In 1933 Godel introduced a calculus of provability (also known as modal logic S4) and left open the question of its exact intended semantics. In this paper we give a solution to this problem. We find the logic LP of propositions and proofs and show that Godel's provability calculus is nothing but the forgetful projection of LP. This also achieves Godel's objective of defining intuitionistic propositional logic Int via classical proofs and provides a Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov style provability semantics for Int which (...) resisted formalization since the early 1930s. LP may be regarded as a unified underlying structure for intuitionistic, modal logics, typed combinatory logic and λ-calculus. (shrink)

We describe a general logical framework, Justification Logic, for reasoning about epistemic justification. Justification Logic is based on classical propositional logic augmented by justification assertions t: F that read t is a justification for F. Justification Logic absorbs basic principles originating from both mainstream epistemology and the mathematical theory of proofs. It contributes to the studies of the well-known Justified True Belief vs. Knowledge problem. We state a general Correspondence Theorem showing that behind each epistemic modal logic, there is a (...) robust system of justifications. This renders a new, evidence-based foundation for epistemic logic. As a case study, we offer a resolution of the GoldmanRed Barns in Justification Logic. Furthermore, we formalize the well-known Gettier example and reveal hidden assumptions and redundancies in Gettier’s reasoning. (shrink)

Justification Logic provides an axiomatic description of justifications and delegates the question of their nature to semantics. In this note, we address the conceptual issue of the logical type of justifications: we argue that justifications in the logical setting are naturally interpreted as sets of formulas which leads to a class of epistemic models that we call modular models . We show that Fitting models for Justification Logic naturally encode modular models and can be regarded as convenient pre-models of the (...) former. (shrink)

In this paper, we provide a semantic analysis of the well-known knowability paradox stemming from the Church–Fitch observation that the meaningful knowability principle /all truths are knowable/, when expressed as a bi-modal principle F --> K♢F, yields an unacceptable omniscience property /all truths are known/. We offer an alternative semantic proof of this fact independent of the Church–Fitch argument. This shows that the knowability paradox is not intrinsically related to the Church–Fitch proof, nor to the Moore sentence upon which it (...) relies, but rather to the knowability principle itself. Further, we show that, from a verifiability perspective, the knowability principle fails in the classical logic setting because it is missing the explicit incorporation of a hidden assumption of /stability/: ‘the proposition in question does not change from true to false in the process of discovery.’ Once stability is taken into account, the resulting /stable knowability principle/ and its nuanced versions more accurately represent verification-based knowability and do not yield omniscience. (shrink)

In this paper individual proofs are integrated into provability logic. Systems of axioms for a logic with operators “A is provable” and “p is a proof of A” are introduced, provided with Kripke semantics and decision procedure. Completeness theorems with respect to the arithmetical interpretation are proved.

The language of the basic logic of proofs extends the usual propositional language by forming sentences of the sort x is a proof of F for any sentence F. In this paper a complete axiomatization for the basic logic of proofs in Heyting Arithmetic HA was found.

Logical theories for representing knowledge are often plagued by the so-called Logical Omniscience Problem. The problem stems from the clash between the desire to model rational agents, which should be capable of simple logical inferences, and the fact that any logical inference, however complex, almost inevitably consists of inference steps that are simple enough. This contradiction points to the fruitlessness of trying to solve the Logical Omniscience Problem qualitatively if the rationality of agents is to be maintained. We provide a (...) quantitative solution to the problem compatible with the two important facets of the reasoning agent: rationality and resource boundedness. More precisely, we provide a test for the logical omniscience problem in a given formal theory of knowledge. The quantitative measures we use are inspired by the complexity theory. We illustrate our framework with a number of examples ranging from the traditional implicit representation of knowledge in modal logic to the language of justification logic, which is capable of spelling out the internal inference process. We use these examples to divide representations of knowledge into logically omniscient and not logically omniscient, thus trying to determine how much information about the reasoning process needs to be present in a theory to avoid logical omniscience. (shrink)

The paper proves a predicate version of Solovay's well-known theorem on provability interpretations of modal logic: If a closed modal predicate-logical formula R is not valid in some finite Kripke model, then there exists an arithmetical interpretation f such that $PA \nvdash fR$ . This result implies the arithmetical completeness of arithmetically correct modal predicate logics with the finite model property (including the one-variable fragments of QGL and QS). The proof was obtained by adding "the predicate part" as a specific (...) addition to the standard Solovay construction. (shrink)

In this paper the modal operator "x is provable in Peano Arithmetic" is incorporated into first-order theories. A provability extension of a theory is defined. Presburger Arithmetic of addition, Skolem Arithmetic of multiplication, and some first order theories of partial consistency statements are shown to remain decidable after natural provability extensions. It is also shown that natural provability extensions of a decidable theory may be undecidable.

This book provides an invaluable overview of the reach of logic. It provides reference to some of the most important, well-established results in logic, while at the same time offering insight into the latest research issues in the area. It also has a balance of theory and practice, containing essays in the areas of modal logic, intuitionistic logic, logic and language, nonmonotonic logic and logic programming, temporal logic, logic and learning, combination of logics, practical reasoning, logic and artificial intelligence, abduction, (...) theorem proving and goal-directed reasoning. It will be invaluable reading for researchers and graduate students in logic and computer science, and a fabulous source of inspiration for research students in search of a topic for a PhD in logic and theoretical computer science. (shrink)

We introduce reference structures — a basic mathematical model of a data organization capable of storing and utilizing information about its addresses. A propositional labeled modal language is used as a specification and programming language for reference structures; the satisfiability algorithm for modal language gives a method of building and optimizing reference structures satisfying a given formula. Corresponding labeled modal logics are presented, supplied with cut free axiomatizations, completeness and decidability theorems are proved. Initialization of typed variables in some programming (...) languages is presented as an example of a reference structure building. (shrink)

Dynamic topological logic provides a context for studying the confluence of the topological semantics for S4, topological dynamics, and temporal logic. The topological semantics for S4 is based on topological spaces rather than Kripke frames. In this semantics, is interpreted as topological interior. Thus S4 can be understood as the logic of topological spaces, and can be understood as a topological modality. Topological dynamics studies the asymptotic properties of continuous maps on topological spaces. Let a dynamic topological system be a (...) topological space X together wError: Corrupted memory profileError: read ICCBased color space profile errorith a continuous function f. f can be thought of in temporal terms, moving the points of the topological space from one moment to the next. Dynamic topological logics are the logics of dynamic topological systems, just as S4 is the logic of topological spaces. Dynamic topological logics are defined for a trimodal language with an S4-ish topological modality, and two temporal modalities, and ∗, both interpreted using the continuous function. (shrink)

Justification Logic is a family of epistemic logical systems obtained from modal logics of knowledge by adding a new type of formula t:F, which is read t is a justification for F. The principal epistemic modal logic S4 includes Tarski’s well-known topological interpretation, according to which the modality 2X is read the Interior of X in a topological space (the topological equivalent of the ‘knowable part of X’). In this paper, we extend Tarski’s topological interpretation from S4 to Justification Logic (...) systems with both modality and justification assertions. The topological semantics interprets t:X as a reachable subset of X (the topological equivalent of ‘test t confirms X’). We establish a number of soundness and completeness results with respect to Kripke topology and the real topology for S4-based systems of Justification Logic. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In 1933 Gödel introduced an axiomatic system, currently known as S4, for a logic of an absolute provability, i.e. not depending on the formalism chosen ([God 33]). The problem of finding a fair provability model for S4 was left open. The famous formal provability predicate which first appeared in the Gödel Incompleteness Theorem does not do this job: the logic of formal provability is not compatible with S4. As was discovered in [Art 95], this defect of the formal provability (...) predicate can be bypassed by replacing hidden quantifiers over proofs by proof polynomials in a certain finite basis. The resulting Logic of Proofs enjoys a natural arithmetical semantics and provides an intended provability model for S4, thus answering a question left open by Gödel in 1933. Proof polynomials give an intended semantics for some other constructions based on the concept of provability, including intuitionistic logic with its Brouwer- Heyting- Kolmogorov interpretation, ?-calculus and modal ?-calculus. In the current paper we demonstrate how the intuitionistic propositional logic Int can be directly realized by proof polynomials. It is shown, that Int is complete with respect to this proof realizability. (shrink)