In their paper, “Helpful Lessons and Cautionary Tales: How Should COVID-19 Drug Development and Access Inform Approaches to Non-Pandemic Diseases?” Holly Fernandez Lynch and colleagues have present...

I offer two potential diagnoses of the behavioral norms governing post‐truth politics by comparing the view of language, communication, and truth‐telling put forward by David Lewis (extended by game theorists), and John Searle. My first goal is to specify the different ways in which Lewis, and game theorists more generally, in contrast to Searle (in the company of Paul Grice and Jurgen Habermas), go about explaining the normativity of truthfulness within a linguistic community. The main difference is that for Lewis (...) and game theorists, “truthful” signaling follows from an align- ment of interests, and deception follows from mixed motives leading to the calculation that sending false information is better for oneself. Following in the Enlightenment tradition, Searle argues that practical reasoning, which involves mastery of at least one language, requires that actors intend to communicate. This intention includes constraining the content of statements to uphold veracity conditions. After distinguishing between these two accounts, I will artic- ulate the implications for explaining, and even informing actions, constitutive of post‐truth politics. I argue that the strategic view of communication is suffi- cient neither to model everyday conversation nor to reflect a public sphere useful for democratic govern- ment. Both the pedagogy of strategic communication as cheap talk, and its concordance with new digital information technologies, challenge norms of truthful- ness that underlie modern institutions essential to an effective public sphere. (shrink)

In On the Origin of Species, Charles Darwin put forward his theory of natural selection. Conventionally, Darwin's argument for this theory has been understood as based on an analogy with artificial selection. But there has been no consensus on how, exactly, this analogical argument is supposed to work – and some suspicion too that analogical arguments on the whole are embarrassingly weak. Drawing on new insights into the history of analogical argumentation from the ancient Greeks onward, as well as on (...) in-depth studies of Darwin's public and private writings, this book offers an original perspective on Darwin's argument, restoring to view the intellectual traditions which Darwin took for granted in arguing as he did. From this perspective come new appreciations not only of Darwin's argument but of the metaphors based on it, the range of wider traditions the argument touched upon, and its legacies for science after the Origin. (shrink)

Team reasoning gives a simple, coherent, and rational explanation for human cooperative behavior. This paper investigates the robustness of team reasoning as an explanation for cooperative behavior, by assessing its long-run viability. We consider an evolutionary game theoretic model in which the population consists of team reasoners and ‘conventional’ individual reasoners. We find that changes in the ludic environment can affect evolutionary outcomes, and that in many circumstances, team reasoning may thrive, even under conditions that, at first glance, may seem (...) unfavorable. We also pursue several extensions that augment the basic account, and conclude that team reasoning is an evolutionarily viable mechanism with the potential to explain behavior in a range of human interactions. (shrink)

This paper presents a unifying framework for the study of artificial life, intelIigence and reality. By providing this framework we can give a clear and concise introduction to the fundamental arguments of all three artificial sciences and facilitate the translation of arguments from any one domain to the other two. The framework is based on a variant of functionalism that does not exclude the role of the observer.

This article does not give the answer to the title question, but is only limited to studying the possibility of giving it. In particular, the author defends that it is legitimate to pose the fundamental question of the philosophy of mathematics and offers several criteria for such a question. As a first approach we propose the question which is incorrect and requires rectification, but is understandable: ‘What is Mathematics?‘. We consider three groups of strategies of responding to it: 1) the (...) question is naive and does not require an answer; 2) the answer is contained in the mathematical knowledge itself; 3) only philosophy can give the answer. Further rectifications to the basic question are questions about the essence and existence of mathematics. The fundamentalist and cultural-historical philosophy of mathematics gave their not fully satisfactory answers to this question in the past century. The dualism problem of philosophy of mathematics is fundamentally resolved through a certain kind of dialectics, which requires the philosophy of mathematics to submit to metaphysics. The unity of existence and essence is considered in the unity of the subject of dialectic - the mathematician who generates the knowledge as self-realization in a series of existential choices, as a means of saving transcendence - the existence ‘toward being‘ rather than ‘toward nothing‘. Positive view of the mathematics turns out to be the explicit expression of negative unity i.e. the subject. (shrink)

The history of philosophy must identify in each system the determining motifs, the genuine crystallizations present throughout the entire system, and separate them from proofs, justifications, and dialogues, from their presentations by philosophers, to the degree that the latter were conscious of them. It must separate the silently advancing mole of genuine philosophical knowledge from the wordy, exoteric, phenomenological, multiformed consciousness of the subject, that consciousness which is the receptacle and motivating force of these reasonings.

We present a new approach to the mathematical objects of General Relativity in terms of which a generic f(R)-gravity theory gravitation is written in a first-order (à la Palatini) formalism, and introduce the concept of Dark Metric which could bypass the emergence of disturbing concepts as Dark Energy and Dark Matter. These issues are related to the fact that General Relativity could not be the definitive theory of Gravitation due to several shortcomings that come out both from theoretical and experimental (...) viewpoints. At large scales, the attempts to match it with the recent observational data lead to invoke Dark Energy and Dark Matter as the bulk components of the cosmic fluid. Since no final evidence, at fundamental level, exists for such ingredients, it could be useful to reconsider the gravitational sector in order to see if suitable extensions of General Relativity could solve the shortcomings present at infrared scales. (shrink)

In this paper we describe an experimental test of the validity of the Pauli Exclusion Principle (for electrons) which is based on a straightforward idea put forward a few years ago by Ramberg and Snow (Phys. Lett. B 238:438, 1990). We perform a very accurate search of X-rays from the Pauli-forbidden atomic transitions of electrons in the already filled 1S shells of copper atoms. Although the experiment has a very simple structure, it poses deep conceptual and interpretational problems. Here we (...) describe the experimental method and recent experimental results, which we interpret in the framework of quon theory. We also present future plans to upgrade the experimental apparatus using Silicon Drift Detectors. (shrink)

In this article, we provide a description of the good in health promotion based on an empirical study of health promotion practices in New South Wales, the most populous state in Australia. We found that practitioners were unified by a vision of the good in health promotion that had substantive and procedural dimensions. Substantively, the good in health promotion was teleological: it inhered in meliorism, an intention to promote health, which was understood holistically and situated in places and environments, a (...) commitment to primary rather than secondary prevention and engagement with communities more than individuals. Procedurally, the good in health promotion arose from qualities of practices that they developed over time in respectful relationships, were flexible and responsive to communities, built capabilities in communities and were sustainable. We discuss our findings with reference to Martha Nussbaum’s normative list of functional capabilities for a good human life, David Buchanan’s vision for health promotion ethics and common concerns in health promotion ethics regarding the relationship between paternalism and freedom. Our thick, vague conception of the good in health promotion, founded in the values and practical reason of people engaged daily in health promotion work, contributes to the development of a more complete theory of health promotion ethics. (shrink)

Background: While religious faith remains one of the most significant features of human life, little is known about its relationship to ordinary belief at the level of the brain. Nor is it known whether religious believers and nonbelievers differ in how they evaluate statements of fact. Our lab previously has used functional neuroimaging to study belief as a general mode of cognition, and others have looked specifically at religious belief. However, no research has compared these two states of mind directly. (...) Methodology/Principal Findings: We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to measure signal changes in the brains of thirty subjects - fifteen committed Christians and fifteen nonbelievers - as they evaluated the truth and falsity of religious and nonreligious propositions. For both groups, and in both categories of stimuli, belief was associated with greater signal in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, an area important for self-representation, emotional associations, reward, and goal-driven behavior. This region showed greater signal whether subjects believed statements about God, the Virgin Birth, etc. or statements about ordinary facts. A comparison of both stimulus categories suggests that religious thinking is more associated with brain regions that govern emotion, self-representation, and cognitive conflict, while thinking about ordinary facts is more reliant upon memory retrieval networks. Conclusions/Significance: While religious and nonreligious thinking differentially engage broad regions of the frontal, parietal, and medial temporal lobes, the difference between belief and disbelief appears to be content-independent. Our study compares religious thinking with ordinary cognition and, as such, constitutes a step toward developing a neuropsychology of religion. However, these findings may also further our understanding of how the brain accepts statements of all kinds to be valid descriptions of the world. © 2009 Harris et al. (shrink)

A partire dalla metà del Novecento, dopo una modernità dominata da prospettive di stampo deontologistico o utilitaristico, la filosofia pratica contemporanea ha visto il sorgere di una ripresa di interesse per un’etica “in prima persona”, in grado di offrire una prospettiva integrale sul soggetto e centrata sullo sviluppo del suo carattere e della sua personalità; in breve, si è assistito a un nuovo potente ingresso in scena dell’idea del bene, e, con essa, della virtù quale via maestra per conseguire il (...) fine adeguato della vita umana. Il volume si propone di rendere conto – anche in correlazione al ruolo delle emozioni, ma non solo – del percorso filosofico della virtù: dall’indagine delle sue fonti “classiche”, all’inizio del suo declino nella modernità, al risorgere della sua vitalità negli ultimi decenni nelle diverse aree linguistico-culturali, tenendo anche conto delle differenti discipline con cui si è interfacciata. Esso non pretende di esaurire i percorsi e le suggestioni che una tematica così vasta presenta, né di coprirne tutta la storia; piuttosto, vuole rappresentare uno stimolo alla ricerca, ponendo in connessione tagli disciplinari e metodologici differenti per offrire una riflessione a tutto campo, che metta in dialogo studiosi provenienti da ambiti diversi ed apra nuove prospettive.Saggi di: Francesco Camera, Angelo Campodonico, Elisabetta Cattanei, Michel Croce, Elisa Cuttini, Marco Damonte, Elisa Grimi, Simona Langella, Alberto Masala, Alma Massaro, Letterio Mauro, Giacomo Samek Lodovici, Maria Silvia Vaccarezza, Paolo Vignola, Lodovica Maria Zanet, Matteo Zoppi. (shrink)

By transcendental aesthetic, Kant means “the science of all principles of a priori sensibility” (A 21/B 35). These, he argues, are the laws that properly direct our judgments of taste (B 35 – 36 fn.), i.e. our aesthetic judgments as we ordinarily understand that notion in the context of contemporary art. Thus the first part of the Critique of Pure Reason, entitled the Transcendental Aesthetic, enumerates the necessary presuppositions of, among other things, our ability to make empirical judgments about particular (...) works of art. These presuppositions are sensible rather than intellectual because on Kant's view, all intellection that considers objects of any kind, whether abstract or concrete, must at base connect to actual, material objects with which we come into direct contact; and this we can do only through sensibility (A 19/B 33). Thus the following discussion explores what Kant claims must be true of us in order to make the sorts of aesthetic judgments we make, rather than any particular class or quality of aesthetic judgments itself. On Kant's view, what must be true of us in order to make aesthetic judgments is not different from what must be true of us in order to make any other kind of judgment about empirical objects. This last point is worth emphasizing, in order to correct an interpretation of Kant's account of aesthetic judgment in the Critique of Judgment that wrongly reads Kant as claiming that aesthetic judgments do not have to satisfy the same basic requirements of judgment that any other kind of judgment also must satisfy, such as the synthetic subsumption of such objects under certain necessary and hard-wired concepts of understanding, the internal coherence of such judgments with other, non-aesthetic ones of a more abstract and comprehensive character, the unified consciousness within which such judgments are intelligibly made, and the like. Of course Kant recognizes the special character of aesthetic judgments and unpacks it in the... (shrink)

In the last few years there has been intense debate in Italy on administration of life-prolonging treatment to premature babies at the edge of viability. In 2006, a group of experts based in Florence drafted recommendations known as Carta di Firenze (CdF) for responsible use of intensive care for premature infants between 22 and 25 weeks of gestational age (GA). The CdF was later endorsed by several medicoprofessional associations, but was followed by recommendations by the Ministry of Health mandating resuscitation (...) for all premature babies regardless of GA and parental consent. Recent statements from medicoprofessional bodies seem to show that the ‘always resuscitate rule’ is not supported by many Italian doctors. We argue that ethically sensitive issues in medicine should be regulated with, and not against, the medical profession and its representative bodies. (shrink)