- Seeking confirmation: A puzzle for norms of inquiry.Jared Millson - 2020 - Analysis 80 (4):683-693.details
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The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press: Oxford.details
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Belief, Knowledge and Practical Matters.Jie Gao - 2024 - Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.details
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Epistemic Courage.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2024 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The Cognitive Science of Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Are Credences Different From Beliefs?Roger Clarke & Julia Staffel - forthcoming - In Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup, John Turri & Blake Roeber (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Preface Writers are Consistent.Roger Clarke - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3):362-381.details
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Credence and Correctness: In Defense of Credal Reductivism.Matthew Brandon Lee - 2017 - Philosophical Papers 46 (2):273-296.details
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Two-state solution to the lottery paradox.Arturs Logins - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3465-3492.details
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Are there counterexamples to the consistency principle?Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - Episteme:1-18.details
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Toward a Lockean Unification of Formal and Traditional Epistemology.Paul Silva Jr & Matthew Brandon Lee - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1):111-129.details
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Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):201-217.details
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The Limitations of the Open Mind.Jeremy Fantl - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge-Action Principles and Threshold-Impurism.Ru Ye - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.details
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Knowledge-Action Principles and Threshold-Impurism.Ru Ye - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.details
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Can Pragmatists Be Moderate?Alex Worsnip - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):531-558.details
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Belief, Credence, and the Preface Paradox.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):549-562.details
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Why Double-Check?Elise Woodard - forthcoming - Episteme:1-24.details
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The Typical Principle.Isaac Wilhelm - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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Headaches for epistemologists.Brian Talbot - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):408-433.details
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Should I pretend I'm perfect?Julia Staffel - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):301-324.details
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How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?Julia Staffel - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):937-962.details
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Accuracy for Believers.Julia Staffel - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):39-48.details
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No Crystal Balls.Jack Spencer - 2018 - Noûs 54 (1):105-125.details
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Extreme Betting.Javier González de Prado Salas - 2018 - Ratio 32 (1):32-41.details
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What it takes to believe.Daniel Rothschild - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1345-1362.details
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Rational requirements for suspended judgment.Luis Rosa - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):385-406.details
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The Pragmatic Encroachment Debate.Blake Roeber - 2016 - Noûs 52 (1):171-195.details
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Permissive Situations and Direct Doxastic Control.Blake Roeber - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):415-431.details
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Suspending belief in credal accounts.Andrew del Rio - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):3-25.details
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No Reasons to Believe the False.Javier González De Prado Salas - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):703-722.details
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No Reasons to Believe the False.Javier González Prado - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):703-722.details
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Précis and replies to contributors for book symposium on accuracy and the laws of credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):1-30.details
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Not Expressivist Enough: Normative Disagreement about Belief Attribution.Eduardo Pérez-Navarro, Víctor Fernández Castro, Javier González de Prado Salas & Manuel Heras–Escribano - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (4):409-430.details
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Not Expressivist Enough: Normative Disagreement about Belief Attribution.Eduardo P.\'Erez-Navarr, V.\'Ictor Fern\'And Castro, Javier Gonz\'ale Prado & Manuel Heras-Escribano - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (4):409-430.details
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Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.details
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Uncertainty Without All the Doubt.Aaron Norby - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (1):70-94.details
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Requirements of intention in light of belief.Carlos Núñez - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2471-2492.details
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Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.details
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Full Belief and Loose Speech.Sarah Moss - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (3):255-291.details
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Credence: A Belief-First Approach.Andrew Moon & Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):652–669.details
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A new puzzle about belief and credence.Andrew Moon - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):272-291.details
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Self-knowledge and the Paradox of Belief Revision.Giovanni Merlo - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (1):65-83.details
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Toward a Lockean Unification of Formal and Traditional Epistemology.Matthew Brandon Lee & Paul Silva - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1):111-129.details
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Will I get a job? Contextualism, belief, and faith.Samuel Lebens - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5769-5790.details
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Epistemic Gradualism Versus Epistemic Absolutism.Changsheng Lai - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (1):186-207.details
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The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13.details
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Teaching & Learning Guide for: The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):e12670.details
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On the Independence of Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):9-31.details
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How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
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