Michael Lewin geht es in seinem Buch um die Vernunft als ein wohlbegründetes und in zeitgenössischen Kontexten fortführbares Forschungsprogramm. Dabei handelt es sich um eine Theorienreihe zu vielfältigen Arten und Funktionen der Ideen, mit deren Hilfe die Vernunft das Verstehen und Wollen steuert und selbstreflexiv wird. Dazu entwickelt der Autor unter dem Stichpunkt „reflektierter Perspektivismus“ das Programm einer perspektivistischen Metaphilosophie, die den Hintergrundparametern forschungsprogrammatische Festlegungen (in Anlehnung an Imre Lakatos), Ansprüche und (Wissens-)Ziele hinter den philosophischen Positionierungen nachspürt und dadurch (...) ihre Grenzen und Möglichkeiten offenlegt. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 34.4 (2001) 335-342 [Access article in PDF] "Dispersing the Cogito: A Response to Vivian's Rhetorical Self" Philip Lewin Bradford Vivian ("The Threshold of the Self," Philosophy and Rhetoric 33. 4: 303-18), in seeking to disrupt the cogito, claims that acts of creative self-constitution by a "rhetorical self" become possible as subjectivity is dispersed across subject positions. However, the apparent ability of the rhetorical self to (...) freely choose which positions it will inhabit, as well as its apparent capacity to undergo subjectification without being marked by its habitation of those positions, seem to reintroduce several of the cogito's essential features.Vivian argues that "there is a historicity to our being and its expression, to our subjectivity and its elaboration" (303). His essay provides a clear and cogent account of how subjectivity might arise as the result of a series of rhetorical acts whose audience is the self. One's self, then, is a local and ongoing aesthetic formation, continually becoming and coming into being; to the extent that the aesthetic nature of this process is produced by persuading one's self to adopt some styles of life over others, then this process is a thoroughly persuasive phenomenon. The aesthetic composition molded by this continually renewed persuasion might best be described as the rhetorical self. (312; emphasis in original) Vivian clears away a good deal of the underbrush that often prevents us from getting a hold on the problematics of selfhood and subjectivity. I find much that is praiseworthy in the essay, particulary its explication of the contingent and shifting nature of the processes through which the self is formed and reformed. But there is a key theoretical elision in Vivian's argument that does much to restore the legitimacy of the Cartesian cogito that he is at pains to disrupt. The result is a model of self that revises Cartesianism by dispersing subjectivity among various subject positions, [End Page 335] but that, in a number of other important ways, preserves essential features of the cogito, as though each fragment of the dispersed cogito were itself a complete mini-cogito.Vivian's account elides the rhetorical process of self-formation. In a typical passage at the end of the essay, he comments, "In order to compose and cultivate one's being in the world, one must persuade one's self to choose and orchestrate certain styles of life from among those available into an entire aesthetics of being" (316-17). The questions this claim provokes are: How does this process of self-persuasion actually take place? What aspect or agency of psyche is doing the persuading? To conceive of the self as Vivian does--a self "conceived as a form--a rhetorical form--that exists only in its continual aesthetic creation, in its indefinite becoming" (304)--suggests a kind of autonomy and self-transparency in self-formation that has discouragingly Cartesian overtones.The terms with which Vivian has chosen to work, namely, subjectivity and the rhetorical self, do not address these issues of self-persuasion. Instead, they serve to mask them. Subjectivity, for Vivian, refers to the positions the self finds itself assuming within discursive regimes, positions whose formation entails moments both of self-persuasion and of subjection to existing social exigency. Subjectivity (so conceived) has the property of being an effect of multiple acts of subjectification, of voluntary acquiescence to preexisting subject positions. "Discourse creates subjects by first creating subject positions from which to speak" (313). The subject is not original, but rather follows from "an entire 'assemblage' of subject positions that are the willful creation of no one, but are instead formed by the complex operations of discourse" (313). The theoretical difficulty with this way of accounting for subjectivity lies in its elision of agency; how shall we make sense of the rhetorical self? More specifically, how does a necessary immersion into discursive practices couple with rhetorical acts of self-persuasion? What motivates self-persuasion? Are all the factors involved in self-persuasion fully conscious and under voluntary control? If not, how are we... (shrink)

L’objet de cet article est de se demander comment les assistantes sociales de l’entre-deux-guerres envisagent les enjeux de la relation de care qui les lie aux usagers des services sociaux. Les assistantes ont en effet un rôle double : prendre soin des familles populaires mais aussi les surveiller et les contrôler. Comment concilient-elles ces impératifs paradoxaux en cherchant la « bonne distance » avec leur public? Pour répondre à cette question, nous nous tournons vers les archives de la formation professionnelle. (...) En effet, les écoles de service social contribuent à définir les attentes de la relation de care et à établir le cadre dans lequel prennent place ces interactions. Nous nous penchons dans un premier temps sur le discours de la vocation chez les postulantes au métier d’assistante, puis sur la manière dont la formation professionnelle régule ces aspirations. Nous concluons sur la force de la notion de care, qui permet de penser l’imbrication entre rapports de domination et bienveillance envers autrui. (shrink)

In Lewin et al. 359–386) the authors proved that certain systems of annotated logics are algebraizable in the sense of Block and Rigozzi 396). Later in Lewin et al. the study of the associated quasi-varieties of annotated algebras is initiated. In this paper we continue the study of the these classes of algebras, in particular, we report some recent results about the free annotated algebras.

In the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant searched for a universal concept of reason different from the understanding and offered the short formula “the faculty of principles”. I will argue that this is only one and not the most pertinent and general mark of the concept of reason. There are more compelling short expressions in Kant’s Reflexionen, the third Critique and/or in the reception of Kant’s works: “the faculty of ideas” or reason in the narrower sense. The latter narrows down the logical (...) sphere of the concept of rational faculties, and the former contains reason’s most basic mark: ideas. The first part of this article will focus on preliminary remarks on Kant’s philosophical methodology and conceptual analysis. The second part will analyze the division of the logical sphere of the concept of reason by nine necessary and coherent marks. These marks are centered around the concept of ideas, which allows for an ideas-first understanding of reason and preference for the formulas the faculty of ideas and reason in the narrower sense. The article will end with an “imperfect definition” of reason based on those nine marks. (shrink)

The standardization of the display of intimacy implies that transparency is normalized in the information society. Social practices are bringing the idea of emancipation to the technological field. This carries significant but unquestioned socio-political expectations that are associated with powerful cybercompanies. Byung-Chul Han treats these issues in his political texts. He argues that transparency is a neoliberal device which does not help solve the problems of citizenship, and it even involves a “depoliticization”. My intention is to carry out a critical (...) review of his texts, and highlight their convergences with other authors dedicated to the philosophy of technology. (shrink)

I argue that Kant has developed a broad systematic account of the architectonic functionality of pure reason that can be used and advanced in contemporary contexts. Reason, in the narrow sense, is responsible for the picture of a well-ordered universe of science consisting of architectonic ideas of science, sciences and parts of sciences. In the first section (I), I show what Kant means by the architectonic ideas by explaining and interrelating the concepts of (a) the faculty of reason, (b) ideas (...) (as principles), (c) method, and (d) sciences of reason. Thereafter (II), I think through his holistic understanding of science and scientific progress and suggest differentiating between four levels of use of architectonic ideas, drawing on the metaphor of a well-structured universe as imagined by Kant in his work on the Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens. I also claim that each possible idea of reason can be (apart from its primary function) additionally regarded as a fourth-level architectonic concept when explicitly conceived as an object of (e. g. philosophical) studies, i. e. from a mere methodological perspective. In the final section (III), I unveil the potential of Kant’s theory by pointing out how this architectonic methodological function of pure reason is tacitly used in Karl-Otto Apel’s contemporary philosophical research programme. You can get the official version of the paper and the whole issue (open access) by clicking on the attached link. (shrink)

Transcendental philosophy was not born like Athena out of Zeus’s head, mature and in full armour from the very beginning. That is why in both prefaces to the Critique of Pure Reason (1781 and 1787) Kant introduces the concept of transcendental philosophy as an “idea.” The idea understood architectonically develops slowly and only gradually acquires a definite form. As witnessed by the works of Kant himself and of his predecessors and followers, the idea of transcendental philosophy has undergone a series (...) of changes and adjustments compared to the initial plan. In this context, my goal is not simply exegesis and historical investigation of transcendental philosophy, but also to look at it from a systematic and methodological perspective. I examine the concept of transcendental philosophy from the viewpoint of programmatic metaphilosophy. The first part discusses programmatics as a distinct subsection of metaphilosophy. I argue that Kant’s architectonic methodology and the methodology of Lakatos can be used to understand the inception, development and degradation of philosophical systems. In the second part I look at the project of transcendental philosophy and the stages of its development from the standpoint of architectonics. The third part shows that Lakatos’s methodology can provide a detailed insight into the elements of transcendental philosophy, a clear idea of its logic and identify the component parts that can be improved and developed. In spite of the different levels of detailing and epistemological prerequisites, the methodologies of Kant and Lakatos can be combined to achieve a metaphilosophically informed and progressive understanding of philosophical projects. (shrink)

La aparición y difusión pandémica del virus SARS-CoV-2 ha evidenciado que el sistema tecnocientífico de investigación, desarrollo, innovación y difusión presenta problemas de previsibilidad, de gestión de riesgos y un alto nivel de incertidumbre. Este trabajo analiza el proceso de producción, gestión y difusión del conocimiento centrándose en los modos y medios tecnocientíficos y sociales de información y comunicación científica sobre la COVID-19. Para ello, en primer lugar, se ha realizado un análisis de los déficits del modelo tecnocientífico de producción (...) y gestión del conocimiento durante la crisis de la COVID-19. En segundo lugar, se ha estudiado el tratamiento y difusión de información en los nuevos modos de información y comunicación social donde se ha generado una circunstancia de infoxicación. En tercer lugar, para evaluar si está teniendo lugar una efectiva comunicación y discusión entre las comunidades científicas, se ha realizado un estudio bibliométrico a partir de los datos de la Web of Science sobre la publicación de resultados de investigación desde 2020 en relación con el virus, su enfermedad y tratamiento. (shrink)

Over the last two decades there has been a growing interest in the transcendental dialectic of Critique of Pure Reason in Germany. Authors, however, often do not pay enough attention to the fact that Kant’s theory of reason (in the narrow sense) and the concept of ideas derived from it is not limited to this text. The purpose of this article is to compare and analyze the functionality of mind as a subjective ability developed by Kant and Fichte with the (...) Hegelian expansion of the mind to the idea of universal rationality. The relevance of such a comparison is connected with the need to demonstrate how the Hegelian paradigm of absolute rationality causes either the subsequent rejection of reason as a philosophical principle in the 19th and´20th centuries counter-discourse, or reduction of reason to the concept of pragmatic rationality. In the first part of this paper, the author intends to differentiate between at least 7 different types of ideas and their functions in Kant’s works. In the second part, he demonstrates how Fichte tries to systematize them beginning with reason, which at first creates an idea of itself. Special attention is paid to the way that Fichte categorizes them with the help of 5 spheres of action or 5 worldviews. The third and final part of the article discusses how Hegel goes beyond the frame of the transcendental philosophy of consciousness using different demands linked to the concepts of “reason” and “ideas”. Although these requirements are not found in Kant and Fichte, they entail a set of difficulties, which the author considers in conclusion. The author’s interpretation of the theory of ideas and their functions in Kant, Fichte and Hegel demonstrates the dynamic character of the theories of reason in classical German philosophy, as well as the relevance of the 7 types of ideas that retain their significance for philosophy of the 21st century. Keywords: Kant and German idealism, types of ideas, functions of reason, worldviews, the problem of different demands. В Германии на протяжении последних двух десятилетий возрос интерес к трансцендентальной диалектике «Критики чистого разума». Однако авторы часто не обращают внимания на то, что кантовская теория разума (в узком смысле), в которой разворачивается работа с идеями, не ограничивается этим текстом. Целью данной статьи является сравнительный анализ разработанной Кантом и Фихте функциональности разума как субъективной способности с гегелевским расширением разума до идеи всеобщей разумности. Актуальность такого сравнения связана с необходимостью продемонстрировать то, каким образом гегелевская парадигма абсолютной разумности вызывает либо последующий отказ от разума как философского принципа в контрдискурсе XIX–XX вв., либо редукцию разума к понятию прагматической рациональности. В первой части данной статьи вводится различение по меньшей мере семи различных видов идей и связанных с ними функций в философии Канта. Во второй части демонстрируется попытка Фихте их систематизировать исходя из утверждения том, что разум должен сначала создать идею о самом себе. Проанализировано также предложенное Фихте распределение идей на пять сфер действенности или типов мировоззрения. В третьей, итоговой части статьи рассмотрен выход гегелевской мысли за рамки трансцендентальной философии сознания. Автор статьи связывает этот процесс с выдвижением не осуществимых в контексте философии Канта и Фихте требований к понятиям «разум» и «идея» и анализирует ряд сложностей, вызванных этими требованиями. Таким образом, интерпретация учения об идеях и их функциях у Канта, Фихте и Гегеля демонстрирует динамический характер теорий разума в классической немецкой философии и актуальность семи видов идей, которые сохраняют свое значение для философии XXI в. Ключевые слова: Кант и немецкий идеализм, виды идей, функции разума, мировоззрение, проблема различных требований. (shrink)

RESUMEN Se indaga el problema de la explotación técnica del mundo a partir de los pensamientos de Xavier Zubiri y Georges Canguilhem. Se examina el análisis zubiriano de la inteligencia humana y la tesis de Canguilhem sobre la originalidad de la actividad técnica, su relación con la ciencia y su papel en la normatividad del organismo. En ambos autores, el término Umwelt, traducido como "circun-mundo" o medio de comportamiento propio, sirve como base para establecer las posibilidades que tiene la técnica (...) en el desarrollo de nuevas formas de relación con el medio ambiente. ABSTRACT The paper inquires into the problem of the technological exploitation of the world on the basis of Xavier Zubiri's and Georges Canguilhem's thought. It examines Zubiri's analysis of human intelligence and Canguilhem's thesis regarding the primordial nature of technological activity, its relation to science, and its role in the normativity of the organism. In both authors, the term Umwelt, translated as "surrounding-world" or behavioral environment, serves as the basis to establish the possibilities of technology in developing new forms of relationship with the environment. (shrink)

Este ensayo se propone mirar el escenario teatral "culto" del teatro independiente y el escenario del teatro comunitario argentino en su articulación con la crisis/rebelión del 2001. Mientras el primero exhibe la desintegración y devaluación social del momento, en el teatro comunitario aparece más bien la recomposición de los lazos sociales y la resistencia política tanto desde su organización como en algunas de sus escenas. Con teatralidades muy distintas, las dos escenas son respuestas al momento histórico-político. El primero se limita (...) a exponer el problema, el segundo busca el mantenimiento de la vida y de la resistencia en comunidad. El ensayo propone que la diferencia se podría deber a que el escenario "culto" se aferra a la filosofía posmoderna en boga y a sus tesis devaluadoras del lenguaje, la narración y el futuro de la historia. (shrink)

H. E. Longino maintains ('Scientific Objectivity and the Logics of Science?, Inquiry, Vol. 26 [1983], pp. 85?106) that scientific objectivity is constituted jointly by the intersubjective criticism and corroboration of the community of scientists, and by ?the formal requirement of demonstrable evidential relevance . . . independent of and external to any particular research program or scientific theory?. Not only do these two constituents of objectivity seem incompatible, but several additional problems arise from her account, the main one of which (...) is her failure to recognize that background assumptions are of several kinds, operative on several levels. An alternative version of objectivity, grounded in Heidegger's analytic of Dasein, is briefly offered. (shrink)

Based on evidence that learning new characters through handwriting leads to better recognition than learning through typing, some authors proposed that the graphic motor plans acquired through handwriting contribute to recognition. More recently two alternative explanations have been put forward. First, the advantage of handwriting could be due to the perceptual variability that it provides during learning. Second, a recent study suggests that detailed visual analysis might be the source of the advantage of handwriting over typing. Indeed, in that study, (...) handwriting and composition –a method requiring a detailed visual analysis but no specific graphomotor activity– led to equivalent recognition accuracy, both higher than typing. The aim of the present study was to assess whether the contribution of detailed visual analysis is observed in preschool children and to test the variability hypothesis. To that purpose, three groups of preschool children learned new symbols either by handwriting, typing, or composition. After learning, children performed first a four-alternative recognition task and then a categorization task. The same pattern of results as the one observed in adults emerged in the four-alternative recognition task, confirming the importance of the detailed visual analysis in letter-like shape learning. In addition, results failed to reveal any difference across learning methods in the categorization task. The latter results provide no evidence for the variability hypothesis which would predict better categorization after handwriting than after typing or composition. (shrink)

RESUMEN Se muestra cómo la "inteligencia sentiente", en sus elementos "noológicos", adquiere cierto carácter "técnico" primario y constitutivo que se despliega en el logos y en la razón de manera individual, social e histórica. En la aprehensión primordial de la realidad se juega la viabilidad misma del hombre en su estar siendo en el mundo como animal humano, donde lo "técnico" juega un papel relevante. En los elementos noológicos primarios de la aprehensión primordial se hallan los cimientos de los que (...) surge la "técnica", que no es entonces elemento accesorio, sino parte constitutiva del hacerse cargo de la realidad. ABSTRACT The paper shows how "sentient intelligence", in its noological elements, acquires a certain primary and constitutive "technological" character that is deployed individually, socially, and historically in logos and reason. The very viability of man's being in the world as a human animal is at stake in the primordial apprehension of reality, and the "technological" plays a relevant role here. It is in the primary noological elements of primordial apprehension that we find the bases for the emergence of "technology", which would then be not an accessory element, but a constitutive part of taking charge of reality. (shrink)

In the later Fichte the reflection splits the world into a fivefoldness of its possible view. To get through all the a priori arranged levels from sensuality to the Doctrine of Science means to use up all the possibilities of the views of the world. I will examine whether Fichte can offer us a direct proof of completeness of the standpoints or at least show indirectly that there must be exactly five of them. Which answer would he give us if (...) we argued that history, skepticism and nonentity could complement the array? -/- Keywords Fivefoldness-worldviews-completeness-proof-history-skepticism -/- Die Reflexion spaltet nach Fichte die Welt in eine Fünffachheit ihrer möglichen Ansicht. Das Durchlaufen der a priori geordneten Stufen von der Sinnlichkeit bis zur Wissenschaftslehre stellt zugleich ein Ausschöpfen der Möglichkeiten dar, sich zur Welt zu verhalten. Ich werde prüfen, ob Fichte uns einen direkten Beweis der Vollständigkeit der Standpunkte geben oder zumindest indirekt dafür argumentieren kann, dass es genau fünf sein müssen. Was würde er uns antworten, wenn wir behaupteten, die Geschichte, der Skeptizismus und die Nullität könnten die Reihe ergänzen? -/- Schlüsselbegriffe Fünffachheit-Weltansichten-Vollständigkeit-Beweis-Geschichte-Skeptizismus. (shrink)

This text links from the biographical and intimate of Nietzsche to the deepest of his thought of the eternal return, because it is the only way to understand this thought of eternal return. And for this, certain of Nietzsche’s biographical milestones are discussed in the light of the work Thus Spoke Zarathustra and its link to Lou Salomé. We look at how Lou Salomé lies behind the mythical figure of Ariadne as the bearer of the ring of return; that is, (...) through the feminine, Nietzsche shows us how the eternal return operates to free us from the chains of modernity. (shrink)

While corporate social responsibility (CSR) is expected to benefit the firm and attract employees, few have examined the effects of CSR on employees outside of work. Extending the organizational citizenship literature, we conceptualize employee engagement in CSR at work and outside of work as a form of “societal citizenship behavior.” Across two studies of working adults, we examine the relationship between identification with an employer that engages in CSR and different forms of employee societal citizenship behaviors (e.g., donations, volunteering) outside (...) of work. In Study 1 (N = 430 employees), we focus upon CSR donation programs and find that identification with an employer that engages in CSR and participating in employer CSR donation programs affect employee citizenship behavior (donations) outside of work. In Study 2 (N = 285 employees), we examine a broader set of citizenship behaviors inside and outside of work and find the relationships hold. Identification with an employer that engages in CSR relates positively to citizenship behavior at work and outside of work. In total, our study results suggest that employer CSR affects employee citizenship behaviors outside of work. We end with directions for future research. (shrink)

Este artículo muestra varios detalles para entender la compleja figura de Ariadna en el pensamiento de Nietzsche, pero que va más allá del autor alemán y se sumerge en ciertos momentos de Ariadna, desde lo etimológico a Otto pasando por Ovidio y Catulo, para dar cuenta de una Ariadna que es la compañera del dios Diónysos y que en cierta forma posibilita la propia verdad del dios; lo que Nietzsche llamaría “eterno retorno”.

In the current dialogue between two authors with different views on analysis, philosophy, and the use of labels, the leading question is: How should one understand the expression ‘analytic philosophy’? Lewin argues that as there are no generally agreed tenets and methods of what is being called ‘analytic philosophy’, the name is to be replaced by a more specific one or abandoned. Williamson defends the use of this phrase, claiming that it is quite serviceable, as it relates to a (...) broad tradition of influence, while it is not even required to adhere to the method of analysis in any distinctive sense. Lewin counters that, in this case, ‘analytic philosophy’ is too empty. One could heal this by conceptual analysis of ‘analytic philosophy’ — but then Kant, for whom philosophy is inherently analytic, would be a proponent of analytic philosophy. Another option is to follow Ryle’s ideal of a label-free, coherent and honest thinking. As Lewin argues, Williamson’s views seem at least partially to agree with Kant’s conception of the difference between philosophy and history of philosophy as well as empirical analysis and the underlying empirical realism. Williamson replies that he uses ‘analytic philosophy’ in its current meaning, which is not composed of the meanings of ‘analytic’ and ‘philosophy’. The current use is different from the earlier ones and not applicable to Kant. He argues against the transcendental idealism and the coarse-grained distinction between analytic and synthetic and a priori and a posteriori that requires an update. (shrink)

This article reflects on how the issue of the Real allows us to rethink the human of today in a more complete and up-to-date way. And for this purpose, two apparently dissimilar perspectives of understanding the Real are discussed: that of the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek, which is rooted in Lacan’s psychoanalysis, and that of the Spanish philosopher Xavier Zubiri, which is born from a deep critical dialogue with Heidegger’s ontology. This paper will show the unity of two visions of (...) the Real that lie at the heart of what is human and that allow us to criticize certain very influential psychoanalytic thought, centred on Jacques-Alain Miller, which cannot account for what is happening to us radically in the current era, or, perhaps, in any era. (shrink)

Se muestra cómo la “inteligencia sentiente”, en sus elementos “noológicos”, adquiere cierto carácter “técnico” primario y constitutivo que se despliega en el logos y en la razón de manera individual, social e histórica. En la aprehensión primordial de la realidad se juega la viabilidad misma del hombre en su estar siendo en el mundo como animal humano, donde lo “técnico” juega un papel relevante. En los elementos noológicos primarios de la aprehensión primordial se hallan los cimientos de los que surge (...) la “técnica”, que no es entonces elemento accesorio, sino parte constitutiva del hacerse cargo de la realidad. (shrink)

This article grapples with Robert Brandom’s account of singular terms. I argue that neither Brandom’s answer to the question “What are singular terms?” nor his answer to the question “Why are there any singular terms?” works as they currently stand. Brandom’s substitution-inferential semantic account of what singular terms are fails to distinguish between the semantic role of singular terms and indefinite descriptions, and Brandom’s “expressive transcendental deduction” for why there are any singular terms fails to deciseively show that singular terms (...) are expressively necessary for the use of logical vocabulary. Still, I then characterize how Brandom does have resources within his substitution-inferential semantics to give a better, revised answer to the question “What are singular terms?” that both fits programmatically within his framework and has a curious Kantian parallel. I leave the matter offering a Brandom-friendly replacement account for why there are any singular terms thus conceived for another occasion. (shrink)

Lo que este artículo busca es pensar el problema filosófico existencial que se volvió, después de la filosofía de Nietzsche, el tema de Dios como Fundamento a comienzos del siglo XX a la luz de dos grandes pensadores: Heidegger y Zubiri. Por medio de la crisis de fe de Zubiri podemos barruntar lo que le sucedía a toda una época a comienzos de siglo y cómo fue necesaria otra filosofía, la de Heidegger, para poder repensar y vivir la experiencia del (...) Fundamento. What this article looks is to think the philosophical existential problem that turned, after Nietzsche’s philosophy, the God's topic since I Base at the beginning of the 20th century in the light of two big thinkers: Heidegger and Zubiri. By means of the crisis of Zubiri’s faith we can feel what was happening to him to the whole epoch at the beginning of century and how another philosophy was necessary, that of Heidegger, to be able to rethink and live through the experience of the Foundation. (shrink)

Eine Untersuchung zu Nietzsches Kritik am Deutschen Idealismus im Rahmen seiner allgemeinen Idealismuskritik und seiner Lehre vom Willen zur Macht.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 34.4 (2001) 335-342 [Access article in PDF] "Dispersing the Cogito: A Response to Vivian's Rhetorical Self" Philip Lewin Bradford Vivian ("The Threshold of the Self," Philosophy and Rhetoric 33. 4: 303-18), in seeking to disrupt the cogito, claims that acts of creative self-constitution by a "rhetorical self" become possible as subjectivity is dispersed across subject positions. However, the apparent ability of the rhetorical self to (...) freely choose which positions it will inhabit, as well as its apparent capacity to undergo subjectification without being marked by its habitation of those positions, seem to reintroduce several of the cogito's essential features.Vivian argues that "there is a historicity to our being and its expression, to our subjectivity and its elaboration" (303). His essay provides a clear and cogent account of how subjectivity might arise as the result of a series of rhetorical acts whose audience is the self. One's self, then, is a local and ongoing aesthetic formation, continually becoming and coming into being; to the extent that the aesthetic nature of this process is produced by persuading one's self to adopt some styles of life over others, then this process is a thoroughly persuasive phenomenon. The aesthetic composition molded by this continually renewed persuasion might best be described as the rhetorical self. (312; emphasis in original) Vivian clears away a good deal of the underbrush that often prevents us from getting a hold on the problematics of selfhood and subjectivity. I find much that is praiseworthy in the essay, particulary its explication of the contingent and shifting nature of the processes through which the self is formed and reformed. But there is a key theoretical elision in Vivian's argument that does much to restore the legitimacy of the Cartesian cogito that he is at pains to disrupt. The result is a model of self that revises Cartesianism by dispersing subjectivity among various subject positions, [End Page 335] but that, in a number of other important ways, preserves essential features of the cogito, as though each fragment of the dispersed cogito were itself a complete mini-cogito.Vivian's account elides the rhetorical process of self-formation. In a typical passage at the end of the essay, he comments, "In order to compose and cultivate one's being in the world, one must persuade one's self to choose and orchestrate certain styles of life from among those available into an entire aesthetics of being" (316-17). The questions this claim provokes are: How does this process of self-persuasion actually take place? What aspect or agency of psyche is doing the persuading? To conceive of the self as Vivian does--a self "conceived as a form--a rhetorical form--that exists only in its continual aesthetic creation, in its indefinite becoming" (304)--suggests a kind of autonomy and self-transparency in self-formation that has discouragingly Cartesian overtones.The terms with which Vivian has chosen to work, namely, subjectivity and the rhetorical self, do not address these issues of self-persuasion. Instead, they serve to mask them. Subjectivity, for Vivian, refers to the positions the self finds itself assuming within discursive regimes, positions whose formation entails moments both of self-persuasion and of subjection to existing social exigency. Subjectivity (so conceived) has the property of being an effect of multiple acts of subjectification, of voluntary acquiescence to preexisting subject positions. "Discourse creates subjects by first creating subject positions from which to speak" (313). The subject is not original, but rather follows from "an entire 'assemblage' of subject positions that are the willful creation of no one, but are instead formed by the complex operations of discourse" (313). The theoretical difficulty with this way of accounting for subjectivity lies in its elision of agency; how shall we make sense of the rhetorical self? More specifically, how does a necessary immersion into discursive practices couple with rhetorical acts of self-persuasion? What motivates self-persuasion? Are all the factors involved in self-persuasion fully conscious and under voluntary control? If not, how are we... (shrink)

In this paper a first order theory for the logics defined through literal paraconsistent-paracomplete matrices is developed. These logics are intended to model situations in which the ground level information may be contradictory or incomplete, but it is treated within a classical framework. This means that literal formulas, i.e. atomic formulas and their iterated negations, may behave poorly specially regarding their negations, but more complex formulas, i.e. formulas that include a binary connective are well behaved. This situation may and does (...) appear for instance in data bases. (shrink)

This book seeks to re-examine the period, to unravel some of the confusion by setting out the historical background of Jung’s ideas, and provide a fresh debate on Jung and his collective theory.