Après avoir recueilli l'enseignement de la sagesse millénaire indienne auprès de Ramana Maharshi et Krishna Menon, Roger Godel a rassemblé dans ses Essais sur l'expérience libératrice (parus en 1952) les conclusions d'une recherche générale sur l'éveil. Son approche de l'éveil se veut d'abord radicalement et volontairement scientifique. L'expérience transcendante est aux yeux de Godel une terra incognita que les scientifiques, et en particulier les psychologues, doivent prendre comme objet d'études faute de quoi ils s'exposent à ne jamais (...) atteindre la vérité ultime. Mais Roger Godel ne fait pas œuvre d'intellectuel en cherchant à décrire l'éveil ; il ne regarde pas l'éveil comme un objet lointain et inconnu ; il écrit, au contraire, en puisant dans sa propre expérience spirituelle. Godel n'est pas seulement un philosophe en quête de sagesse, mais un sage, un homme accompli. Il montre dans ses Essais que les mystiques d'Orient comme d'Occident conduisent toutes à une même expérience spirituelle et qu'il est temps pour l'homme de s'éveiller à sa propre dimension intérieure de divinité. (shrink)

Socrate et le sage indien.--Socrate et Diotime.--Terre de Socrate.--Platon à Héliopolis d'Égypte.

Socrate et le sage indien.--Socrate et Diotime.--Terre de Socrate.--Platon à Héliopolis d'Égypte.

Gödel appears to have believed strongly that the human mind cannot be explained in terms of any kind of computational physics, but he remained cautious in formulating this belief as a rigorous consequence of his incompleteness theorems. In this chapter, I discuss a modification of standard Gödel-type logical arguments, these appearing to strengthen Gödel’s conclusions, and attempt to provide a persuasive case in support of his standpoint that the actions of the mind must transcend computation. It appears that Gödel did (...) not consider the possibility that the laws of physics might themselves involve noncomputational procedures; accordingly, he found himself driven to the conclusion that mentality must lie beyond the actions of the physical brain. My own arguments, on the other hand, are from the scientific standpoint that the mind is a product of the brain’s physical activity. Accordingly, there must be something in the physical actions of the world that itself transcends computation. We do not appear to find such noncomputational action in the known laws of physics, however, so we must seek it in currently undiscovered laws going beyond presently accepted physical theory. I argue that the only plausibly relevant gap in current understanding lies in a fundamental incompleteness in quantum theory, which reveals itself only with significant mass displacements between quantum states (“Schrödinger’s cats”). I contend that the need for new physics enters when gravitational effects just begin to play a role. In a scheme developed jointly with Stuart Hameroff, this has direct relevance within neuronal microtubules, and I describe this (still speculative) scheme in the following. (shrink)

This book is a fascinating and accessible summary of Roger Penrose's current thinking on those areas of physics in which he feels there are major...

Presenting a look at the human mind's capacity while criticizing artificial intelligence, the author makes suggestions about classical and quantum physics and ..

Roger Penrose's original and provocative ideas about the large-scale physics of the Universe, the small-scale world of quantum physics and the physics of the mind have been the subject of controversy and discussion. These ideas were set forth in his best-selling books The Emperor's New Mind and Shadows of the Mind. In this book, he summarises and brings up to date his current thinking in these complex areas. He presents a masterful summary of those areas of physics in which (...) he feels there are major unsolved problems. Through this, he introduces radically new concepts which he believes will be fruitful in understanding the workings of the brain and the nature of the human mind. These ideas are then challenged by three distinguished experts from different backgrounds - Abner Shimony and Nancy Cartwright as Philosophers of Science and Stephen Hawking as a Theoretical Physicist and Cosmologist. Finally, Roger Penrose responds to their thought-provoking criticisms. This volume provides an accessible, illuminating and stimulating introduction to Roger Penrose's vision of theoretical physics for the 21st Century. His enthusiasm, insight and good humour shine through this brilliant account of the problems of modern physics. (shrink)

_'Nagel and Newman accomplish the wondrous task of clarifying the argumentative outline of Kurt Godel's celebrated logic bomb.'_ _– The Guardian_ In 1931 the mathematical logician Kurt Godel published a revolutionary paper that challenged certain basic assumptions underpinning mathematics and logic. A colleague of physicist Albert Einstein, his theorem proved that mathematics was partly based on propositions not provable within the mathematical system. The importance of Godel's Proof rests upon its radical implications and has echoed throughout many (...) fields, from maths to science to philosophy, computer design, artificial intelligence, even religion and psychology. While others such as Douglas Hofstadter and Roger Penrose have published bestsellers based on Godel’s theorem, this is the first book to present a readable explanation to both scholars and non-specialists alike. A gripping combination of science and accessibility, _Godel’s Proof_ by Nagel and Newman is for both mathematicians and the idly curious, offering those with a taste for logic and philosophy the chance to satisfy their intellectual curiosity. _Kurt Godel_ Born in Brunn, he was a colleague of physicist Albert Einstein and professor at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, N.J. (shrink)

The logician Kurt Godel in 1951 established a disjunctive thesis about the scope and limits of mathematical knowledge: either the mathematical mind is equivalent to a Turing machine (i.e., a computer), or there are absolutely undecidable mathematical problems. In the second half of the twentieth century, attempts have been made to arrive at a stronger conclusion. In particular, arguments have been produced by the philosopher J.R. Lucas and by the physicist and mathematician Roger Penrose that intend to show (...) that the mathematical mind is more powerful than any computer. These arguments, and counterarguments to them, have not convinced the logical and philosophical community. The reason for this is an insufficiency if rigour in the debate. The contributions in this volume move the debate forward by formulating rigorous frameworks and formally spelling out and evaluating arguments that bear on Godel's disjunction in these frameworks. The contributions in this volume have been written by world leading experts in the field. (shrink)

_'Nagel and Newman accomplish the wondrous task of clarifying the argumentative outline of Kurt Godel's celebrated logic bomb.'_ _– The Guardian_ In 1931 the mathematical logician Kurt Godel published a revolutionary paper that challenged certain basic assumptions underpinning mathematics and logic. A colleague of physicist Albert Einstein, his theorem proved that mathematics was partly based on propositions not provable within the mathematical system. The importance of Godel's Proof rests upon its radical implications and has echoed throughout many (...) fields, from maths to science to philosophy, computer design, artificial intelligence, even religion and psychology. While others such as Douglas Hofstadter and Roger Penrose have published bestsellers based on Godel’s theorem, this is the first book to present a readable explanation to both scholars and non-specialists alike. A gripping combination of science and accessibility, _Godel’s Proof_ by Nagel and Newman is for both mathematicians and the idly curious, offering those with a taste for logic and philosophy the chance to satisfy their intellectual curiosity. _Kurt Godel_ Born in Brunn, he was a colleague of physicist Albert Einstein and professor at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, N.J. (shrink)

_'Nagel and Newman accomplish the wondrous task of clarifying the argumentative outline of Kurt Godel's celebrated logic bomb.'_ _– The Guardian_ In 1931 the mathematical logician Kurt Godel published a revolutionary paper that challenged certain basic assumptions underpinning mathematics and logic. A colleague of physicist Albert Einstein, his theorem proved that mathematics was partly based on propositions not provable within the mathematical system. The importance of Godel's Proof rests upon its radical implications and has echoed throughout many (...) fields, from maths to science to philosophy, computer design, artificial intelligence, even religion and psychology. While others such as Douglas Hofstadter and Roger Penrose have published bestsellers based on Godel’s theorem, this is the first book to present a readable explanation to both scholars and non-specialists alike. A gripping combination of science and accessibility, _Godel’s Proof_ by Nagel and Newman is for both mathematicians and the idly curious, offering those with a taste for logic and philosophy the chance to satisfy their intellectual curiosity. _Kurt Godel_ Born in Brunn, he was a colleague of physicist Albert Einstein and professor at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, N.J. (shrink)

Il dibattito sul ruolo e le implicazioni del teorema di Gödel per l'intelligenza artificiale ha recentemente ricevuto nuovo impeto grazie a due importanti volumi pubblicati da Roger Penrose, The Emperor's New Mind [1989] e Shadows of the Mind [1994]. Naturalmente, Penrose non è il primo né l'ultimo a usare il teorema di Gödel allo scopo di trarne conseguenze per i fondamenti dell'intelligenza artificiale. Tuttavia il recente dibattito suscitato dai due libri di Penrose è significativo sia per ampiezza sia per (...) profondità. In queste pagine si vuole dare una rassegna di tale dibattito, cominciando dai suoi precursori negli anni '60 (fra cui Lucas, Putnam, e Chihara), per passare poi alle complesse argomentazioni proposte da Penrose e le reazioni di una serie di commentatori (ad esempio Dennett, Feferman, McDermott, Davis). (shrink)

Let me start with a disclaimer. I am not going to be primarily concerned with the Gödelian argument against mechanism, although that is what I am primarily associated with in the public mind. Not that I don't stand by it. Although there have been many criticisms, some of them ill informed and evidently based on not having read what I had actually written, the critics had a strong tendency to disagree with one another more than they did with me, or (...) later with Roger Penrose. At first I tried to answer critical arguments, but became somewhat bored with having to make the same points over and over again. I often wondered what Gödel himself thought, having a strong sense of his being in sympathy with my general line of argument. In fact he had expressed his views in a lecture on Boxing Day, 1951, which was finally published in the third volume of his Collected Works in 1995. Gödel argues for a disjunction: an Either/Or, with the strong suggestion that the second disjunct is untenable, and hence by Modus Tollendo Ponens that the first disjunct must be true. (shrink)

Roger Penrose is justly famous for his work in physics and mathematics but he is _notorious_ for his endorsement of the Gödel argument (see his 1989, 1994, 1997). This argument, first advanced by J. R. Lucas (in 1961), attempts to show that Gödel’s (first) incompleteness theorem can be seen to reveal that the human mind transcends all algorithmic models of it¹. Penrose's version of the argument has been seen to fall victim to the original objections raised against Lucas (see (...) Boolos (1990) and for a particularly intemperate review, Putnam (1994)). Yet I believe that more can and should be said about the argument. Only a brief review is necessary here although I wish to present the argument in a somewhat peculiar form. (shrink)

Summarizing a surrounding 200 pages, pages 179 to 190 of Shadows of the Mind contain a future dialog between a human identified as "Albert Imperator" and an advanced robot, the "Mathematically Justified Cybersystem", allegedly Albert's creation. The two have been discussing a Gödel sentence for an algorithm by which a robot society named SMIRC certifies mathematical proofs. The sentence, referred to in mathematical notation as Omega(Q*), is to be precisely constructed from on a definition of SMIRC's algorithm. It can be (...) interpreted as stating "SMIRC's algorithm cannot certify this statement." The robot has asserted that SMIRC never makes mistakes. If so, SMIRC's algorithm cannot certify the Goedel sentence, for that would make the statement false. But, if they can't certify it, what is says is true! Humans can understand it is true, but mighty SMIRC cannot certify it. The dialog ends melodramatically as the robot, apparently unhinged by this revelation, claims to be a messenger of god, and the human shuts it down with a secret control. (shrink)

In his stimulating book SHADOWS OF THE MIND, Roger Penrose presents arguments, based on Gödel's theorem, for the conclusion that human thought is uncomputable. There are actually two separate arguments in Penrose's book. The second has been widely ignored, but seems to me to be much more interesting and novel than the first. I will address both forms of the argument in some detail. Toward the end, I will also comment on Penrose's proposals for a "new science of consciousness".

Marie-Magdeleine Davy (1903-1998) était philosophe, écrivaine et maître de recherche au cnrs. Profondément engagée dans la vie intellectuelle de son époque, elle confia ses plus riches pensées à d'innombrables écrits publiés pendant plus d'un demi-siècle. On y croise les figures essentielles de sa méditation : Guillaume de Saint-Thierry, Nicolas Berdiaev, Louis Massignon, Gabriel Marcel, Roger Godel, Henry Corbin, Simone Weil, Henri Le Saux et tant d'autres. Esprit indépendant et non conventionnel, éternelle voyageuse en quête d'absolu, Marie-Magdeleine Davy ne (...) cessa d'affirmer que la connaissance de soi se présente comme une recherche du sens de la Vie, c'est-à-dire une recherche de la Vérité conduisant à une démarche d'intériorité.00± Découvrir sa dimension de profondeur permet de prendre contact avec l'Infini qui est en soi ; ce caractère d'éternité humanise et rend possible la véritable communication avec autrui.? Telle est la conviction de Marie-Magdeleine Davy, après avoir lu, médité et conversé avec des hommes et des femmes en Orient et en Occident.00Pour beaucoup d'Européens, Marie-Magdeleine Davy aura été un témoin de la dimension d'intériorité que tout être porte en lui, une preuve vivante de cet aspect autre de la vie capable de donner un sens au monde et à l'Histoire. ± Une grande dame.? C'est ainsi que les Deux-Sévriens qui l'ont connue l'appellent encore. Ses archives, désormais classées, apportent un éclairage nouveau sur une œuvre et une pensée s'adressant à tous ceux qui sont soucieux de répondre à leur destin. (shrink)

This piece continues the tradition of arguments by John Lucas, Roger Penrose and others to the effect that the human mind is not a machine. Kurt Gödel thought that the intensional paradoxes stand in the way of proving that the mind is not a machine. According to Gödel, a successful proof that the mind is not a machine would require a solution to the intensional paradoxes. We provide what might seem to be a partial vindication of Gödel and show (...) that if a particular solution to the intensional paradoxes is adopted, one can indeed give an argument to the effect that the mind is not a machine. (shrink)

This paper presents, from a historical and logical-philosophical perspective, the Gödelian arguments of two Oxford scholars, John Lucas and Roger Penrose. Both have been based on Gödel's Theorem to refute mechanism, computationalism and the possibility of creating an AI capable of simulating or duplicating the human mind. In the conclusions, the growing application of empirical methods in mathematics is mentioned and a possible path that would support Lucas and Penrose's arguments is speculated.

Crispin Wright joins the ranks of those who have sought to refute mechanist theories of mind by invoking Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems. His predecessors include Gödel himself, J. R. Lucas and, most recently, Roger Penrose. The aim of this essay is to show that, like his predecessors, Wright, too, fails to make his case, and that, indeed, he fails to do so even when judged by standards of success which he himself lays down.

Using the Godel incompleteness result for leverage, Roger Penrose has argued that the mechanism for consciousness involves quantum gravitational phenomena, acting through microtubules in neurons. We show that this hypothesis is implausible. First the Godel result does not imply that human thought is in fact non-algorithmic. Second, whether or not non-algorithmic quantum gravitational phenomena actually exist, and if they did how that could conceivably implicate microtubules, and if microtubules were involved, how that could conceivably implicate consciousness, is (...) entirely speculative. Third, cytoplasmic ions such as calcium and sodium are almost certainly present in the microtubule pore, barring the quantum-mechanical effects Penrose envisages. Finally, physiological evidence indicates that consciousness does not directly depend on microtubule properties in any case, rendering doubtful any theory according to which consciousness is generated in the microtubules. (shrink)

Using the Gödel Incompleteness Result for leverage, Roger Penrose has argued that the mechanism for consciousness involves quantum gravitational phenomena, acting through microtubules in neurons. We show that this hypothesis is implausible. First, the Gödel Result does not imply that human thought is in fact non algorithmic. Second, whether or not non algorithmic quantum gravitational phenomena actually exist, and if they did how that could conceivably implicate microtubules, and if microtubules were involved, how that could conceivably implicate consciousness, is (...) entirely speculative. Third, cytoplasmic ions such as calcium and sodium are almost certainly present in the microtubule pore, barring the quantum mechanical effects Penrose envisages. Finally, physiological evidence indicates that consciousness does not directly depend on microtubule properties in any case, rendering doubtful any theory according to which consciousness is generated in the microtubules. (shrink)

This paper argues for two theses: that degrees of belief are context sensitive; that outright belief is belief to degree 1. The latter thesis is rejected quickly in most discussions of the relationship between credence and belief, but the former thesis undermines the usual reasons for doing so. Furthermore, identifying belief with credence 1 allows nice solutions to a number of problems for the most widely-held view of the relationship between credence and belief, the threshold view. I provide a sketch (...) of a formal framework on which both theses are true. This is a modified Bayesian framework; I argue that despite making credences context-sensitive, the framework lets Bayesians hold on to their signature explanatory successes. The sort of context-sensitivity claimed for credences here mirrors the sort of context-sensitivity I have elsewhere claimed for outright belief: one's credences depend, in part, on the space of alternative possibilities one takes seriously in a context. (shrink)

Offering a collection of fifteen essays that deal with issues at the intersection of phenomenology, logic, and the philosophy of mathematics, this 2005 book is divided into three parts. Part I contains a general essay on Husserl's conception of science and logic, an essay of mathematics and transcendental phenomenology, and an essay on phenomenology and modern pure geometry. Part II is focused on Kurt Godel's interest in phenomenology. It explores Godel's ideas and also some work of Quine, Penelope (...) Maddy and Roger Penrose. Part III deals with elementary, constructive areas of mathematics. These are areas of mathematics that are closer to their origins in simple cognitive activities and in everyday experience. This part of the book contains essays on intuitionism, Hermann Weyl, the notion of constructive proof, Poincaré and Frege. (shrink)

Offers an in-depth exposition of the Confucian conception of persons as the starting point of Confucian ethics.

Roger A. Shiner; VII*—Wittgenstein and the Foundations of Knowledge, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 78, Issue 1, 1 June 1978, Pages 103–124, ht.

Uses a comparative hermeneutical method to explain the most important terms in the classical Confucian philosophical texts, in an effort to allow the tradition to speak on its own terms.

In his most comprehensive book on the subject , Roger Penrose provides arguments to demonstrate that there are aspects of human understanding which could not, in principle, be attained by any purely computational system. His central argument relies crucially on oft-cited theorems proven by Gödel and Turing. However, that key argument has been the subject of numerous trenchant critiques, which is unfortunate if one believes Penrose's conclusions to be plausible. In the present article, alternative arguments are offered in support (...) of Penrose-like conclusions . It is argued here that a purely computational agent, which lacked conscious awareness, would be incapable of possessing crucial concepts and of understanding certain kinds of geometrically-based proofs. Specifically, it is argued that the acquisition of human-like concepts of countable and non-denumerable infinities, and human-like comprehension of a particular geometrically motivated proof does require conscious apprehension of the subject matter involved. This does not preclude the possibility that a computational agent might come to possess the requisite consciousness, but it is argued that if this consciousness does arise within the agent, it does so, at best, as an emergent, contingent side-effect of the underlying processes involved. (shrink)

For more than a century scholars both inside and outside of China have undertaken the project of modernizing Confucianism, but few have been as successful or influential as Li Zehou (b. 1930). Since the 1950s, Li's extensive efforts in this regard have in turn exerted a profound influence on Chinese modernization and resulted in his becoming one of China's most prominent social critics. To transform Confucianism into a contemporary resource for positive change in China and elsewhere, Li has reinterpreted major (...) ideas and concepts of classical Confucianism, including a rereading of the entire Analects, replete with his own philosophical speculations derived from other Chinese and Western traditions (most notably, the ideas of Kant and Marx), and developed an aesthetical theory that has proved especially far-reaching. Although the authors of this volume hail from East Asia, North America, and Europe and a wide variety of academic backgrounds and fields of study, they are unanimous in their appreciation of Li's contributions to not only an evolving Confucian philosophy, but also world philosophy. They view Li first and foremost as a sui generis thinker with broad global interests and not one who fits neatly into any one philosophical category, Chinese or Western. This is clearly reflected in the chapters included here, which are organized into three parts: Li Zehou and the Modernization of Confucianism, Li Zehou's Reconception of Confucian Philosophy, and Li Zehou's Aesthetical Theory and Confucianism. Together they form a coherent narrative that reveals how Li has, for more than half a century, creatively studied, absorbed, and reconceptualized the Confucian ideational tradition to integrate it with Western philosophical elements and develop his own philosophical insights and original theories. At the same time, he has transformed and modernized Confucianism for the purpose of both coalescing with and reconstructing a new world cultural order. (shrink)

Archaeology's Visual Culture explores archaeology through the lens of visual culture theory. The insistent visuality of archaeology is a key stimulus for the imaginative and creative interpretation of our encounters with the past, acknowledging the multiplicity of meanings that cohere around artifacts, archaeological sites and museum displays. Archaeology's Visual Culture investigates the nature of this projection, revealing an embedded subjectivity in the imagery of archaeology. Using a wide range of case studies the book highlights the way archaeologists view objects and (...) the consequences that ensue from ways of seeing"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

Sexual experimentation, living together, raising children outside of marriage, remarriage after divorce, and same-sex relationships...These behaviours have become common in the wider society as well as among Christians and Catholic Christians. Not only do they think and act differently than the official Church teaching, but they do so convinced that they are acting rightly. This challenges ethics to respond by what can be called an 'ethics of mercy', by meeting people where they are and helping them to grow towards the (...) fullness of life and love. Such a pastoral and educational ethics of growth should dare to stand within the tension between what is desirable and what is attainable, without surrendering the 'pro-vocative' idea of conjugal covenant as the basis for the family. Mercy is needed not only after ethics but in ethics. In harmony with Pope Francis's plea for a 'gospel of mercy', this book seeks a middle way between merciless rigourism and relativising subjectivism. It proposes an ethics of redemption that accompanies people on their way to meaningful living and loving, grounded in a spirituality that springs from the salvation offered in Jesus. (shrink)

L'étranger divin qu'incarne Dionysos, l'étranger à soi que devient Rousseau dans le regard des autres, l'étranger barbare que décrit Lucien de Samosate, l'étranger du dehors qui n'habite pas la maison commune, l'étranger mis à distance par la constitution des morales, l'étranger en exil que célèbre l'Islam... Qu'ont-ils donc en commun? Et comment se distinguent-ils? L'objet de ce travail à plusieurs voix n'est pas de construire une théorie. L'exercice consiste au contraire à multiplier les approches, à laisser jouer librement, de la (...) Grèce antique aux Temps modernes en passant par le monde musulman, une diversité de figures et de notions, pour mettre à l'épreuve leur impact sur l'idée même d'altérité. (shrink)

The legacy of classical antiquity -- War and peace in the medieval world -- Holy wars, crusades, and religious wars -- Humanism and Neo-Stoicism -- The search for a science of peace.

This paper is a response to Brad Hooker's “Does having deep personal relationships constitute an element of well‐being?” (2021). The paper begins with a discussion of the implications of disagreement about such issues. After raising some general questions for Hooker's account, the paper turns to the key elements in a deep personal relationship, according to Hooker: multi‐faceted understanding, and strong affection. The issue of impartiality is discussed, and it is claimed that Hooker's account is consistent with morality's being impartial. Some (...) possible interpretations of Hooker's overall project are offered, and the paper ends with a discussion of Hooker's suggestions that the affection in valuable personal relationships must be merited. (shrink)

Elizabeth Anscombe is now recognised as one of the most important philosophers of the second half of the 20th century. She left a large corpus of work, wide-ranging in content, always original and bold. Her monograph Intention, published in 1957, is a modern classic, and was described by Donald Davidson as "the most important treatment of action since Aristotle." Her writings in ethics have inspired countless discussions, and she has been credited with having changed the face of Anglophone moral philosophy (...) by reviving and arguing for virtue ethics, now a major field. Since Anscombe's death in 2001, her philosophical work has received a steadily increasing level of attention worldwide. Anscombe is often difficult to read, and she has certainly been frequently misunderstood, but the sympathetic interest in her work which is now evident in so many quarters is making it possible for a true picture to begin to emerge of the range, depth, and power of her contribution to philosophy. The Oxford Handbook of Elizabeth Anscombe conveys something of that emerging picture of Anscombe's overall philosophy-showing the great fecundity of her ideas in essays that develop and expand on those ideas-and allows contributors to engage critically with Anscombe, not merely to expound what she said. The handbook opens with an introduction that addresses the question of the unity in diversity of Anscombe's philosophy, relating this to the twenty-two essays that follow. The handbook is divided into parts along broadly thematic lines, addressing: intention, ethical theory, human life, the first person, and Anscombe on other philosophers. (shrink)

Philosopher Roger Scruton offers a wide-ranging perspective on philosophy, from logic to aesthetics, written in a lively and engaging way that is sure to stimulate debate. Rather than producing a survey of an academic discipline, Scruton reclaims philosophy for worldly concerns.