For Philippa Foot, the essence of morality consists in acting on the reasons on which, qua human being, one ought to act; and this ought is one of “natural normativity”—the same ought that also occurs in statements about what a plant or an animal, qua exhibiting a certain form of life, “ought” to be like in various respects, or how its organs “ought” to function. Of this conception Foot avails herself in order to refute the moral sceptic—an undertaking that raises (...) various critical questions, in particular: 1) Is it the naturally normative ought that also occurs in a practical judgement of the form “I ought to F”? If so, how are we to account for what Foot calls the “practicality” of such a judgement? If not, what kind of intelligible step could an agent take, in order to get from a theoretical statement of natural normativity to a practical judgement that ceteris paribus issues in action? 2) Can we understand the validity of every moral requirement in terms of natural normativity, i.e. of a teleological necessity of individuals’ acting well? 3) If we can, will this understanding rely on premises sufficiently certain to justify morality in a sense suggested by Foot’s anti-sceptical considerations?—I argue that “Natural Goodness” does not satisfactorily answer these questions, and conclude by sketching an account of practical moral knowledge that does not seem to provoke them. (shrink)

In Part I of ‘Causality and Determination” (CD), Anscombe writes that (1) we understand causality through understanding specific causal expressions, (2) efficient causation can be perceived, (3) “causality consists in the derivativeness of an effect from its causes”, and 4) no “analysis in terms of necessity or universality” has a place for this. Theses (1) and (2) represent fundamental and important insights. (3) is unsatisfactory; for, taken in a sense that does not already build on the general notion of causation, (...) deriving from does little to elucidate this notion. CD is however right to urge the need to identify a “core, the common feature, of causality in its various kinds”—a kind of criterion, such as the one suggested by Makin (2000), that takes account of (4) in that it is more substantial than, but does not entail, “necessity or universality”. What CD seems to underestimate is the important role of regularities, possibly neither necessary nor exceptionless, for our understanding of the causal relation. Finally, such understanding also requires us, not only to rely on a common criterion of causation, but also on a subjective component of this idea: the consciousness of our own causal agency. Anscombe’s own investigations into non-observational practical knowledge open the door to the study of this aspect of causality. (shrink)

Anselm Müller; VIII*—Mental Teleology, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Pages 161–184, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristote.

Anselm Müller; VIII*—Mental Teleology, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Pages 161–184, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristote.

I am very happy indeed to contribute to this series of lectures, especially because I owe most of my training in philosophy to Elizabeth Anscombe, whose work has given the series its name. I am deeply indebted to the marvellous generosity of her teaching, to the example she set me of an unrelentingly thorough and serious thinker, to the unobtrusive way she introduced me to Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Through Elizabeth Anscombe I also made the acquaintance of my friend Philippa Foot, (...) whose work in moral philosophy has, over decades and more than anyone else's, influenced my own. I hope it will be possible to recognize in what I am going to say here not indeed the excellence but at least traces of the beneficial influence of both these philosophers. (shrink)

Do the virtues, as is often said, conflict with each other? The history of philosophy knows various attempts to conceive of them so as to exclude such conflict. Nicolai Hartmann ("Ethik", 1925) is the most prominent representative "and" critic of this tradition in our century. Each Aristotelian "mean", for him, represents a "synthesis" of "conflicting values"; but only the "one and only virtue" synthesizing "all" values would exclude all tragic conflict. In contrast, the Aristotelian and medieval conception of "connexio virtutum" (...) by "prudence" allows the virtues to "limit each other" and thus be "compatible" without merging into one super-virtue. (shrink)

From Aristotle we can learn how our understanding of human action may profit from a certain way of reading what he has to say about the inherent teleology of cognition. Much as cognition, as such, aims at judging correctly on the basis of suitable reasons , action, as such, aims at doing the right thing for the right reasons . Moreover, one cannot determine whether “the right thing” is being done in a given situation without first determining whether appropriate patterns (...) of motivation would have prompted it in that situation. (shrink)

Es gibt eine normative Verwendung des Wortes "handeln", die nicht das Ausführen von Handlungen thematisiert, sondern beliebiges Tun und Lassen unter einen Bewertungsmaßstab stellt. Charakteristisch ist die Verbindung mit ethisch wertenden Ausdrücken: "gut / schlecht / gerecht … handeln". Hier grenzt "handeln" das, worauf der Begriff sich bezieht, nicht gegen anderes ab, sondern kennzeichnet eine Bewertungsdimension: die ethische. Neben dieser gibt es zwar noch andere Bewertungsdimension. Doch genießt die ethische eine Sonderstellung – wie der Zusammenhang zwischen "gut gehandelt" und "guter (...) Mensch" zeigt.Handeln ist insoweit kein poiesis-, sondern ein praxis-Begriff . Sein telos ist, absichtsunabhängig, das gute Handeln selbst. Dagegen intendiert man in der poiesis über sie hinaus deren telos. Doch ist eine poiesis ihrer Motivation nach zugleich als Handeln bewertbar. In diesem Sinne sind Handlungen, ob man will oder nicht, durch das gute Handeln finalisiert. Handlungstheorie führt somit unweigerlich vor anthropologische und ethische Fragen. (shrink)

From Aristotle we can learn how our understanding of human action may profit from a certain way of reading what he has to say about the inherent teleology of cognition. Much as cognition, as such, aims at judging correctly on the basis of suitable reasons, action, as such, aims at doing the right thing for the right reasons. Moreover, one cannot determine whether “the right thing” is being done in a given situation without first determining whether appropriate patterns of motivation (...) would have prompted it in that situation. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Language, thought, and reality Time, necessity, and causation From experience to self‐consciousness Human action and practical thought Under a description Existence by convention and intention Challenges to contemporary moral philosophy.

Mit diesem Buch geht die analytische Handlungstheorie neue Wege. Statt den von Davidson vorgezeichneten Mustern zu folgen, knüpft der Autor an die aristotelische Unterscheidung von poiesis und praxis an, um die komplexen teleologischen Strukturen menschlichen Handelns zu untersuchen. Als überraschend ergiebiger Leitfaden erweist sich dabei der Begriff der Erziehung. Eine Fülle detaillierter Analysen zeitigt nicht nur anthropologisch und moralphilosophisch bedeutsame Resultate, sondern auch zeitkritische Folgerungen. 'Wie im Bereich der Erziehung, so gewöhnen wir uns auch sonst daran, die Wirklichkeit unseres Handelns (...) mit Kategorien des Hervorbringens zu überziehen und auch da nach Produkten zu suchen, wo es eigentlich um die Qualität des Lebens geht. Angesichts solcher Verirrungen fundamentale Strukturen und Ansprüche praktischer Vernunft erneut zu bedenken, ist heute vielleicht die vornehmste Aufgabe der Handlungsphilosophie.'. (shrink)

Thema des Aufsatzes ist die Ethik der ethischen Debatte. Kuhse und Singer fordern eine unbehinderte Diskussion ihrer These, „daß es unter bestimmten Umständen ethisch gerechtfertigt ist, das Leben mancher schwerstbehinderter Neugeborener zu beenden". Auch eine „Erklärung deutscher Philosophen zur sog. "Singer-Affäre" aus dem Jahr 1989 spricht sich für die öffentliche Diskussion aus. Gegen die Selbstverständlichkeit dieser Forderung ist zu bedenken: 1. Wo grundlegende Gewißheiten aufeinandertreffen, muß zwar nicht die Argumentation, aber doch der Anspruch, durch Argumente zu begründen oder zwingend zu (...) widerlegen, aufgegeben werden; andere Formen der Reaktion widerstreiten daher nicht notwendig der Rationalität. 2. Im Vergleich zur fach-internen birgt die öffentliche Diskussion zusätzliche Rationalitätsrisiken. 3. Die Einstellung zur öffentlichen Diskussion einer grundlegenden moralischen Frage wird unweigerlich von der eigenen Antwort auf diese Frage mitbestimmt. 4. Die Kundgabe einer ethischen Auffassung ist selbst ethisch bewertbar. - Wenn man also die öffentliche Diskussion der Früheuthanasie genauso ablehnt wie z.B. die der Sklaverei, ist diese Intoleranz vertretbar. (shrink)

O autor analisa a validade de uma certa variante do “argumento ontológico" deAnselmo, a saber, a versão lógico-modal de Charles Hartshorne. Ele investiga, primeiramente, a origem dos argumentos de Hartshorne, partindo de uma interpretação de Anselmo; em segundo lugar, o argumento lógico-modal é apresentado, junto com as suas pressuposições e implicações. Finalmente, o autor propõe uma avaliação da abordagem de Hartshorne.

Pohl (Chinese studies, Trier U., Germany) and Muller (philosophy, Trier U.) present 16 contributions penned by U.S., German, Taiwanese, and Chinese scholars that explore the ethical viewpoints of their respective philosophical traditions. The collection is meant to be cross-cultural at the same time as it attends to the political/ideological rifts of the Western and Chinese regions. After exploring theoretical issues of understanding ethics in a global context, the contributors explore ethical and political values for Chinese and Western societies respectively. Final (...) papers offer a more explicitly comparative approach, looking at such ideas as morality and the family, medical ethics, and jurisprudential attitudes towards human rights. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR. (shrink)

This is the first collection of essays devoted to the thought of Anselm W. Müller. It brings to the attention of the English-speaking world an influential and highly regarded philosopher who has made important contributions to a wide range of philosophical debates. The volume begins with a biographical sketch of Müller. Arguably, Müller's most important contributions are to the philosophy of action and virtue ethics. The contributors, which include friends, colleagues, and former students, engage with different (...) aspects of Müller's thought in these areas. Subjects include his interpretation of Aristotle and Wittgenstein, the teleology of thought and action, the Aristotelian distinction between poiesis and praxis and its application to ethical upbringing, and the possibility of practical knowledge and practical truth. Teleological Structures in Human Life will be of interest to researches and advanced students working on virtue ethics, philosophy of action, and practical reasoning. (shrink)

This paper presents a reading of the Tractatus’ remarks on ethics. Drawing on work by Anselm Müller, subsequently developed by Anthony Price, the reading makes of some of Wittgenstein’s most striking and most puzzling early remarks a recognizable and insightful account of ethical experience, while also accommodating the equally striking formal quality of those remarks. The account identifies a distinctive ethical achievement that requires a distance from particular concrete goods that one might pursue and a responsiveness to those (...) goods as a whole—to one’s world as a whole; only through such openness is one open to the abstract objective that is doing what is best; and only through openness to that does one express oneself in, and assume responsibility for, one’s actions. This account allows us to understand why, for example, Wittgenstein connects “absolute or ethical value” with “wonder at the existence of the world” and with “understand[ing] the question about the meaning of life”. But it also makes sense of why that is precisely a question, and why those to whom “the meaning of life … become[s] clear” cannot “say in what this meaning consist[s]”. The responsiveness to a good which ethical subjects distinctively manifest is a responsiveness not to some distinctive and describable state of affairs but to the question of what is best—willing determination of what here and now that is. This account yields a vision of self-expression not as hearkening to some inner voice but as an openness to one’s life as a whole; and this, in turn, opens up a way of approaching the puzzle of Wittgenstein’s insistence that “of [the willing subject] we cannot speak”. I also suggest that we find here one possible sense for Wittgenstein’s famous remark to Ludwig von Ficker that “the point of [the Tractatus] is ethical”, in that openness to the world as a whole—openness to how things are as such and as a whole—emerges as fundamentally a practical, rather than theoretical achievement. (shrink)

The paper aims to clarify the role of the meaning of life in Anselm Müller’s philosophy. Müller says that the ethically good life is the life of acting well, and acting well requires at least a rough conception of the meaning of life, or a conception of what makes a life go well. But why is such a conception required and what does it mean to have such a conception? I argue that such a conception cannot provide (...) us with ultimate ends in our practical deliberations. Nor can its role be merely to provide a standard against which practical reasoning can be assessed. Rather, our conception of the meaning of life is, in the first instance, that which allows us, in our practical reasoning, to see certain considerations as good reasons for certain actions and to weigh reasons for and against different options. One upshot of my interpretation is that Müller should be more optimistic about philosophy’s ability to answer the question of the meaning of life than he allows himself to be. (shrink)

There is, in some quarters, concern about high–level machine intelligence and superintelligent AI coming up in a few decades, bringing with it significant risks for humanity. In other quarters, these issues are ignored or considered science fiction. We wanted to clarify what the distribution of opinions actually is, what probability the best experts currently assign to high–level machine intelligence coming up within a particular time–frame, which risks they see with that development, and how fast they see these developing. We thus (...) designed a brief questionnaire and distributed it to four groups of experts in 2012/2013. The median estimate of respondents was for a one in two chance that high-level machine intelligence will be developed around 2040-2050, rising to a nine in ten chance by 2075. Experts expect that systems will move on to superintelligence in less than 30 years thereafter. They estimate the chance is about one in three that this development turns out to be ‘bad’ or ‘extremely bad’ for humanity. (shrink)

Will future lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), or ‘killer robots’, be a threat to humanity? The European Parliament has called for a moratorium or ban of LAWS; the ‘Contracting Parties to the Geneva Convention at the United Nations’ are presently discussing such a ban, which is supported by the great majority of writers and campaigners on the issue. However, the main arguments in favour of a ban are unsound. LAWS do not support extrajudicial killings, they do not take responsibility away (...) from humans; in fact they increase the abil-ity to hold humans accountable for war crimes. Using LAWS in war would probably reduce human suffering overall. Finally, the availability of LAWS would probably not increase the probability of war or other lethal conflict—especially as compared to extant remote-controlled weapons. The widespread fear of killer robots is unfounded: They are probably good news. (shrink)

The contribution of the body to cognition and control in natural and artificial agents is increasingly described as “off-loading computation from the brain to the body”, where the body is said to perform “morphological computation”. Our investigation of four characteristic cases of morphological computation in animals and robots shows that the ‘off-loading’ perspective is misleading. Actually, the contribution of body morphology to cognition and control is rarely computational, in any useful sense of the word. We thus distinguish (1) morphology that (...) facilitates control, (2) morphology that facilitates perception and the rare cases of (3) morphological computation proper, such as ‘reservoir computing.’ where the body is actually used for computation. This result contributes to the understanding of the relation between embodiment and computation: The question for robot design and cognitive science is not whether computation is offloaded to the body, but to what extent the body facilitates cognition and control – how it contributes to the overall ‘orchestration’ of intelligent behaviour. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the widely held view that Aristotle's vicious agent is a principled follower of a wrong conception of the good whose soul, just like the soul of the virtuous agent, is marked by harmony between his reason and non-rational desires is an exegetical mistake. Rather, Aristotle holds – consistently and throughout the Nicomachean Ethics – that the vicious agent lacks any real principles of action and that his soul lacks unity and harmony even more than (...) the soul of the uncontrolled agent. (shrink)

The philosophy of AI has seen some changes, in particular: 1) AI moves away from cognitive science, and 2) the long term risks of AI now appear to be a worthy concern. In this context, the classical central concerns – such as the relation of cognition and computation, embodiment, intelligence & rationality, and information – will regain urgency.

This paper follows Part I of our essay on case-intensional first-order logic (CIFOL; Belnap and Müller (2013)). We introduce a framework of branching histories to take account of indeterminism. Our system BH-CIFOL adds structure to the cases, which in Part I formed just a set: a case in BH-CIFOL is a moment/history pair, specifying both an element of a partial ordering of moments and one of the total courses of events (extending all the way into the future) that that (...) moment is part of. This framework allows us to define the familiar Ockhamist temporal/modal connectives, most notably for past, future, and settledness. The novelty of our framework becomes visible in our discussion of substances in branching histories, i.e., in its first-order part. That discussion shows how the basic idea of tracing an individual thing from case to case via an absolute property is applicable in a branching histories framework. We stress the importance of keeping apart extensionality and moment-definiteness, and give a formal account of how the specification of natural sortals and natural qualities turns out to be a coordination task in BH-CIFOL. We also provide a detailed answer to Lewis’s well-known argument against branching histories, exposing the fallacy in that argument. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Der (un)teilbare Geist" verfügbar.

While the consequences of mathematically-based software, algorithms and strategies have become ever wider and better appreciated, ethical reflection on mathematics has remained primitive. We review the somewhat disconnected suggestions of commentators in recent decades with a view to piecing together a coherent approach to ethics in mathematics. Calls for a Hippocratic Oath for mathematicians are examined and it is concluded that while lessons can be learned from the medical profession, the relation of mathematicians to those affected by their work is (...) significantly different. There is something to be learned also from the codes of conduct of cognate but professionalised quantitative disciplines such as engineering and accountancy, as well as from legal principles bearing on professional work. We conclude with recommendations that professional societies in mathematics should sponsor an (international) code of ethics, institutional mission statements for mathematicians and syllabuses of ethics courses for incorporation into mathematics degrees. (shrink)