This book discusses Henry Odera Oruka's sage philosophy, rethinking it in light of recent debates in African philosophy and African Studies. The chapters engage perspectives from anthropology, literature, and postcolonial scholarship, questioning and exploring the relevance of sage philosophy for current challenges, including decolonialization.

In einer kühnen Metapher haben einst Hieronymus, Erasmus und Luther die Heilige Schrift als ein Labyrinth bezeichnet, das die Leser bei fortgesetztem Lesen in eine sich sogar steigernde Verwirrung stürze. Beinah im selben Atemzug wird eben dieselbe Heilige Schrift von eben denselben Autoren als der einzige Faden gepriesen, der die Leser aus dem Labyrinth ihres Lebens herausführe. Eines und dasselbe als Labyrinth und als Faden: Diese Figur ist paradigmatisch. Im Labyrinth der Ethik geht es nicht anders zu. Nur wer sich (...) ihm überläßt, findet aus ihm heraus. 24 Beiträge von namhaften Theologen und Theologinnen zur Theologischen Ethik finden sich in den fünf Abschnitten des vorliegenden Buches, das nacheinander "Biblische Grundlagen", "Theologische Systematik", "Ethische Modelle", "Ethische Leitbegriffe" und "Ethik und die Religionen" behandelt: Hans-Dieter Bastian: Zwischen Glauben und Handeln: Bibel-Lesen - Werner H. Schmidt: Glaube und Handeln. Aspekte des Alten Testaments - Wolfgang Schrage: Der 1. Korintherbrief als Paradigma paulinischer Ethik - Michael Wolter: Der Kompromiß bei Paulus - Jörg Haustein: Beobachtungen zum Schriftverständnis ökumenischer Dokumente - Gerhard Sauter: "Schrifttreue" in ethischer Urteilsbildung Günter Bader: Handeln im Namen Gottes - Erich Gräßer: Die ersten und die letzten Dinge. Bemerkungen zur theologischen und ethischen Schöpfungswahrnehmung - Marcin Hintz: Glaube, Tradition, Vernunft: Auf den Spuren theologischer Urteilsbildung im polnischen Protestantismus - Rolf Schäfer: Christliche Glaubens- und Sittenlehre bei Schleiermacher - Karl-Wilhelm Dahm: Herausforderungen für Selbstverständnis und Rolle des protestantischen Pfarrers im Zuge des Modernisierungsprozesses Traugott Jähnichen: Sozialethik auf dem Weg der Ausbildung von Bereichsethiken - Historische Traditionen und perspektivische Herausforderungen - Ulrich Eibach: Christengemeinde und christliches Leben und Handeln in der pluralistischen Gesellschaft - Ludger Honnefelder: Gesundheit unser "höchstes Gut"? Wertentscheidungen im Rahmen der Ressourcenallokation im Gesundheitswesen - Jörg Hübner: Kollektives Handeln im Zeitalter der Globalisierung. Perspektiven für eine zukünftige politische Ethik - Gottfried Hütter: Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte für Tiere? - Tobias Schlingensiepen: Adam, wo bist du? Die Entkontextualisierung menschlichen Lebens als Problem u. Herausforderung evangelischer Ethik Edgar Thaidigsmann: "Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben". Das Problem der Begründung einer Ethik der Verantwortung für das Lebendige bei Albert Schweitzer und Hans Jonas - Konrad Stock: Laster - der "vielnamige Frevel". Eine theologische Erinnerung an ein vergessenes Problem - Ulrich H. J. Körtner: Bildung und Wertebewußtsein. Anmerkungen zum Wertbegriff in der aktuellen Bildungsdiskussion - Hans G. Ulrich: Güter oder Werte? Zur Aufgabe der Theoriebildung in der evangelischen Sozialethik - Hartmut Kreß: Toleranz als Verpflichtung protestantischer Ethik Hans Waldenfels: Unterwegs zu einer interreligiösen Theologie - Sung-Hee Lee-Linke: Interreligiöse Ethik. Ein Modell für die Zukunft? (shrink)

'Myth has not been really vanquished and subjugated. It is always there, lurking in the dark and waiting for its hour and opportunity' Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the StateAs a central part of his philosophy of symbolic forms as a form of religious expression, and as a political problematic the question of myth belongs at the heart of Ernst Cassirer's intellectual enterprise. Using a variety of methodological and conceptual approaches, these papers examine the persistence of myth as a symbolic (...) form from a variety of perspectives: philosophical, anthropological, psychological, political, and historico-cultural. In its way each paper attempts, in Cassirer's phrase, to 'see the adversary face to face'.The contributors to this volume are Paul Bishop, Alan Cardew, Milad Doueihi, Dina Gusejnova, Cyrus Hamlin, Stefanie Hölscher, Kai Kresse, John Michael Krois, Barbara Naumann, Detlev Pätzold, Martine Prange, Birgit Recki, Edward Skidelsky, Roger Stephenson and Jonathan Westwood. (shrink)

I offer a fresh interpretation of the dialectical strategy of Physics 2.8’s arguments that things in nature happen for the sake of something. Whereas many recent interpreters have concluded that these arguments inevitably beg the question against Aristotle’s opponents, I argue that they constitute a careful attempt to build common ground with an opponent who rejects Aristotle’s basic worldview. This common ground, first articulated in the famous Winter Rain Argument, takes the form of an intriguing pattern of reasoning: that natural (...) proceedings that happen in a given manner always or for the most part do not do so by chance. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 61.2 (2000) 263-283 [Access article in PDF] Contesting Metaphors and the Discourse of Consciousness in William James Jill M. Kress Ah, not to be cut off,not by such slight partitionto be excluded from the stars' measure.What is inwardness?What if not sky intensified,flung through with birds and deepwith winds of homecoming? --Rainer Maria Rilke William James's lifelong attention to questions about human mental (...) experience elucidates the development of the concept of consciousness through its realization in fields as disparate as natural science, radical empiricism, and religious mysticism. 1 Over the course of a career that both establishes and traverses disciplinary boundaries, James's work embodies tensions between scientific explanations for mental phenomena and the inescapability of metaphysical arguments. Jamesian psychology thus alternates between materialist and spiritualist assumptions of scientists and philosophers at the turn of the century, joining their compulsive investigations into the nature of consciousness. 2 Most readers [End Page 263] of James puzzle over the theoretical contradictions within his work, debating central philosophical dilemmas concerning the status of the conscious self. Perhaps the most paradoxical aspect of James's theories, his response to dualism, emerges as he attempts to negotiate ethereal explanations for consciousness with bodily processes. 3 The mind-body problem disrupts James's more delicately balanced theories, a disruption registered explicitly through the metaphors in his texts.Reading The Principles of Psychology (1890) alongside "Does 'Consciousness' Exist" (1904), this essay demonstrates how figurative language directs James's study of consciousness. I argue that metaphor does more than describe consciousness; metaphor constructs James's arguments, governs his conflicting theories of mind through a series of rhetorical configurations and provokes the continual reconstruction of his ideas of human subjectivity. Furthermore, while it is impossible for James to explain and to study consciousness without metaphor, he experiences great anxiety about using language, figurative or otherwise, to represent his object of study. The language becomes more powerful than his intentions or designs and, indeed, raises implications that James cannot control. James possesses a heightened awareness of what he crafts with words; he also, perhaps more penetratingly, acknowledges the inadequacy of any linguistic system to realize concepts thoroughly. 4 Struggling over appropriate "names" and "terms" for consciousness, James presupposes some clearly delineated concept around which we might wrap a verbal expression; yet he also seems painfully aware that every new metaphor launches an entirely new theory. Fluid and unpredictable, consciousness becomes like language itself, yielding its power precisely because it can be so many things at once. The ultimate principle of Jamesian consciousness seems to be its creative capacity; still, once James admits that the problem of consciousness is a problem of language, his carefully constructed designs begin to unravel. Though consciousness will be translated into James's notion of "pure experience" by the time he writes the radical empiricism [End Page 264] essays, James remains simultaneously committed to his figures (especially of the "stream of consciousness") and ambivalent about the account of consciousness that they provide. James helps create the modern self with its enhanced individuality, though his metaphors at once direct us inward to a centered, private self and propel us outward to find consciousness materializing in the fluxional cycle of the natural world.In presenting his initial theory of the stream of our thoughts, James argues for its coherence. His most famous metaphor of the "stream" of consciousness appears to saturate the varied material of the mind, its water washing over and through any distinctions or separations which the mind might present: Consciousness, then, does not appear to itself chopped up in bits. Such words as "chain" or "train" do not describe it fitly as it presents itself in the first instance. It is nothing jointed; it flows. A "river" or a "stream" are the metaphors by which it is most naturally described. In talking of it hereafter, let us call it the stream of thought, of consciousness, or of subjective life. 5James's desire to find words that are more "natural... (shrink)

Aristotle claims that just as a builder uses ‘tools’ to build a house, so too the soul ‘use[s] heat and coldness as tools’ to build an animal (Generation of Animals 740b25–34). I consider two questions about this claim: (1) what sorts of things does the soul use, and what is it for things like them to be organized? and (2) what philosophical work does this sort of organization do in Aristotle’s account of animal generation? I argue that the soul needs (...) flexible intermediate agents, that it organizes them in a way that exploits their flexibility, and that this is due to the demands of a complex, multi-stage process directed at a single end. (shrink)

The target article provides stimulating evidence for culture in cetaceans but does not provide a coherent theoretical framework. We argue that a complex, adaptive systems approach not only can provide such a framework but also can contribute advanced data analysis and simulation methods. For humpback whale songs, we suggest the framework of to model the observed spatio-temporal dynamics.

Among the metaphors used in the target article are “musical instruments,” “water waves,” and other types of mechanical oscillators. The corresponding equations have inertial properties and lead to standing waves that depend on boundary conditions. Other, physiologically relevant quantities like refractory times are not contained in the mechanical oscillator model but occur naturally, for instance, in biological forest fire metaphors.

In Physics 2.4–6, Aristotle offers an account of things that happen “by luck” and “spontaneously”. Many of these things are what we might think of as “lucky breaks”: cases where things go well for us, even though we don’t expect them to. In Physics 2.5, Aristotle illustrates this idea with the case of a man who goes to the market for some reason unrelated to collecting a debt he is owed. While he is there, this man just so happens to (...) run into his debtor and get his money back—which is what he “wanted” all along. This case has a number of features that have proved puzzling. Most notably, Aristotle seems to think that while “it happened accidentally to him to come and to do this for the sake of getting the money”, nevertheless the man “did not come for the sake of this”—though he “would have”. What must such a proceeding be like to be described in these ways? Physics 2.4–6 makes several important moves towards answering this question. One of them—among the earliest and seemingly a foundational one—is the claim that “for the sake of something are as many things as could be done by thought and by nature”. The aim of this paper is to identify the role that this claim plays in Aristotle’s account of spontaneous proceedings. It defends two main claims. First, Aristotle’s suggestion that spontaneous proceedings could be done by nature and by thought is the product of a more general strategy. His approach is to sketch an intuitive pattern of explanation for proceedings that happen for the sake of something in the ordinary—non-spontaneous—way, and then to try to extend that model to the case of things that do so spontaneously, preserving as much of it as possible. Applying this strategy reveals that whereas nature and thought in fact function as efficient causes of ordinary proceedings that are for the sake of something, this cannot be the case in spontaneous ones. Instead, nature and thought could function as their causes. Second, I argue that Aristotle’s implementation of this strategy is rooted in his account of causation and especially Physics 2.3’s list of “modes” of causes. When he claims that spontaneous proceedings “could” be done by nature and by thought, he is saying that nature and thought are their efficient causes in capacity. In the practical case, spontaneous proceedings are caused by agents who have certain capacities, connected with their desires and abilities. In the right circumstances, these agents would actively exercise those capacities in acting for the sake of a given end. (shrink)

In 'Een handvol filosofen' staan de filosofen centraal die sinds de oprichting van de Vrije Universiteit in 1880 aan deze instelling verbonden zijn geweest. Het gaat hierbij niet alleen om de inhoud van hun werk, maar ook om de personen zelf. Er waren filosofiedocenten die zich met de universiteit identificeerden en zich volledig konden ontplooien. Er waren er echter ook voor wie dit niet gold, die geïsoleerd of in gewetensnood raakten. Veel filosofiestudenten waren actief betrokken bij wat er in hun (...) faculteit gebeurde. Zij namen initiatieven, protesteerden soms tegen de gang van zaken en kozen partij in conflictsituaties. Sinds het eind van de jaren zestig van de twintigste eeuw verloor de Vrije Universiteit geleidelijk haar christelijk karakter. Tegenwoordig werken alle stafleden vanuit hun eigen motivatie mee aan een hoofdzakelijk seculier geworden universiteit, die ruimte biedt voor religieuze en levensbeschouwelijke diversiteit. (shrink)

Volume 52, Issue 9, August 2020, Page 931-936.

According to the predictive coding theory of psychosis, hallucinations and delusions are explained by an overweighing of high-level prior expectations relative to sensory information that leads to false perceptions of meaningful signals. However, it is currently unclear whether the hypothesized overweighing of priors represents a pervasive alteration that extends to the visual modality and takes already effect at early automatic processing stages. Here, we addressed these questions by studying visual perception of socially meaningful stimuli in healthy individuals with varying degrees (...) of psychosis proneness. In a first task, we quantified participants’ prior for detecting faces in visual noise using a Bayesian decision model. In a second task, we measured participants’ prior for detecting direct gaze stimuli that were rendered invisible by continuous flash suppression. We found that the prior for detecting faces in noise correlated with hallucination proneness as well as delusion proneness. The prior for detecting invisible direct gaze was significantly associated with hallucination proneness but not conclusively with delusion proneness. Our results provide evidence for the idea that overly strong high-level priors for automatically detecting socially meaningful stimuli might constitute a processing alteration in psychosis. (shrink)

In this philosophically sophisticated and historically significant work, John H. Zammito reconstructs Kant's composition of The Critique of Judgment and reveals that it underwent three major transformations before publication. He shows that Kant not only made his "cognitive" turn, expanding the project from a "Critique of Taste" to a Critique of Judgment but he also made an "ethical" turn. This "ethical" turn was provoked by controversies in German philosophical and religious culture, in particular the writings of Johann Herder and the (...) Sturm und Drang movement in art and science, as well as the related pantheism controversy. Such topicality made the Third Critique pivotal in creating a "Kantian" movement in the 1790s, leading directly to German Idealism and Romanticism. The austerity and grandeur of Kant's philosophical writings sometimes make it hard to recognize them as the products of a historical individual situated in the particular constellation of his time and society. Here Kant emerges as a concrete historical figure struggling to preserve the achievements of cosmopolitan Aufkl-rung against challenges in natural science, religion, and politics in the late 1780s. More specifically Zammito suggests that Kant's Third Critique was animated throughout by a fierce personal rivalry with Herder and by a strong commitment to traditional Christian ideas of God and human moral freedom. "A work of extraordinary erudition. Zammito's study is both comprehensive and novel, connecting Kant's work with the aesthetic and religious controversies of the late eighteenth century. He seems to have read everything. I know of no comparable historical study of Kant's Third Critique."-Arnulf Zweig, translator and editor of Kant's ;IPhilosophical Correspondence, 1759-1799;X "An intricate, subtle, and exciting explanation of how Kant's thinking developed and adjusted to new challenges over the decade from the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason to the appearance of the Critique of Judgment. "--John W. Burbidge, Review of Metaphysics "There has been for a long time a serious gap in English commentary on Kant's Critique of Judgment Zammito's book finally fills it. All students and scholars of Kant will want to consult it."--Frederick Beiser, Times Literary Supplement. (shrink)

In a critical review of late twentieth-century gene-culture co-evolutionary models labelled as ‘global phylogeny’, the authors present evidence for the long legacy of co-evolutionary theories in European-based thinking, highlighting that (1) ideas of social and cultural evolution preceded the idea of biological evolution, (2) linguistics played a dominant role in the formation of a unified theory of human co-evolution, and (3) that co-evolutionary thinking was only possible due to perpetuated and renewed transdisciplinary reticulations between scholars of different disciplines—especially within the (...) integrative framework of the ‘humanid’ and the ‘hominid’ branches of anthropology. (shrink)

Philosophy should not be understood as a Eurocentric project of Greco-Judaic origin, but as a critical and fundamentally reflective intellectual practice which occurs worldwide, in many different forms. If this is so, anthropology has a crucial role to play in the project of reshaping philosophy's self-conception, to include the multiplicity of regional intellectual histories that have been neglected, and thus acknowledge and take seriously philosophical reflections from around the world. Through empirical observation, documentation, and comparative analysis, an anthropology of philosophy (...) can help philosophy reach a better self-understanding, particularly in times of rising awareness of globally operating interdependencies and suspicions that philosophy is a smoke-screen for Eurocentric power interests. Anthropological investigation, if performed carefully and in combination with philosophical expertise, can provide concrete details, accounts and assessments of philosophical practice around the world, different from those that a sociology of philosophies (Collins 1998) or a history of philosophy can offer. It can integrate understanding of local languages and sensitivity for relevant social contexts, and need not be philosophically naive. Philosophy is linked to knowledge, the quest for knowledge, the critique of knowledge, and to the various perspectives from which forms of knowledge can be described and conceptualised. An anthropology of philosophy can be developed in relation to an anthropology of knowledge (Lambek 1993), where various locally relevant forms of knowledge are identified, observed, described and discussed, in relation to social practice. Making the case for an anthropology of philosophy, my paper refers to arguments of African philosophers, and the debate on African philosophy, while also drawing from my own fieldwork experience on philosophical discourse in a Swahili context. (shrink)

Introduction: Platonic dramatology -- The political and philosophical problems. Using pre-Socratic philosophy to support political reform: the Athenian stranger ; Plato's Parmenides: Parmenides' critique of Socrates and Plato's critique of Parmenides ; Becoming Socrates ; Socrates interrogates his contemporaries about the noble and good -- Paradigms of philosophy. Socrates' positive teaching ; Timaeus-Critias: completing or challenging Socratic political philosophy? ; Socratic practice -- The trial and death of Socrates. The limits of human intelligence ; The Eleatic challenge ; The trial (...) and death of Socrates -- Conclusion: Why Plato made Socrates his hero. (shrink)

[penultimate draft; prepared for publication in Aristotle’s Parts of Animals: A Critical Guide, ed. Sophia Connell – please cite final version] -/- Parts of Animals II.10 makes a new beginning in Aristotle’s study of animals. In it, Aristotle proposes to “now speak as if we are once more at an origin, beginning first with those things that are primary” (655b28-9). This is the start of his account of the non-uniform parts of blooded animals: parts such as eyes, noses, mouths, etc., (...) as opposed to uniform parts like blood and flesh. PA II.10 proposes a new strategy for studying these parts: “one ought to speak about the human kind first” (656a10). Beginning “first” with the “primary” things thus amounts to beginning with humans (655b28-9). -/- Why does Aristotle think this strategy is appropriate for his project? One answer is that it reflects a fundamental anthropocentrism. Lloyd, for instance, has raised the possibility that the basic assumptions that guide Aristotle’s biology may to some extent reflect the anthropocentrism of his culture, where the relation of humans to animals was “a preoccupation of popular beliefs”. In this paper, I develop an interpretation that both builds on and challenges this suggestion. I do so by investigating how Aristotle thinks this strategy works in theory and in practice: his justifications for adopting it and its interaction with his scientific commitments. I argue that Aristotle adopts it in part because he thinks that humans are such that his scientific concepts apply to them in a particularly clear way. (This too is a form of anthropocentrism: one that might be resisted by arguing that humans are not the best illustrations of these concepts—that Aristotle ought to look elsewhere for models with the features he desires.) -/- More specifically, Aristotle holds that starting with humans helps establish the causal explanations of the parts of other animals, particularly when they are recalcitrant. What makes humans suitable for this role is a special teleological relation between their parts and the ends they serve: in humans, he supposes, this connection is particularly tight (in a way I explain below). Consequently, Aristotle thinks he can use humans to illuminate which sorts of features tend to be for the sake of which ends, and then extend the results of this inquiry to the parts of the other animals. (shrink)

Aristotle contrasts standard animal generation with ‘spontaneous generation’, which happens when some material putrefies and gives rise to a new organism. This paper addresses two interrelated puzzles about spontaneous generation. First, is it of the same ‘fundamental kind’ of causal process as standard generation? Second, is it ‘spontaneous’, as understood in Physics 2.4–6: rare, accidentally caused, and among things that are for the sake of something? I argue that both puzzles turn on the same questions about the process types involved. (...) I show that the type putrefaction plays a more important role in spontaneous generation than has been recognized so far. Because putrefaction does not play this role in standard generation, the two processes are of different ‘fundamental’ kinds. Moreover, spontaneous generation happens rarely in that it is rare for processes of putrefaction to happen in such a way that they can also be described in terms of concoction. (shrink)

This article presents a response to Richard Rorty's paper "Is Philosophy Relevant to Business Ethics?" The author questions Rorty's views on the depreciation of the role of philosophy in applied ethics, and outlines four reasons why philosophy retains its relevance. The author addresses the role of moral reasoning in the development of the moral imagination. The author also concludes that humans have the means necessary to make moral progress and are capable of moral reasoning, and need only to develop a (...) strong moral imagination. (shrink)

Abstract:During recent years, the principle and practice of employment-at-will have been under attack. While progress has been made in eroding the practice, the principle still governs the philosophical assumptions underlying employment practices in the United States, and, indeed, EAW has been promulgated as one of the ways to address economic ills in other countries. This paper will briefly review the major critiques of EAW. Given the failure of these arguments to erode the underpinnings of EAW, we shall suggest new avenues (...) for approaching employment issues to achieve the desirable goal of employee dignity and respect. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Coherence Theories of Law What Coherence Is The Characterization of Normative Coherence Theories The Normative Value of Coherence References.

This paper discusses Odera Oruka’s philosophical work from the perspective of its emphasis on the ‘practical’ impetus that Oruka himself underlined. In different ways, his various projects - his sage philosophy, his philosophy of liberty, his environmental philosophy and, perhaps most importantly, his critiques of African (and implicitly Kenyan) social and political realities - can be seen as manifestations of his commitment to the practical relevance and social significance of knowledge, and his conviction about the potentially liberating force of philosophical (...) critique. Here, I try to provide an overall sketch of this agenda, seeking toinitiate more thorough and detailed discussion for the future. As a main reference point for discussion, I look at how the term ‘humanism’ has been used (and can be used) to describe Oruka’s work, in contrast to the invocation of this term by some nationalist political ideologies, in particular Moi’s so-called ‘nyayo philosophy’. Oruka’s work could be more explicitly appreciated and explored, I argue, for the ways in which he observed and actively criticized instances of inhumanity and ‘false humanism’ in post-colonial Africa. (shrink)

This paper discusses Odera Oruka’s philosophical work from the perspective of its emphasis on the ‘practical’ impetus that Oruka himself underlined. In different ways, his various projects - his sage philosophy, his philosophy of liberty, his environmental philosophy and, perhaps most importantly, his critiques of African (and implicitly Kenyan) social and political realities - can be seen as manifestations of his commitment to the practical relevance and social significance of knowledge, and his conviction about the potentially liberating force of philosophical (...) critique. Here, I try to provide an overall sketch of this agenda, seeking toinitiate more thorough and detailed discussion for the future. As a main reference point for discussion, I look at how the term ‘humanism’ has been used (and can be used) to describe Oruka’s work, in contrast to the invocation of this term by some nationalist political ideologies, in particular Moi’s so-called ‘nyayo philosophy’. Oruka’s work could be more explicitly appreciated and explored, I argue, for the ways in which he observed and actively criticized instances of inhumanity and ‘false humanism’ in post-colonial Africa. (shrink)

This groundbreaking volume casts light on the long shadow of naturalistic monism in modern thought and culture. When monism's philosophical proposition - the unity of all matter and thought in a single, universal substance - fused with scientific empiricism and Darwinism in the mid-nineteenth century, it led to the formation of a powerful worldview articulated in the work of figures such as Ernst Haeckel. The compelling essays collected here, written by leading international scholars, investigate the articulation of monism in science, (...) philosophy, and religion and its impact on a range of social movements, from socialism and early feminism to imperialism and eugenics. The result is a broad and comprehensive chronological, disciplinary, and geographic map of a century of monism, as well as a bellwether for innovative new directions in the interdisciplinary study of science, religion, philosophy, and culture. (shrink)