Was macht das Besondere der menschlichen Lebensform aus? Wie können wir es verstehen, dass unsere Art wie alle anderen natürlich evolviert ist und dennoch als einzige Art die Fähigkeit entwickelt hat, unter dem Anspruch der Freiheit und in reflexiver Distanz zu handeln, damit aber die Umwelt auf eine Welt hin zu transzendieren? Jung argumentiert, dass sich diese Fragen nur beantworten lassen, wenn man philosophische, evolutionstheoretische und kognitionswissenschaftliche Ansätze aufeinander bezieht. Der Schlüssel hierfür ist der Begriff der Bedeutung. Alle Lebewesen erfassen (...) ihre Umwelt im praktischen Umgang mit ihr als bedeutsam. Auch der Geist des Menschen ist essentiell verkörpert und basiert auf erlebten Bedeutsamkeiten. Die Fähigkeit zur symbolischen Artikulation und kulturellen Weiterentwicklung solcher Lebensbedeutungen erlaubt es ihm aber auch, die lokale Umwelt zu transzendieren und dabei Werte, Normen und objektive Geltungsansprüche zu entwickeln. Eine zeitgemäße Anthropologie muss in der Lage sein, diese qualitativen Besonderheiten des menschlichen Geistes als Resultate von Naturprozessen verständlich zu machen. Sie verbindet methodischen Naturalismus mit Offenheit für die Transzendenz des Geistes über die Umwelt. Damit leistet der Autor einen wichtigen Beitrag zu einem nichtreduktionistischen Verständnis des Menschen, das Leib und Geist nicht dualistisch trennt, sondern ihre spannungsvolle Einheit sichtbar macht. (shrink)

This book endeavors to fill the conceptual gap in theorizing about embodied cognition. The theories of mind and cognition which one could generally call "situated" or "embodied cognition" have gained much attention in the recent decades. However, it has been mostly phenomenology, which has served as a philosophical background for their research program. The main goal of this book is to bring the philosophy of classical American pragmatism firmly into play. Although pragmatism has been arguably the first intellectual current which (...) systematically built its theories of knowledge, mind and valuation upon the model of a bodily interaction between an organism and its environment, as the editors and authors argue, it has not been given sufficient attention in the debate and, consequently, its conceptual resources for enriching the embodied mind project are far from being exhausted. In this book, the authors propose concrete subject-areas in which the philosophy of pragmatism can be of help when dealing with particular problems the philosophy of the embodied mind nowadays faces - a prominent example being the inevitable tension between bodily situatedness and the potential universality of symbolic meaning. (shrink)

Humans are creatures of articulation: an essential part of our form of life is the expression of what appears to us significant in what we experience and how we behave. The aim of this volume is to proceed from this realisation to an integrative anthropology that not only takes into account the uniqueness of our form of life, but also our evolutionary context. This has important consequences for our understanding of our corporeality, actions, language, consciousness and morals.

In the human quest for orientation vis-à-vis personal life and comprehensive reality the worldviews of religionists and humanists offer different answers, and science also plays a crucial role. Yet it is the ordinary, embodied experience of meaningful engagement with reality in which all these cultural activities are rooted. Human beings have to relate themselves to the entirety of their lives to achieve orientation. This relation involves a non-methodical, meaningful experience that exhibits the crucial features for understanding worldviews: it comprises cognition, (...) volition, and emotion, is embodied, action-oriented, and expressive. From this starting-point, religious and secular worldviews articulate what is experienced as ultimately meaningful. Yet the plurality and one-sidedness of these life stances necessitates critical engagement for which philosophy provides indispensable means. In the end, some worldviews can be ruled out, but we are still left with a plurality of genuine options for orientation. (shrink)

English summary: Ordinary, unmethodical experience forms our lives. It accumulates when we interact with our environment as living beings, and combines cognitive, affective and volitional elements. In it, questions of meaning and value and issues of knowledge become strongly interdependent. In a normative sense, modern culture has tremendously upgraded the status of ordinary people's experience. However, at the same time, our world is increasingly determined by the methodological experience of the (natural) sciences and by the technology they have made possible. (...) Will scientific experience now replace ordinary experience, or will it complement and regulate it? How do facts and values relate to one another and what does this mean for our understanding of democracy? Matthias Jung starts by developing an integrated approach to ordinary experience, taking into account insights from areas including hermeneutics, phenomenology, pragmatism and cognitive science. As a result, three main areas of discussion emerge: knowledge, values and ideology, all of which are covered in their respective individual chapters. German description: Gewohnliche, unmethodische Erfahrung formt unser Leben. Sie vollzieht sich, wenn wir als lebendige Wesen mit unserer Umwelt interagieren, und verbindet jeweils kognitive, affektive und willentliche Dimensionen. Fragen nach Sinn und Wert und Wissensfragen sind in ihr eng aufeinander bezogen. Normativ hat die Kultur der Moderne die Erfahrung gewohnlicher Menschen enorm aufgewertet, doch gleichzeitig wird unsere Welt immer starker von der methodischen Erfahrung der (Natur-)Wissenschaften und der von ihr ermoglichten Technik bestimmt. Ersetzt nun wissenschaftliche die gewohnliche Erfahrung oder erganzt und korrigiert sie diese? Wie verhalten sich Fakten und Werte zueinander und was ergibt sich daraus fur unser Verstandnis von Demokratie? Matthias Jung entwickelt zunachst ein integriertes Konzept gewohnlicher Erfahrung und nimmt dabei Einsichten u.a. aus Hermeneutik, Phanomenologie, Pragmatismus und Kognitionswissenschaften auf. Daraus ergeben sich drei exemplarische Problemfelder: Wissen, Werte und Weltanschauung. Ihnen sind jeweils eigene Kapitel gewidmet. (shrink)

Meanings are felt and lived by the human organism before they are articulated. Following insights from pragmatism and embodied cognition, this paper suggests that there is an ‘appropriate’ relationship between what is meant and was is expressed in words and actions that can be formulated as a hitherto neglected yet crucial validity claim, namely congruity. Congruity is what connects the meaningfulness implicit in living a life with the articulated meanings of symbolic communication. We distinguish between the intertwined aspects of semiotic (...) congruity, the fusion between sensual patterns and semiotic meanings, performative congruity, the freedom and ability to articulate qualitatively experienced meaningfulness, and hermeneutic congruity, the capability of achieving congruence between situational meanings and one’s entire being-in-the-world. The latter presupposes a synthesis of horizontal and vertical congruity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:From Dilthey to Mead and Heidegger: Systematic and Historical Relations MATTHIASJUNG FOR TODAY'S READER, G. H. Mead's lectures on Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century offer a surprise: Mead, despite having attended his lectures from 1889 to 1891, does not mention the name of Wilhelm Dilthey, who nowadays is regarded as one of the classical authors of nineteenth-century philosophy. Mead's lectures lack any sign of awareness concerning the (...) hermeneutic tradition, represented by such names as Friedrich Schlegel, Schleiermacher, Droysen and, of course, Dilthey. Nevertheless it is, as I would like to show in the following pages, quite obvious that Mead's own philosophical conception shows some striking parallels with Dilthey's thought, which can be explained partly through direct influence, partly through the similarity of the questions both tried to answer. For Mead's missing reference to the mentioned tradition, I see two complementary explanations. Firstly, the philosophical importance of the hermeneutic tradition in nineteenth-century philosophy was mainly a retrospective matter. Only after 1927, when Martin Heidegger published Being and Time, did philosophical interest in hermeneutics begin; and then it took thirty-three years more till Hans-Georg Gadamer's Truth and Method brought about a historical interest in the development of hermeneutic thought. Secondly, Mead's own passion for the development of science may have forced him to neglect these philosophical movements, which seemed to resist the autocracy of (natural) science. Wilhelm Dilthey's thought, especially around the year 189o, can systematically be interpreted as a common starting-point for two of the most important directions of contemporary philosophy: pragmatism and hermeneutics. It is but a small exaggeration to say that G. H. Mead drew out the pragmatic, Martin Heidegger the hermeneutic consequences of Dilthey's concept of [661 ] 662 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER ~995 Seelenleben, understood as a "best~indige Wechselwirkung zwischen unserem Eigenleben und dem Milieu. ''1 Mead's phase-model of acting, his whole idea of understanding meaning as the result of a social process, are paralleled and partly anticipated by Dilthey, as is Heidegger's conception of Dasein as "beingin -the-world" and his attempt to understand the inner historicity of life.2 In pointing this out, I do not want to claim that Mead was conscious of the systematic relation of his theories to Dilthey's work; nevertheless I will argue that Dilthey's ideas may have served as a source of inspiration and, furthermore, that this inspiration was made possible through some important similarities in the systematic architecture of both hermeneutics and pragmatism.3 I begin by working out the historical dimension, which Hans Joas characterized as "Meads biographische Abkunft von Dilthey"4 (section l). After that, I will sketch Dilthey's philosophical position around 189o in order to show how he works to transform the German tradition of "philosophy of consciousness" into a new concept of interaction between the life-processes of detranscendentalized subjects and their environment (section 2). Having done this, I will be ready to discuss the parallels between Mead's pragmatic approach to the life-process and Dilthey's work (section 3). Finally, the early Heidegger's and Mead's transformations of "philosophy of consciousness" will briefly be interpreted as different ways of overcoming the inherent problems of Dilthey 's attempt (section 4). Between April 23, 1889 and October ~4, 1891 G. H. Mead was registered at the Humboldt-University of Berlin.5 During this period Wilhelm Dilthey, who had come from Breslau to Berlin in 1882, gave the following lectures: "Geschichte der neueren Philosophie"; "Geschichte und System der P/idagogik "; "Logik und Erkenntnistheorie"; "Psychologie als Erfahrungswissen- ' Wilhelm Dilthey, DichterischeEinbildungskraft und Wahnsinn, in GesammelteSchriften, Bd. VI (Stuttgart/G6ttingen: Teubner/Vandenhoeck &Ruprecht, 1962),95. 9In Sein und Zeit (cited from the 15th edition, Tfibingen: Niemeyer, 1979),Heidegger refers frequently to Dilthey: 46, 47, 2o5, 2~ 249, 376f-, 385, 397-4o4 9The two most important sources concerning his early reception of Dilthey'swork are the lecture from the summer semester of 192o,Phi~nomenologieder Anschauung und des Ausdrucks, ed. C. Strube (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1993) and the "Kasseler Vortr~ge," given in 1925 under the title "Wilhelm Diltheys Forschungsarbeit und der... (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 64 Heft: 3 Seiten: 410-423.

Sprint interval training is characterized by intensity of “all-out” effort and superior time-efficiency compared to traditional moderate-intensity continuous training and has been proposed as one viable solution to address the commonly reported barrier of lack of time for physical activity. While substantial physiological benefits of participation in SIT have been well-documented, the psychological responses to SIT are less clear. No systematic review has been conducted thus far to respond to the assumption that its supramaximal intensity will induce adverse feelings. Therefore, (...) the aim of the present study was to synthesize studies analyzing affective and enjoyment responses to SIT and to compare the responses to SIT with MICT and other high intensity interval training protocols with lower intensities. After searching relevant databases up until 22nd March 2021, twenty-five studies meeting the inclusion criteria were included in the present review. Random effect meta-analysis using the pooled data demonstrated that SIT induced similar post-exercise affective valences during the training compared to MICT and HIIT, but lower affective valences immediately post-exercise compared to MICT. Moreover, affective responses during SIT decreased to negative valences according to the results from most included studies, while low-volume SIT protocols with shorter sprint duration and repetitions induced more positive affective responses. Level of enjoyment after SIT were positive and were comparable to MICT or HIIT. Overall, the results from the existing literature indicate that SIT might cause unpleasant feelings during the training and be perceived less pleasurable than MICT immediately post training but could be a comparably enjoyable modality for healthy individuals in relation to MICT or HIIT, despite its supramaximal intensity. Low-volume SIT may be a realistic option for individuals seeking a time-efficient workout with comparable affective responses to MICT or HIIT.Systematic Review Registration[https://www.crd.york.ac.uk/PROSPERO], Identifier [CRD42021284898]. (shrink)

Bei der Herausbildung des modernen sozialtheoretischen Denkens haben zwei Theorieströmungen eine zentrale Rolle gespielt: der amerikanische Pragmatismus und die deutsche Tradition des Historismus. Eine Zusammenführung der beiden damals unverbundenen Strömungen, so die These des Bandes, wäre historisch höchst fruchtbar gewesen. Die Autoren zeigen, wie eine vergleichende Bezugnahme noch heute revitalisierend auf die aktuelle Sozialtheorie und die empirischen Forschungsprogramme des Sozialen wirkt.

This book examines how legal causation inference and epidemiological causal inference can be harmonized within the realm of jurisprudence, exploring why legal causation and epidemiological causation differ from each other and defining related problems. The book also discusses how legal justice can be realized and how victims’ rights can be protected. It looks at epidemiological evidence pertaining to causal relationships in cases such as smoking and the development of lung cancer, and enables readers to correctly interpret and rationally use the (...) results of epidemiological studies in lawsuits. The book argues that in today’s risk society, it is no longer possible to thwart the competence of evidence using epidemiological research results. In particular, it points out that the number of cases that struggle to prove a causal relationship excluding those using epidemiological data will lead to an increase in the number of lawsuits for damages that arise as a result of harmful materials that affect our health. The book argues that the responsibility to compensate for damages that have actually occurred must be imputed to a particular party and that this can be achieved by understanding causal inferences between jurisprudence and epidemiology. This book serves as a foundation for students, academics and researchers who have an interest in epidemiology and the law, and those who are keen to discover how jurisprudence can bring these two areas together. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 63 Heft: 3 Seiten: 610-616.

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 96 Heft: 1 Seiten: 334-337.

Alle kulturellen Praktiken sind verkörpert: Ihnen ist die Spannungseinheit von leiblichem Erleben, physischem Tun und kulturellem Sinn eingeschrieben. Von den Kognitions- bis zu den Kulturwissenschaften ist Verkörperung daher mittlerweile ein zentrales Forschungsthema. Der vorgelegte Band widmet sich in interdisziplinärer Perspektive exemplarischen Praktiken und Ritualen des Körpers und will einem drohenden neuen Dualismus zwischen leiblicher und kultureller Verkörperung entgegenwirken. Biologischer Organismus, bewusstes Erleben und kulturelle Traditionen sollen in ihrer Wechselbezüglichkeit hervortreten und damit sichtbar machen, dass „Sinn“ ein Phänomen ist, das die (...) cartesianische Trennung von Geist und Körper unterläuft. (shrink)

Main description: Menschen sind Wesen, die ihr Leben nicht nur führen, sondern es auch erleben. Warum eigentlich? Der Band sucht aus der Perspektive verschiedener natur- und geisteswissenschaftlicher Disziplinen nach Antworten auf diese Frage, in denen das persönliche Erleben und Fühlen als zentrale Komponente unserer Austauschbeziehung mit der sozialen und physischen Umwelt betrachtet wird.

Este artigo tece considerações sobre antinegritude e a distingue do racismo, expondo a falsa universalidade do Social e do Humano: o racismo ocorre no Social entre os Humanos, enquanto a antinegritude continuamente expulsa os negros e a negritude dessas categorias modernas fundamentais cujas definições derivam da expulsão violenta. Para delinear a discussão, o artigo analisa dois textos paradigmáticos que se esforçam para lidar intransigentemente com a antinegritude, mas através da linguagem do racismo: George Yancey, Who Is White? e "The Combahee (...) River Collective Statement." O artigo conclui sugerindo a necessidade de um salto de invenção fanoniano e uma abrangente abolição. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 98 Heft: 2 Seiten: 727-729.