O artigo "Educação moral: a busca da excelência a partir de virtudes aristotélicas e a formação do educador" coloca em relevo a necessidade do cultivo de virtudes para a construção da excelência moral do homem. Discutimos a importância da compreensão do termo filosófico. Os resultados esperados consistem na possibilidade do educador de conseguir compreender, dentre os valores clássicos, em específico, o da justiça e o da amizade, como sendo a base para a discussão da educação moral. Se a educação moral (...) exerce algum papel na formação da personalidade humana, então, é preciso examinar quais virtudes são efetivamente necessárias para o desenvolvimento do caráter do homem. A educação moral, tal como temos concebido, possibilita a construção da autonomia do educando para que ele se torne um cidadão emancipado, independente, crítico e, antes, autocrítico. Com efeito, o problema desta investigação consiste na pergunta: quais são os desafios para a formação do educador no processo de conquista da excelência a partir de virtudes aristotélicas em se tratando de educação moral? Nesse sentido, o objetivo principal deste trabalho é compreender a excelência humana a partir do desenvolvimento de virtudes aristotélicas, especialmente a justiça e aamizade, com vistas aos desafios que se colocam aos educadores. Do ponto de vista do método, o trabalho é realizado a partir de revisão bibliográfica e procura problematizar, conceituar e argumentar características típicas do método de forma mais rigorosa, virtudes fundamentais para a formação do caráter do homem. (shrink)

O estudo consiste na discussão da perspectiva larrosiana do conceito de experiência, a partir do livro Tremores. Partiu da pergunta: O conceito de experiência como acontecimento fundamenta a necessidade de uma nova língua educacional? O método tratou de pesquisa bibliográfica que teve o início na revisão de literatura sobre o tema, análise sistemática do livro Tremores, da mesma forma que problematização em torno do conceito de acontecimento em Martin Heidegger e de experiência em Walter Benjamin. Como resultado, o conceito de (...) experiência se expressa como raridade e deve ser pensado como acontecimento capaz de trazer novos sentidos. Para Larrosa, pensar novos sentidos é pensar novas realidades, tendo como base os sentidos gerados pelos mecanismos de subjetivação que existem em cada indivíduo. Sendo o sentido individual e subjetivo, é responsável por mostrar a cada indivíduo uma forma de experiência. Assim, a aposta diz respeito à necessidade de se repensar as linguagens, das quais emergem o mundo de cada indivíduo, e, além disso, de pensar a pedagogia como transformadora do que já existe por meio da linguagem. A linguagem possibilita a compreensão de si e do outro, em uma realidade abstrata que se perdeu das palavras e se distanciou da verdadeira experiência e do mundo real, enquanto acontecimento. Por derradeiro, o estudo demonstrou a necessidade de uma nova língua para a educação em Jorge Larrosa, como necessidade de fortalecimento da potência que habita entre aqueles que escutam e aqueles que falam, dos que não desejam colocar fim à identidade do sujeito, destruí-la, mas dar possibilidades para que a identidade se abra a novas significações, a fim de construir o acontecimento, a abertura e o conhecimento. (shrink)

Em O Niilismo, Volpi Franco discorre sobre a história do niilismo e problematiza temas contemporâneos como o fim da história, o relativismo e o ceticismo.

Resenha de: KOHAN, Walter Omar. O Mestre inventor. Relatos de um viajante educador. Tradução Hélia Freitas. 1. ed. Belo Horizonte: Autêntica Editora, 2013 (Coleção Educação: Experiência e Sentido).

Este texto discute aspectos educacionais do pensamento de Herbert Spencer, especialmente sobre os princípios dirigentes da educação intelectual. Questiona-se: qual a importância dos princípios dirigentes da educação intelectual de Herbert Spencer para a educação atual? Spencer coloca em relevo os problemas da educação intelectual, moral e física, da mesma maneira que considera a superficialidade da formação familiar e a consequência para a educação escolar.

Este artigo discute os pressupostos éticos da educação da solidão, compreendida como educação aristocrática ou educação do solitário. Abordase alguns pressupostos da ética aristocrática em Heráclito, a partir de diversos comentadores, com o intento de evidenciar que a noção de ética aristocrática encontra amparo na vivência do filósofo obscuro, além de tratar da questão do ó, no sentido de explicitar que a vida aristocrática não diz respeito a qualquer vida, mas à vida desperta. Em seguida, aborda-se a educação aristocrática como (...) educação da solidão e, neste contexto, busca-se responder à questão central do artigo que consiste na pergunta: quais os pressupostos éticos da educação da solidão? O método consiste em revisão bibliográfica, dado se tratar de investigação realizada no contexto de fundamentos da educação, mais precisamente de filosofia da educação. Os resultados alcançados apontam para três pressupostos éticos da educação da solidão com destaque para a excelência individual. This article discusses the ethical education of solitude, understood as aristocratic education or education of solitarian. It approaches some assumptions of aristocratic ethics in Heraclitus, from several commentators, with the intent of showing that the notion of aristocratic ethics finds support in living the obscure philosopher, and address the issue of ó, in the sense to clarify that the aristocratic life is not about any life but its waking life. Then, it approaches the aristocratic education as education of solitude and in this context, we seek to answer the central question of the article: what the ethical education of solitude? The method is based on literature review dealing with research conducted in the context of foundations of education, specifically in the philosophy of education. The results point to three ethical premises of the solitude of education with emphasis on individual excellence. (shrink)

Resenha da obra Nietzsche e o Paradoxo, de Rogério Miranda de Almeida. Destinada aos interessados no pensamento de Nietzsche, especialmente os mais rigorosos, a obra analisa os escritos do filósofo a partir do original e o faz com rigor e precisão. Com linguagem sofisticada, o texto de Almeida revela profundo conhecimento da obra de Nietzsche, decifrando a presença do paradoxo em sua filosofia.

Resenha do livro de: Vânia Dutra Azeredo. Nietzsche e a dissoluçáo da moral. 2ed. Sáo Paulo. Unijuí. 2003.

O artigo "Educação moral: a busca da excelência a partir de virtudes aristotélicas e a formação do educador" coloca em relevo a necessidade do cultivo de virtudes para a construção da excelência moral do homem. Discutimos a importância da compreensão do termo filosófico. Os resultados esperados consistem na possibilidade do educador de conseguir compreender, dentre os valores clássicos, em específico, o da justiça e o da amizade, como sendo a base para a discussão da educação moral. Se a educação moral (...) exerce algum papel na formação da personalidade humana, então, é preciso examinar quais virtudes são efetivamente necessárias para o desenvolvimento do caráter do homem. A educação moral, tal como temos concebido, possibilita a construção da autonomia do educando para que ele se torne um cidadão emancipado, independente, crítico e, antes, autocrítico. Com efeito, o problema desta investigação consiste na pergunta: quais são os desafios para a formação do educador no processo de conquista da excelência a partir de virtudes aristotélicas em se tratando de educação moral? Nesse sentido, o objetivo principal deste trabalho é compreender a excelência humana a partir do desenvolvimento de virtudes aristotélicas, especialmente a justiça e aamizade, com vistas aos desafios que se colocam aos educadores. Do ponto de vista do método, o trabalho é realizado a partir de revisão bibliográfica e procura problematizar, conceituar e argumentar características típicas do método de forma mais rigorosa, virtudes fundamentais para a formação do caráter do homem. (shrink)

Editorial para o dossiê Nietzsche e a Educação.

A escola: problema filosófico é uma coletânea oriunda do III Congresso da Sociedade Brasileira de Filosofia da Educação, realizado em 2018 na Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Campinas. Organizado por Samuel Mendonça e Silvio Gallo, o livro foi publicado em 2020 pela Parábola Editorial (São Paulo). Junto à obra A escola: uma questão pública – publicada no mesmo ano e pela mesma Editora –, forma um díptico que interroga, com o instrumental teórico próprio da Filosofia da Educação, a instituição (...) escolar. (shrink)

This article discusses the importance of metaemotions (emotions about emotions), showing their undeniable existence and how they are a critical and essential part of emotion life. The article begins by placing reflexivity of emotions within the general reflexivity of human beings. Then, the article presents the literature on metaemotion, showing some of the problems that surround them, which ultimately will lead to ask if the concept of metaemotion is really necessary. The second part of the article argues for the usefulness (...) of the concept, pointing out its role in establishing distinctions among emotional states as well as further clarifying the nature of emotion, and concludes on pointing out some of the directions for future research on metaemotions. (shrink)

The chapter shows how the recognition of reflexivity of emotions is crucial for understanding the role of emotions in reasoning because it highlights the regulatory role of emotion in emotional experience. The chapter begins by showing that to attain a conception of rationality that incorporates feelings, emotions, and sentiments as parts of the reasoning processes requires capturing the emotional landscape in all its complexity, and that integrating the role of meta-emotions is a contribution in that direction. Then introducing the notion (...) of meta-emotions and showing how emotional reflexivity modifies the nature of our emotional world, it is shown how emotions also have a regulatory mechanism that can either be maladaptive or at the center of emotional health. In addition, because meta-emotions provide a test for the more general assumptions of theories of emotions, the chapter ends by showing how adopting a Situated Approach to Emotions is well-suited for explaining the refinement and complexity of emotion regulation. The final reflection of the chapter explains why adopting such theoretical frame of work makes it possible to use the term situation in a technical manner, which then reveals that emotions sometimes are described as causes while other times as reasons in connection to their regulative mechanisms. (shrink)

In this paper, I will argue that there is a version of possibilism—inspired by the modal analogue of Kit Fine’s fragmentalism—that can be combined with a weakening of actualism. The reasons for analysing this view, which I call Modal Fragmentalism, are twofold. Firstly, it can enrich our understanding of the actualism/possibilism divide, by showing that, at least in principle, the adoption of possibilia does not correspond to an outright rejection of the actualist intuitions. Secondly, and more specifically, it can enrich (...) our understanding of concretism, by proving that, at least in principle, the idea that objects have properties in an absolute manner is compatible with transworld identity. (shrink)

In contemporary philosophy, substantive moral theories are typically classified as either consequentialist or deontological. Standard consequentialist theories insist, roughly, that agents must always act so as to produce the best available outcomes overall. Standard deontological theories, by contrast, maintain that there are some circumstances where one is permitted but not required to produce the best overall results, and still other circumstances in which one is positively forbidden to to do. Classical utilitarianism is the most familiar consequentialist view, but it is (...) widely regarded as an inadequate account of morality. Although Professor Scheffler agrees with this assessment, he also believes that consequentialism seems initially plausible, and that there is a persistent air of paradox surrounding typical deontological views. In this book, therefore, he undertakes to reconsider the rejection of consequentialism. He argues that it is possible to provide a rationale for the view that agents need not always produce the best possible overall outcomes, and this motivates one departure from consequentialism; but he shows that it is surprisingly difficult to provide a satisfactory rationale for the view that there are times when agents must not produce the best possible overall outcomes. He goes on to argue for a hitherto neglected type of moral conception, according to which agents are always permitted, but not always required, to produce the best outcomes. (shrink)

Resenha do novo livro de Israel Finkelstein, publicado em inglês em 2013. Israel Finkelstein apresenta nova visão acerca do reino do Norte Israel, apontando a compilação e redação final das narrativas bíblicas pelos judaítas, depois da queda do reino do Norte Israel. É uma bela obra que resume o desenvolvimento das pesquisas arqueológicas do autor.

Gils-Schmidt and Salloch recognise that human and climate health are inextricably linked, and that mitigating healthcare-associated climate harms is essential for protecting human health.1 They argue that physicians have a duty to consider how their own practices contribute to climate change, including during their interactions with patients. Acknowledging the potential for conflicts between this duty and the provision of individual patient care, they propose the application of Korsgaard’s neo-Kantian account of practical identities to help navigate such scenarios. In this commentary, (...) we argue that by focusing attention on this physician–patient level, the authors overlook the complexity of climate change, both within the healthcare sector and beyond. We recognise the importance of individual agency in tackling this issue, and we also recognise that the authors do briefly acknowledge the importance of considering these broader complexities; however, we emphasise the need for climate and health discussions/action to be situated in a wider framework of systemic change. Our concern is that overemphasis on patient-level interactions risks normalising the prioritisation of individual-level approaches to addressing climate change, detracting from such a broader approach. Physician training emphasises the need for trust, confidentiality and shared decision-making in the doctor–patient relationship. …. (shrink)

A RELEVÂNCIA DO PRÉVIO ESGOTAMENTO DAS INSTÂNCIAS DESPORTIVAS E AS SANÇÕES AO SEU DESCUMPRIMENTO.

Logical omniscience states that the knowledge set of ordinary rational agents is closed for its logical consequences. Although epistemic logicians in general judge this principle unrealistic, there is no consensus on how it should be restrained. The challenge is conceptual: we must find adequate criteria for separating obvious logical consequences from non-obvious ones. Non-classical game-theoretic semantics has been employed in this discussion with relative success. On the one hand, with urn semantics [15], an expressive fragment of classical game semantics that (...) weakens the dependence relations between quantifiers occurring in a formula, we can formalize, for a broad array of examples, epistemic scenarios in which an individual ignores the validity of some first-order sentence. On the other hand, urn semantics offers a disproportionate restriction of logical omniscience. Therefore, an improvement of this system is needed to obtain a better solution of the problem. In this paper, I argue that our linguistic competence in using quantifiers requires a sort of basic hypothetical logical knowledge that can be formulated as follows: when inquiring after the truth-value of ∀xφ, an individual might be unaware of all substitutional instances this sentence accepts, but at least she must know that, if an element a is given, then ∀xφ holds only if φ is true. This thesis accepts game-theoretic formalization in terms of a refinement of urn semantics. I maintain that the system so obtained affords an improved solution of the logical omniscience problem. To do this, I characterize first-order theoremhood in US+. As a consequence of this result, we will see that the ideal reasoner depicted by US+ only knows the validity of first-order formulas whose Herbrand witnesses can be trivially found, a fact that provides strong evidence that our refinement of urn semantics captures a relevant sense of logical obviousness. (shrink)

Mind wandering is typically operationalized as task-unrelated thought. Some argue for the need to distinguish between unintentional and intentional mind wandering, where an agent voluntarily shifts attention from task-related to task-unrelated thoughts. We reveal an inconsistency between the standard, task-unrelated thought definition of mind wandering and the occurrence of intentional mind wandering (together with plausible assumptions about tasks and intentions). This suggests that either the standard definition of mind wandering should be rejected or that intentional mind wandering is an incoherent (...) category. Solving this puzzle is critical for advancing theoretical frameworks of mind wandering. (shrink)

We sometimes fail unwittingly to do things that we ought to do. And we are, from time to time, culpable for these unwitting omissions. We provide an outline of a theory of responsibility for unwitting omissions. We emphasize two distinctive ideas: (i) many unwitting omissions can be understood as failures of appropriate vigilance, and; (ii) the sort of self-control implicated in these failures of appropriate vigilance is valuable. We argue that the norms that govern vigilance and the value of self-control (...) explain culpability for unwitting omissions. (shrink)

In this anthology, distinguished scholars--Thomas Nagel, T.M. Scanlon, John Rawls, Robert Nozick, Samuela Scheffler, Conrad D. Johnson, Bernard Williams, Peter Railton, Amartya Sen, Philippa Foot, and Derek Parfit-- debate arguments for and against the moral doctrine of consequentialism to present a complete view of this important topic in moral philosophy.

Each volume of this series of companions to major philosophers contains specially commissioned essays by an international team of scholars and will serve as a reference work for students and nonspecialists. John Rawls is the most significant and influential philosopher and moral philosopher of the twentieth century. His work has profoundly shaped contemporary discussions of social, political and economic justice in philosophy, law, political science, economics and other social disciplines. In this exciting collection of new essays, many of the world's (...) leading political and moral theorists discuss the full range of Rawls's contribution to the concepts of political and economic justice, democracy, liberalism, constitutionalism, and international justice. There are also assessments of Rawls's controversial relationships with feminism, utilitarianism and communitarianism. New readers will find this the most accessible guide to Rawls currently available. Advanced students and specialists will find a conspectus of recent developments in the interpretation of Rawls. (shrink)

Suppose that a patient is receiving treatment options from her doctor. In one case, the doctor says, “the surgery has a 90% survival rate.” Now, suppose the doctor instead said, “the procedure has a 10% mortality rate.” Predictably, the patient is more likely to consent on the first description and more likely to dissent on the second. This is an example of a framing effect. A framing effect occurs when “the description of [logically-equivalent] options in terms of gains (positive frame) (...) rather than losses (negative frame) elicits systematically different choices.” Framing effects are ubiquitous, but they are particularly troublesome in medicine. Many worry that there is tension between valuing informed consent and using framing effects in clinical settings. In this paper, I answer this question: if an individual is subject to a framing effect when she gives her consent, does this undermine the validity of her consent? I argue that framing effects do not undermine consent in general. (shrink)

This dissertation is an experiment: what happens if we treat proper names as anaphoric expressions on a par with pronouns? The first thing to notice is that a name's 'antecedent' can occur in a discourse prior to the one containing the name. An individual may be introduced and tagged with a name in one context, and then retrieved using the name in a later context. To allow for discourse crossing anaphora, in addition to the usual cross-sentential anaphora, a revision of (...) discourse semantics is in order. Essentially, we must countenance discourse referents that span contexts, and think of contexts, not as islands, but as nodes connected to each other by the discourse referents they share. Discourse semantics gives rise to a new notion of content determined by discourse reference rather than pure reference. In a space of contexts structured by shared discourse referents, discourse content becomes transmissable. For a piece of content may be sent from one context to another whenever the discourse referents bundled up in the content are held in common by the two contexts. The final step is to treat the cognitive state of an agent as just another kind of context, and so a potential recipient of discourse content. Discourse content is more fine-grained than traditional 'singular' content, and so is a better fit for our pretheoretic intuitions about communication and attitude reporting. This is illustrated by applying the theory to Frege's puzzle, a puzzle of Loar's about communication, Kripke's puzzle about belief, Geach's intentional identity and new breed of 'mixed' de re-de dicto sentence. (shrink)

P. Kyle Stanford defends the problem of unconceived alternatives, which maintains that scientists are unlikely to conceive of all the scientifically plausible alternatives to the theories they accept. Stanford’s argument has been criticized on the grounds that the failure of individual scientists to conceive of relevant alternatives does not entail the failure of science as a corporate body to do so. I consider two replies to this criticism and find both lacking. In the process, I argue that Stanford does not (...) provide evidence that there are likely scientifically plausible unconceived alternatives to scientific theories accepted now and in the future. (shrink)

One popular theory of moral responsibility locates responsible agency in exercises of control. These control-based theories often appeal to tracing to explain responsibility in cases where some agent is intuitively responsible for bringing about some outcome despite lacking direct control over that outcome’s obtaining. Some question whether control-based theories are committed to utilizing tracing to explain responsibility in certain cases. I argue that reflecting on certain kinds of negligence shows that tracing plays an ineliminable role in any adequate control-based theory (...) of responsibility. (shrink)

This volume contains articles covering a broad spectrum of proof theory, with an emphasis on its mathematical aspects. The articles should not only be interesting to specialists of proof theory, but should also be accessible to a diverse audience, including logicians, mathematicians, computer scientists and philosophers. Many of the central topics of proof theory have been included in a self-contained expository of articles, covered in great detail and depth. The chapters are arranged so that the two introductory articles come first; (...) these are then followed by articles from core classical areas of proof theory; the handbook concludes with articles that deal with topics closely related to computer science. (shrink)

This article challenges the association between realist methodology and ideals of legitimacy. Many who seek a more “realistic” or “political” approach to political theory replace the familiar orientation towards a state of justice with a structurally similar orientation towards a state of legitimacy. As a result, they fail to provide more reliable practical guidance, and wrongly displace radical demands. Rather than orienting action towards any state of affairs, I suggest that a more practically useful approach to political theory would directly (...) address judgments, by comparing the concrete possibilities for action faced by real political actors. (shrink)

Confabulation is typically understood to be dysfunctional. But this understanding neglects the phenomenon’s potential benefits. In fact, we think that the benefits of non-clinical confabulation provide a better foundation for a general account of confabulation. In this paper, we start from these benefits to develop a social teleological account of confabulation. Central to our account is the idea that confabulation manifests a kind of willful ignorance. By understanding confabulation in this way, we can provide principled explanations for the difference between (...) clinical and non-clinical cases of confabulation and the extent to which confabulation is rational. (shrink)

The controversy over the equivalence of continuous sedation until death (CSD) and physician-assisted suicide/euthanasia (PAS/E) provides an opportunity to focus on a significant extended use of CSD. This extension, suggested by the equivalence of PAS/E and CSD, is designed to promote additional patient autonomy at the end-of-life. Samuel LiPuma, in his article, “Continuous Sedation Until Death as Physician-Assisted Suicide/Euthanasia: A Conceptual Analysis” claims equivalence between CSD and death; his paper is seminal in the equivalency debate. Critics contend that sedation (...) follows proportionality protocols for which LiPuma’s thesis does not adequately account. Furthermore, sedation may not eliminate consciousness, and as such LiPuma’s contention that CSD is equivalent to neocortical death is suspect. We not only defend the equivalence thesis, but also expand it to include additional moral considerations. First, we explain the equivalence thesis. This is followed by a defense of the thesis against five criticisms. The third section critiques the current use of CSD. Finally, we offer two proposals that, if adopted, would broaden the use of PAS/E and CSD and thereby expand options at the end-of-life. (shrink)

Humans have always sought to change their environment—building houses, monuments, temples, and roads. In the process, they have remade the fabric of the world into newly functional objects that are also works of art to be admired. In this second edition of his popular Existential Pleasures of Engineering, Samuel Florman explores how engineers think and feel about their profession. A deeply insightful and refreshingly unique text, this book corrects the myth that engineering is cold and passionless. Indeed, Florman celebrates (...) engineering not only crucial and fundamental but also vital and alive he views it as a response to some of our deepest impulses, an endeavor rich in spiritual and sensual rewards. Opposing the "anti-technology" stance, Florman gives readers a practical, creative, and even amusing philosophy of engineering that boasts of pride in his craft. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is an attempt to delimitate what the dialectical syllogism looks like in Aristotle’s Topics. Aristotle never gave an example of a dialectical syllogism, but we have some clues spread over books I and VIII of the Topics which make it possible to understand at least what within a dialectical debate is a dialectical syllogism. The interpretation advanced here distinguishes the logical order of the dialectical argumentation from the order of the debate. This distinction enables us (...) to have a better understand of what is and how the dialectical syllogism is identified in the debate. In addition, we can solve some interpretative difficulties other interpretations could not solve, and have a more solid grasp of how endoxa are used in a dialectical debate. (shrink)

This article is divided into three sections. In the first and second, I examine Sartorio’s account of the causal structure of the famous Thirsty Traveler thought experiment. I argue that this account does not withstand critical scrutiny. In the third, I turn to a novel kind of moral luck that Sartorio uses the Thirsty Traveler to expose. I expand the scope of my argument to look also at other recently proposed categories of moral luck. I argue that these proposals are (...) overhasty. (shrink)

According to Aristotle, the medical art aims at health, which is a virtue of the body, and does so in an unlimited way. Consequently, medicine does not determine the extent to which health should be pursued, and “mental health” falls under medicine only via pros hen predication. Because medicine is inherently oriented to its end, it produces health in accordance with its nature and disease contrary to its nature—even when disease is good for the patient. Aristotle’s politician understands that this (...) inherent orientation can be systematically distorted, and so would see the need for something like the Hippocratic Oath. (shrink)

Some people believe that the demands of morality coincide with the requirements of an enlightened self-interest. Others believe that morality is diametrically opposed to considerations of self-interest. This book argues that there is another position, intermediate between these extremes, which makes better sense of the totality of our moral thought and practice. Scheffler elaborates this position via an examination of morality's content, scope, authority, and deliberative role. Although conflicts between morality and self-interest do arise, according to this position, nevertheless morality (...) is fundamentally a reasonable and humane phenomenon. Moreover, the psychological bases of effective moral motivation have sources deep within the self, and morally motivated individuals try to shape their own interests so as to avoid conflict with morality. Since human practices and institutions help to determine the prevalence of these motives, and since in this and other ways they influence the degree to which conflicts between morality and self-interest actually occur, the extent of such conflict is not fixed or immutable, and is in part a social and political issue. (shrink)

O que se pretende neste artigo é mostrar antes de tudo que revoluçáo galilena é fruto de uma mudança de mentalidade, de visáo de mundo, decorrente da própria crise por que passava o paradigma aristotélico . Um bom exemplo desta mudança e das dificuldades de livrar-se dos quadros tradicionais do pensamento filosofico é o matematismo(universo de precisáo) e a crença galileana em orbitas circulares, respectivamente. Com efeito, como poderá Galileu ser um dos fundadores da fisica moderna, se esta é fundamentada (...) no principio de inércia e na preponderancia da reta em relaçáo ao circulo? A resposta é a presentada a partir da analise do racíonio de Galileu no tocante a ideia de movimento. (shrink)

Samuel Clarke was by far the most gifted and influential Newtonian philosopher of his generation, and A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, which constituted the 1704 Boyle Lectures, was one of the most important works of the first half of the eighteenth century, generating a great deal of controversy about the relation between space and God, the nature of divine necessary existence, the adequacy of the Cosmological Argument, agent causation, and the immateriality of the soul. Together (...) with the other texts presented in this edition, it also provides the best introduction to Clarke's philosophical views, which, in addition to their intrinsic interest, are historically important for the light they shed both on the philosophical positions within the Newtonian circle and on the exchange between Clarke and Leibniz, the most famous philosophical controversy of the eighteenth century. (shrink)

Taking the title of his book from Isaiah Berlin's famous essay distinguishing a negative concept of liberty connoting lack of interference by others from a positive concept involving participation in the political realm, Samuel Fleischacker explores a third definition of liberty that lies between the first two. In Fleischacker's view, Kant and Adam Smith think of liberty as a matter of acting on our capacity for judgment, thereby differing both from those who tie it to the satisfaction of our (...) desires and those who translate it as action in accordance with reason or "will." Integrating the thought of Kant and Smith, and developing his own stand through readings of the Critique of Judgment and The Wealth of Nations, Fleischacker shows how different acting on one's best judgment is from acting on one's desires--how, in particular, good judgment, as opposed to mere desire, can flourish only in favorable social and political conditions. At the same time, exercising judgment is something every individual must do for him- or herself, hence not something that philosophers and politicians who reason better than the rest of us can do in our stead. For this reason advocates of a liberty based on judgment are likely to be more concerned than are libertarians to make sure that government provides people with conditions for the use of their liberty--for example, excellent standards of education, health care, and unemployment insurance--while at the same time promoting a less paternalistic view of government than most of the movements associated for the past thirty years with the political left. (shrink)

Cognitive theorists routinely disagree about the evidence supporting claims in cognitive science. Here, we first argue that some disagreements about evidence in cognitive science are about the evidence available to be drawn upon by cognitive theorists. Then, we show that one’s explanation of why this first kind of disagreement obtains will cohere with one’s theory of evidence. We argue that the best explanation for why cognitive theorists disagree in this way is because their evidence is what they rationally grant. Finally, (...) we explain why our view does not lead to a pernicious kind of relativism in cognitive science. (shrink)

Most democratic theorists agree that concentrations of wealth and power tend to distort the functioning of democracy and ought to be countered wherever possible. Deliberative democrats are no exception: though not its only potential value, the capacity of deliberation to ‘neutralise power’ is often regarded as ‘fundamental’ to deliberative theory. Power may be neutralised, according to many deliberative democrats, if citizens can be induced to commit more fully to the deliberative resolution of common problems. If they do, they will be (...) unable to get away with inconsistencies and bad or private reasons, thereby mitigating the illegitimate influence of power. I argue, however, that the means by which power inflects political disagreement is far more subtle than this model suggests and cannot be countered so simply. As a wealth of recent research in political psychology demonstrates, human beings persistently exhibit ‘motivated reasoning’, meaning that even when we are sincerely committed to the deliberative resolution of common problems, and even when we are exposed to the same reasons and evidence, we still disagree strongly about what ‘fair cooperation’ entails. Motivated reasoning can be counteracted, but only under exceptional circumstances such as those that enable modern science, which cannot be reliably replicated in our society at large. My analysis suggests that in democratic politics – which rules out the kind of anti-democratic practices available to scientists – we should not expect deliberation to reliably neutralise power. (shrink)