present article offers detailed analysis and critical discussion of Kaplan’s counterexample and proposes a reasonable reformulation of Quine’s Theorem that bypasses both this (...) No categories |
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A collection of ten previously published essays on existence, nonexistence, empty names, fiction and myth, and free logic. |
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Quine’s criterion of theoretical ontological commitment is subject to a variety of interpretations, all of which save one yield incorrect verdicts. Moreover, the interpretation that yields correct verdicts is not what Quine meant. Instead the intended criterion unfairly imputes ontological commitments to theories that lack those commitments and fails to impute commitments to theories that have them. Insofar as Quine’s criterion is interpreted so that it yields only correct verdicts, it is trivial and of questionable utility. Moreover, the correct criterion (...) |
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examine Nathan Salmon’s solution to the problem of trivialization, as it arises for conceptions of general term rigidity that construe it as identity of designation across possible worlds. I argue that he does not succeed in showing that some alleged general terms, such as “the colour of the sky” are non-rigid, but also that a small class of different examples that he presents, which can be construed as second order descriptions, are indeed non-rigid general terms, although for reasons different from (...) |
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